COA 376263 TANYA JABER-VARBEDIAN V MICHAEL J MCCOY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
TANYA JABER-VARBEDIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2026
8:43 AM
v No. 376273
Wayne Circuit Court
MICHAEL J. MCCOY, LC No. 94-453896-DS
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Michael J. McCoy, appearing in propria persona, appeals by leave granted the
order that denied his motion for reconsideration of the conclusion that he waived his statute of
limitations defense applicable to the child support arrearage owed to the mother of his four
children, plaintiff Tanya Jaber-Varbedian. Jaber-Varbedian v McCoy, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered October 22, 2025 (Docket No. 376263). We reverse and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The record reflects that in October 1994, plaintiff filed an action against defendant seeking
child support. The court action referral alleged that paternity established defendant as the father
of MJJ (d/o/b 3/1990), IAJ (d/o/b 5/1991), and twins JJJ-I and JJJ-II (d/o/b 7/11/1992). It was
asserted that defendant, the absent father, was employed by Foodland Distributors in Livonia,
Michigan. In 1995, 1996, and 1997, efforts were made to collect child support. A bench warrant
was issued in 1995, and a hearing was held in 1996. According to notes of the disposition,
defendant claimed that he failed to pay because he did not receive any mail at his grandmother’s
home and he was told that he would get a payment coupon book but never did.
In November 2007, defendant filed a motion to have the surcharge amount subtracted from
the arrearage and a corresponding adjustment made to the arrearage amount. In December 2007,
defendant reportedly owed $75,025.40 in child support. The following month, the child support
weekly amount of $435 per month accumulated to an arrearage of $92,057.68. Defendant then
filed a request for relief from the surcharge. On a standard form entitled “Objections to Referee
Recommendation,” defendant wrote that he sought relief from the “substantial burden of the

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surcharge” in addition to a request for an accurate record of the arrearage, but neither request was
granted. Defendant alleged that the referee stated that she did not have the discretion to cancel the
past surcharge amounts. He asked the court for relief from the surcharges and an accurate
arrearage amount to move forward with eliminating the balance. The referee made a
recommendation that the surcharges terminate effective February 1, 2008.
In 2008, the Friend of the Court (FOC) sent a notice to the parties that defendant had
requested a decrease in his current child support obligation on “03/21/1995.” Additionally,
plaintiff failed to respond to the court’s request for her earnings for a 12-month period. It was
noted that defendant was ordered to pay $435 per month for the four minor children since
March 21, 1995.1 It was recommended that defendant pay plaintiff $320 per month for the four
minor children effective December 1, 2007. On February 22, 2008, defendant filed an objection
to the FOC recommendation. He alleged that he had been unemployed since “early 2006” and had
been aggressively seeking employment both in and out of state. Because of the economic
downturn, defendant requested relief from the “overburdensome” support payment.
The FOC determined that defendant had worked in late 2007. It calculated his monthly
child support obligation for the four minor children at $320 per month. Defendant submitted a
statement to the FOC acknowledging that he “must begin to pay support” as ordered by the court.
But he continued to assert that he was unemployed and sought to enter community college to
expand his career options. He sought to reduce his child support to $75 per week.
Then, on January 8, 2024, defendant2 filed a motion seeking an order to terminate the
income withholding order. In the section of the motion form seeking court ordered relief,
defendant asked:
That the FOC’s Income withholding action be immediately terminated and that all
improperly seized monies be immediately returned. I am also requesting that
sanctions are placed upon FOC to ensure that no further erroneous and egregiously
unfair prosecutive actions can be initiated in the future.
With the form motion, defendant submitted a brief seeking to terminate the income withholding
order. Defendant alleged that the four children reached the age of majority in 2008, 2009, and
2010. The FOC and Michigan Department of Health and Human Services acknowledged that the
age of majority was 18. Moreover, court-ordered child support typically ended once the child
reached the age of majority, resulting in case closure. Despite all of the children reaching the age
of 18 by 2010, the child support case did not close until 2022. And, by statute, the period of
limitations to collect child support was 10 years from the date the last support payment was due
regardless of when the last payment was made. The statute was consistent with Michigan’s child
support manual, and the statute of limitations precluded enforcement for arrearages. If the court
1 The March 21, 1995 order required defendant to $4 per week for each child until he was
employed. Once employed, he was to pay $100 per week for all four children.
2 In this motion, defendant identified himself as plaintiff. For purposes of consistency, we will
continue to address him as defendant.

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allowed the FOC to continue income withholding, defendant asserted that his due process rights
would be violated. Therefore, he requested the trial court to grant his motion to terminate the
income withholding order, to order the return of any and all monies improperly withheld, and to
order sanctions to prevent any further erroneous and egregiously unfair prosecutorial action.
On March 18, 2024, a referee heard defendant’s motion. Only defendant appeared. The
referee had reviewed defendant’s motion and noted that she could not hear statute of limitations
issues. The referee scheduled a court hearing for July 29, 2024. In the interim, the referee advised
defendant that she would suspend the income withholding order and “put a hold on the account.”
On March 19, 2024, the referee filed an interim order and recommendation. This
recommendation stated:
Defendant/Father filed a motion for cancellation of the support arrears on this case
based upon the Statute of Limitations. Essentially, that law says that once a debt
becomes too old, it is unenforceable. This is an affirmative defense. In the case of
child support the statute of limitations generally runs from the date the youngest
child turned age 18. In this case, the youngest children (twins) turned age 18 in
2010.
Court records show that no payments of child support were made through the Court
between September 2008 and January 2024. The Court began receiving payments
from an income withholding order to the [defendant’s employer] in January 2024.
Defendant filed his motion for statute of limitations defense 1/8/24. The praecipe
was filed 2/22/24 and the Scheduling Office sent out Notice of Hearing on the
matter 2/24/24.
Per Docket Directive 2013-26, Statute of Limitations issues must be heard by the
Judge. The Referee made no recommendation on the substance of the motion. The
only action taken by the Referee was to preserve monies pending the hearing before
the Judge.
The referee adjourned defendant’s motion for cancellation of the support arrears to July 29, 2024,
to be heard by the trial court. The referee recommendation provided that the order was only an
interim order.
On July 29, 2024, a court hearing was held on defendant’s motion. Plaintiff and defendant
appeared in pro per, and an attorney appeared on behalf of the Wayne County FOC. When asked
his position, defendant stated, “[T]he statute of limitations has passed on that debt and the state
law says that that debt is unenforceable.”
The FOC argued that the youngest children turned 18 years old in 2010, and the statute of
limitations would have expired in July 2020. FOC records further revealed that there were no
payments received between September 2008 and January 2, 2024. But on January 2, 2024, the
FOC received a payment through an income withholding order. Because of the receipt of that
payment, the statute of limitations was “revived or extended[.]” The FOC argued that defendant
did not file his motion until January 8, 2024, which was after the FOC had already received
payment under the income withholding order. Furthermore, the referee did not make a

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recommendation addressing the “substance of the issue.” Thus, the FOC argued that the January 2,
2024 payment extended the statute of limitations such that defendant’s motion should be denied.
The trial court inquired of the FOC attorney whether 10 years of inactivity was sufficient
or whether a motion had to be filed because “[i]t’s not anything that’s automatic.” The FOC
attorney stated that because the statute of limitations was an affirmative defense, defendant
“would’ve had to file a motion.”
The court then advised that defendant had to file a motion and “that would be your defense”
to a payment that was made. Defendant interjected, stating that his understanding was a payment
made before the statute of limitations expired “reinvigorates or restarts the tally of the clock” but
not before that. The trial court advised defendant that because a payment occurred on January 2,
2024, and his motion was not filed until January 8, 2024, he could not succeed. It further advised
that “there has to be literally no activity before you file your motion.” Defendant asserted that the
court misunderstood the law. The trial court ruled that defendant’s motion was denied, and his
remedy was to appeal to a higher court, stating:
I’m going to deny your motion for the reasons that I’ve stated on the record is that
because the payment was received on January 2nd, 2024, the statute of limitations
restarts and that you, [defendant], have to do something.
Now, had you filed your motion prior to that January 2nd, 2024 date, we’d
be dealing with another issue, then it would qualify. But because your motion
wasn’t filed until after that payment, then it doesn’t qualify, okay?
So that’s the ruling of the Court today. You will receive an order to that
effect.
On July 29, 2024, the court entered an order denying defendant’s motion.3
On August 15, 2024, defendant moved for reconsideration of his motion to terminate
income withholding. He argued that the court erroneously interpreted the clear and unambiguous
language of the applicable statutes.
The clerk and scheduling office assigned the motion to the referee’s docket for hearing.
However, because it was a motion for rehearing of the issue decided before the court on July 29,
2024, the referee referred the matter back to the judge.
On February 28, 2025, a hearing was held on “the motion for reconsideration of motion to
terminate income withholding.” Plaintiff and defendant appeared in pro per, and the FOC was
represented by the same counsel. Defendant argued that the court improperly imposed “an
obligation or duty” to file a motion raising the statute of limitations. He argued that he had no
such obligation, and the statute of limitations expired. Therefore, he owed no obligation to the
3 The court’s denial order reflected defendant’s erroneous designation of himself as the plaintiff
when he filed his motion.

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FOC or plaintiff. The FOC attorney answered that “the statute of limitations, it’s an affirmative
defense so that he would have a duty to file a motion to invoke his - - the statute of limitations
defense.” The FOC received payments between January and April of 2024, even though it stopped
charging defendant in August 2010. And, again, caselaw held that the payment of an arrearage
waived any statute of limitations defense.
After swearing the parties in, plaintiff advised that her youngest twins were born in 1992.
The FOC concluded that the twins turned 18 years old on July 11, 2010. The trial court advised
that the governing statutes were not automatically invoked. Defendant noted that the referee was
in disagreement with that position and offered to read the statute to the court. Defendant also
acknowledged that the FOC attorney referred to caselaw, but he claimed that it was distinguishable
because there was a distinction between collection of arrears before the statute of limitations period
expired. The trial court continued to assert that defendant was not entitled to an automatic
elimination of the arrearage but had to bring an action before the court. (“I’m telling you, you
have to file an action and assert statute of limitations as a defense. *** And you did not bring an
action.”). After defendant questioned the trial court’s ruling and whether collusion was involved,
the trial court advised defendant to appeal to a higher court, and the hearing ended.
On February 28, 2025, an order denying defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the
motion to terminate income withholding was entered. On March 4, 2025, the trial court entered a
second order, concluding that defendant’s payment on his arrearages waived his statute of
limitations defense, the FOC was to reinstate the income withholding order, and any money on
hold in the account was to be released.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Where no factual dispute exists . . . whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations
is a question of law that we review de novo.” Wayne Co Social Servs Dir v Yates, 261 Mich App
152, 154; 681 NW2d 5 (2004). “Issues involving statutory interpretation present questions of law
that are reviewed de novo.” Le Gassick v Univ of Mich Regents, 330 Mich App 487, 495; 948
NW2d 452 (2019).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that he was required to file an
original action and, as a plaintiff, raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.
Additionally, he contends that the trial court erred by determining the 10-year statute of limitations
did not apply. We agree.
“A statutory limitations period represents a legislative determination of that reasonable
period of time that a claimant will be given in which to file an action.” Lothian v Detroit, 414
Mich 160, 166; 324 NW2d 9 (1982). Although limitations periods were initially disfavored
because of the harsh result, the modern view deems them “wise and beneficial.” Id. A number of
public policy considerations support enforcement of limitations periods:
They encourage the prompt recovery of damages; they penalize plaintiffs who have
not been industrious in pursuing their claims; they afford security against stale
demands when the circumstances would be unfavorable to a just examination and

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decision; they relieve defendants of the prolonged fear of litigation; they prevent
fraudulent claims from being asserted; and they remedy *** the general
inconvenience resulting from delay in the assertion of a legal right which it is
practicable to assert. [Id. at 166-167 (quotation marks and citations omitted)].
A maxim in law concludes “that nothing can interrupt the running of the statute of limitation,” id.
at 167 (quotation marks and citation omitted), but exceptions have been developed by the
Legislature and the courts. The running of the statute of limitations may be suspended because of
disabilities such as infancy, insanity, or imprisonment. Id.; see also MCL 600.6851. Additionally,
the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations may be waived premised on a failure to plead
it, by the parties’ agreement not to raise it, or by conduct which prevents a defendant from
interjecting it. Lothian, 414 Mich at 167.
MCL 600.5809 addresses actions to enforce noncontractual money obligations and the time
limitation to pursue such litigation, with subsection (4) applicable to child support:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to enforce a
noncontractual money obligation unless, after the claim first accrued to the person
or to someone through whom he or she claims, the person commences the action
within the applicable period of time prescribed by this section.
(2) The period of limitations is 2 years for an action for the recovery of a
penalty or forfeiture based on a penal statute brought in the name of the people of
this state.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4), the period of limitations is 10 years
for an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of
this state, or in a court of record of the United States or of another state of the United
States, from the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree . . . .
(4) For an action to enforce a support order that is enforceable under the
support and parenting time enforcement act, Act No. 295 of the Public Acts of 1982,
being sections 522.601 to 522.650 of the Michigan Compiled Acts, the period of
limitations is 10 years from the date that the last support payment is due under the
support order regardless of whether or not the last payment is made.
“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.”
Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Schs, 485 Mich 69, 76; 780 NW2d 753 (2020). Legislative
intent must be discerned from the plain statutory language. Perkovic v Zurich American Ins Co,
500 Mich 44, 53; 893 NW2d 322 (2017). “When the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory
language is clear, judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted.” Id. (quotations marks
and citation omitted). The court’s interpretation of the statutory language “must give effect to
every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute
surplusage or nugatory.” South Dearborn Environmental Improvement Ass’n, Inc v Dep’t of
Environmental Quality, 502 Mich 349, 361; 917 NW2d 603 (2018). “The courts may not read
into the statute a requirement that the Legislature has seen fit to omit.” Menard Inc v Dep’t of
Treasury, 302 Mich App 467, 471-472; 838 NW2d 736 (2013). “When the Legislature fails to

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address a concern in the statute with a specific provision, the courts cannot insert a provision
simply because it would have been wise of the Legislature to do so to effect the statute’s purpose.”
Id. at 472 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
As an initial matter, we note that the trial court denied defendant’s motion by concluding
that, to avail himself of the 10-year period of limitations, defendant was required to file a complaint
and then raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The 10-year period addressing
the statute of limitations in MCL 600.5809(4) for support actions contains no such requirement.
The trial court read into the statute prerequisites that simply do not exist. Menard Inc, 302 Mich
App at 472. Moreover, the trial court failed to identify the cause of action that defendant would
file to obtain relief, and how as a plaintiff, he would raise an affirmative defense. Because the trial
court erroneously read conditions into the plain language of MCL 600.5809(4) not dictated by the
Legislature and required defendant to take action not reflected in the legislative intent, we reverse
the trial court’s decision. The basis of the trial court’s ruling did not have a statutory legal
foundation.
We now turn to caselaw addressing the 10-year statute of limitations applicable to child
support arrearages. In Alpena Friend of the Court ex rel Paul v Durecki, 195 Mich App 635, 636;
491 NW2d 864 (1992), the respondent appealed an opinion and order that essentially denied his
motion to dismiss enforcement proceedings involving the payment of his child support arrearage.
Specifically, the respondent and his wife divorced in 1962. At that time, the couple had two minor
children and the respondent was ordered to pay $10 a week for each child. Despite repeated
collection attempts, the respondent was chronically in arrears on his child support obligation.
Apparently, the petitioner and the respondent engaged in negotiations in an attempt to obtain
payment of the arrearage. Toward that goal, in 1988, the respondent made ten payments. In
June 1989, a bench warrant was issued for the respondent when his child support arrearage was
$8,400. Id.
At the bench warrant hearing, the respondent asserted that his last child support payment
was due on August 21, 1977, the date his youngest child reached the age of majority.
Consequently, the respondent claimed that the proceedings against him should be dismissed
because enforcement was sought more than ten years after the statute of limitations expired as set
forth in MCL 600.5809(3).4 Durecki, 195 Mich App. at 636-637. The petitioner alleged that the
ten-year period of limitations did not apply to the case. Alternatively, the petitioner argued that
even if the ten-year period of limitations did apply, the respondent’s payment that occurred after
the expiration of the limitation period waived the statute of limitations defense. Id. at 637.
The trial court agreed that the ten-year period of limitations applied but adopted the
petitioner’s view that payments made after the limitations period acknowledged the child support
4 It should be noted that a large part of defendant’s argument is that prior cases addressing the 10-
year limitations dealt with MCL 600.5809(3), when at issue in this case is MCL 600.5809(4).
Defendant does not recognize that in 1992 when the Durecki and other cases were decided,
MCL 600.6809 did not have a subsection (4). Rather, MCL 600.5809(3) applied a 10-year period
to “judgments” or “decrees” by courts of record. MCL 600.5809 was amended by 1996 PA 27,
immediately effective June 17, 1996 with § 2 effective January 1, 1997.

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obligation and waived the defense of the statute of limitations. The respondent alleged that partial
payment did not revive the obligation and he did not voluntarily pay because he was under the
duress of potentially being held in contempt of court. But this Court rejected the respondent’s
position:
In Collateral Liquidation, Inc v Palm, 296 Mich 702; 296 NW 846 (1941),
our Supreme Court again explained that a payment is equivalent to a new promise
to pay on an obligation and extends the application of the statute of limitation. More
recently, this Court held in Federal Deposit Ins Corp v Garbutt, 142 Mich App
462; 370 NWW2d 387 (1985), that a partial payment made on a note after it matures
serves to revive the statute of limitation, and a cause of action begins to accrue on
that date. See also Bonga v Bloomer, 14 Mich App 315; 165 NW2d 487 (1968).
Consistent with these authorities, we find no error in the trial court’s ruling in this
case. [The r]espondent had a legal obligation to make child support payments, and
his acknowledgment of the continuing vitality of that debt waived the defense of
the statute of limitation and allowed enforcement of the obligation.
[The r]espondent’s claim, that the rule of Miner [v Lorman, 56 Mich 212,
216; 22 NW 265 (1885),] and its progeny does not apply in this case because his
payments were involuntary, is without merit. The basis of [the] respondent’s claim
of involuntariness – that the 1988 payments were made under duress because they
were made to avoid being held in contempt of court – is without both record and
legal support. [Durecki, 195 Mich App at 638-639.]
Although this case was relied upon by the FOC in the trial court, it is factually distinguishable
from defendant’s factual scenario. In Durecki, the respondent’s child support obligation ended on
August 21, 1977, when his youngest child reached the age of majority. Applying the ten-year
period of limitations, the respondent was no longer obligated to pay the arrearage as of August 21,
1987. Despite the statute of limitations, the respondent negotiated with the petitioner and made
10 payments in 1988. This Court concluded that the respondent’s legal obligation to make child
support payments was given continued vitality by the respondent’s acknowledgment of the debt
and his recent payments that allowed for enforcement of the obligation as well as the waiver of the
statute of limitations. Id.
In this case, however, defendant’s obligation to pay child support ended July 11, 2010. The
ten-year period of limitations expired on July 11, 2020. Defendant made no payments during that
ten-year period. In December 2023, the FOC sent an income withholding order to defendant’s
employer and was able to secure funds through that order. The FOC failed to present evidence
that defendant voluntarily made payments between 2010 and 2024 or that he negotiated with
plaintiff or the FOC or notified them of his employment and consented to the income withholding
order. Stated otherwise, the FOC presented no evidence that defendant’s actions between July 11,
2020 and January 2024 revived or extended the period.
Additionally, in Wayne Co Social Servs Director v Yates, 261 Mich App 152, 153; 681
NW2d 5 (2004), the defendant appealed the denial of his motion to extinguish his child support
arrearage premised on the expiration of the statute of limitations. The defendant and his spouse
divorced in 1977. Although their divorce judgment did not address child support, the petitioner

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filed a complaint for support on behalf of the children because of their receipt of state aid. In 1978,
the defendant was ordered to pay $60 per week in child support. In 1979 and 1988, modest
payments were received. The defendant relocated to Florida where he was self-employed. Wayne
County filed a reciprocal support action in Florida. As a result, the defendant was required to pay
$72.10 a week for current support and arrearages. In 1990, 1996, 1997, and 1998, amounts were
recouped. Nonetheless by April 2002, the arrearage was nearly $41,000. Id. at 153-154.
The youngest child turned 18 in 1990. In 2002, the defendant moved to extinguish the
child support arrearage, alleging that the period of limitations had expired. This Court noted that
the defendant made payments through income withholding between 1990 and 1998, after the
children turned 18 years of age but before the period of limitations expired. Nonetheless, it held
that partial payments within the period of limitations operated to extend the period and rejected
the contention that the nature of the payments, through income withholding, were involuntary. Id.
at 154-157.
The Yates case does not support affirming the trial court’s decision. In the present case,
after defendant’s twins turned 18 on July 11, 2010, there is no indication that defendant made any
payments. The period of limitations expired on July 11, 2020. Thus after the children turned 18
and before the period of limitations expired, defendant made no payments that would have served
to revive his child support obligation.
In fact, it is undisputed that defendant did not pay child support for more than 10 years (at
least from August 2010 through January 1, 2024), when suddenly an income withholding order
addressed to defendant’s employer caused a child support payment to be made on January 2, 2024.5
Furthermore, neither plaintiff nor the FOC presented any evidence that defendant could have
contested the amount withdrawn before a court hearing.6
5 We note that defendant provided a July 12, 2020 letter from the FOC addressed to him with his
application for leave to appeal. This letter explained that the child support case under Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act would be closed within 60 days after it was “identified for possible
closure because no payments [had been made] in 10 years and the child(ren) are adults.” In
addition, the letter stated that the FOC case “may also close at a later date” and that FOC could
destroy its file. Although this letter arguably supports defendant’s position, it is not contained in
the lower court record provided to this Court, and therefore, we cannot consider it. See Magley v
M & W Inc, 325 Mich App 307, 322 n 8; 926 NW2d 1 (2018) (A litigant may not expand the record
on appeal.); MCR 7.210(A)(1).
6 Defendant provided a copy of the income withholding order with his application for leave to
appeal. That order is dated December 18, 2023, a Monday. Defendant filed his motion to
terminate the income withholding order 21 days later, on January 8, 2024. Notably, the Wayne
Circuit Court typically closes for two weeks during the holidays. See
<https://www.3rdcc.org/Documents/Administration/General/Notice_2023-12-21-2023-
2024HolidayOperations.pdf> (accessed September 14, 2026). And without information about
when defendant was notified of the income withholding order, it would be questionable how he
could have objected and stopped the withdrawal order directed at his employer any earlier than he

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For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant’s requested relief
and we remand for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion to terminate the income
withholding order and direct repayment of monies obtained under it. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
did. But, again, the income withholding order is not contained in the lower court file provided to
this Court, and therefore, we cannot consider it. Magley, 325 Mich App at 322 n 8;
MCR 7.210(A)(1).

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