COA 373496 PEOPLE OF MI V GERRY KENNETH ADAMS JR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 5/20/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 20, 2026
10:45 AM
v No. 373496
Gogebic Circuit Court
GERRY KENNETH ADAMS, JR., LC No. 2024-000003-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and LETICA and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for: (1) third-degree fleeing and
eluding a police officer, MCL 257.602a(3)(b); and (2) assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police
officer, MCL 750.81d(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve 43 days in jail. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises out of an officer’s attempt to issue traffic citations to a line of vehicles
stopped on a street that were attempting to enter a marijuana dispensary parking lot. The street at
issue, Wemple Street, was a side road connected to a busier street; as denoted by signs, no parking
was allowed on either side of Wemple Street. Nevertheless, it became routine for dispensary
customers to wait in line, in their vehicles, on the right side of Wemple Street.1 As a result, the
Ironwood Public Safety Department received “numerous complaints” about the resulting traffic.
The Department’s initial policy was to tell the drivers to move along, but on the day of this incident,
the Department instructed an officer (“the officer”) to start issuing citations for “no parking or
impeding traffic.”
1 To be clear, although the vehicles were lined upon on the street next to the dispensary parking
lot, we note that the video of the incident shows that they were not stopped in traffic, i.e., this was
not a situation in which traffic attempting to enter the parking lot had caused a backup on the
roadway. Rather, each car appeared to simply be stopped on the road, with a significant space in
between each respective vehicle, and the entrance to the parking lot was not blocked.

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When the officer arrived at Wemple Street, he parked behind five stationary vehicles that
were waiting in line on the right side of the road.2 The officer walked by each vehicle, telling each
driver he passed to wait and that they were not free to leave. Defendant’s vehicle was the third in
the line. When passing defendant’s vehicle, the officer stated, “Wait here. You’re not free to
leave.” Defendant asked, “Is this good?” The officer replied, “No. Wait here, you’re not free to
leave.” The officer continued walking forward and began speaking with the first driver in the line.
While the officer spoke with the first driver, defendant pulled his vehicle into the left lane
and started driving forward. The officer said, “No!” and walked in front of defendant’s vehicle.
Defendant stopped, and the officer walked to defendant’s driver’s side window to speak with him.
The two engaged in a heated argument, with the officer telling defendant that he was being cited
for parking in a no-parking area, and defendant arguing that he had not violated any law. Twice
defendant told the officer that he would pull over nearby, and the officer told him to stay where he
was. Eventually, without permission to do so, defendant drove to the end of Wemple Street and
turned right out of the officer’s sight. Unbeknownst to the officer, defendant pulled into the
dispensary parking lot and joined the standing line of customers.
The officer called in on his radio, giving the station defendant’s Minnesota license plate
information and stating that defendant was “fleeing.” Nine minutes later, after driving around the
area looking for defendant, the officer spotted defendant standing in the line. The officer parked,
approached defendant, and said, “Come here!” Defendant walked toward the officer, saying,
“Listen, I’ll talk to you bro, but I did not do anything wrong, man. I was just waiting in line to
pull in the parking . . . .”3 The officer said, “Okay. Yeah, you did. You’re under arrest. Come
over here,” as he grabbed defendant’s arm. A “physical altercation” ensued. The officer pushed
defendant down to the parking lot pavement. Defendant struggled, screamed, and cursed before
the officer and two other officers finally subdued him and placed him in handcuffs. Defendant
sustained a scratch on his temple; he was taken to the hospital as a precaution, with no other injuries
found. The officer’s body-camera footage, which showed the entire incident, was played for the
jury.
The jury found defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced defendant, as stated earlier.
Defendant now appeals.
II. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
convictions because: (1) the officer’s initial stop was unlawful as defendant was not committing
2 The left side of Wemple Street was empty.
3 While walking toward the officer, defendant held out his hand. Defendant asserts that he held
out his hand in an attempt to shake the officer’s hand, but the body camera footage is unclear
whether defendant was attempting to shake the officer’s hand or if he was just motioning with his
hands as he talked.

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any traffic violations, (2) defendant did not show an intent to flee, and (3) defendant’s subsequent
resistance was a lawful response to unlawful force. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Criminal defendants do not need to take any special steps to preserve a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 116-117; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
“The evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant when a rational factfinder could
determine that the prosecutor proved every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 117. “An appellate court reviews de novo a lower court’s determination that there
was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, meaning that the appellate court provides no
deference to the lower court’s determination.” People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 384; 15 NW3d 249
(2024). “Yet reversing a guilty verdict on the basis that there was insufficient evidence is a high
bar to overcome.” Id. at 384-385.
[W]hen the lawfulness of police action is an element of a criminal offense, a court
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction
must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution and then
determine whether, as a matter of law, an officer’s actions were “lawful” in light of
those facts. Under this test, a conviction will be overturned only when an officer’s
conduct cannot be reasonably perceived as lawful when viewed under a lens
sufficiently deferential to that conduct. [Id. at 386.]
“It is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be
fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.”
People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 239; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The scope of review is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Circumstantial
evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of
the elements of a crime.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he prosecutor need not
negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400;
614 NW2d 78 (2000).
“Our primary goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.”
People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 647; 983 NW2d 827 (2022). “We begin with the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statute, and if the text is clear and unambiguous, then it will be enforced
as written.” Id.
B. TRAFFIC VIOLATION
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions
because he did not commit any traffic violations, making the officer’s initial stop unlawful. We
disagree.
“[A] traffic stop is more similar to a temporary seizure under [Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88
S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968)] than a formal arrest.” Lucynski, 509 Mich at 646 (citation
omitted). “A brief, on-the-scene detention of an individual is not a violation of the Fourth

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Amendment as long as the officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion for the detention.” People
v Custer, 465 Mich 319, 327; 630 NW2d 870 (2001). “Whether an officer has reasonable and
articulable suspicion to briefly detain an individual is a fact-specific inquiry that is determined on
a case-by-case basis.” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26, 32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021). “Although
reasonable and articulable suspicion is a lesser showing than probable cause, it still entails
something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch, because an officer must
have had a particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Both the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.923 et seq., and the Ironwood Code of
Ordinances,4 prohibit parking in an area with a no-parking sign. See MCL 257.674(1)(n);
Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-530(a)(14).
Pursuant to the Michigan Vehicle Code, “[a] vehicle must not be parked, except if
necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the law or the directions of a
police officer or traffic-control device, in any of the following places,” including “[a]t a place
where an official sign prohibits stopping or parking.” MCL 257.674(1)(n). “A person who violates
this section is responsible for a civil infraction.” MCL 257.674(4). The Michigan Vehicle Code
defines “[p]arking” as “standing a vehicle, whether occupied or not, upon a highway, when not
loading or unloading except when making necessary repairs.” MCL 257.38.
Similarly, pursuant to the Ironwood Code of Ordinances, “[a] vehicle shall not be parked,
except if necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the law or the
directions of a public safety officer or traffic-control device, in any of the following places,”
including “[a]t a place where an official sign prohibits stopping or parking[.]” Ironwood
Ordinances, § 30-530(a)(14). “A person who violates this section is responsible for a civil
infraction.” Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-530(b). The Ironwood Code of Ordinances defines
“[p]arking” as “standing a vehicle, whether occupied or not, upon a highway when not loading or
unloading, except when making necessary repairs.” Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-61 (emphasis
omitted). And it defines “[s]tand or standing” as “the halting of a vehicle other than for the purpose
of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.” Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-
81 (emphasis omitted).
In this case, defendant argues that his vehicle not “parked,” but merely “standing” or
“stopping.” But defendant fails to acknowledge that the Michigan Vehicle Code and the Ironwood
Code of Ordinances both define “parking” as “standing a vehicle, whether occupied or not, upon
a highway, when not loading or unloading except when making necessary repairs.” MCL 257.38;
see Ironwood Ordinances, § 30-61. Body-camera footage clearly showed that defendant’s vehicle
was stopped and standing in a street with a no-parking sign; therefore, there was sufficient evidence
for a factfinder to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the officer had a legal basis to issue
a traffic citation under both MCL 257.674(1)(n) and Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-530(a)(14). See
Cain, 238 Mich App at 117. Accordingly, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
4 Ironwood Michigan, Code of Ordinances <https://library.municode.com/mi/
ironwood/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH30TRMOVE> (accessed April 20,
2026).

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the prosecution, the officer’s actions were lawful. See Prude, 513 Mich at 386; Custer, 465 Mich
at 327.5
C. INTENT TO FLEE
Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of
third-degree fleeing and eluding a police officer because he did not show an intent to flee from the
police. We disagree.
MCL 257.602a(1) states that when a police officer directs a driver to bring their vehicle to
a stop, that driver “shall not willfully fail to obey that direction by increasing the speed of the
motor vehicle, . . . or otherwise attempting to flee or elude the officer.”
In this case, ample evidence was presented to support the fleeing element. From the start,
the officer twice told defendant, “Wait here. You’re not free to leave.” When the officer then
went to speak to the driver of the first vehicle in line, defendant attempted to drive away, stopping
only because the officer stood in front of his vehicle and told him to stop. Arguably, that action
alone justified the fleeing element: defendant was already stopped, had been told to stay stopped,
but instead began moving forward as if attempting to leave the area. But then for almost two more
minutes, the officer continued to make it very clear that he was telling defendant to stop, while
defendant argued with him. Defendant twice stated that he would drive his car and pull over into
a nearby area, and the officer told him not to do that. Eventually, defendant started driving away.
The officer again told him to stop, but defendant kept driving, turning out of sight. Defendant then
parked outside the officer’s view and entered the dispensary’s standing line. There was no
indication that defendant tried to find the officer again. It took over nine minutes for the officer to
locate defendant’s vehicle after defendant drove away, during which time the officer was under
the impression that defendant had fled the area.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a factfinder to determine, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that defendant intended to flee from the police. See Cain, 238 Mich App at 117.
D. RESISTANCE
Defendant further argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of
assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer because his resistance was merely a lawful
response to the police officers’ use of excessive force. We disagree.
Defendant attempts to analogize this case to People v Moreno, 491 Mich 38, 46-47; 814
NW2d 624 (2012), in which the police were acting unlawfully from the start, thereby triggering
the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest. This reliance on Moreno is inapt because, as
5 Because we conclude that defendant’s vehicle was parked in a no-parking zone—providing the
officer with a legal basis to issue a traffic citation—we do not reach the issue whether defendant’s
vehicle also impeded traffic.

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discussed, defendant has failed to establish that the police had no lawful basis for detaining him in
the first instance.
Defendant also contends that the amount of force that the police used against him was
excessive. Determining whether the amount of force was reasonable “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v Connor, 490 US
386, 396; 109 S Ct 1865; 104 L Ed 2d 443 (1989). “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of
force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Id. at 396-397. The inquiry is objective, viewing the officer’s actions “in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Id. at 397.
Regarding the severity of the crime, defendant correctly points out that his initial stop was
for a minor parking infraction. MCL 257.674(1)(n); Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-530(a)(14). But
defendant then escalated the situation by attempting to drive away despite being told not to. By
doing so, defendant satisfied the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding, which is “a felony
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or
both . . . .” MCL 257.602a(3). This justified the officer’s initial use of force, which was to grab
defendant by the arm when he was standing in line at the dispensary. But defendant again escalated
the situation by struggling with the officer. By doing so, defendant satisfied the elements of
assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, “a felony punishable by imprisonment for not
more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.” MCL 750.81d(1). This justified
the officers’ actions of bringing defendant down to the pavement and handcuffing him.
Regarding the threat that defendant posed to the safety of others, defendant’s actions
demonstrated some threat potential. He attempted to leave the traffic stop, engaged in an intense
argument with the officer, and then actually drove away. This behavior justified reasonable
concerns about why defendant was so quick to get away from the police, and it resulted in an angry
driver fleeing the police. Then, when the officer grabbed defendant, and defendant resisted, an
obvious concern was raised as to whether defendant could hurt himself or the officers if not
promptly subdued and handcuffed.
Lastly, as previously stated, defendant clearly attempted to evade or resist arrest.
Defendant had already driven away from the officer despite being told several times not to, turned
out of the officer’s sight, and gave no indication that he planned to meet up with the police again.
The officer had to search for defendant before finding him waiting in the dispensary line. Because
defendant had already fled once, the officer was justified in grabbing defendant’s arm to prevent
a second escape. Defendant then engaged in physical resistance, which justified the officers’
actions of bringing defendant down to the pavement and handcuffing him.
Notably, there was testimony that the use of multiple officers in subduing defendant
actually minimized injury to defendant, as opposed to the more violent methods that the officer

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might have resorted to if he were left to bring defendant down by himself. Also, defendant was
immediately taken to the hospital to ensure his physical well-being; he sustained only one minor
injury, possibly from defendant’s own physical exertions. Moreover, the jurors had the benefit of
watching the entire encounter through the body-camera footage, which allowed them to observe
the nuances of the situation presented to the officer and the actions that he took.
Accordingly, we conclude that the facts and circumstances of this case do not indicate that
the amount of force used was unreasonable. See Connor, 490 US at 396-397. Therefore, sufficient
evidence existed for a factfinder to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant’s
resistance was not a lawful response to excessive force. See Cain, 238 Mich App at 117.
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not: (1) requesting a jury
instruction focusing on the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct, and (2) moving for a directed
verdict. We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because defendant did not raise this issue in a motion for a new trial or evidentiary hearing
filed in the trial court, or in a motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing filed in this Court, it is
not preserved for appellate review. See People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227; 966
NW2d 437 (2020); People v Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658; 620 NW2d 19
(2000). When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not preserved, “our review is limited
to errors apparent on the record.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
B. ANALYSIS
In Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test that a defendant must meet to prove that
his or her counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require a new trial. The test is as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. [Id.]
Stated more simply, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
at 694. To show that a counsel’s performance was deficient, a defendant “must identify the acts
or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id. at 690. “The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances,
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Id

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Because there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in each case, courts “must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689
(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reviewing courts are not only required to give counsel
the benefit of the doubt with this presumption, they are required to affirmatively entertain the range
of possible reasons that counsel may have had for proceeding as he or she did.” People v Gioglio
(On Remand), 296 Mich App 12, 22; 815 NW2d 589 (2012) (quotation marks and citation
omitted), vacated in part on other grounds 493 Mich 864 (2012).
1. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant first contends that the jury was not given enough information to understand and
determine whether the officer acted lawfully in initiating defendant’s detention.
Pursuant to the fleeing offense, the jury was instructed that the officer had to have been
“performing his lawful duties . . . .” Similarly, pursuant to the assaulting, resisting, or obstructing
offense, the jury was instructed that obstruction includes “a knowing failure to comply with a
lawful command,” and that conviction in this case required “that the defendant knew or had reason
to know that [the officer] was a police officer performing his duties at the time,” including that he
“gave the defendant a lawful command, was making a lawful arrest, or was otherwise performing
a lawful act.”
Defendant specifically argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting the
following jury instructions: (1) M Crim JI 15.5(2), which states in pertinent part that “[a]n arrest
is legal if it is made [describe circumstances for a warrantless arrest found in MCL 764.15,]” with
MCL 764.15(1)(a) explaining that a warrantless arrest is allowed when “[a] felony, misdemeanor,
or ordinance violation is committed in the peace officer’s presence”; and (2) M Crim JI 5(5), which
states that “[t]he prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [arrest was legal / the
(officer . . . ) was acting within (his / her) legal authority]. It is up to you to determine whether the
[officer’s . . .] actions were legal according to the law as I have just described it to you.” (Second,
fifth, and sixth alterations in original.)
We agree that the trial court should have provided more specific definitions of “lawful
duties” and “lawful act.” More complete definitions would have better explained that the officer
needed to have witnessed a statutory or ordinance violation in the first instance as well as the
nature of the specific violations at issue. See People v Carroll, 514 Mich 851, 851; 8 NW3d 576
(2024) (“[A] jury cannot meaningfully assess whether an officer acted lawfully without detailed
legal instructions regarding the applicable law governing the officer’s legal authority to act.”)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
We are not persuaded, however, that defense counsel’s decision to not request such
additional instructions constituted deficient performance. Defense counsel appears to have
decided that the lawfulness of the officers’ actions was the element most vulnerable to attack, but
then also reasoned that the best way to attack it was to encourage the jury to agree that defendant
was not “parking” as a matter of the commonsense meaning of that term. Given that, as we
explained earlier, the legal definition of “parking” would not have favored defendant, defense
counsel exercised reasonable trial strategy by not drawing attention to it. See Strickland, 466 US

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at 689. For the same reasons, defendant has failed to show any prejudice to his defense. See id.
at 687. Defendant violated MCL 257.674(1)(n) and Ironwood Ordinance, § 30-530(a)(14) by
parking in an area with a no-parking sign; further legal definitions would only have enforced that
fact and strengthened the prosecution’s case.
Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction
focusing on the lawfulness of the officer’s conduct. See id.
2. DIRECTED VERDICT
Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed
verdict. As previously discussed, there was sufficient evidence presented to sustain defendant’s
convictions; therefore, a motion for a directed verdict would have been properly denied. Defense
counsel “was not required to argue a frivolous or meritless motion.” People v Gist, 188 Mich App
610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991). Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
move for a directed verdict. See Strickland, 466 US at 687.
IV. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR—INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Defendant further argues that he was denied a fair trial because of improper comments
made by the prosecutor, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to such error.
We disagree.
A. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to the alleged instance of
prosecutorial impropriety, that issue is not preserved for appellate review. See People v Bennett,
290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). “Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error
affecting substantial rights.” Id. “Reversal is warranted only when plain error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 475-476 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Further, this Court cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have
alleviated any prejudicial effect.” Id at 476 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because defendant did not raise his alternative ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in
the trial court or in a motion to remand for an evidentiary hearing in this Court, it is also not
preserved for appellate review. See Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App at 227; Sabin, 242 Mich App
at 658. When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not preserved, “our review is limited
to errors apparent on the record.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 253.
B. PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
As an initial matter, we submit that the term “prosecutorial error” is more appropriate than
the term “prosecutorial misconduct” in this case. See People v Cooper, 309 Mich App 74, 87-88;
867 NW2d 452 (2015) (“Although we recognize that the phrase ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ has
become a term of art in criminal appeals, we agree that the term ‘misconduct’ is more appropriately
applied to those extreme—and thankfully rare—instances where a prosecutor’s conduct violates
the rules of professional conduct or constitutes illegal conduct.”) (citations omitted).

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“Generally, to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that
he was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 201; 891 NW2d
255 (2016). “A prosecutor can deny a defendant his or her right to a fair trial by making improper
remarks that so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 62; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “We must evaluate instances of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case
basis, reviewing the prosecutor’s comments in context and in light of the defendant’s arguments.”
Id. at 62-63. “Generally, prosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their arguments, and
are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as they relate to
their theory of the case.” People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 22; 776 NW2d 314 (2009). “A
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.” Solloway, 316 Mich App at 201.
In this case, the prosecutor made the following remarks in his opening statement:
[T]he complexion of this community changed significantly when these dispensaries
came to town. And if you don’t live in the City of Ironwood, but rather township,
Watersmeet, Erwin, wherever, . . . thank your lucky stars. I mean, Ironwood’s
gained the reputation of a name change of Ironweed ‘cause there’s five dispensaries
now. And what baffles the mind and me, as the prosecuting attorney, chief law
enforcement official in this county, is, it invites people of all shapes and sizes into
this community. And a majority of them are purchasing the product and bringing
it back home to where it is illegal. For example, Wisconsin. Minnesota was illegal
up until recently.
* * *
Again, I’m not here to disparage [defendant] and tell you he’s a bad person. I’m
not here to criticize him for what he chooses to do with marijuana. Except that I
will say, anyone that purchases product and then decides to go through Wisconsin
and Minnesota, back then, you’re breaking the law. But we’re not here for that
today.
Defendant argues that these opening comments were not only irrelevant, but also an
attempt to prejudice the jury against defendant because of his connection to the described problem
and his status as an out-of-state purchaser. We agree that some of the prosecutor’s remarks went
beyond what was directly relevant to this case. “A prosecutor may not appeal to the jury to
sympathize with the victim. Nor may a prosecutor urge the jury to convict as part of its civic duty
or on the basis of its prejudices.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 237 (citation omitted). But, “viewed
in context, the comments were relatively brief and did not likely deflect the jury’s attention from
the evidence presented in this case.” Id. As previously discussed, the majority of the trial focused
on the crimes at issue, and sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendant’s convictions.
Moreover, at the conclusion of trial, the trial court clearly explained the elements of the charged
crimes as well as the need for the jury to focus on the evidence presented, and that the attorney
arguments are not evidence. “Curative instructions are sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of
most inappropriate prosecutorial statements, and jurors are presumed to follow their instructions.”

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Id. at 235 (citations omitted). “Finally, because a timely objection and curative instruction could
have alleviated any prejudicial effect of the improper prosecutorial statement, we cannot conclude
that the error denied defendant a fair trial or that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at
237.
Defendant also takes issue with the following remarks in the prosecutor’s closing
statement: “[D]efendant knew of the [officer’s] order. In other words, the defendant was in a
position to hear what he was told. There’s no evidence that [defendant] was deaf, hard of hearing,
didn’t understand what the officer was saying, and the officer made it quite clear.”
Defendant argues that the prosecutor misled the jury about his hearing ability, considering
that he struggled to hear without the assistance of a device in the trial court proceedings. But
defendant presented no evidence or argument at trial, and presents none on appeal, that the incident
underlying this case resulted from any difficulty in hearing. The body-camera footage confirmed
that defendant heard what the officer said; he simply disagreed that he was being lawfully detained.
The fleeing-and-eluding charge required the prosecution to prove that defendant “willfully fail[ed]
to obey” the officer’s direction to bring his vehicle to a stop. MCL 257.602a(1). Accordingly, it
was reasonable and proper for the prosecutor to clarify that there was no evidence presented
establishing that defendant failed to obey the officer’s directives simply because he could not hear
them. See Seals, 285 Mich at 22.
C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Defendant alternatively argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
these challenged remarks.
“[T]here are times when it is better not to object and draw attention to an improper
comment.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 242 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Furthermore,
declining to raise objections, especially during closing arguments, can often be consistent with
sound trial strategy.” Id. “We will not substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of
trial strategy, nor will we use the benefit of hindsight when assessing counsel’s competence.” Id.
at 242-243. In this case, defendant has “simply failed to overcome the strong presumption that
trial counsel’s performance was strategic.” Id. at 243. Moreover, defendant failed to show there
is a reasonable probability that, “but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of defendant’s trial
would have been different.” Id. As previously stated, the jury had the benefit of watching the
entire incident via body-camera footage, and that footage contained sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s convictions. The prejudice prong of defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim has
therefore not been satisfied. See Strickland, 466 US at 687.
Affirmed.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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