COA 377427 IN RE C K D CUMMINS MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 24, 2026
9:40 AM
In re C. K. D. CUMMINS, Minor.
No. 377427
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2023-886583-NA
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her
minor son, CC, pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody
despite financial ability to do so), (i) (parental rights to child’s sibling terminated due to serious
and chronic neglect or abuse), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned to parent). We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Children’s Protective Services (CPS) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) became heavily involved in respondent’s life several years ago due to her issues with
domestic violence, substance use, untreated mental health, unemployment, inadequate housing,
and improper supervision and medical neglect of two of her other children (CC’s older siblings).1
Her parental rights to those children were involuntarily terminated in December 2018 as a result
of her failure to comply with court-ordered services provided to rectify those issues.2 In August
2023, a few weeks after CC’s birth, DHHS petitioned to remove CC from respondent’s care and
terminate respondent’s parental rights at initial disposition, alleging that CC had been born with
1 Respondent gave birth to another child, AC, in November 2024 while these proceedings were
ongoing. Respondent’s parental rights to AC are not at issue in this appeal.
2 The children were initially placed with, and eventually adopted by, their maternal aunt.

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cocaine in his system and that respondent suffered from the same issues that led to the termination
of her parental rights as to CC’s two older siblings.
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition, placed CC with his
maternal aunt and two siblings, and suspended respondent’s parenting time.3 Additionally, even
though the authorized petition sought termination at initial disposition, the court ordered DHHS to
make reasonable efforts and to prepare a case service plan (CSP) so that respondent had access to
services and could voluntarily participate in them to address her issues. DHHS obliged, providing
referrals throughout the case so that respondent could participate in a variety of services meant to
address her issues with untreated mental health, substance use, domestic violence, and parenting
skills, and offering to assist respondent in obtaining consistent employment and appropriate
housing.
The trial court conducted a combined adjudication and initial dispositional hearing in July
2024.4 Because DHHS petitioned for termination at initial disposition, the initial-dispositional
portion of the hearing acted simultaneously as a termination hearing. At the outset of the hearing,
respondent pleaded to jurisdiction and to statutory grounds for termination so that she could
proceed to a best-interests determination. As the factual basis for her plea, respondent pleaded to
all the allegations in an amended copy of the petition.5 Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the
court also took judicial notice of the previous termination proceeding, including all documents
filed therein. After reviewing the petition once more and confirming that respondent understood
the various rights she was giving up by entering a plea, the court accepted respondent’s plea and
entered an order exercising jurisdiction over CC, finding that the factual basis for the plea had
sufficiently established statutory grounds to exercise jurisdiction over CC and had established, by
clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights
pursuant to MCL 719.19b(3)(g), (i), and (j). The court again ordered DHHS to continue to make
reasonable efforts toward reunification so that respondent had access to useful services.
The trial court then moved to the best-interests portion of the hearing, which spanned across
five days between January and September 2025. At the conclusion of the best-interests hearing,
after considering all the evidence and testimony provided by the parties, the trial court found that
a preponderance of the evidence established that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
3 Per DHHS’s recommendation, the trial court stated that it would reconsider the possibility of
parenting time if respondent enrolled in a mental-health service and could provide at least three
negative drug screens. Respondent eventually did so, and DHHS began offering her supervised
parenting time in August 2024.
4 The hearing was originally set to occur in March 2024, but it was repeatedly adjourned for various
reasons not relevant to this appeal.
5 The petition was amended only to remove the allegation that MCL 712A.2(b)(4) (parent
substantially failed to comply with a limited guardianship placement plan) served as a statutory
basis for jurisdiction; the amended petition was otherwise identical to the original.

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in CC’s best interests. The court thereafter issued an order terminating respondent’s parental rights
as previously described. This appeal followed.
II. REASONABLE EFFORTS
On appeal, respondent argues that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts as ordered by
the trial court6 because DHHS, when providing services, made no effort to accommodate her
intellectual disability as required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101
et seq.
We ordinarily “review for clear error the trial court’s factual finding that [DHHS] made
reasonable efforts to reunify [a] respondent[] with the child.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332,
338; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). But because respondent did not object to the adequacy of the services
provided—specifically, DHHS’s compliance with the ADA when rendering services—this issue
is unpreserved for appellate review. See id. at 337-338. We review unpreserved issues for plain
error affecting substantial rights. In re Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 463; 951 NW2d 704 (2020).
To obtain appellate relief under the plain-error standard of review, a respondent
first must show: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3)
the error affected substantial rights. Generally, an error affects substantial rights if
it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome of the proceedings. After the
respondent has satisfied these requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted when the plain,
forfeited error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. [In re Berryman/Hurd/Morgan/Morgan-Hurd, ___ Mich App
___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026) (Docket Nos. 374775; 374776); slip op at 3-4
(quotation marks and citations omitted).]
In general, when a child is removed from a parent’s custody, DHHS must make reasonable
efforts toward reunification, except under certain, limited circumstances. In re Walters, ___ Mich
6 We note that, as recognized by the trial court, DHHS was not required to make reasonable efforts
toward reunification in light of the authorized petition for termination at initial disposition and
respondent’s subsequent plea, which established that respondent’s parental rights to CC’s two
older siblings had been involuntarily terminated in 2018 and respondent still struggled with the
same issues that led to the previous termination—i.e., domestic violence, substance use, untreated
mental health, unemployment, inadequate housing, and parenting skills. See In re Sanborn, 337
Mich App 252, 260-262; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (stating that DHHS need not make reasonable
efforts “when a parent has his or her parental rights involuntarily terminated to a sibling of the
child at issue and the parent has failed to rectify the conditions that led to that earlier termination
of parental rights”); see also MCL 712A.19a(2)(c); MCR 3.977(E). The trial court nonetheless
ordered DHHS to plan for reunification and adoption as concurrent permanency goals, and to
correspondingly make reasonable efforts by creating a CSP and offering services to respondent so
that she could voluntarily participate in them to rectify her ongoing issues. Accordingly, we
address this issue as if reasonable efforts were required in this case.

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App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369318); slip op at 3-4; see also MCL
712A.19a(2). Reasonable efforts include “creat[ing] a [CSP] outlining the steps that both [DHHS]
and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve
reunification.” In re Matamoros, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
371544); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). DHHS and the trial court must then
continually review, update, and revise a parent’s CSP as needed throughout the proceedings to
ensure that a parent has “a meaningful opportunity to comply with” the CSP. In re Mason, 486
Mich 142, 156, 169; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). Although the ADA does not provide a defense to
proceedings to terminate parental rights, In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 24-25; 610 NW2d 563
(2000), it does require DHHS to reasonably accommodate a disabled parent when providing
services to achieve reunification and avoid termination of parental rights, In re Hicks/Brown, 500
Mich 79, 86; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing 42 USC 12132 and 28 CFR 35.130(b)(7). “[E]fforts
at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if [DHHS] has failed to modify its
standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the
ADA.” Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86.
As noted, respondent’s reasonable-efforts argument focuses solely on DHHS’s alleged
failure to accommodate her intellectual disability when providing her with services. But DHHS
“cannot accommodate a disability of which it is unaware,” and it must have knowledge that a
parent is disabled before it is required to provide reasonable accommodations for that disability
under the ADA. Id. at 87. Here, beyond making conclusory assertions, respondent has not
demonstrated that she suffers from an intellectual disability or that, even if she did, DHHS was
aware of that disability at the time it was providing services to her. As her primary grounds for
support, respondent emphasizes that the trial court, pursuant to her counsel’s request, appointed
her a guardian ad litem (GAL) in January 2024, thereby recognizing her limited intellectual
capacity. A trial court may, under MCR 3.916(A), appoint a GAL to a party of the proceedings if
it finds it necessary to do so for the party’s welfare, and the record makes clear that respondent’s
counsel requested, and the trial court appointed, a GAL to respondent due to untreated mental-
health concerns that were impacting her behavior at hearings. The record does not, however,
indicate that these mental-health concerns and ensuing behavioral issues were tied to or reflective
of an intellectual disability within the scope of the ADA. Respondent also emphasizes that her
September 2024 psychological evaluation indicated that her verbal intelligence was low, but
neither the psychological evaluation nor the evaluator diagnosed respondent with any cognitive or
intellectual disabilities requiring ADA accommodations. The evaluator further clarified during
her testimony at the best-interests hearing that the test results upon which that statement was based
were ultimately deemed invalid and could not be relied upon.
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, “when challenging the services [being] offered,”
the burden is on the parent to identify other “services that would have been appropriate in light of
such disability or how the services offered were deficient” and to demonstrate that he or “she
would have fared better if other services had been offered.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252,
266-267; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). Respondent has not done so in this case. Other than asserting that
she “needed extra help,” respondent has not identified exactly what other services DHHS should
have provided in light of her asserted disability. See id. at 264, 266-267. Nor does she explain
how the services DHHS actually offered to her—which included referrals for a psychological
evaluation, mental-health counseling, domestic-violence counseling, random drug screenings,

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substance-abuse treatments, and parenting education, as well as offers to assist respondent in
obtaining housing, employment, and additional financial assistance to subsidize her housing
costs—were deficient or how she would have fared better had DHHS offered additional services
or accommodations. See id. Rather, the record reflects that DHHS provided referrals for a
multitude of services to address respondents’ issues—several of which respondent at least partially
participated in—but that respondent simply failed to uphold her “commensurate responsibility” to
cooperate with, engage in, and benefit from the services offered by DHHS. Atchley, 341 Mich
App at 339 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, respondent has not shown that
the trial court reversibly erred when it determined that DHHS made reasonable efforts toward
reunification. See Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 266-267; Pederson, 331 Mich App at 463.
III. BEST-INTERESTS DETERMINATION
Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination of her parental
rights was in CC’s best interests. We review for clear error a trial court’s determination regarding
a child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
Clear error exists when the “reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the
witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 90.
When determining whether termination is in the best interests of the child, the court should
place its “focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964
NW2d 881 (2020). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the child’s
best interests,” and it should consider a variety of factors, including “the child’s bond to the parent;
the parent’s parenting ability; the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality; and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Simpson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368248); slip op at 5 (quotation marks, citations, and alterations
omitted). “Other factors that the court may consider include the parent’s history, the parent’s
psychological evaluation, the age of the child, and a parent’s substance-abuse history.” In re MJC,
349 Mich App 42, 62; 27 NW3d 122 (2023) (citations omitted). The court may also consider the
parent’s ability to provide the child a safe and permanent home, “the parent’s visitation history
with the child, the child’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption,” id. (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted), as well as “how long the child was in foster care or placed
with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parents’ home within
the foreseeable future, if at all,” In re CJM, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024)
(Docket No. 367565); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court must also
expressly consider a child’s placement with a relative, which ordinarily weighs against
termination. Id. at ___; slip op at 4.
According to respondent, the trial court’s best-interests findings were clearly erroneous
because the court failed to adequately account for the parent-child bond between respondent and
CC and for her progress in her services. The record before us belies this claim.
In its findings, the trial court expressly stated that it had considered whether and to what
extent there was a parent-child bond between respondent and CC, concluding that the evidence

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demonstrated that no such bond existed. As support for this finding, the court emphasized
respondent admitted to a psychologist that she and CC “did not know one another” and that CC
“was more attached to his foster mother than to her,” that the psychologist “opined no bond
existed,” and that the caseworker testified that CC had a strong bond with his relative placement
and “looked to [his] foster parent for comfort, affection, and needs.” The evidence supported this
conclusion, as the psychologist’s testimony and written psychological evaluation for respondent
both indicated that respondent made such admissions to her. Additionally, the caseworker testified
that CC was strongly bonded with his relative placement, that CC looked to that placement for all
of his needs, and that CC typically turned to DHHS supervisors, rather than respondent, for comfort
and guidance during respondent’s supervised parenting times.
In its findings, the trial court also discussed respondent’s progress at length and expressly
stated that it considered that progress in its determination, noting that respondent’s ability “to
establish housing separate from [her abusive long-term partner] was a significant accomplishment
for” her but that she “failed to demonstrate any meaningful and lasting progress,” particularly as
it related to her mental health, substance use, and parenting ability. The court further found that
respondent’s minimal progress since her 2018 termination case “d[id] not outweigh the [best-
interests] focus . . . on the child” and demonstrated that she was unlikely to rectify these issues
within a reasonable amount of time given CC’s young age and how long he had been in his relative
placement’s care.7
The evidence supported this conclusion, as testimony and documentary evidence
established that respondent refused to participate in any of the recommended parenting-education
courses; was still using and testing positive for substances; was not consistently participating in
mental-health treatments and therefore had not addressed her mental-health issues; and was still in
a relationship with her long-term partner at the time of the hearing, despite having completed a
domestic-violence course and even though he was selling, and providing her with, drugs.
Respondent was unable to participate in supervised parenting time for more than a year because
she repeatedly tested positive for substances, and even after she was offered parenting times, she
inconsistently attended and CC generally avoided engaging with her. Additionally, respondent
acquired employment and suitable housing during the proceedings, but at the time of termination,
she was unemployed and three months behind on rent. And, as the trial court noted, these issues
have been ongoing since 2018, and the caseworker and the psychologist both testified that
respondent was no closer to rectifying her issues than she was in 2018 and had too much instability
in her own life to be able to provide the stability in CC’s life that he needed. Although respondent
testified to the contrary, the court did not find respondent’s testimony to be credible because it was
inconsistent and because respondent “tried to answer questions to present herself in a better light.”
We see no basis to disrupt that credibility assessment here. See Moss, 301 Mich App at 80.
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court properly weighed all the evidence available
to it at the time that it made its best-interests determination, Simpson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
7 The court also duly considered this relative placement as weighing against termination, but found
that the evidence as a whole demonstrated that termination was in CC’s best interests. See CJM,
___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4.

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op at 5, and we see no clear error in its findings, id. at ___; slip op at 3. While respondent may
disagree with how the trial court ultimately weighed the parent-child bond and her progress in
rectifying her issues against the many other considerations relevant to CC’s best interests, she has
not shown any reversible error in that regard. See id. at ___; slip op at 3, 5.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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