COA 368551 PEOPLE OF MI V RAMON CATRELL LOGAN II Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2026
10:59 AM
v No. 368551
Kent Circuit Court
RAMON CATRELL LOGAN II, LC No. 17-011526-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: ACKERMAN, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s resentencing order, where the court sentenced
defendant to serve 375 months to 100 years in prison for his second-degree murder conviction.
We affirm.
I. FACTS
This Court previously: (1) affirmed defendant’s convictions for second-degree murder,
MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b; but (2) vacated defendant’s sentence for second-degree murder and remanded “for
the trial court to articulate its reasons for the extent of the sentencing departure or resentence the
defendant.” People v Logan, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 14, 2021 (Docket No. 345014), p 1 (Logan I).
When defendant first appealed his convictions and sentences, this Court summarized the
facts as follows:
This case arises from the fatal shooting of Keith Kirkwood on August 22,
2016 at 1645 College Avenue. In the College Avenue incident, defendant, then 17-
years-old, and codefendant Mikey Davis, then 15-years-old, approached Kirkwood
and his cousin Ricky Johnson, and asked if they wanted to purchase a bike. Johnson
and Kirkwood were drinking beer. Johnson tried to get defendant and Davis to
leave the bike there and return the next day for the money. This offer upset
defendant and Davis who thought Johnson and Kirkwood were treating them like

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naïve children. After Johnson pulled $25 out of his wallet, defendant and Davis
both drew guns, and one of them announced that this was now a robbery. Davis
pistol whipped Kirkwood and defendant hit Johnson in the mouth with the butt of
a gun. After Kirkwood repeatedly told defendant and Davis that there was no
money, Davis and defendant shot Kirkwood multiple times. Kirkwood later died
from his gunshot wounds. [Logan I, unpub op at 1-2.]
Two days later, defendant was involved in a “second bike related shooting . . . .” Id. at 2.
“Defendant’s cousins, his codefendant’s father, his girlfriend, and two confidential informants
testified that defendant told them that he killed Kirkwood.” Id.
Defendant was charged with felony murder and armed robbery, but a jury found him guilty
of the lesser offense of second-degree murder and the additional charge of felony-firearm. Id.
Regarding defendant’s second-degree murder conviction, MCL 750.317 authorized a sentence of
life or any term of years, and the recommended minimum sentencing guidelines range was 225
months (18 years and 9 months) to 375 months (31 years and three months), or life in prison.1 Id.
at 17. The trial court sentenced defendant, above the recommended guidelines range, to serve 456
months (38 years) to 1,200 months (100 years) in prison. Id.
Thereafter, defendant appealed as of right his convictions and second-degree murder
sentence. Id. at 1. This Court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated his sentence for
second-degree murder and remanded to the trial court “for articulation as to the reasons for the
extent of its departure or resentencing.” Id. at 17-20.
On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant to a within-guidelines and presumptively
valid sentence of 375 months (31 years and three months) to 100 years in prison for his second-
degree murder conviction. Defendant appeals, arguing once again that he is entitled to
resentencing.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v Boykin, 510 Mich
171, 182; 987 NW2d 58 (2022). “An abuse-of-discretion standard recognizes that there may be
more than one principled outcome[,] and the trial court may not deviate from that principled range
of outcomes.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion by violating the ‘principle of proportionality,’
which requires that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the
circumstances of the offender.” People v Brcic, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026)
(Docket Nos. 362727; 366230); slip op at 10 (citations omitted). “This review, a ‘reasonableness’
review, applies to both sentences within and outside the guidelines.” Id. “Claims alleging a
1 Defendant’s total offense variable (OV) score was 120 points, placing him at OV Level III. His
total prior record variable (PRV) score was 15 points, placing him at PRV Level C. Second-degree
murder is a Class M2 felony. MCL 777.16p. The minimum sentence range grid for Class M2,
MCL 777.61, provides a range of 225 months to 375 months, or life, for offenders at OV Level
III-PRV Level C.

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violation of constitutional due process are reviewed de novo,” People v Dixon-Bey, 340 Mich App
292, 296; 985 NW2d 904 (2022), including “[w]hether a defendant’s sentence constitutes cruel
and/or unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or
Article 1, § 16 of the Michigan Constitution,” People v Stovall, 510 Mich 301, 312; 987 NW2d
85 (2022).
III. PROPORTIONALITY
On appeal, defendant first argues that his sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate,
especially considering that he was a juvenile when the offense was committed. We disagree.
A. LEGAL STANDARDS
“Where the Legislature has assigned a range of sentencing outcomes for any given
conviction, the trial court has authority to sentence a defendant within that range.” Boykin, 510
Mich at 183. The trial court must “exercise discretion in a way that ensures the individualized
sentence conforms with the principle of proportionality.” Id. The statutory sentencing range for
second-degree murder is “life, or any term of years . . . .” MCL 750.317.
The “basic considerations” relevant to determining an appropriate sentence are as follows:
“(a) the reformation of the offender, (b) protection of society, (c) the disciplining of the wrongdoer,
and (d) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.” People v Snow, 386 Mich 586,
592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972). Sentences may not violate “the ‘principle of proportionality,’ which
requires that a sentence be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the circumstances
of the offender.” Brcic, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10 (citations omitted). The test for
proportionality requires consideration of the following: “(1) the severity of the sentence relative to
the gravity of the offense; (2) sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction for other offenses; (3)
sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the goal of rehabilitation,
which is a criterion specifically rooted in Michigan’s legal traditions.” People v Kardasz, ___
Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 165008); slip op at 33 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The reasonableness review “applies to both sentences within and outside the guidelines.”
Brcic, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10. “The sentencing guidelines are only advisory; however,
those guidelines remain a highly relevant consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing
discretion.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “A within-guidelines sentence carries a
rebuttable presumption of proportionality.” Id. “The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
that their within-guidelines sentence is unreasonable or disproportionate.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). “A defendant may overcome the presumptive proportionality of a within-
guidelines sentence by presenting unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively
proportionate sentence disproportionate.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 465; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), the United
States Supreme Court concluded that a mandatory sentence of life without parole (LWOP) for a
defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In People v Taylor, 510 Mich 112, 126; 987

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NW2d 132 (2022), our Supreme Court summarized the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Miller as follows:
[In Miller, 567 US 460,] the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits mandatory LWOP sentences for crimes committed when the
offender was under 18 years old. Mandatory LWOP penalty schemes “preclude a
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it.” Id. at 476. This “poses too great a risk of
disproportionate punishment.” Id. at 479. “In imposing a State’s harshest penalties,
a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.” Id. at 477.
The Supreme Court set forth circumstances that a trial court should consider
before concluding that it is appropriate to sentence a juvenile offender to die in
prison. Id. at 477-478. Those “Miller factors” are: (1) the juvenile’s “chronological
age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure
to appreciate risks and consequences”; (2) the juvenile’s family and home
environment—“from which he cannot usually extricate himself—no matter how
brutal or dysfunctional”; (3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including
the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures
may have affected him”; (4) “the incompetencies of youth,” which affect whether
the juvenile might have been charged with and convicted of a lesser crime, for
example, because the juvenile was unable to deal with law enforcement or
prosecutors or because the juvenile did not have the capacity to assist their attorney
in their own defense; and (5) the juvenile’s “possibility of rehabilitation.” Id.
Miller did not “foreclose a sentencer’s ability” to impose a life sentence without parole for “the
rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” but when the young offender’s
“diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change” were properly considered,
“appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be
uncommon.” Parks, 510 Mich at 239-240 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Michigan Legislature established juvenile sentencing and resentencing procedures
consistent with Miller. MCL 769.25 applies the Miller principles prospectively. In Montgomery
v Louisiana, 577 US 190, 208-209; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), the United States
Supreme Court held that Miller applies retroactively to all persons sentenced to LWOP for offenses
committed before they were 18 years old. See Parks, 510 Mich at 239. Accordingly, MCL
769.25a applies the Miller principles retroactively. See Parks, 510 Mich at 240. The Parks Court
summarized the requirements of these statutes as follows:
The statutes require the court to sentence a defendant to at least a 60-year maximum
term and a minimum term of not less than 25 years or more than 40 years, unless
the prosecuting attorney files a motion seeking a sentence of life without parole.
MCL 769.25a(4)(b) and (c); MCL 769.25(3) and (9). If the prosecutor seeks a
sentence of life without parole, the trial court must conduct a hearing and consider
the Miller factors, any other relevant criteria, and the defendant’s record while
incarcerated. MCL 769.25a(4)(b); MCL 769.25(6). [Parks, 510 Mich at 240-241.]

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The Court noted that it previously held in Taylor, 510 Mich at 129, “that the combination of Miller
and MCL 769.25 creates a rebuttable presumption against life-without-parole sentences for
juvenile offenders and that the prosecution, as the moving party, must overcome this presumption
by clear and convincing evidence.” Parks, 510 Mich at 241.
The Michigan Supreme Court extended these safeguards to defendants who were 18 years
old at the time they committed first-degree murder. Id. at 244. The Court further extended the
safeguards to 19-year-olds and 20-year-olds. People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket Nos. 166428; 166654); slip op at 2, 12-14, 37-38. But, in People v Abraham, ___
Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 364574); slip op at 1, 5-8, which was
decided while Taylor and its companion case were pending in the Supreme Court, this Court
declined to extend Parks to a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder for a homicide
he committed in 1991, when he was 22 years old. Also, in People v Adamowicz, 346 Mich App
213, 219-220; 12 NW3d 35 (2023), this Court rejected the argument for precluding mandatory life
without parole for 21-year-old defendants.
In Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189, our Supreme Court held that a trial court’s “consideration
of youth and its attendant circumstances is also required by this state’s sentencing jurisprudence”
when a defendant is sentenced to a term of years under MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. The Court
explained how the four considerations stated in Snow, 386 Mich at 592, are especially relevant for
young offenders, who have good potential for reformation. Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189.
Michigan jurisprudence has expanded the principles underlying Miller and its progeny to
young offenders found guilty of second-degree murder. In Stovall, 510 Mich at 308, the Michigan
Supreme Court considered whether a life sentence with the possibility of parole for second-degree
murder was cruel or unusual punishment for a defendant who was under 18 years old when he
committed the offense. The Court analyzed the following factors:
(1) the severity of the sentence imposed compared to the gravity of the offense, (2)
the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed on other
offenders in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan
compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4)
whether the penalty imposed advances the penological goal of rehabilitation. [Id.
at 314.]
The Court determined that the first and second factors weighed against imposition of a parolable
life sentence for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder because “parolable life sentence
for second-degree murder is often more severe than the minimum sentences now given to most
juveniles who commit first-degree murder: 25 to 40 years.” Id. at 314-316. Additionally,
defendants sentenced under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a received the statutory maximum term
of 60 years, guaranteeing release after 60 years of imprisonment, but a defendant sentenced to
parolable life has no guarantee of release before death.2 Id. at 317-318. Regarding the third factor,
2 MCL 769.25(9) provides that when the sentencing court imposes a term of years, “the maximum
term shall be not less than 60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more

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the Court determined that “there is a clear national trend toward treating juveniles less harshly than
adults and extending Miller beyond just the mandatory LWOP context.” Id. at 318. Regarding
the fourth factor, the Court determined, inter alia, that a parolable life sentence for a juvenile
convicted of second-degree murder does not advance the penological goal of rehabilitation because
“prisoners who receive parolable life sentences are given lower priority when it comes to
educational and rehabilitative programming,” which are vital to enhance the juvenile’s growth and
rehabilitative potential. Id. at 320. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a life sentence with the
possibility of parole for second-degree murder was cruel or unusual punishment for a defendant
who was under 18 years old when he committed the offense. Id. at 308, 322.
In People v Eads, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 357332);
slip op at 1-2, 13, lv gtd 25 NW3d 118 (2025), this Court vacated a sentence of 50 to 75 years’
imprisonment for second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, committed when the defendant was a
juvenile. The defendant was originally sentenced as an adult in 1992. Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3.
The trial court’s sentence departed from the recommended minimum-sentence range under the
judicial guidelines in effect at the time the sentencing offense was committed. Id. at ___; slip op
at 3. In 2021, the defendant unsuccessfully sought relief from judgment on the ground that his
sentence was unconstitutional and disproportionate. Id. at ___; slip op at 4. This Court initially
denied the defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded
the case to this Court “for consideration as on leave granted with additional instructions that this
Court shall consider whether the defendant is entitled to relief under [Boykin] or [Stovall]” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
On remand, this Court concluded that it could not “find sound reason to deem [the
defendant’s] sentence constitutionally permissible when the parolable life sentence at issue in
Stovall was not.” Id. at ___; slip op at 9. This Court determined that “a term-of-years sentence of
50 to 75 years for a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder is an unduly severe penalty when
compared to the gravity of the offense and the penalty imposed on other offenders in Michigan.”
Id. This Court explained that the defendant’s sentence was not materially distinguishable from the
sentence in Stovall because the defendant was “effectively serving a life sentence.” Id. This Court
cited the United States Sentencing Commission’s definition of a life sentence “as a period of
incarceration of 470 months (approximately 39 years) or more—a period of incarceration well
short of Eads’s 50-year minimum, let alone his 75-year maximum.” Id. Additionally, the life
expectancy for a general-population prisoner was 64 years, and likely shorter for a prisoner
committed as a minor. Id.
This Court also emphasized that the term-of-years sentence, like the parolable life sentence
in Stovall, left the defendant with a lack of procedural safeguards available to persons convicted
of first-degree murder. Id. at ___; slip op at 11. This Court explained that none of the other
jurisdictions’ second-degree murder penalties were comparable to the defendant’s 50-year
than 40 years.” Therefore, it is possible for a defendant sentenced under this provision to receive
a maximum term of more than 60 years. In contrast, MCL 769.25a(4)(c) provides that if the trial
court resentences the defendant to a term of years, “the maximum term shall be 60 years and the
minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years.”

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minimum term; only one state, Tennessee, had a maximum term in excess of 50 years. Id. at ___;
slip op at 12. This Court reasoned that the defendant’s 50-to-75-year term would not allow the
defendant “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court concluded that
the defendant’s term-of-years sentence could not satisfy constitutional requirements when the
sentence in Stovall failed to do so. Id. at ___; slip op at 13.
This Court further held that the defendant’s 50-to-75-year term violated the principle of
proportionality because it did not take into account his individual circumstances, including his
youth. Id. at ___; slip op at 14-15. This Court addressed the trial court’s failure to consider the
defendant’s age as follows:
[I]t is clear from the existing record that the court in this case did not consider
Eads’s youth and its attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors. In
justifying its sentence, the court described the murder as “the most unprovoked
crime” it had ever seen . . . . The court openly acknowledged that Eads’s
background and the circumstances of the murder demonstrated that Eads was
immature and impulsive, lacked discipline and self-restraint, and had been
negatively influenced by gang members from a young age. Such observations
reflect the very “characteristics of youth” that a sentencing court must consider as
potentially mitigating the sentencing offense. The trial court, however, dismissed
the very notion that such characteristics might have a mitigating effect and instead
considered them as aggravating factors in support of a significant departure
sentence—an approach plainly contrary to Miller and its progeny. [Id. at ___; slip
op at 15 (citations omitted).]
Accordingly, this Court reversed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for relief
from judgment, vacated his sentence for second-degree murder, and remanded to the trial court for
resentencing. Id. The Supreme Court granted the prosecutor’s application to appeal, instructing
the parties to include in their briefs the issues of whether this Court erred in granting relief under
Stovall and Boykin. Eads, 25 NW3d 118 (Mich, 2025). Oral arguments were held April 8, 2026.
In Echols, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1, 6-8, this Court vacated a sentence of 75 to
150 years for second-degree murder for a defendant who committed the murder one month after
he turned 18 years old. The defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range was 10 to 25 years’
imprisonment, or parolable life. Id. at ___; slip op at 2. This Court held that Eads’s rationale
applied “with only greater” force to the more severe sentence. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court
found that the sentence was excessively harsh because the defendant would not become eligible
for parole until well past the life expectancy of incarcerated persons. Id. This Court emphasized
that the defendant committed a lesser offense than first-degree murder, but he received a minimum
sentence that was 15 years higher than the minimum sentence under MCL 769.25 and MCL
769.25a, and a maximum sentence that was 90 years higher than the maximum sentence under
MCL 769.25 and MCL 769.25a. Id. at ___; slip op at 7. This Court also held that the defendant’s
sentence violated the principle of proportionality. Id. at ___; slip op at 8. The prosecutor’s
application to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal this Court’s judgment in Echols is held in
abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Eads. People v Echols, 32 NW3d 83 (Mich,
2026).

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In People v Campbell, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No.
368742); slip op at 1-2, this Court held that a sentence of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for second-
degree murder was unreasonably excessive for a defendant who was 18 years old when he
committed the homicide. The defendant’s minimum sentence range under the judicial sentencing
guidelines was 10 years to life. Id. at ___; slip op at 5. This Court determined that the trial court
erred in focusing only on the egregiousness of the murder, without considering the defendant’s
“youth and its attendant characteristics” as mitigating factors. Id. at ___; slip op at 8-9 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). This Court compared the defendant’s sentence to the defendants’
sentences in Eads and Echols, noting that it was more severe than was generally authorized for
persons convicted of first-degree murder when they were between 18 and 20 years old. Id. at ___;
slip op at 8. Accordingly, this Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded for
resentencing, instructing the trial court to “consider [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant
characteristics at the time that he committed the offense as mitigating factors.” Id. at ___; slip op
at 13.
In People v Nard, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369185);
slip op at 2-3, remanded on other grounds 28 NW3d 731 (Mich, 2026), the then 17-year-old
defendant sexually assaulted two young boys and forced one to submit to sexual penetration. The
defendant perpetrated other cruel acts against the boys, and then killed them, by drowning one and
hanging the other in a tree. Id. In 1976, the defendant was convicted of two counts of second-
degree murder and sentenced to two terms of life in prison with the possibility of parole. Id. at
___; slip op at 1. In 2023, in light of Stovall, the defendant was resentenced to concurrent terms
of 60 to 150 years. Id. Although the defendant had been released on parole, he appealed his new
sentences. Id. This Court reasoned that the defendant’s parole and release from incarceration in
2024 disproved his argument that his sentence was a de facto life sentence. Id. at ___; slip op at
5. This Court held that the “heinous circumstances” of the defendant’s brutal murders of two
helpless children justified the severity of his sentences. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court
determined that the trial court adequately considered the defendant’s youth, and did not err in
ultimately concluding that the egregiousness of the defendant’s crimes outweighed the mitigating
factor of youth. Id. at ___; slip op at 6, 8.
The defendant in Nard also argued that he should not receive a sentence for second-degree
murder that was longer than the maximum sentence allowed for a juvenile convicted of first-degree
murder. Id. at ___; slip op at 6. This Court rejected the argument, stating that MCL 769.25(9)
allows a court to “impose either a term-of-years sentence or a sentence of imprisonment for life
without parole.” Id.
B. ANALYSIS
As previously explained, defendant’s sentence is improper if it is so excessive as to
constitute cruel or unusual punishment, if it violates the nonconstitutional principle of
proportionality, or if it was imposed without consideration of the characteristics of youth as
mitigating factors. As the summary of caselaw indicates, the analyses of these issues often overlap.
Defendant’s minimum sentence of 31.25 years for second-degree murder is markedly
shorter than the previously discussed minimum sentences of 50 years (Eads, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 1), 65 years (Campbell, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 1), 75 years (Echols, ___ Mich

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App at ___; slip op at 1), and life with the possibility of parole (Stovall, 510 Mich at 307).
Defendant’s sentence falls slightly below the midpoint (32.5 years) of the 25 to 40-year minimum-
sentence range in MCL 769.25(9). Although this comparison does not reveal as strong a disparity
between defendant’s sentence and a first-degree murder sentence as shown in Eads, Echols, and
Campbell, it does demonstrate a possibility that defendant will serve a longer sentence than persons
convicted of first-degree murder.
In this case, the severity of defendant’s sentence correlates to the gravity of his offense.
See Kardasz, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 34-35. Defendant shot and killed the victim in an
argument about the sale of a bicycle; as the trial court commented, there was no provocation or
any circumstance triggering defendant’s fatal attack. When considering sentences imposed in the
same jurisdiction for similar offenses, we note that defendant’s sentence was substantially shorter
than the sentences deemed excessive in Eads, Echols, and Campbell. His minimum sentence is
also shorter than the 40-year upper limit for a minimum sentence under MCL 769.25(9) and MCL
769.25a(4)(c). When considering sentences imposed in other jurisdictions, our Supreme Court has
determined that most states had a maximum term of 30 to 40 years. Stovall, 510 Mich at 319-320.
We acknowledge that the goal of rehabilitation could be undermined by a 31-year sentence. See
id. at 320. At resentencing, a report3 was submitted noting that defendant had not been able to
begin some recommended programs because prisoners with earlier release dates had priority;
however, defendant testified that he had completed his GED, enrolled in college classes, and
worked with mentors.
Evaluating all these factors, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or
violate the principle of proportionality. See Brcic, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 10. Defendant
killed a person during an argument that defendant started. Logan I, unpub op at 1-2. A 31.25-year
minimum sentence is within a principled range of outcomes. See Brcic, ___ Mich App at ___; slip
op at 10.
The rule in Miller that the sentencing court must consider the characteristics of youth when
sentencing a young offender applies to defendants who are sentenced to terms of years and to
defendants convicted of second-degree murder for crimes they committed when they were under
the age of 21 years. Boykin, 510 Mich at 190-193; Stovall, 510 Mich at 315-322; Echols, ___
Mich App at ___; slip op at 4. Once again, the relevant considerations in sentencing a young
defendant are: (1) immaturity and impetuosity, (2) family and home environment, (3)
circumstances of the homicide, (4) disadvantage in dealing with the legal system, and (5)
possibility of rehabilitation. See Miller, 567 US at 476-477; Taylor, 510 Mich at 126.
Additionally, the four considerations stated in Snow, 386 Mich at 592, are especially relevant for
young offenders, who have good potential for reformation. Boykin, 510 Mich at 188-189. These
considerations are: “(a) the reformation of the offender, (b) protection of society, (c) the
disciplining of the wrongdoer, and (d) the deterrence of others from committing like offenses.”
Snow, 386 Mich at 592. Although the Michigan Supreme Court has determined that trial courts
are required to consider the defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor in these instances, the Court
3 The report was authored by Kenneth Romanowski, Ph.D., a counselor for the Michigan
Department of Corrections.

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has also made it clear that trial courts are not required to “articulate their bases for considering an
offender’s youth during sentencing hearings . . . .” Boykin, 510 Mich at 190.
In defendant’s resentencing memorandum, defendant attached a report entitled “Summary
of Adolescent Developmental and Neurodevelopmental Science in re Juvenile Life Without
Parole,” authored by Dr. Daniel P. Keating, Ph.D., of the Departments of Psychology, Psychiatry,
and Pediatrics at the University of Michigan. That lengthy report detailed how neurological
developments in a person’s early 20s enable their prefrontal cortex to significantly improve its
capacity for making sound judgments. Defendant also attached an eight-page “expert report,”
authored by Kenneth Romanowski, Ph.D., a counselor for the Michigan Department of
Corrections, detailing defendant’s disciplinary history and participation in rehabilitative services
during his imprisonment. At resentencing, the trial court noted that it considered both of these
reports as follows:
I have read your memorandum. I have also read the report from Doctor
Romanowski who I have had him testify live in this court in the last couple of
hearings I have had in the last few months on juvenile lifers.
Also, I am very familiar with Doctor Keating. I have had Doctor Keating
testify. I have read numerous of his articles. I am well aware of the issue with
regards to brain development.
* * *
As I mentioned, I have read the memo from Doctor Keating. Doctor
Keating talks about in younger people how the prefrontal cortex has not been
developed until and as he’s testified in this courtroom till about age 25. That
impacts the ability to make intelligent decisions and to appreciate consequences.
Doctor Romanowski who you’ve supplied a report to also has testified in
this court. This [c]ourt’s found him several times to be very credible . . . . Doctor
Romanowski who is actually a—in charge of prisons across the State of Michigan
for almost 42 years and now does ex—expert opinions with regards to these
juvenile matters.
The trial court went on to state that at the time that defendant committed this offense, he
had “one prior felony, two prior misdemeanors[,] and a juvenile court record,” noting that
defendant had “been in jail already four times and probation.” The court then reiterated the facts
and circumstances of this case and found that the sentencing guidelines did not take into account
defendant’s “lack of remorse, bragging about the offense afterwards[,] or the cold-blooded nature
of the crime.” The trial court explained that it heard testimony from “numerous witnesses about
how [defendant] had basically been bragging about the shooting,” which caused the court to
“realize[] that [defendant was] actually proud of this, quite frankly.”
Taken together, the trial court clearly considered defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor.
See id. at 188-190. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to be resentenced on that basis.

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IV. CONSIDERATION OF ACQUITTED CONDUCT
In his Standard 4 brief,4 defendant further argues that the trial court improperly based its
sentencing decision on its belief that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, even though the
jury convicted him of the lesser offense of second-degree murder. We disagree.
A. ANALYSIS
In Dixon-Bey, 340 Mich App at 294, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder,
but she was ultimately convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder. The trial court
imposed a sentence of 35 to 70 years in prison, in excess of the recommended minimum sentencing
guidelines range. Id. This Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded to the trial court
to articulate its reasons for the upward departure. Id.; see also People v Dixon-Bey, 321 Mich App
490, 494-495; 909 NW2d 458 (2017). The trial court resentenced the defendant to 30 to 70 years’
imprisonment, in excess of the recommended minimum sentencing guidelines range. Dixon-Bey,
340 Mich App at 295. The defendant again appealed, and the following events ensued:
After this Court’s opinion in defendant’s prior appeal, but before the trial
court held the resentencing hearing, our Supreme Court decided People v Beck, 504
Mich 605; 939 NW2d 213 (2019), cert den sub nom Michigan v Beck, [589] US
[1244]; 140 S Ct 1243; 206 L Ed 2d 240 (2020). Beck held that, unlike uncharged
conduct, a trial court is forbidden from using acquitted conduct when crafting a
sentence. Beck, 504 Mich at 609, 629. Our Supreme Court explicitly held that it
violates a defendant’s right to due process when a judge increases a defendant’s
sentence “because the judge believes that the defendant really committed one or
more of the crimes on which the jury acquitted.” Id. at 609. As this Court has
observed, there may be situations in which it is not obvious what conduct should
be considered “acquitted.” [People v] Brown, 339 Mich App [411,] 421-422[; 984
NW2d 486 (2021)]. However, this is not one of those situations. The jury acquitted
defendant of first-degree murder and convicted her of second-degree murder. It
could not be plainer that the jury acquitted defendant of first-degree murder because
it found that the element of premeditation was not established. Nevertheless, the
trial court, in its own words, “gave defendant an additional 10 years in prison for a
cold blooded, premeditated stabbing of a victim of this community . . . .” The trial
court’s blatant refusal to follow Beck persisted despite both attorneys advising the
trial court that Beck prohibited the use of acquitted conduct when crafting a
sentence. [Id. at 297.]
Accordingly, this Court vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing before a
different judge. Id. at 305.
Contrary to defendant’s assertions otherwise, this case is completely distinguishable from
Dixon-Bey. Defendant draws attention to the trial court’s statement that this case involved “a cold-
blooded murder,” but unlike the trial court in Dixon-Bey, the trial court in this case made no
4 See Administrative Order No. 2004-6, 471 Mich ci, cii, Standard 4 (2004).

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indication that it believed that this case involved any sort of premeditation. See id. at 297. “[T]he
elements of first-degree murder are (1) the intentional killing of a human (2) with premeditation
and deliberation.” People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240; 917 NW2d 559 (2018) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Accordingly, premeditation and deliberation are the distinguishing factors
between first-degree and second-degree murder. Id. at 241. Therefore, the trial court’s
classification of this crime as “a cold-blooded murder” was not inconsistent with defendant’s
acquittal of first-degree murder. Moreover, at resentencing, the trial court specifically stated that
it would not take defendant’s acquitted conduct into account. Accordingly, defendant’s argument
is without merit.
Affirmed.
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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