COA 374356 ROBERT BANKER SR V CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
ROBERT BANKER, SR.,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 10, 2026
11:08 AM
v No. 374356
Wayne Circuit Court
CITIZENS UNITED RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE
d/b/a CURE AUTO INSURANCE,
LC No. 23-004606-NF
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/Third-
Party Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
ASCENSION PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL,
MEDICAL DEVICE SPECIALTY INC., and
MICHIGAN SURGERY SPECIALISTS,
Third-Party Defendants,
and
SURGEONS CHOICE MEDICAL CENTER,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and REDFORD, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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Defendant/counterplaintiff/third-party plaintiff, Citizens United Reciprocal Exchange,
doing business as CURE Auto Insurance, appeals as of right a consent judgment in which CURE
reserved the right to challenge the trial court’s earlier orders denying CURE’s motion for summary
disposition and granting the motion for summary disposition filed by defendant, Allstate Property
and Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate). CURE argues that the trial court erred by denying
CURE’s motion for summary disposition because, plaintiff/counterdefendant, Robert Banker Sr.
aided nonparty Robert Banker. Jr. in fraudulently procuring a policy from CURE, so Banker Sr.
should not be considered an innocent third party. Agreeing with the trial court that there is no
evidence that Banker Sr. committed any fraud in procuring the policy, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At all relevant times, Banker Jr. lived with his mother, Theresa Banker and Banker Sr.
Banker Jr. owned a 1999 Jeep Cherokee and a 2000 Jeep Cherokee. Banker Sr. primarily drove
the 2000 Jeep. Banker Jr. applied for an auto insurance policy with CURE for both of his vehicles
on December 16, 2022. According to Banker Jr., Banker, Sr. “told [him] to make sure [he] got
insurance” on the 2000 Jeep, but Banker Sr. was not present when Banker Jr. applied for the
insurance and did not provide Banker Jr. with any information, though Banker Sr. was aware that
Banker Jr. had applied for the policy.
In the application, CURE required Banker Jr. to list “[a]ll household members . . . as
potential drivers or residents,” but Banker Jr. listed only “Robert Banker”1; he did not include
Banker Sr. or Theresa. Upon receiving Banker Jr.’s application, CURE issued him a policy that
listed “Robert Banker” as named insured. On the same day that Banker Jr. submitted his
application, CURE sent a letter to him requesting that he notify CURE if the list of household
members in his application was not accurate. Banker Jr. never responded to this request.
On December 30, 2022, Banker Jr. asked Banker Sr. to call CURE to take the 2019 Jeep
off the CURE policy and add a recently purchased 2016 Jeep Cherokee to the policy. During the
phone call,2 Banker Sr. told the CURE representative that he was “trying to transfer one vehicle
off my policy and put[] another one on.” He provided the policy number, then stated the
policyholder’s name was “Robert Eugene Banker.” After Banker Sr. gave an e-mail address
different than the one CURE had on file, Banker Sr. said to “leave [the e-mail address] like it is,”
adding, “I’m just doing it for him cause he’s at work.” Banker Sr. asked to remove the 1999 Jeep
from the policy, then provided vehicle information for the 2016 Jeep. When the CURE
representative asked how the 2016 Jeep would be used, Banker Sr. said that “he’s just gonna be
using it to drive to work.” When the CURE representative asked if the 2016 Jeep would be titled
1 Banker Jr. listed his birthdate as the birthdate of the “Robert Banker” identified in the application.
2 CURE filed a recording of this phone call with this Court. Banker Sr. and Allstate argue this
Court should not consider the recording because CURE did not file it in the trial court. Although
the electronic file of the recording is not part of the lower court record, CURE indicated that it
included the recording with its motion for summary disposition in the trial court, and the recording
is indeed identified as an exhibit in that filing. We therefore consider the recording part of the
lower court record and address its content on appeal.

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under “your name,” Banker Sr. said yes and identified the owner as “Robert Banker.” When the
CURE representative asked about how the vehicle was being financed, Banker Sr. had the CURE
representative wait while he called Banker Jr. to ask for that information, then provided it to the
CURE representative.
On January 6, 2023, Banker Sr. was driving the 2000 Jeep when another vehicle failed to
yield and hit the 2000 Jeep head on. CURE received a claim for PIP benefits from “Robert Banker”
on January 8, 2023. CURE ran a search and identified Banker Sr. and Theresa as possible
household members that were not listed on the policy, which prompted CURE to send another
letter to Banker Jr. inquiring about his household members. Banker Jr. again did not respond, and
CURE later identified Banker Sr. as the PIP claimant and a member of Banker Jr.’s household.
CURE refused to pay Banker Sr.’s benefits, prompting Banker Sr. to file this action. CURE
then sent Banker Jr. a letter declaring his policy “void from the date of inception” because Banker
Jr. fraudulently obtained the policy by misrepresenting his household members in the application.
Banker Sr. then applied for benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan, which assigned
Banker Sr.’s claim to Allstate, who was added as a party to this action. CURE was also allowed
to file a third-party complaint against Ascension Providence Hospital, Michigan Surgery
Specialists, Medical Device Specialty Inc, and Surgeons Choice Medical Center (collectively the
third-party-defendant providers), who all treated Banker Sr. following the collision.
CURE and Allstate eventually filed competing motions for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Allstate argued that CURE was the higher-priority insurer responsible for
paying Banker Sr.’s benefits because CURE had a policy with Banker Jr., and Banker Sr. was
Banker Jr.’s resident relative. Allstate recognized that CURE had rescinded its policy with Banker
Jr. on grounds that Banker Jr. engaged in fraud when procuring the policy, but Allstate contended
that this rescission should not extend to Banker Sr. because he was an innocent third party and the
equities weighed against rescission. In its competing motion, CURE argued that it was entitled to
rescind its policy with Banker Jr. as a matter of law, and that this rescission should be extended to
Banker Sr. because the equities weighed in favored doing so. As part of the latter argument, CURE
contended that Banker Sr. was not only aware of Banker Jr.’s fraud but “took an active role” in it
by instructing Banker Jr. to purchase insurance for the 2000 Jeep and by calling CURE to add the
2016 Jeep to Banker Jr.’s policy without adding himself to the policy as a household member.
CURE asserted that Banker Sr.’s involvement in—or at the very least knowledge of—Banker Jr.’s
fraud weighed heavily in favor of extending the rescission of Banker Jr.’s policy to Banker Sr.
At the hearing on the parties’ competing motions, CURE’s counsel again emphasized
Banker Sr.’s alleged involvement in Banker Jr.’s fraud, arguing that this weighed heavily in favor
of extending the rescission of Banker Jr.’s policy to Banker Sr. The other parties at the hearing
pushed back against this argument, noting that Banker Sr. was not involved in procuring the policy,
and that Banker Sr. said nothing amounting to fraud in his phone call with CURE. The trial court
ruled that there was no evidence that Banker Sr. engaged in “pre-procurement” fraud, and the only
evidence that CURE had produced showed that Banker Sr. “did not properly disclose who he was”
in a phone conversation with a CURE agent after the policy was procured. The court believed that
some of Banker Sr.’s statements “may have been fraudulent,” but the court reiterated that these
statements were not made “in the procurement of this policy.” The court thus concluded that
Banker Sr. was an innocent third party, so it had to weigh the equities to determine whether

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CURE’s policy should be rescinded with respect to Banker Sr. Doing so, the court concluded that
the equities weighed against rescission,3 so it denied CURE’s motion for summary disposition and
granted summary disposition to Allstate. The court did not believe that the rescission issue with
respect to the third-party-defendant providers had been adequately raised, so it clarified that its
ruling did not apply to them. After the hearing the trial court issued two orders—one order denied
CURE’s motion for summary disposition, the other granted Allstate’s motion for summary
disposition and dismissed Allstate from the case. Neither order was a final order, and the case
remained open.
Eventually, CURE, Banker Sr. and the third-party-defendant providers entered into a
consent judgment on January 21, 2025. In this consent judgment, CURE reserved the right to
appeal the trial court’s earlier orders denying CURE’s motion for summary disposition and
granting Allstate’s motion for summary disposition. This was a final order that closed the case.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
CURE on appeal contests the trial court’s ruling on competing motions for summary
disposition. Appellate courts review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
disposition. Sherman v Progressive Mich Ins Co, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2026)
(Docket No. 167826); slip op at 9. CURE and Allstate moved for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). When a party files a (C)(10) motion, if there are no genuine issues of material
fact, then the trial court may rule that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Sherman, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 9. If the moving party requests rescission, then the trial
court’s decision to grant or deny that relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ___; slip
op at 9-10.
III. ANALYSIS
CURE contends that the trial court erred by denying its request to extend the rescission of
Banker Jr.’s policy to Banker Sr. because Banker Sr. aided in fraudulently procuring the policy.
This, according to CURE, rendered a weighing of the equities improper because Banker Sr. was
not an innocent third party.
In Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co, 502 Mich 390; 919 NW2d 20 (2018), our Supreme Court
clarified that an insurance policy could be rescinded with respect to an innocent third party, id. at
407, but held that such a rescission could only be effectuated if a court, in its discretion, found that
the equities favored extending rescission of the policy to the innocent third party, id. at 409-411.
Since Bazzi, this Court has clarified that an individual who “participate[s] in the fraudulent
procurement of [an] insurance policy . . . cannot be considered an innocent third party, and the trial
3 As part of its ruling, the court found that, while Banker Sr. was close with his son, there was no
evidence that Banker Sr. aided in fraudulently procuring the policy. The court thus concluded that
the factor considering the innocent third party’s knowledge of the fraud weighed against rescinding
the policy.

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court need not engage in any balancing of the equities” in order to rescind the policy with respect
to the party who engaged in fraud. Webb v Progressive Marathon Ins Co, 335 Mich App 503,
512-513; 967 NW2d 841 (2021).
CURE argues that there is no question of fact that Banker Sr. helped fraudulently procure
Banker Jr.’s policy, so the trial court erred by balancing the equities to determine whether to
rescind the policy with respect to Banker Sr. We agree with the trial court, however, that the
opposite is true—there is no evidence whatsoever that Banker Sr. participated in fraudulently
procuring the policy from CURE. Banker Jr. testified that he procured the policy on his own
without Banker Sr.’s involvement. Banker Sr. admitted that he was aware that Banker Jr. procured
the policy, but he never indicated that he was involved in actually applying for or otherwise
procuring the policy. While it is true that Banker Jr. testified that Banker Sr. “told [him] to make
sure [he] got insurance” on the 2000 Jeep, nothing about this suggests that Banker Sr. engaged in
any fraud; he did not, for instance, instruct Banker Jr. to not list him as a household member on
the policy. Again, the record evidence establishes that Banker Jr. procured the policy on his own
without Banker Sr.’s aid.
CURE contends that because Banker Sr. directed Banker Jr. to procure the policy, Banker
Jr. was acting as Banker Sr.’s agent when procuring the policy, so Banker Jr.’s fraud can be
imputed to Banker Sr. as Banker Jr.’s principal. This argument was not raised below, however, so
it is waived. See Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280,
294; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). CURE claims that this issue is preserved because CURE argued below
that Banker Sr. “was not an innocent third party to the fraud.” That is true, but CURE argued
below that Banker Sr. was not an innocent third party because he “took an active role” in
fraudulently procuring the policy. CURE never argued that Banker Sr. was not an innocent third
party because Banker Jr. was acting as Banker Sr.’s agent when Banker Jr. fraudulently procured
the policy. The latter argument is not simply a more sophisticated argument of the former one—
they are two separate arguments, and because CURE only raised the former argument below, the
latter argument is waived on appeal.
CURE alternatively argues that Banker Sr. helped obtain Banker Jr.’s policy through fraud
because, when Banker Sr. added the 2016 Jeep to the policy, CURE and Banker Jr. effectively
agreed to a new contract with new terms. While CURE recognizes that parties are free to amend
their agreements, CURE fails to explain why adding the 2016 Jeep to Banker Jr.’s policy did not
amend the parties’ contract but created a new one. CURE observes that there can be no amendment
without mutuality of agreement, and it contends that there can be no mutuality “when one party is
lying in the amendment process.” It is unclear, however, how this relates to CURE’s argument
that adding the 2016 Jeep to Banker Jr.’s policy created a new policy. If Banker Sr. engaged in
fraud to amend the policy, then, presumably, that amendment would not be effective. But that
does not establish that CURE issued a new policy or that Banker Sr. somehow engaged in fraud
when the policy was originally procured.
In a four-sentence paragraph, CURE also contends that even if Banker Sr. was considered
an innocent third party requiring “the equites [to be] balanced, they would inevitably weigh in
favor of CURE” because Banker Sr. engaged in fraud while CURE was an innocent insurer. When
balancing the equities, the trial court engaged in a lengthy analysis in which it carefully walked
through the various factors that it considered when deciding whether equity favored rescinding

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Banker Jr.’s policy as to Banker Sr.4 As part of its analysis, the court explicitly acknowledged that
Banker Sr. may have engaged in fraud after the policy was procured, but the court concluded that
because Banker Sr. did not participate in fraudulently obtaining the policy, Banker Sr.’s purported
fraud did not favor rescinding the policy as to him.5 The court then considered a number of other
factors, several of which it found weighed against rescinding the policy as to Banker Sr., before
ultimately concluding not to extend rescission of CURE’s policy to Banker Sr. CURE on appeal
does not address any of the factors that went into the trial court’s ruling, even its analysis of Banker
Sr.’s purported fraud. “When an appellant fails to dispute the basis of the trial court’s ruling, this
Court need not even consider granting plaintiffs the relief they seek.” Derderian v Genesys Health
Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 381; 689 NW2d 145 (2004) (quotation marks, citation, and alteration
omitted).
Lastly, CURE raises two arguments with respect to the third-party-defendant providers: (1)
that a medical provider’s claim for no-fault benefits is derivative of the insured’s claim, so Mota-
Peguero v Falls Lake Nat’l Ins Co, 350 Mich App 692; 33 NW3d 912 (2024)—which held that a
medical provider’s claim for benefits was not derivative of the insured’s claim—was wrongly
decided, and (2) that if a medical provider’s claim for no-fault benefits was not derivative of an
insured’s claim, then this Court should adopt new factors that trial courts can consider when
deciding whether to extend rescission of a no-fault policy to an innocent-third-party medical
provider. We decline to address either argument because we do not have jurisdiction over CURE’s
claims against the third-party-defendant providers.
At the hearing on CURE’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court explicitly
declined to rule on the rescission issue with respect to the third-party-defendant providers,
concluding that CURE had not adequately raised the issue in its motion. CURE’s claims against
those providers therefore remained unresolved after the trial court entered its orders granting
Allstate’s motion for summary disposition and denying CURE’s motion for summary disposition.
CURE’s claims against the third-party-defendant providers were not resolved until CURE entered
into the final consent judgment and agreed to have its case dismissed. It follows that, with respect
to the third-party-defendant providers, CURE was not “aggrieved” within the meaning of MCR
4 In Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Michigan v ACE American Ins Co, 503 Mich 903, 906-907; 919
NW2d 394 (2018) (MARKMAN, C.J., concurring), then-Chief Justice MARKMAN identified five
factors that courts could consider when deciding whether equity favored rescinding an insurance
policy with respect to an innocent third party. This Court adopted these so-called MARKMAN
factors in Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright, 331 Mich App 396, 411; 952 NW2d 586 (2020),
abrogated on other grounds by Sherman, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 9-10. The trial court applied
the MARKMAN factors when deciding whether to extend the rescission of Banker Jr.’s policy to
Banker Sr.
5 The court provided this analysis as part of its consideration of the second MARKMAN factor,
which looks to “the relationship between the fraudulent insured and the innocent third party to
determine if the third party had some knowledge of the fraud.” Pioneer, 331 Mich App at 411.
CURE never argues that the trial court erred in its consideration of this factor (or any other factor).
We therefore decline to address whether the trial court properly considered whether Banker Sr.
had knowledge of Banker Jr.’s fraud when it considered the second MARKMAN factor.

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7.203(A)—the court rule governing this Court’s jurisdiction—by any ruling with respect to the
third-party-defendant providers. CURE’s only claims against the third-party-defendant providers
were resolved in the final consent judgment, and any injury that CURE suffered as a result of the
consent judgment was the result of CURE’s decision to agree to the judgment, not by any action
taken by the trial court. See Federated Ins Co v Oakland Co Rd Comm, 475 Mich 286, 291-292;
715 NW2d 846 (2006) (explaining that to be “aggrieved” within the meaning of MCR 7.203(A),
the appealing party “must demonstrate an injury arising from either the actions of the trial court or
the appellate court judgment”); Sauer v Rhoades, 338 Mich 679, 681; 62 NW2d 634 (1954)
(explaining that a party cannot appeal from a consent judgment because the judgment reflects the
judgment of the parties, not of the court).
Affirmed.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ James Robert Redford

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