COA 373375 PEOPLE OF MI V TIARRA MIRANDA PAGEL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/17/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2026
9:43 AM
v No. 373375
Baraga Circuit Court
TIARRA MIRANDA PAGEL, LC No. 2023-001732-FC
Defendant-Appellant
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BOONSTRA and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right her sentence of 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, see MCL 777.21(3)(c), after a jury found her guilty of possession with
intent to deliver methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i). We affirm defendant’s sentence but
remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was pulled over for speeding after a Michigan State Police Trooper witnessed
her car backing out of a known “drug house” with her codefendant as a passenger. During the
traffic stop, the Trooper found 14.4 grams of methamphetamine in plastic bags inside defendant’s
vehicle. Defendant told the Trooper that she had driven from her home in Wisconsin to Baraga
County, Michigan, to pick up some baby clothes. Defendant denied that the methamphetamine
found in her vehicle was hers, but she admitted that she had the same kind of plastic bag at her
residence in Wisconsin. She also admitted that she paid her codefendant’s drug supplier
approximately $200 for a “drug related purpose” the day before she drove over from Wisconsin.
Defendant was arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine.
At trial, text messages between defendant and codefendant established that defendant
agreed to pick up methamphetamine from the supplier in Wisconsin and bring it to codefendant in
Michigan. A witness testified that she overheard a phone call in which codefendant and defendant
discussed “how to get enough money to . . . secure the drugs and bring ’em to Michigan.” In this
call, codefendant agreed to split the drugs with defendant if she picked them up. The witness also
admitted to selling two grams of methamphetamine for codefendant on the day of the traffic stop

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in exchange for a few grams of methamphetamine. In a subsequent search of the witness’s house,
the State Police located methamphetamine contained in the same kind of bag as the
methamphetamine found in defendant’s vehicle.
A jury convicted defendant of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine under
MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court assessed 50 points to defendant’s
offense variable (OV) 15, over defendant’s objections, because it found sufficient evidence in the
record to conclude that defendant crossed state lines with the intent of delivering
methamphetamine. See MCL 777.45(1)(d). Defendant now appeals, challenging the trial court’s
assessment of 50 points for OV 15.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that OV 15 was assessed incorrectly because there was no evidence that
she transported methamphetamine across state lines. We disagree.
“Under the sentencing guidelines, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear
error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Horton, 345 Mich
App 612, 616; 8 NW2d 622 (2023) (cleaned up). “Clear error is established when the appellate
court is left with a firm and definite conviction that an error occurred.” Id. A “[p]reponderance
of the evidence means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more
convincing force and the greater probability of truth.” People v Cross, 281 Mich App 737, 740;
760 NW2d 314 (2008) (cleaned up). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the
scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question
of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich
430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013).
A criminal defendant’s sentence must be derived from accurately scored sentencing
guidelines. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). “A sentencing court
has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored, provided that evidence of record
adequately supports a particular score.” People v Gray, 297 Mich App 22, 28; 824 NW2d 213
(2012) (cleaned up). “When calculating the sentencing guidelines, a court may consider all record
evidence, including the contents of a [presentence investigation report (PSIR)], plea admissions,
and testimony presented at a preliminary examination.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354,
358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015). “The trial court may rely on reasonable inferences arising from the
record evidence to sustain the scoring of an offense variable.” People v Muniz, 343 Mich App
437, 453; 997 NW2d 325 (2022) (cleaned up). “Offense variables must be scored giving
consideration to the sentencing offense alone, unless otherwise provided in the particular variable.”
People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 133; 771 NW2d 655 (2009).
OV 15 applies to “aggravated controlled substance offenses.” MCL 777.45(1). OV 15
should be assessed 50 points if
[t]he offense involved traveling from another state or country to this state while in
possession of any mixture containing a controlled substance classified in schedule
1 or 2 that is a narcotic drug or a drug described in section 7212 or 7214 with the
intent to deliver that mixture in this state. [MCL 777.45(1)(d).]

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The trial court’s assessment of 50 points was supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
The trial court relied on four aspects of the record evidence against defendant. First, it considered
the statements from the witness in the presentence investigation report where she stated that she
overheard codefendant instruct defendant to pick up the methamphetamine from his supplier in
Wisconsin. Second, it noted that the methamphetamine found in the witness’s house was
contained in an identical bag to the one found in defendant’s vehicle. Third, it relied on a text that
defendant sent where she said she “ha[d] nothing extra on [her] . . . nothing extra than the original
deal.” Fourth, it noted that, after codefendant sent his supplier’s address in Wisconsin, defendant
stated that she was “[l]eaving now” and told codefendant to tell his supplier that “[she was] in a
red Jeep.”
Moreover, the witness testified that she overheard defendant and codefendant discussing
“how to get enough money to . . . secure the drugs and bring ’em to Michigan.” The trial court
clearly found this testimony credible. See People v Ziegler, 343 Mich App 406, 411; 997 NW2d
493 (2022) (noting that reviewing courts must defer to a trial court’s assessment of witness
credibility). Furthermore, the methamphetamine recovered from the witness’s house and
defendant’s vehicle were contained in identical black cross-patterned plastic bags, which
defendant also admitted she had at home in Wisconsin. During the trial, the State Trooper read
numerous text and Facebook messages recovered from defendant’s phone that detailed her plan to
pick up the methamphetamine from codefendant’s supplier in Wisconsin and bring it to
codefendant in Michigan. On this record, we are not definitely and firmly convinced the trial court
made a mistake by assessing 50 points for OV 15.
However, defendant’s judgment of sentence does not reflect that she was sentenced as a
fourth-offense habitual offender. The trial court calculated defendant’s sentence as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, and her sentence was of a length that included a fourth-offense habitual
offender status. Therefore, we remand this matter to the trial court for the ministerial task of
correcting the judgment of sentence to accurately reflect that defendant was sentenced as a fourth-
offense habitual offender. See People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 312; 639 NW2d 815 (2001)
(explaining that, if a judgment of sentence contains an error, it is appropriate to remand the matter
for the ministerial task of correcting that error).
Affirmed, and remanded for a ministerial correction of defendant’s judgment of sentence.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Sima G. Patel

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