COA 378267 IN RE Z ALTORK MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2026
9:26 AM
In re Z. ALTORK, Minor.
No. 378267
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-000027-NA
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals by right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to the minor
child, ZA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused child or sibling of the child physical
injury or physical or sexual abuse); (h) (parent imprisoned for such a period the child would be
deprived of a normal home for more than two years); (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if returned
to parent); (k)(iii) (parent’s abuse of child or sibling of the child included battering, torture, or
other severe physical abuse); and (k)(v) (parent’s abuse of child or a sibling of the child included
life-threatening injury). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arose after Children’s Protective Services (CPS) received two complaints in April
2024 alleging that ZA witnessed respondent “stab” nonrespondent-mother and LK, who is
respondent’s then-stepdaughter and ZA’s half-sibling. That same day, CPS Investigator Lindsey
Wagner learned that mother and LK “were in critical condition” and underwent emergency surgery
after they were taken to the hospital.
On April 16, 2024, Wagner conducted a forensic interview with LK in which she provided
the details of the attack. According to LK, while at home, “she was packing her snacks in her book
bag when” respondent “moved quickly around a corner and came towards her with a butcher
knife . . . . ” Respondent “then began stabbing her in an upward downward motion striking her
face and chest first.” Mother “began screaming for him to stop, moved between his legs and threw
her body over” LK, trying to protect her. Respondent “then began stabbing” nonrespondent-
mother “several times, only stopping when the knife became lodged in” nonrespondent-mother’s
side. LK tried to help her mother to her feet but “slipped on all the blood causing her to fall and

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hit her head on the counter.” Afterwards, respondent left the house. LK stated that “she instructed
her sister, [ZA], who witnessed the entire incident to run and lock the door while she contacted
911 and applied pressure to her mother’s wounds.”
Mother’s injuries included “multiple lacerations to her chest, lung, diaphragm and spine,”
in addition to “multiple stab wounds to her left chest, abdomen, and the left side of her breastbone,
where the weapon was found to still be embedded.” LK sustained “stab wounds” to her chin,
chest, “breastbone near her heart,” arm, abdominal activity, hand, “as well as multiple other
lacerations.” In addition, medical professionals reported “that the stab wounds were very deep
and some of the wounds appeared to be defensive wounds.”
For these acts, respondent was arrested and charged with two counts of assault with intent
to murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; and two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious
assault), MCL 750.82.
On April 18, 2024, two days after the attack, petitioner, the Department of Health and
Human Services, petitioned the trial court to take jurisdiction over LK and ZA under
MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). Petitioner requested that the court order the children to remain in the
care and custody of mother. For ZA only, presumably because LK was respondent’s stepchild,
petitioner sought termination of respondent’s parental rights at the initial disposition.
Over the next year, the trial court ordered that parenting time be suspended, and it
repeatedly adjourned proceedings at respondent’s request in light of his pending criminal case. In
August 2024, ZA underwent a trauma assessment, and the court received a report detailing the
results of the assessment that indicated ZA met the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder for
children aged six years and younger. The criminal case was adjudicated in April 2025 when a jury
found respondent guilty on all charges.
At a combined proceeding in November 2025, the trial court held a bench trial for
adjudication, a hearing regarding statutory grounds for termination, and a hearing to determine if
termination was in ZA’s best interests. The court took judicial notice under MRE 201 of the
criminal file underlying respondent’s convictions. Petitioner offered, and the trial court admitted
without objection, three exhibits related to respondent’s criminal case: (1) the felony complaint,
(2) an order of disposition, and (3) the judgment of sentence showing that he had been sentenced
to 285 months to 40 years in prison on the AWIM charges and 24 months to four years in prison
on the felonious assault charges. No further evidence was admitted at this juncture.
Concerning jurisdiction, the trial court found, by a preponderance of evidence, that ZA was
subject to a substantial risk of harm to her mental well-being as a result of respondent “attempting
to murder” her sister and her mother, and that respondent’s home was an unfit place for a child to
reside in. The trial court then found grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (h),
(j), (k)(iii), and (k)(v), focusing again on respondent’s AWIM convictions, convictions of felonious
assault, and the likelihood of harm posed to ZA.
During the best-interest determination, CPS worker Elizabeth Bury testified that ZA was
involved in “trauma-based therapy” following the attack. Bury testified that ZA had not asked or
spoken about respondent. Bury stated that she believed ZA had permanency and stability with

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nonrespondent-mother. Following argument, the trial court held that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in ZA’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order terminating
respondent’s parental rights to ZA.
Respondent now appeals.
II. JURISDICTION
We first address respondent’s second argument, that there was insufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s findings as to the “statutory grounds” such that a “jurisdictional defect”
existed that renders the subsequent termination order void. In his brief, however, respondent fails
to articulate what type of jurisdiction the trial court lacked. He cites several cases related to
subject-matter jurisdiction, he might contest whether the court had personal jurisdiction over him,
or he may take issue with whether sufficient evidence supported the statutory grounds for
adjudication, MCL 712A.2(b), or the statutory grounds for termination, MCL 712A.19b(3). But
he offers no factual basis or legal authority to support any jurisdictional challenge. Respondent’s
failure to provide any supporting authority for or further develop this argument renders it
abandoned, and we decline to address it further. See In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484
NW2d 672 (1992) (“A party may not merely announce his position and leave it to us to discover
and rationalize the basis for his claim.”).
III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION
Respondent next challenges on due process grounds the trial court’s finding that statutory
grounds for termination were met. Specifically, he argues that the court clearly erred by finding
statutory grounds existed to terminate his parental rights to ZA by clear and convincing evidence
without hearing testimony or cross-examination. We disagree.
“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App 326, 333; 985 NW2d 912 (2022) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). We review the trial court’s determination for clear error, and a
“finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe
the witnesses.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If we conclude that termination is
supported by at least one statutory ground, additional grounds for the trial court’s decision need
not be considered.” Id. at 333-334 (citations omitted).
Here, petitioner requested termination of respondent’s parental rights as to ZA at the initial
disposition hearing, and the trial court found grounds for termination pursuant to
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (h), (j), (k)(iii), and (k)(v). MCR 3.977(E) outlines how a trial court must
proceed when termination is requested at the initial disposition hearing. In relevant part, the rule
provides:
The court shall order termination of the parental rights of a respondent at the initial
dispositional hearing held pursuant to MCR 3.973, and shall order that additional
efforts for reunification of the child with the respondent shall not be made, if

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* * *
(3) at the initial disposition hearing, the court finds on the basis of clear and
convincing legally admissible evidence that has been introduced at the trial or plea
proceedings, or that is introduced at the dispositional hearing, that one or more facts
alleged in the petition:
(a) are true, and
(b) establish grounds for termination of parental rights under MCL
712A.16b(3)(a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), or (m);
The record properly established a statutory ground for termination under at least MCL
712.19b(3)(j). Under this statute, the trial court may terminate a respondent’s parental rights to a
child when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(j); In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d
61 (2014).]
“The harm contemplated under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) includes emotional harm as well as physical
harm.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 279; 976 NW2d 44 (2021) (citation omitted).
Here, admissible evidence showed that respondent attacked ZA’s mother and half-sibling
LK while ZA was present. Both mother and LK suffered multiple stab wounds that required
extended medical care. Respondent’s convictions, and the details of the underlying violent
conduct, were previously introduced through LK’s forensic interview testimony included with the
petition, the three documents admitted by the trial court at the hearing, and the court taking judicial
notice of respondent’s criminal file. The report outlining the results of ZA’s trauma assessment
stated that ZA exhibited numerous negative psychological effects following the stabbings that
impacted “many areas of her functioning.” For example, ZA had frequent nightmares and became
scared whenever she had to go to another level of mother’s house alone. The trial court noted that
ZA could not be returned to respondent regardless because he was sentenced to “a minimum of
23.75 years.” But it stated further that, “if for some reason it was a possibility,” respondent’s
convictions of AWIM related to mother and LK established clear and convincing evidence that
ZA would be harmed if returned to his care under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).
“Brief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient.”
MCR 3.977(I)(1). The evidence available to the court, which included the trauma assessment
report, indicated that ZA experienced extreme emotional harm after witnessing respondent attack
mother and LK that manifested through negative psychological effects. As stated previously, the
harm referenced in MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) encompasses emotional harm as well as physical harm.
In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 279. A child experiencing extreme emotional harm resulting from
a parent’s criminal behavior against a child’s sibling causes “lifelong and profound effects” that
continuously places the affected child at further risk if returned to the parent’s care. In re Hudson,
294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011).

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In support of his due process argument, respondent claims he was denied an opportunity to
present evidence or witnesses. But at the combined hearing, the court asked respondent’s counsel
if he had “any witnesses as to the jurisdiction and termination,” and he responded that he only had
one for best interests. Thus, for the above reasons, the trial court did not clearly err or violate
respondents due process rights in finding statutory ground to terminate respondent’s parental rights
as stated in MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Because we find that at least one statutory ground for
termination was established through clear and convincing evidence, we need not address the other
grounds relied upon by the court. In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, 340 Mich App at 333-334.
IV. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent further contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that it was in ZA’s
best interests to terminate his parental rights. We disagree.
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court’s finding that termination is
in a child’s best interests is reviewed for clear error. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving
due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Kellogg, 331
Mich App 249, 253; 952 NW2d 544 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“The purpose of child protective proceedings is the protection of the child.” In re Brock,
442 Mich 101, 107; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). “[T]he history of Michigan’s termination-of-parental-
rights statute indicates that the focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the
parent.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). “[W]hether termination of
parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 90. The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the
child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A child’s safety
and well-being, and the risk that a child might face if returned to the parent’s care, must also be
considered in the court’s best-interest determination. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120,
141-142; 809 NNW2d 412 (2011). Trial courts may also consider “the child’s bond to the parent,
the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
“Placement with a relative weighs against termination, but that fact is not dispositive given
that a trial court may terminate parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 347; 990 NW2d 685
(2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An incarcerated parent may provide proper care
and custody for his or her child by having the child placed with a relative during the parent’s
incarceration. In re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 421; 852 NW2d 524 (2014). However, the trial court
is permitted to consider the length of a parent’s incarceration when determining whether
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. See In re Jenks, 281 Mich App 514,
519; 760 NW2d 297 (2008).
In this case, a preponderance of evidence supported the trial court’s finding that it was in
ZA’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. In considering respondent’s

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parenting ability, the trial court found that he acted “contradictory to his ability to appropriately
parent” by attacking ZA’s mother and LK with a knife. The court noted “that [ZA] witnessed the
attack and was in the house” and found that she suffered trauma “as a witness to this attack.” These
findings are representative of the trial court’s consideration for ZA’s safety and well-being. See
In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 141-142.
The trial court also considered the parent-child bond and found that “whatever bond there
was between [ZA] and [respondent] has been shattered; that [ZA] may still have. . . . feelings for
him, [but] those feelings can’t be separated from her fear of him.” The court stressed that ZA was
traumatized by witnessing respondent’s violent attack and found that he demonstrated “an inability
to understand the effect of violence on the children.” In support of these findings, Bury testified
that ZA was involved in “trauma-based therapy” following the attack. She testified further that
ZA had not asked or spoken about respondent and opined that ZA had permanency and stability
with mother.
In determining “whether sometime in the future any contact would be safe for [ZA],” the
trial court considered “any mitigating factors that would explain [respondent’s] behavior.” The
trial court considered that respondent was incarcerated and that there was no physical risk to ZA.
Nonetheless, respondent’s lack of history caring for ZA suggested that, even if he were to be
released during ZA’s childhood, he failed to show that he had the ability to care for ZA. See In re
Jenks, 281 Mich App at 519.
As respondent argues, ZA’s placement with mother weighed against termination, but that
fact was not dispositive. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich App at 347. Even though respondent could
still provide proper care or custody for ZA by placing ZA with a relative during his incarceration,
see In re Sanders, 495 Mich at 421, the trial court appropriately considered the length of time that
respondent would be incarcerated and assigned more weight to that fact. In re Jenks, 281 Mich
App at 519.
On this record, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that it was in ZA’s best interests
to terminate respondent’s parental rights. To the extent that respondent argues that there were
other legal avenues besides termination to protect ZA from him, he failed to develop any arguments
as to what other avenues were available or how they would establish clear and convincing evidence
of error. Given this failure, we consider these arguments abandoned. In re Toler, 193 Mich App
at 477; In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350, 362 n 5; 948 NW2d 131 (2019).
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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