COA 370581 IN RE STREATE KOURTAKIS ESTATE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re ESTATE OF STREATE KOURTAKIS.
PAMELA KOURTAKIS,
Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2026
10:32 AM
v No. 370581
Oakland Probate Court
MICHAEL KOURTAKIS, LC No. 2020-396420-DE
Appellant.
In re ESTATE OF LUCILLE KOURTAKIS.
PAMELA KOURTAKIS,
Appellee,
v No. 370582
Oakland Probate Court
MICHAEL KOURTAKIS, LC No. 2020-396270-DE
Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.

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In these consolidated appeals,1 appellant appeals as of right the probate court’s order
denying admission of purported testamentary instruments for his parents, decedents Streate
Kourtakis and Lucille Kourtakis. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and appellee are the son and daughter of decedents. Appellant lived with
decedents nearly all his life. Appellee relocated to California sometime before 2009. Streate died
in 2016, after which Lucille relocated to California, living with appellee until her death in 2020.
Both parties sought to be named the personal representative of their parents’ respective estates.
Appellant sought to admit various documents he alleged were Streate’s and Lucille’s wills and
codicils. Appellee objected to their admission, arguing they were obtained on the basis of
appellant’s undue influence over the decedents; according to appellee, appellant was emotionally
abusive and domineering, and kept their parents in a state of fearful dependence. Appellee alleged
appellant used his influence to coerce their parents into signing the documents at issue. Appellant
disagreed, arguing he and his parents were always a tightly-knit family unit and that he always
served their best interests. After a bench trial, the probate court found, of relevance, that appellee
had established a rebuttable presumption of undue influence that appellant failed to rebut. Because
the purported testamentary instruments were procured through undue influence, they were
inadmissible. Appellant now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a probate court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Guardianship of Redd,
321 Mich App 398, 403; 909 NW2d 289 (2017). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when this
Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). This Court “defer[s] to the probate court on matters of credibility,
and will give broad deference to findings made by the probate court because of its unique vantage
point regarding witnesses, their testimony, and other influencing factors not readily available to
the reviewing court.” Id. at 412 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the trial court erred in finding that the purported testamentary instruments
were procured through undue influence. We disagree.
A party “alleging undue influence in the execution of a testamentary instrument must
present evidence that the grantor was subjected to threats, misrepresentation, undue flattery, fraud,
or physical or moral coercion sufficient to overpower volition, destroy free agency[,] and impel
the grantor to act against his inclination and free will.” Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia, 312
Mich App 684, 699; 880 NW2d 269 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While it did
not delve into specifics, the trial court found, after “[w]eighing the testimony and the credibility
of the witness’s [sic] testimony, as well as the evidence provided,” that the purported instruments
1 In re Kourtakis Estate, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 24, 2024 (Docket
Nos. 370581 and 370582).

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were the product of undue influence. The crux of this case depends on the weight the trial court
afforded the testimonies provided below. Given our deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations and the testimonies provided, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. In re Guardianship of Redd, 321 Mich App at 403, 412.
The record reflects that, while in appellant’s care, hospital staff treating Streate for a fall
observed marks on his wrists consistent with being held by restraints. He also had pressure sores
on his genitals and buttocks. As a result, hospital staff contacted Adult Protective Services (APS).
Appellant claimed that his resistance to APS’s investigation was due to his parents’ desire to avoid
the agency, but appellee disagreed. APS ultimately petitioned for a guardianship, and Daniel
Kosmowski was appointed as Streate’s guardian ad litem and assigned to investigate Streate’s
alleged abuse and neglect. Kosmowski testified that he interviewed appellant and was not satisfied
with his explanation that Streate’s condition was caused by sitting on a rattan chair without
padding, but Streate died before he finished his reports.2 Another report was made to APS after a
neighbor reported that Streate had urinated on himself and that he and Lucille were underfed;
appellant testified this was a false report.
Appellee testified that, after Streate’s death, Lucille fled with her to California with only a
suitcase. Indeed, decedents had tried to escape from appellant before, in 2009, but returned to
Michigan after appellant made threatening telephone calls. Appellee further testified that Lucille
wrote a letter to the police that she and appellee were afraid of appellant, and that he prevented
Lucille from leaving the house. Appellant disagreed with this allegation, testifying that his parents
went out almost every day. He also referenced a 2014 deposition of Streate in which Streate
contended he was not under appellant’s, or anyone else’s, influence, but also admitted he was
present during the deposition. Appellant admitted that he drafted the documents at issue in his
parents’ presence, but did so at their direction. Decedents wanted the documents in place to protect
appellant’s interests.
The trial court impliedly found that appellee and Kosmowski were more credible than
appellant. Appellee’s and Kosmowski’s testimonies support the trial court’s conclusion that
2 Appellant also challenges the trial court’s decision to permit Kosmowski to testify because
appellee did not name him as a witness in her trial brief as instructed by the trial court. Appellee’s
failure to include Kosmowski in her brief gave the trial court “discretion to impose sanctions”
against her. Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin, 288 Mich App 143, 164; 792 NW2d 749 (2010). A trial
court abuses its discretion by making a decision that falls outside the range of principled outcomes.
Id. Even though appellee did not include Kosmowski as a witness as instructed, she had filed
independent witness lists during the proceedings that listed Kosmowski. Thus, appellant was on
notice of appellee’s intent to call Kosmowski, and was independently aware of Kosmowski’s
involvement with Streate. As a result, appellant did not suffer from any unfair surprise by the
admission of Kosmowski’s testimony. Moreover, admitting the testimony of Streate’s former
guardian ad litem, given his relation to the subject matter and his status as a neutral nonparty
weighing in on the credibility contest between the parties, is within the range of principled
outcomes. Id.

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decedents were subject to appellant’s control and suffered abuse at his hands. Therefore, the trial
court’s finding that appellant, who admitted he drafted the documents at issue, procured them
through threats or “coercion sufficient to overpower volition, destroy free agency[,] and impel the
[decedents] to act against [their] inclination and free will.” Bill & Dena Brown Trust, 312 Mich
App at 699 (quotation marks and citation omitted).3
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
3 Because the trial court properly found that the documents were inadmissible on the basis of undue
influence, we need not address appellant’s other arguments regarding their admissibility under
MCL 700.2502 and MCL 700.2503. We also need not address appellant’s arguments regarding
the trial court’s findings as to the presumption of undue influence and whether a fiduciary
relationship existed between him and decedents, because the record supports the trial court’s
finding that undue influence was actually present.

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