COA 376857 IN RE J S F ABBOTT MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/9/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
January 09, 2026
1:56 PM
In re J. S. F. ABBOTT, Minor.
No. 376857
Calhoun Circuit Court
Juvenile Division
LC No. 2025-000249-NA
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and REDFORD and RICK, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights to his
minor child, JA, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), and (k)(ii). We affirm.
I. FACTS
In January 2025, petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services, petitioned to
remove JA from the care and custody of respondent and the child’s mother. The petition alleged
that Battle Creek Police officers found the child in an unlivable home1 and in a serious state of
neglect. When the police went to the family’s home, JA’s five-year old half-brother answered the
door holding a knife. The officers took the knife and asked the child to tell his parents to come to
the door. The child went back into the house, then returned to the door holding a loaded gun. The
officers took the gun from the child. Upon entering the home, they found JA’s mother, the
mother’s boyfriend, a neighbor man, JA, and two of JA’s siblings. The house was extremely dirty
and cluttered, and the children were very dirty and appeared neglected. JA, who was less than one
year old, had significant rashes on his neck, face, and buttocks, and was struggling to breathe.
Emergency services immediately transported JA to the hospital for treatment. JA’s mother was
arrested and charged with second-degree child abuse and child endangerment.
1 Shortly thereafter, the house was condemned.

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At that time, respondent was in jail after being charged with assaulting JA’s mother earlier
that month. Petitioner filed a petition seeking the removal of JA2 from the home, and the trial
court entered an ex parte order placing JA into petitioner’s custody. After receiving medical care
at the hospital, JA was placed in foster care. Petitioner thereafter amended the petition to add
allegations that respondent sexually abused SV, JA’s eight-year-old half-sister.3 The trial court
authorized the petition. The trial court directed respondent to participate in parenting education,
mental-health services, and any services related to sexual abuse that were available within the jail.
Respondent admitted the allegations in the petition regarding his criminal history and that
his house was unlivable and had been condemned. Respondent pleaded no contest to the
allegations detailing JA’s condition when he was removed from the home. The trial court assumed
jurisdiction of JA. Before the termination hearing, petitioner entered a notice of intent to introduce
into evidence statements regarding SV’s allegations that respondent sexually abused her. Counsel
for respondent did not object, and the trial court admitted the statements into evidence at trial under
MCR 3.972(C)(2).
At the dispositional hearing, the foster care worker testified regarding the allegations
underlying the petition, noting respondent’s history with Children’s Protective Services including
improper supervision, domestic violence, failure to protect, physical abuse, sexual abuse, physical
neglect, threatened harm, and placing a child at unreasonable risk. The forensic interviewer who
interviewed SV testified regarding SV’s reports of sexual abuse by respondent, specifically, the
child’s disclosure that respondent had put his hand in her underwear and rubbed her vagina. The
foster care worker also testified regarding previous allegations of sexual abuse by respondent’s
two stepchildren, who later recanted the allegations.
The children’s mother testified that in January 2025, respondent beat her in front of the
children. She also testified that, although she never witnessed any inappropriate interactions
between SV and respondent, she believed SV’s allegation that respondent sexually abused her.
The children’s mother testified that she had received a text message from respondent’s step-
daughter telling her that respondent also had sexually abused her, but that the step-daughter had
recanted the allegations after respondent promised her something in return for recanting.
Respondent testified that he had received “36 plus certificates” for completing several
parenting classes4 and that he never sexually abused SV. He also read a statement to the trial court
that asked that his parental rights not be terminated because JA was his only son and he wanted to
be the “best dad ever.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent caused physical or sexual abuse), (j) (reasonable likelihood
child will be harmed if returned to parent’s home), and (k)(ii) (parent abused the child or sibling
of the child by criminal sexual conduct). The trial court also found that termination was in JA’s
2 The other children also were removed from the home.
3 Respondent is not the father of SV.
4 The record indicates that respondent received one certificate for one parenting class.

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best interests because no bond had been established between JA and respondent, JA was in a
preadoptive home, and JA’s condition had greatly improved since he was placed in foster care.
The trial court also noted that a custody order alone would not sufficiently protect JA because of
the level of domestic violence in the case. Respondent now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondent contends that the trial court erred by finding that termination of his parental
rights to JA was in the child’s best interests. We disagree.
Once the trial court finds that a statutory basis for terminating a parent’s rights has been
established, the trial court must terminate the parent’s rights if a preponderance of the evidence
demonstrates that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Lombard,
___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 367714); slip op at 5. We review for
clear error the trial court’s decision regarding a child’s best interests. In re Sanborn, 337 Mich
App 252, 276; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). In doing so, we focus on the child, not the parent. In re
Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 346; 990 NW2d 685 (2022). A trial court’s decision is clearly
erroneous if although there is evidence to support it, this Court upon reviewing the entire evidence
“is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Keillor, 325
Mich App 80, 93; 923 NW2d 617 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A clearly
erroneous decision is one that is “more than maybe or probably wrong.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App
30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011).
When determining the best interests of a child in a termination proceeding, the trial court
is required to weigh the available evidence and consider a wide variety of factors, including the
child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability,
and finality, the advantages of the foster home over the parent’s home, the length of time the child
has been in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to the parent’s home in the
foreseeable future, and the parent’s compliance with the case service plan. See In re Sanborn, 337
Mich App at 276-277.
When making the determination regarding JA’s best interests, the trial court considered
several of the relevant factors. The trial court determined that there was very little bond, if any,
between JA and respondent because JA was removed to foster care when he was only seven months
old. The trial court considered that JA was doing well in foster care and his condition had
improved significantly after being removed from respondent’s care. See In re Atchley, 341 Mich
App at 347. The trial court also considered that JA’s foster family was approved as an adoptive
family. See In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court also
emphasized respondent’s history as a perpetrator of domestic violence, and generally violent
history. See In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 238; 894 NW2d 653 (2016). Although respondent
participated in a parenting class and expressed the desire to be a good father, the trial court did not
err by determining that the preponderance of the evidence nonetheless demonstrated that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in JA’s best interests.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by relying upon SV’s statements alleging
sexual abuse because the statements were not corroborated. However, that trial court largely did
not base its best-interest determination on the sexual-abuse allegations; rather, the trial court

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focused in part on the sexual-abuse allegations when determining that statutory grounds existed to
terminate respondent’s parental rights, a determination which respondent does not contest on
appeal.
A preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that termination
of respondent’s parental rights is in JA’s best interests. Respondent admitted his criminal history
of violent offenses, and did not dispute the events that led to his arrest and conviction of domestic
violence against JA’s mother. Respondent also did not contest the deplorable condition of the
home, that the home had been condemned, nor the neglected condition in which JA was found.
There also was evidence that respondent sexually assaulted JA’s half-sister. We conclude that the
trial court did not err by considering SV’s statements among the other factors considered by the
trial court when determining JA’s best interests, nor did the trial court clearly err by determining
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in JA’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Michelle M. Rick

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