COA 370638 JERRY SPENCE V VILLAGE OF SEBEWAING Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JERRY SPENCE and JENNIFER SPENCE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2026
10:49 AM
v No. 370638
Huron Circuit Court
VILLAGE OF SEBEWAING and COUNTY OF
HURON,
LC No. 2023-105859-CZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and O’BRIEN and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs, Jerry and Jennifer Spence, appeal as of right the trial court order granting
summary disposition to defendants Sebewaing Village and Huron County under MCR
2.116(C)(4). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
The basic facts are undisputed. In 2015, the Spences purchased waterfront property in
Sebewaing Village with the intent of building a house. On October 24, 2016, the County granted
the Spences’ application for a soil erosion permit. Over a year later, the Spences submitted a
building permit application and a copy of their finalized planning documents to Mark Epperson,
who worked in the County’s Planning, Building, and Zoning Department. A few days later, they
submitted their zoning permit application to the Village. The Village approved their zoning permit
on April 2, 2018. Subsequently, the County approved their building permit on April 23, 2018.
On July 24, 2018, the Spences informed the County that they were unable to begin
construction on their house “due to budgeting issues.” In their e-mail, they noted that the soil
erosion permit had an expiration date, but that the building permit did not. In response, the County
advised that “[t]he building permit is good for one year but as long as there’s ongoing activity it
may stay open longer.” On March 19, 2019, the soil permit was extended.
Construction began on the property in August 2019. By September 2019, excavation was
completed, the foundation was formed and poured, and—according to the Spences’ complaint—

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“all inspections were complete and signed off by the proper agencies.” No further progress was
made on the construction of the house. Instead, on April 1, 2020, the Spences’ informed the
County that they could not proceed with construction in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Spences asked the County what was needed to keep their building permit active for an
anticipated “build date Spring of 2021.” Epperson, on behalf of the County advised, “Your permit
will remain open for now. If we decide a renewal fee is necessary we’ll contact you and the fee is
only $50.” Later, in February 2021, the Spences informed the County that they remained unable
to proceed with building their house because of the economic impact caused by the pandemic.
They again asked what was necessary from the County in order “to keep the building permit in
Active status for an expected build date Spring of 2022.” In response, Epperson responded that
“[b]ecause of the covid we are not charging any extension fees so rest well.”
The Spences finally contacted the Village in November 2021. At that time, they asked if
they could park a recreational vehicle on the property while the construction on their house was
being completed. The Village denied that request. In addition, the Village advised them that their
“building permits have expired, and [that they would] need to apply for new permits at the village
level and county level.” More specifically, the version of the Village’s zoning ordinance in effect
at the time the original zoning permit was issued provided that “[a]ll building for which a zoning
permit is issued shall be completed within two years of the date the zoning permit is issued, unless
extended by action of the Village Council.” Sebewaing Ordinances, 153.228(F).1 Thus, by
operation of law, the zoning permit expired in April 2020.
On December 10, 2021, the Spences submitted a new application for a zoning compliance
permit. Attached to the application was a copy of the original site plan and a foundation plan with
handwritten notes showing a sump-pump enclosure room that had been added to the construction.
In addition, the Spences contacted the County to inquire whether their building and soil erosion
permits were still active. The County answered that the permits remained active.
After the Spences submitted their request for a new zoning compliance permit, Matt
Bumhoffer, a zoning administrator for the Village, sent them an e-mail advising that the
application did not meet the deadline for the February planning commission meeting and that it
would instead go before the March planning commission meeting.
A few hours later, the County sent an e-mail informing the Spences that they had been
incorrectly advised that the permits were active and that, due to a lack of progress, the permits had
actually expired. The County further noted that it had received notice that their zoning compliance
permit had expired and that the Spences had applied to the Village for a new one. The County
invited the Spences to file a new application for a building permit and soil erosion permit after
they resolved the zoning issues on the property. The Spences did not apply for a new building or
soil-erosion permits with the County. They also did not challenge the County’s assertion that the
permits had expired due to lack of progress.
1 This rule is substantially similar to the current version of the Village’s zoning ordinance. See
Sebewaing Ordinance, § 153.137(E).

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The Spences attended the March meeting of the Village’s Planning Commission. At the
meeting, the Planning Commission “summarily denied reinstatement” of the original zoning
permit because it did not comply with set-back requirements. The minutes from the Planning
Commission meeting reflected compliance issues with the original zoning permit and stated that
the Spences would have the property surveyed and review the setbacks.
The Spences allege that, during the month after that meeting, they “provided [to the
Village] proof of compliance with the original approved Zoning Permit related to the front yard
set-back with help from [their] designer.” In a subsequent e-mail to the Village, the Spences asked
what they needed to do in order to reach “a solution and a path to finish [their] house.” The Village
responded by directing them to the Village’s zoning board of appeals.
On April 27, 2022, the Spences submitted an application to the zoning board of appeals.
On the application, they checked the box for “variance request” and the box for “appeal from
administrative decision.” In the description of the request, they wrote, “Not exactly sure if [we
are] asking for a variance or an appeal.” They answered the questions related to a variance request
and provided a copy of their survey and the final site plan that had been used in their original
application for a zoning compliance permit.
The zoning board of appeals met on May 29, 2022. On June 13, 2022, the board sent a
letter to the Spences denying their request for a zoning compliance permit and their request for a
variance. A copy of the meeting minutes was attached to the letter.
On July 20, 2022, the Spences sent a survey of their property to Bumhoffer, the Village’s
zoning administrator. They allege that the survey demonstrated their compliance with their
original zoning permit and building permit. They also acknowledged that their driveway was
encroaching on the neighboring property and agreed to correct that error. In response, the Village
referred the Spences to the meeting minutes for the June meeting of the zoning board of appeals
(which voted to approve the denial letter and the May meeting minutes) and provided the Spences
with information related to filing an appeal with the zoning board of appeals.2 The correspondence
noted that a timely appeal of the zoning board of appeals’ decision had not been received, that
another application to appeal could not be submitted for a one-year period, and that the Village
“considers this matter closed.” The Planning Commission did not further consider the matter.
In April 2023, the Spences filed a complaint against the Village and the County, raising
claims of temporary taking in violation of federal and state constitutional protections, violation of
state and federal procedural and substantive due process, violation of the fair and just treatment
clause of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 17, and violations of their civil rights.
They requested superintending control, a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and monetary
2 The website referenced in the letter contains information related to appealing the zoning board’s
decision to the circuit court. See
https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/sebewaing/latest/sebewaing_mi/0-0-0-8190#JD_153.123
<last accessed July 31, 2026> No references to appeals to the circuit court were included in the
letter, however.

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damages. Initially, the matter was removed to federal court. After the complaint was amended to
remove all federal claims, the federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state-law claims and remanded the matter to the state court.
Subsequently, in state court, the Village filed a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8). The County also moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(4), (C)(8), and (C)(10). Before the motions were heard, the Spences filed a notice of
taking the depositions of Epperson and Bumhoffer. A few days later, the Spences filed a motion
seeking to (1) correct the court record so that documents filed in the federal action could be
considered in the state action, (2) schedule a pretrial conference for entry of a scheduling order,
(3) adjourn the motions for summary disposition, (4) and to compel the depositions of Epperson
and Bumhoffer. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court ordered the record to reflect
the documents that had been filed in federal court, scheduled a pretrial hearing, and adjourned the
motions for summary disposition. The court did not, however, enter an order compelling the
requested depositions, but it noted that it would allow the parties to reschedule the requested
depositions.
On February 12, 2024, the Spences filed a second motion to compel and to adjourn the
rescheduled motions for summary disposition. In their supporting brief, they asserted that, despite
their attempts to reschedule the depositions of Bumhoffer and Epperson, the lawyer for the Village
and the lawyer for the County would not provide them with any deposition dates prior to the date
scheduled for the motions for summary disposition. They maintained that this was the second time
that both the Village and the County “have sought to gain an unfair advantage in this case by
refusing to equally, in good faith, extend any professional curtesy under MCR 1.105 to schedule
depositions, in addition to refusing to adjourn their Motions for Summary Dispositions . . . .”
Following a hearing on the second motion to compel, the trial court entered an order denying the
Spences’ second motion to compel because the court was not persuaded that factual development
was necessary to resolve the matters presented in the pending motions for summary disposition.
Thereafter, the Spences filed a motion in response to the Village’s motion for summary
disposition and to the County’s motion for summary disposition. Following a hearing on the
motions, the trial court granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). This appeal
follows.
II. SUMMARY DISPOSITION
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Spences argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their entire complaint under
MCR 2.116(C)(4). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) is proper if the trial court “lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter.” “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a prerequisite for a court to hear
and decide a claim.” Core Values Constr, LLC v Sheehan's on the Green, Inc, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW2d ___ (2025) (Docket No. 369250); slip op at 4 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[W]hether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is a question of law
that is reviewed de novo.” Harris v Vernier, 242 Mich App 306, 309; 617 NW2d 764 (2000). A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) may be supported by affidavits,
depositions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(2). “For jurisdictional questions

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under MCR 2.116(C)(4), we determine whether the affidavits, together with the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence, demonstrate a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Wells Fargo Rail Corp v Michigan, 344 Mich App 351, 358; 1 NW3d 373 (2022)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court may make factual findings when resolving a
challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Smith v Smith, 218 Mich App 727, 733; 555 NW2d
271 (1996).
B. ANALYSIS
1. CLAIMS AGAINST THE VILLAGE
We conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing the Spences’ claims against the
Village under MCR 2.116(C)(4). “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court’s abstract power to
determine a case of a particular kind or character.” Zelasko v Charter Township of Bloomfield,
347 Mich App 141, 155; 14 NW3d 441 (2023). “Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear
and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the
constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by
the constitution or statutes of this state.” MCL 600.605. Additionally, the Michigan Constitution
provides that circuit courts “have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law . . . .”
Const 1963, art 6, § 13. “The circuit court also has certain appellate jurisdiction.” Zelasko, 347
Mich App at 155. As explained in Zelasko,
The circuit court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right filed by an aggrieved party
from “a final order or decision of an agency from which an appeal of right to the
circuit court is provided by law.” MCR 7.103(A)(3). Specifically, the Michigan
Zoning Enabling Act (the MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq., provides for judicial
review of all decisions of a local government; under § 605 of the MZEA, MCL
125.3605, a decision of a zoning board of appeals is final, subject to appellate
review by the circuit court. [Id.]
See also MCL 125.3605 (stating that the “decision of the zoning board of appeals shall be final”
and that “[a] party aggrieved by the decision may appeal to the circuit court for the county in which
the property is located as provided under [MCL 125.3606]).”
MCL 125.3606(3) sets forth time limits for filing an appeal of a decision from the zoning
board of appeals. See also MCR 7.122(B) (proving that an appeal from a zoning-ordinance
determination “must be filed within the time prescribed by the statute applicable to the appeal.”).
“The time limit for filing an appeal in the circuit court is jurisdictional; a circuit court lacks
jurisdiction over an untimely filed claim of appeal.” Quality Market v Detroit Bd of Zoning
Appeals, 331 Mich App 388, 393; 952 NW2d 603 (2019); see also MCR 7.104(A). As a result,
when a party does not timely claim an appeal under MCL 125.3606(3), the circuit court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an original action challenging the zoning board of appeals’
decision. Zelasko, 347 Mich App at 161. Such an action constitutes an impermissible collateral
attack on the decision by the zoning board of appeals. Id.
In this case, the Spences filed an application with the Village’s zoning board of appeals on
April 27, 2022. Their application included a request for either an “appeal from administrative

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decision” or a “variance request.” At the May 2022 zoning board of appeals meeting, the zoning
board of appeals denied their appeal and their request for a variance. A letter detailing the denial
and a copy of the minutes from the meeting were mailed to the Spences. The Spences did not
appeal the decision of the zoning board of appeals in the circuit court. Instead, in May 2023,
almost one year after the zoning board of appeals issued its decision denying their request, the
Spences filed an original action against the Village.
If a plaintiff fails to file a timely claim of appeal, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hear
their original complaint if their complaint amounts to a collateral attack on the decision of the
zoning board of appeals. Id. Thus, because the Spences failed to timely file a claim of appeal of
the decision of the zoning board of appeals, the question is whether their original complaint is
nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack upon that decision. Zelasko instructs that, in
order to determine whether the plaintiffs were required to file a claim of appeal instead of a
separate action under MCR 7.122(A)(2), the court must consider whether the gravamen of the
plaintiffs’ separate complaint amounts to a challenge to the zoning board of appeals’ decision. Id.
at 159. “The gravamen of the complaint is determined by reading the complaint as a whole and
looking beyond mere procedural labels.” Id. “A party cannot avoid the dismissal of a cause of
action through artful pleading.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, in Count I of their first amended complaint, the Spences asserted that the Village had
effected a temporary or de facto taking of their property when it denied the zoning compliance
permit and variance request after the Spences had already begun construction on their property in
reliance upon the originally issued permits. The same factual basis was used in support of the
Spences’ claims for violation of procedural due process (Count II) and substantive due process
(Count III) and their claim that the fair-and-just-treatment clause of the Michigan Constitution had
been violated (Count IV). In Count V, they asked that the trial court impose superintending control
upon the zoning board of appeals so as to force them to “properly consider” the Spences’
application for a zoning compliance permit or a variance request. In Count VI, they further
requested that the court enter a declaratory judgment and injunction. For declaratory relief, they
sought a declaration that the Village’s conduct effected a taking of their property without just
compensation, that it violated the Spences’ due-process rights, and that the conduct violated the
Spences’ rights under the Fair and Just Treatment Clause of the Michigan Constitution. They
asked the court to enter an injunction preventing the Village from obstructing the Spences’ right
to build on their property as allowed by the originally issued zoning permit. In addition to the
declaratory and injunctive relief, the Spences sought damages in excess of $25,000. Considered
as a whole and looking beyond the procedural labels used in the first amended complaint, it is clear
that the Spences’ sought reversal of the decision by the zoning board of appeals so that they may
complete construction on their house in accordance with the 2018 permits. As such, their goal is
to overturn the decision of the zoning board of appeals, i.e., their complaint is a de facto appeal of
that decision. And, because they did not timely file an appeal of that decision in the circuit court,
the circuit court was without jurisdiction to decide the dispute.
Rather than argue that their complaint is distinct from an appeal of the decision of the
zoning board, the Spences maintain that they have an unfettered right under MCR 7.122(A) to
either appeal the decision of the zoning board of appeal to the circuit court or to bring “a complaint
for relief relating to a determination under a zoning ordinance.” The Zelasko Court recognized
that “under certain circumstances,” MCR 7.122(A)(2) “does not restrict the right of a party to bring

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a separate complaint for relief relating to a zoning determination.” Zelasko, 347 Mich App at 159.
The Zelasko Court did not identify the “certain circumstances” under which such a separate claim
could be brought. Instead, as noted above, it looked to see whether the separate action was actually
an improper appeal of the decision of the zoning board of appeal and concluded that, if it were, it
was an impermissible collateral attack for which the circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. at 159.
The Spences argue that the Zelasko Court’s interpretation of MCR 7.122(A) was incorrect
because it added a “certain circumstances” exception to the right to bring a separate action instead
of an appeal. We disagree.
“When called on to construe a court rule, this Court applies the legal principles that govern
the construction and application of statutes.” Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich
188, 193; 612 NW2d 116 (2000). Thus, the first step is to consider “the plain language of the court
rule” and if that language “is unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed, without
further judicial construction or interpretation.” Id.
MCR 7.122 addresses appeals from zoning ordinance determinations. MCR 7.122(A)
provides:
(1) This rule governs appeals to the circuit court from a determination under
a zoning ordinance by any officer, agency, board, commission, or zoning board of
appeals, and by any legislative body of a city, village, township, or county
authorized to enact zoning ordinances. Unless this rule provides otherwise, MCR
7.101 through MCR 7.115 apply. This rule does not apply to legislative decisions
of a city, village, township, or county, such as the adoption of or amendment to a
zoning ordinance.
(2) This rule does not restrict the right of a party to bring a complaint for
relief relating to a determination under a zoning ordinance. A party may seek a
stay of enforcement under MCR 7.123(E).
(3) An appeal under this section is an appeal of right.
Again, the Spences contend that they may either file an appeal under MCR 7.122(A)(1) or
a separate claim for relief under MCR 7.122(A)(2). However, at the outset, MCR 7.122(A)(2)
only provides that MCR 7.122 does not “restrict” the right to bring a separate complaint that is
related “to a determination under a zoning ordinance.” The fact that the court rule does not restrict
the right to file a separate complaint does not mean that the court rule authorizes such a complaint
under any circumstance. Indeed, there is no language in the court rule indicating that litigants may
forego an appeal of a decision of a zoning appeals board and then bring a separate action
challenging that same decision after the time for such an appeal has expired. The Legislature could
have indicated that a litigant could choose either an appeal under subdivision (A)(1) or an original
action under subdivision (A)(2), but it did not.
In addition, the Spences’ interpretation renders nugatory the remainder of MCR 7.122,
which sets forth the timing requirements for an appeal, the manner of filing an appeal, whether

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bond is required on appeal, what materials constitute the record on appeal and how that record is
transmitted to the circuit court, the requirements for the appellate briefs, what type of decision
must be rendered by the trial court to resolve the appeal, and that the notice of decision on appeal
must be served on the parties. None of those requirements would need to be satisfied under the
Spences’ interpretation of MCR 7.122(A)(2) because a party could easily avoid them by just filing
a separate action challenging the zoning board’s decision. “The maxim that every word of a court
rule should be given meaning, and that courts should not render any part of a court rule surplusage,
is well-settled.” Grievance Administrator, 462 Mich at 195.
Another problem exists with the Spences’ interpretation. As noted above, MCL 125.3605
expressly provides that “[t]he decision of the zoning board of appeals shall be final,” but that it
may be appealed to the circuit court as provided in MCL 125.3606. In turn, MCL 125.3606(3)
sets forth the timeline for an appeal from a decision of a zoning board of appeals, and it is well-
established that the time limit for such an appeal is jurisdictional. See Quality Market, 331 Mich
App at 393-394; MCR 7.104(A). If the Spences’ interpretation of MCR 7.122(A)(2) as allowing,
without restriction the filing of either an appeal or an original complaint, were correct, then an
aggrieved party would be able to avoid the jurisdictional limits imposed by the timeline for an
appeal under MCL 125.3606 simply by framing its challenge to the decision of the zoning board
of appeals as an original complaint instead of an appeal from the zoning board’s decision. Such
an interpretation would lead to absurd results. See Rafferty v Markovitz, 461 Mich 265, 270; 602
NW2d 367 (1999) (noting that court rules “must be construed to prevent absurd results, injustice,
or prejudice to the public interest).
In light of the foregoing, we discern no error with the Zelasko Court’s determination that
MCR 7.122(A)(2) allows an original action under certain circumstances, but that it may not be
maintained as a collateral attack to a decision that was required to be appealed under MCL
125.3605.
The Spences further argue that, even if Zelasko was correctly decided, we should conclude
that it only applies prospectively. We disagree. In general, judicial opinions are given full
retroactive effect. Pohutski v Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 695; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). The
dispositive question is whether the decision at issue articulated a new principle of law. Id. For
retroactivity purposes, a law is new when it either overrules established precedent or addresses a
matter of first impression that was not foreshadowed by prior appellate authority. People v
Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 68; 330 NW2d 366 (1982). Here, the Zelasko decision did not announce a
new principle of law. Instead, it relied upon the plain language of MCL 125.3605, MCL 125.3606,
MCR 7.122(A), and several cases, including Quality Market, 331 Mich App at 394-395, which
plainly held that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction if the plaintiff fails to timely
appeal a decision of the zoning board of appeals. As no new rule of law was announced in Zelasko,
there is no basis upon which to give it a prospective application.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court order dismissing the complaint against
the Village under MCR 2.116(C)(4).

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2. CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY
The County argued that because the Spences did not challenge the expiration of their
permits, their claims for temporary takings and violation of due process are not ripe and must be
dismissed. The trial court agreed and dismissed the claims against the County under MCR
2.116(C)(4).
The rule of finality provides that “[a] claim that the application of government regulations
effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations to the property at issue.” Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App 677, 711; 770
NW2d 421 (2009). “The rule of finality applies to all constitutional ‘as applied’ challenges to land
use regulations and ensures that a plaintiff has suffered an actual, concrete injury.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Here, based upon the allegations in the first amended complaint, the
Spences argue that the County took the following actions and inactions: (1) they granted a soil
erosion permit in 2016; (2) they granted a building permit in 2018 after the Village issued the
original zoning compliance permit, (3) through written correspondence the County assured the
Spences that their permits remained active in 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022, (4) the County then
reversed course and announced that the permits had expired as of February 15, 2022 because there
was a lack of progress on the construction, and (5) the County invited them to reapply for the
permits after resolving any zoning issues with the Village. The Spences never re-applied for any
permits with the County, nor did they challenge the decision to “expire” or “revoke” the previously
granted permits.
The County points out that the Spences could have pursued administrative remedies by
going before the Construction Board of Appeals. See MCL 125.1514. On appeal, the Spences
maintain that such an action would have been futile because their application to the Village’s
zoning board of appeals was denied. The matter before the zoning board of appeals, however,
concerned the zoning compliance permit, not the building permit. Thus, the denial of relief from
the Village does not excuse the Spences from needing to comply with the rule of finality with
respect to their claims against the County.
Because the matter was not ripe for appellate review in light of the Spences complete
failure to challenge any aspect of the County’s decision, the trial court did not err by dismissing
their complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(4).
III. MOTION TO COMPEL
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Spences next contend that the trial court erred by denying their second motion to
compel. Challenges to a court’s denial of a motion to compel are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Ligouri v Wyandotte Hosp and Med Ctr, 253 Mich App 372, 375; 655 NW2d 592
(2002).

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B. ANALYSIS
The Spences argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their second motion
to compel. They note that their motion to compel was denied because the trial court was not
persuaded that factual development was necessary in order for them to respond to the pending
motions for summary disposition. They maintain that reasoning was incorrect because motions
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(10) can require factual development.
We agree that motions under (C)(4) and (C)(10) can certainly require factual development.
However, “the mere fact that the discovery period remains open does not automatically mean that
the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition was untimely or otherwise inappropriate.”
Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264,
293; 769 NW2d 234 (2009). If a party is opposing summary disposition on the grounds that
additional discovery is required, that party must identify the disputed issue and “must offer the
required MCR 2.116(H) affidavits, with the probable testimony to support is contentions.” Id.
Here, beyond proclaiming that they needed to take Epperson and Bumhoffer’s depositions in order
to respond to the motions for summary disposition, the Spences did not identify any disputed
issues, nor did they offer the affidavits required under MCR 2.116(H).
As such, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the second
motion to compel.
IV. OTHER ISSUES
The Spences argue numerous other issues in this brief on appeal. Their statement of
questions presented, however, only identifies the above two issues. “An issue not contained in the
statement of questions presented is waived on appeal.” English v Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich,
263 Mich App 449, 459; 688 NW2d 523 (2004); Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 521; 934
NW2d 64 (2019). Accordingly, the additional issues have been waived and are not properly before
this Court.
Affirmed. The Village and the County may tax costs as the prevailing parties. MCR
7.219(A).
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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