COA 378023 IN RE S M RICHARDS MINOR Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/21/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2026
1:33 PM
In re S. M. RICHARDS, Minor.
Nos. 378023 & 378576
Lapeer Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 24-013296-NA
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals,1 respondent-mother and respondent-father appeal as of right
the order terminating their parental rights to the minor child, SMR. Respondents assert the same
arguments on appeal, claiming that the trial court erred when it found (1) statutory grounds for
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) and (2) that termination of respondents’
parental rights was in SMR’s best interests. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Respondents have a history of domestic violence. In December 2024, respondent-father
lived in a tent in the woods, and respondent-mother was staying at a women’s shelter for domestic-
violence victims. One night, respondent-mother left the shelter and brought SMR—who had a
severe cough and double ear infection—to respondent-father’s tent, where the three slept overnight
while it was about 37 degrees Fahrenheit outside. In the morning, respondents got into a loud
argument, and when law enforcement arrived, they found SMR in a car seat outside the tent in the
snow, not wearing shoes. Respondent-father was eventually arrested for domestic violence and
taken to jail. SMR was taken into protective custody and placed in foster care after it was
determined that respondent-mother was unable to care for him.
1 In re SM Richards Minor, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 18, 2026
(Docket Nos. 378023 and 378576).

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The court took jurisdiction over SMR in January 2025 after respondents entered no-contest
pleas. In the ensuing months, respondents barely complied with their treatment plans. As a result,
at a May 2025 dispositional review hearing, respondents were told that they needed to do “a lot
more moving forward.” Unfortunately, respondents’ sluggish progress continued through to the
next dispositional review hearing in August 2025. At that hearing, the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) requested permission to file a petition to terminate respondents’ parental
rights due to their lack of progress. The court granted the request while noting that respondents
could still participate in services and work towards removing the barriers to reunification.
By the time of the termination trial in October 2025, respondents had still done little to
remove their barriers to reunification. Respondent-mother had obtained housing but was still
struggling to address her issues with domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental health.
Respondent-father had not made any progress on removing his barriers to reunification. As a
result, the trial court found statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g),
and (j). The court also found that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in SMR’s best
interests, so respondents’ parental rights were accordingly terminated.
This appeal followed.
II. STATUTORY GROUNDS
On appeal, both respondents first dispute the trial court’s finding that statutory grounds for
termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court must find at least one statutory ground for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 272; 976 NW2d 44 (2021). This Court reviews for clear error a trial
court’s statutory-ground finding. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271;
779 NW2d 286 (2009).
B. APPLICABLE LAW
The trial court found statutory grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). Those subsections provide that a trial court may terminate a
parent’s parental rights if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.

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* * *
(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
The court need find only one statutory ground for termination to terminate parental rights. In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 272. Consequently, this Court will affirm “[i]f the trial court did not
clearly err by finding one statutory ground existed.” Id. at 273.
C. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it found by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was proper under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The initial dispositional order was entered on February 14, 2025, so by the
time that respondent-mother’s rights were terminated in October 2025, more than 182 days had
passed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order.
The conditions that led to respondent-mother’s adjudication included inappropriate
housing, domestic-violence concerns, abuse of drugs and alcohol, concerns about respondent-
mother’s ability to safely parent SMR, and mental-health issues. Since her adjudication,
respondent-mother obtained housing, but all the other issues that led to respondent-mother’s
adjudication remained.
For substance abuse, the court reviewed respondent-mother’s history of drug testing and
observed that she had “49 non-compliant tests, and numerous other tests with some other issues in
there,” such as testing positive for prescription medication that she was not prescribed.
Respondent-mother also had “multiple tests for alcohol.” One of those positive tests was as recent
as August 2025. The court noted that respondent-mother had been offered services to aid her in
addressing her substance abuse, including a referral for “Substance Use Disorder” programming
(SUD). According to SUD, however, respondent-mother had made “minimal progress towards
her goal of abstaining from alcohol consumption” and “living a lawful lifestyle.” The court further
noted that respondent-mother had attended “Sacred Heart”—a rehabilitation facility—for “nine
days” but ultimately “[l]eft against recommendations.” On this record, the court concluded that
respondent-mother had “not rectified the substance abuse issues that led to her adjudication.”
For respondent-mother’s mental health, the court noted that respondent-mother
participated in a psychological evaluation but “was extremely guarded” for it, meaning that she
“was not open and forthright,” which hampered the psychologist’s ability to aid respondent-mother
in “address[ing] the issues.” Despite this, it was recommended that respondent-mother attend

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individual therapy to help her address her “deep[er]” issues, which respondent-mother initially
participated in. She was, however, “still very guarded” during the sessions. The court concluded
that respondent-mother’s mental health remained a barrier because she was not “receiving much
benefit from this counseling that she’s doing.”
Turning to domestic-violence concerns, the court labeled this as “one of the foremost
things” that respondent-mother needed to address because it was what “first brought this [case]
into attention.” The court found that this issue was “significant” but does “not appear” to have
been “ever addressed at all by” respondent-mother. The court noted that respondent-mother
continued to see respondent-father, continued breaking the no-contact order of both her probation
and respondent-father’s probation, and continued to engage in domestic violence. The court noted
that the most recent example was when respondent-mother was arrested for domestic violence as
a result of an incident involving respondent-father in August 2025. The court concluded that it
had this case “for eight months,” and respondent-mother was still dealing with the same issue that
she was “at the beginning.”
For parenting skills, the trial court observed that respondent-mother had worked with
multiple services but was unable to address her issues. Respondent-mother worked with “Family
Preservation” but was “closed out” due to “lack of progress, lack of communication.” She later
signed up for “Love and Logic” “in April[] but did not attend.” She signed up for the class again
later and this time attended, but she “was asked to leave on the last night of the class due to her
inappropriate behavior.” Respondent-mother did end up completing the program, but “it [was]
said that she did not benefit.” The court summarized that respondent-mother was “not benefitting
from the [parenting] programs” in which she participated, explaining that “just because you sit
there doesn’t mean you benefit from [being] there.” As for parenting time, the court noted that
respondent-mother “had some good parenting time, but it’s been back and forth.” But the court
commended respondent-mother on her recent parenting time, acknowledging that “it’s gone better
lately,” though the court caveated this by also acknowledging that there still “has been some
cancellations and some missed parenting times.” The court was also “concerned” that respondent-
mother failed to attend SMR’s surgery because she “didn’t have transportation.”
After concluding that respondent-mother had failed to rectify these conditions that led to
termination, the court next considered whether there was a reasonable likelihood that respondent-
mother could rectify the unresolved conditions in a reasonable time considering SMR’s age. The
court noted that SMR was 26 months old at the time of the termination trial and had been in foster
care for 10 months. In that time, respondent-mother, in the court’s opinion, had “made little, if
any, progress in addressing the main reason the court took jurisdiction over the child,” despite
being “told multiple times in court how to address these things.” The court ultimately relied on
that lack of progress as well as respondent-mother’s “lack [of] insight, unwilling[ness] to take
responsibility, [and] continued poor decisions” to conclude that respondent-mother would not be
able to rectify the conditions that led to adjudication in a reasonable time considering SMR’s age.
Respondent-mother on appeal contends that by the time of her termination trial in October
2025, she had in fact rectified all of the conditions that led to adjudication except her substance
abuse. As explained, the trial court concluded that, by the time of the termination trial, respondent-
mother had appropriate housing but still had not addressed her issues with substance abuse,
domestic violence, mental health, and parenting skills. Respondent-mother does not contend that

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any of the trial court’s underlying factual findings in support of its conclusions were clearly
erroneous. She instead merely contends that the facts as found by the trial court do not support
that the conditions remained unrectified.
For mental health, respondent-mother emphasizes that she completed a psychological
evaluation and attended therapy. And for parenting skills, respondent-mother similarly
emphasizes that she “engaged in parenting education as directed by DHHS.” Both assertions are
true, and the trial court acknowledged as much. The trial court concluded that respondent-mother’s
mental health and parenting skills remained a barrier to reunification because respondent-mother
had not benefited from the services in which she engaged. Respondent-mother does not dispute
these findings, and they establish that respondent-mother’s mental health and parenting skills
remained barriers to reunification, as the trial court found.
For domestic violence, respondent-mother acknowledges that she was arrested for a
domestic-violence incident involving respondent-father two months before the termination trial,
but she insists that domestic violence was no longer an issue for her by the time of trial. Since this
case began, respondent-mother was offered services to help her address her issues with domestic
violence that primarily involved respondent-father. Despite this attempted intervention,
respondent-mother was arrested for a domestic-violence incident involving respondent-father two
months before trial. We are not convinced that, on such facts, the trial court made a mistake by
finding that respondent-mother’s struggles with domestic violence had not been rectified by the
termination trial.
Respondent-mother also argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that respondent-
mother could not rectify her struggles with substance abuse, parenting skills, and mental health in
a reasonable time considering SMR’s age.2 Starting with respondent-mother’s substance abuse,
respondent-mother again emphasizes that she participated in services offered to her. The trial
court, however, acknowledged respondent-mother’s participation in substance-abuse services but
concluded that she was either not completing the services (like when respondent-mother left
Sacred Heart early against the provider’s recommendation) or was not benefitting from the services
(like how SUD stated that respondent-mother had made “minimal progress” towards her goals).
Respondent-mother’s ongoing struggle with substance abuse was exemplified by the results of her
drug screenings—she had “49 non-compliant tests” that included “multiple tests for alcohol,”
including as recently as August 2025. Given respondent-mother’s lack of progress and either
2 Respondent-mother does not explicitly make this argument with respect to domestic violence
because she believes that she sufficiently “addressed” this barrier to reunification. For
thoroughness, we note that if respondent-mother had made this argument with respect to domestic
violence, we would reject it. Considering that (1) respondent-mother was offered services to
address her issues with domestic violence since the case began and (2) she failed to make any
meaningful progress towards addressing her issues with domestic violence (culminating in her
arrest for domestic-violence incident involving respondent-father a mere two months before the
termination trial), we are not convinced that the trial court clearly erred by finding that there was
not a reasonable likelihood that respondent-mother could address this barrier in a reasonable time
considering SMR’s young age.

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unwillingness or inability to benefit from the services offered, the trial court properly found that
there was not a reasonable likelihood that respondent-mother could address her struggles with
substance abuse within a reasonable time considering SMR’s age.
For respondent-mother’s mental-health issues, she again emphasizes her participation in
services but ignores that the trial court was concerned about the fact that respondent-mother had
not benefited from the services in which she engaged. On that point, the trial court noted that
respondent-mother was “guarded” in her therapy sessions and during the psychological evaluation,
which supported the court’s finding that respondent-mother “lack[ed] insight” into how to properly
address her mental-health issues despite being “told multiple times in court how to address these
things.” It also supported that respondent-mother was “unwilling to take responsibility” for her
mental-health issues and address them in a way that made reunification with SMR possible. All
of this supports the trial court’s finding that there was not a reasonable likelihood that respondent-
mother could address her mental-health issues in a reasonable time considering SMR’s age, and
we are not convinced that this finding was erroneous.
The same largely holds true for respondent-mother’s lack of parenting skills. Again,
respondent-mother engaged in services to help her develop better parenting skills, but she failed
to sufficiently benefit from those services. This issue is perhaps a closer call because the trial court
found that respondent-mother’s parenting-time sessions had recently improved, but it is also true
that respondent-mother had still not progressed to unsupervised visits due to concerns with her
parenting ability despite having received services for months. Ultimately, it is unnecessary to
decide this particular sub-issue because, regardless of whether respondent-mother could have
developed the skills necessary to safely parent SMR in a reasonable time considering SMR’s age,
the other barriers to reunification remained, and the trial court properly found that there was not a
reasonable likelihood that respondent-mother could rectify those barriers in a reasonable time
given SMR’s age.
To summarize, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
More than 182 days had elapsed since respondent-mother’s initial dispositional order was issued,
and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that (1) the conditions that led to adjudication
(domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental-health concerns) continued to exist and (2) there
was not a reasonable likelihood that respondent-mother would be able to rectify these barriers to
reunification in a reasonable time considering SMR’s young age.
Having concluded that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), we need not
address the other statutory grounds on which the trial court relied to terminate respondent-mother’s
parental rights.
D. RESPONDENT-FATHER
Like with respondent-mother, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err when it
found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was
proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). The initial dispositional order was entered on February 14,
2025, so by the time that respondent-father’s rights were terminated in October 2025, more than
182 days had passed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order.

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The conditions that led to respondent-father’s adjudication were largely the same as the
conditions that led to respondent-mother’s adjudication—inappropriate housing, domestic-
violence concerns, substance abuse, and mental-health issues. The trial court found that
respondent-father had failed to rectify all of these conditions by the time of the termination trial,
and respondent-father does not appear to dispute that finding on appeal. For thoroughness,
however, we briefly review the trial court’s reasoning for making the findings that it made.
For substance abuse, the court observed that respondent-father had 39 noncompliant results
that included testing positive for alcohol on multiple occasions. The court noted that respondent-
father did not appear to have issues with other substances—only alcohol. But the court emphasized
that respondent-father’s issues with alcohol were severe, as demonstrated by his testing positive
for alcohol at a court hearing in August 2025. Respondent-father also admitted to drinking alcohol
“the day before the last hearing,” and at the time of the termination trial, he was “in jail again for
alcohol issues.” The court accordingly found that respondent was continuing to abuse alcohol at
the time of the termination hearing.
Respondent-father’s mental health issues—another of respondent-father’s barriers to
reunification—were to some extent tied to his alcohol abuse; the result of respondent-father’s
psychological evaluation recommended that he participate in inpatient treatment “to safely detox.”
The court observed that respondent-father had not done this, nor had he engaged in any “outpatient
substance abuse counseling” to help him achieve sobriety. The court further noted that respondent-
father had largely not complied with any other recommendation from his psychological
evaluation—it was recommended that respondent-father engage in “mental health counseling” but
the court was unable to confirm what, if any, type of counseling respondent-father had engaged
in; it was recommended that respondent-father “follow up with a psychiatric provider” but there
was no evidence that he had done so; and it was recommended that respondent-father get help
addressing “his extensive history of domestic violence,” which he had not done.
This bled into the trial court’s finding that domestic violence remained a barrier to
reunification for respondent-father. The court observed that respondent-father’s history of
domestic violence included “[f]ive domestic violence convictions . . . over the history of his life.”
The court noted that one of his recent domestic-violence convictions carried with it a no-contact
order with respondent-mother, but respondent-father violated that order “on a regular basis.”
Respondent-father’s contact with respondent-mother while this case was ongoing led to three
instances of domestic violence documented by the police—two in March 2025 and a third in
August 2025. Considering this history, the court concluded that respondent-father’s struggles with
domestic violence remained unresolved.
As for housing, the court found that respondent still did “not have any safe housing.”
Respondent-father admitted that the current house he lived in was “not appropriate” for SMR. The
court also observed that respondent-father lived a transient life as he sometimes lived with his
parents and other times, for reasons unknown, “live[d] in a tent.” The court found that this did not
constitute “stable housing by any stretch of the imagination” and concluded that because it had
been ongoing “for ten months now,” housing remained a barrier to reunification.
On appeal, respondent-father argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that
respondent-father could not rectify his barriers to reunification within a reasonable time

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considering SMR’s age. The trial court reasoned that respondent-father could not rectify his
barriers to reunification within a reasonable time because, in the 10 months since this case began,
respondent-father had not made any meaningful progress on addressing any of his issues. The
court did not believe that “[t]he mere possibility” that respondent-father could “radical[ly] change”
was enough to find a reasonable probability that respondent-father could rectify his barriers to
reunification within a reasonable time.
Respondent-father emphasizes that he complied with some aspects of his case service plan,
such as completing parenting classes and a psychological evaluation, attending most parenting-
time sessions, and testing negative on some drug screenings. While that is true, the trial court
found that respondent-father had not benefited from any of the services he completed, so his
participation did little to rectify his barriers to reunification. The prospect that respondent-father
may participate in more services in the future is hardly a basis to conclude that he may rectify his
barriers to reunification if he continues to not benefit from the (few) services in which he engages.
Respondent-father also offers excuses for his ongoing struggles with housing and substance abuse,
but we cannot fault the trial court for not crediting those excuses when respondent-father refused
to engage in any of the services offered to him to help address his ongoing issues with housing and
substance abuse.
On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that
termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). More
than 182 days had elapsed since respondent-father’s initial dispositional order was issued, and the
trial court did not clearly err by finding that (1) the conditions that led to adjudication (housing,
domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental-health concerns) continued to exist and (2) there
was not a reasonable likelihood that respondent-father would be able to rectify these barriers to
reunification in a reasonable time considering SMR’s young age.
Having concluded that termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), we need not
address the other statutory grounds on which the trial court relied to terminate respondent-father’s
parental rights.
III. BEST INTERESTS
Respondents next each contest the trial court’s finding that termination of their parental
rights was in SMR’s best interests.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Once a trial court has determined that a statutory ground for termination has been proven
by clear and convincing evidence, it must decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether
termination is in the child’s best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61
(2014). A trial court’s best-interests determination is reviewed for clear error. Id.
B. APPLICABLE LAW
The best-interests analysis is focused on the child, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich
App 76, 87-88; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). To determine the child’s best interests, the court should

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weigh all available evidence and consider a variety of factors. In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
Relevant factors include the parent-child bond, the parent’s history of attending parenting time,
the parent’s parenting ability, advantages of the caregivers’ home in relation to the parent’s home,
and the children’s need for permanence and stability. Id. at 713-714. Continued engagement in
domestic violence is also a possible consideration, as is the parent’s “visitation history, the parent’s
engaging in questionable relationships, the parent’s compliance with treatment plans, the child’s
well-being in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re Sanborn, 337 Mich App at 277.
C. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
Ample evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights was in SMR’s best interests. SMR came into care after he was left outside in the
middle of winter while respondent-mother and respondent-father were involved in a domestic-
violence altercation. Despite being offered services to develop skills to better handle domestic-
violence situations, respondent-mother continued to place herself in such situations by continuing
to engage with respondent-father. More than that, respondent-mother engaged in domestic
violence and was arrested for her conduct in August 2025—eight months after SMR was removed
from her care. As for compliance with her treatment plan more generally, respondent-mother
engaged in some of the services offered, but as explained earlier, she did not benefit from that
engagement, so her barriers to reunification remained. The trial court also emphasized how SMR
was thriving in his current placement and how his caregivers were open to the possibility of
adoption, which weighed in favor of finding that termination was in SMR’s best interests.
Termination also offered SMR a chance at permanence, stability, and finality because he would
not have to stay—in the trial court’s words—“in the limbo” that he had been in while respondent-
mother’s case was ongoing. All of these factors supported the trial court’s finding that termination
of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in SMR’s best interests.
Respondent-mother contends that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination
of her parental rights was in SMR’s best interests because the court did not place adequate weight
on her bond with SMR, the court discounted respondent-mother’s progress towards providing a
safe home environment for SMR, and the court improperly compared respondent-mother to SMR’s
foster placement. Starting with respondent-mother’s bond with SMR, the strength of that bond
was questionable, and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in SMR’s
best interests for all of the reasons explained above despite there being some type of bond between
respondent-mother and SMR. As for the trial court purportedly discounting respondent-mother’s
progress, we do not read the trial court’s decision as insufficiently crediting respondent-mother’s
progress. The court merely observed that respondent-mother had only recently made progress
towards addressing the barriers to reunification. That was appropriate because the court was tasked
with considering whether SMR should remain in “limbo” waiting to see if respondent-mother
could progress to the point that she could safely reunite with SMR or if it was time to consider an
alternative permanent placement for SMR. Lastly, as for comparing the advantages of SMR’s
foster placement to respondent-mother’s home, we believe that, in context, the trial court was not
intending to simply compare the homes but instead observing how SMR had thrived in his foster

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placement as compared to when he was in respondent-mother’s care.3 SMR came into foster care
behind on many of his developmental milestones, and through the efforts of his foster placement,
the child had made significant progress towards achieving those milestones. How SMR fared in
his foster placement is obviously an appropriate consideration for a best-interest analysis because
the analysis is focused on the child.
In the end, we cannot conclude that, on the facts of this case, the trial court clearly erred
when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent-mother’s parental
rights was in SMR’s best interests.
D. RESPONDENT-FATHER
As with respondent-mother, ample evidence supported that termination of respondent-
father’s parental rights was in SMR’s best interests. SMR came into care after he was left outside
in the middle of winter while respondent-mother and respondent-father were involved in a
domestic-violence altercation. Respondent-father continued struggling not only with refraining
from domestic violence but following the terms of his probation, which included a no-contact order
with respondent-mother and abstaining from alcohol. Respondent-father’s inability to adhere to
3 Respondent-mother relies on the following statement from Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 115; 92
NW2d 604 (1958), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426; 505 NW2d
834 (1993), in support of her argument: “It is totally inappropriate to weigh the advantages of a
foster home against the home of the natural and legal parents.” When the Fritts Court made this
statement, it was discussing the statutory standard for taking jurisdiction over a minor child. See
id. at 112-115. And it was in that context that the Court explained that a trial court could not find
that a parent was neglecting their child because a foster home could offer “advantages” that the
parent’s home could not. Id. at 115. Trial courts must instead assess evidence of neglect using
“statutory standards.” Id. at 115.
In In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 215 n 21; 661 NW2d 216 (2003), our Supreme Court extended
Fritts’s rule and clarified that the type of “improper comparisons” discussed in Fritts could not be
discussed when a trial court was deciding whether there existed a statutory ground to terminate a
respondent’s parental rights. That is, a trial court cannot consider the possible “advantages” of a
foster placement over a respondent’s home when deciding whether there exists a statutory ground
for termination. But later, in In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 117 n 53; 763 NW2d 587 (2009) (Opinion
by CORRIGAN, J.), the lead opinion suggested that it was proper for a court to “reach[] the question
whether [a minor child’s] best interests were better served by her foster family” so long as the
court “first properly [finds] grounds to terminate [the] respondent’s rights.” That is, the lead
opinion in In re Rood suggested that the type of analysis prohibited by Fritts did not apply to a
trial court’s best-interest analysis. Consistent with this analysis, and as noted above, this Court
has repeatedly recognized a court’s best-interest assessment may consider “the advantages of a
foster home over a parent’s home.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). See also e.g., In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 634-635; 776 NW2d 415 (2009)
(recognizing this proposition and explaining that Fritts does not require otherwise). Respondent-
mother does not acknowledge this authority or explain why the court’s analysis was improper
despite it.

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his probation conditions resulted in his returning to jail for a time. Respondent-father also
continued struggling with alcohol throughout the pendency of this case, which included an incident
in August 2025 in which respondent-father came to court inebriated. There was also the issue of
respondent-father’s inappropriate housing—respondent-father vacillated between living with his
parents and living in a tent, and neither living arrangement was suitable for SMR. In addition, as
recognized earlier, the trial court emphasized how SMR was thriving in his current foster
placement and how his caregivers were open to the possibility of adoption, which were factors that
weighed in favor of finding that termination was in SMR’s best interests. Termination of
respondent-father’s parental rights and the possibility that SMR could receive a permanent
placement also supported termination because it offered SMR the chance at permanence, stability,
and finality, which he needed and that respondent-father had not shown the ability to provide. All
of these factors supported the trial court’s finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental
rights was in SMR’s best interests.
In the face of this evidence, respondent-father contends that his rights should not have been
terminated because he loved and was bonded with SMR, he had quality visits with SMR, and his
compliance with his treatment plan was improving. We do not question respondent-father’s love
for SMR, but that alone does not demonstrate whether and to what extent SMR was bonded to
him, and there was record evidence that this bond, while existent, was not especially strong. And
while respondent-father may have had quality visits with SMR, he had not demonstrated the ability
to safely parent SMR, so those visits remained supervised. In addition, to any extent that
respondent-father’s compliance with his treatment plan may have been improving (which is
debatable), this case had been outstanding for 10 months by the time of the termination trial, and
respondent-father had made virtually no progress towards rectifying his barriers to reunification,
as explained earlier. In the face of all of the evidence that supported that termination was in SMR’s
best interests, respondent-father’s bond with SMR did not render clearly erroneous the trial court’s
finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in SMR’s best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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