COA 376682 IN RE DOYEN/EMANUELSON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/30/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 2026
1:50 PM
In re DOYEN/EMANUELSON, Minors.
No. 376682
Marquette Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-010773-NA
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to the
three minor children, RD, JD, and LE, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to
adjudication continue to exist). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Marquette County Children’s Protective Services (CPS) was contacted on October 20,
2022, and opened an investigation into respondent’s household after law enforcement responded
to a domestic-violence altercation between respondent and the children’s mother1 that occurred
while the children were present. On November 23, 2022, CPS opened an ongoing case for
improper supervision because of continued physical and verbal altercations between the two in the
home with the children present. On April 23, 2023, RD and JD were removed from respondent’s
care and custody due to emotional instability and domestic violence. Petitioner, the Michigan
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), filed a petition on April 25, 2023, seeking to
remove RD and JD from respondent’s care “due to ongoing domestic violence altercations that
puts the children at direct risk of physical injury.” The petition alleged that law enforcement had
responded to respondent’s home 19 times since January 8, 2023, “for investigation for family
troubles, investigation for suspicious situations and assault and battery.” The petition also alleged
that respondent had four additional biological children no longer under his care or custody. A CPS
1 The children’s mother is not a party to this appeal.

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worker forensically interviewed an older child living in the home that was the mother’s biological
child but not respondent’s. The child reported that respondent “consistently threatens to kill his
mom and that he is afraid of him.” The petition also alleged that respondent stated that he would
“kill his children before they would be taken away from him.” The reasonable efforts made to
prevent the removal of the children included: “Families First, Family Team Building Solutions,
Cell phone, payment of rent to avoid eviction, Law Enforcement intervention, Safety Planning,
Family Team meetings, drug screens, Pathways, MSHDA, DHHS assistance including gas cards,
phone card, crib, pack and play, clothing, diapers, shampoo, baby wash and backpacks.” For
example, the petition alleged that on February 3, 2023, a Family Together Building Solutions
worker found that respondent had JD sleeping on a pile of blankets on the floor, so CPS provided
respondent with a pack and play.
The third child, LE, was born on August 13, 2023, while the case was in progress.
Respondent pleaded no contest to an amended petition on August 14, 2023, and was ordered by
the court to participate in and show benefit from services provided by or monitored by petitioner.
The court ordered that respondent participate in Family Support Education; undergo a
psychological evaluation or release the results of an evaluation taken within the past year, and
follow the recommendations; participate with Pathways Community Mental Health, and sign a
release of information to Community Mental Health; take medications as prescribed; participate
in a domestic violence class at the Women’s Center; participate in Early On Services for the
children; follow the parenting guidelines; and participate in supervised parenting time not less than
twice per week for two hours at a time.
From the outset and over the course of the two-year case, respondent maintained an
acrimonious relationship with petitioner’s employees, including three separate caseworkers.
Respondent was banned from in-person visits at petitioner’s Marquette office after multiple
incidents with the first caseworker where respondent’s behavior made her feel unsafe. After being
banned, respondent initially refused to attend virtual visits because JD was too young to
participate. Eventually, respondent and petitioner compromised, and petitioner began holding
parenting times in a Marquette library. Respondent’s attendance improved for a while until there
was another incident with the first caseworker. A second caseworker then began overseeing
respondent’s case. Around this time, respondent began having difficulties with his vehicle and
was inconsistently attending in-person parenting times. Respondent’s attendance at virtual
sessions was also inconsistent.
RD and JD returned to the mother’s care on September 21, 2023. On May 10, 2024, a new
petition was filed to remove the children, including LE, from the mother due to her emotional
instability, recent substance abuse, allowing inappropriate adults in the home, and domestic
violence incidents occurring in the presence of the children. Regarding respondent, the petition
alleged that it was “contrary to the welfare of the children to be in the care and custody of
[respondent] due to his continued lack of progress in his foster care case which includes his
emotional instability, housing, and parenting.” At the emergency preliminary hearing held on the
same date as the filing of the new petition, the court noted that respondent continued to reside in
his uncle’s attic, which was unfit for the children, and had not completed the parenting course or
participated in most parenting times. The court stated that RD and JD had already been removed
from respondent’s care, but that LE would now be removed as well. The court found that a
substantial risk of harm existed if LE remained in respondent’s care and noted that respondent had

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not progressed enough with emotional stability. The court also found that petitioner had made
reasonable efforts.
An amended petition was filed by petitioner on July 24, 2024, again alleging respondent’s
continued issues with emotional stability, housing, and parenting skills, and added that respondent
also had ongoing issues with domestic relations and employment. The petition alleged that
respondent was living in his car, which was not a proper living arrangement for the children.
Respondent admitted to the allegations in the amended petition.
After providing services for nearly two years, petitioner filed a petition to terminate
respondent’s parental rights as to all three children on April 25, 2025. The second and third
caseworkers testified that respondent missed nearly half of the parenting-time sessions, remained
combative and unable to regulate his emotional responses, was resistant to signing release forms
to provide petitioner information regarding his engagement with services, and had not secured
appropriate housing for the children to be released into his custody. Furthermore, these
caseworkers and the children’s foster parents testified that the children often exhibited emotionally
dysregulated, self-injurious, and violent behavior after attending parenting times with respondent.
The caseworkers agreed that respondent had not rectified his barriers to reunification and that
termination was in the best interests of the children.
Respondent testified that petitioner was purposefully painting him and his participation in
a bad light. He asserted that petitioner often provided him with conflicting or otherwise unhelpful
guidance on how to secure or manage housing, employment, or disability income. He argued that
the caseworkers would purposefully trigger him during parenting times and that their descriptions
of his behavior at parenting times were inaccurate. Respondent contended that he secured
parenting classes, vehicle-repair assistance, and a housing voucher on his own. Additionally, he
noted that he was applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) without assistance from
petitioner. Concerning missed parenting-time sessions, respondent proclaimed that the
caseworkers were misrepresenting the number of sessions by including sessions that he was not
allowed to attend from the period of time where he was banned from petitioner’s office. He
testified that he was currently living in a motel but had recently applied for SSDI, and he believed
he would soon have appropriate housing for the children.
The court found petitioner’s representatives more credible than respondent. It found that
respondent failed to show meaningful progress in addressing his barriers to reunification and that
petitioner had shown by clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable likelihood
that the conditions that led to adjudication would be rectified within a reasonable time considering
the children’s ages. The court further found that termination was in the best interests of each of
the children because respondent failed to show meaningful progress throughout the two-year
duration of the case, largely failed to comply with the service plan, and could not provide the
structure, routine, and predictability that the children needed. Additionally, the court considered
that the foster parents were willing to adopt the children and provide permanency. The court
ultimately terminated respondent’s parental rights to each child. Respondent now appeals.

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II. ANALYSIS
A. REASONABLE EFFORTS
Respondent argues that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to enable the children
to return to his care by not making any accommodations for respondent’s disabilities. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s factual finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts
to reunify respondent with the children for clear error. In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 338; 990
NW2d 685 (2022) (citation omitted). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence
to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Id. (citation omitted).
“Under Michigan’s Probate Code, the [DHHS] has an affirmative duty to make reasonable
efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500
Mich. 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). Petitioner’s duty to make reasonable efforts includes the
creation of a service plan containing steps that the agency and the parent “will take to rectify the
issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Even though petitioner “has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to
provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of
respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248;
824 NW2d 569 (2012). A respondent-parent must also demonstrate that they have “sufficiently
benefited” from the services provided. Id. “When challenging the services offered, a respondent
must establish that he or she would have fared better if other services had been offered.” In re
Sanborn, 337 Mich App 252, 264; 976 NW2d 44 (2021).
Our Supreme Court has stated that public entities, such as petitioner, must make
“reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are
necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless . . . the modifications would
fundamentally alter . . . the service provided.” In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86, citing 28 CFR
35.130(b)(7) (2016) (quotation marks omitted). The term “disability,” for the purposes of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., is defined as a “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities” of an individual. 42
USC 12102(1)(A). This Court has recognized as well that “a known or suspected intellectual,
cognitive, or developmental impairment” qualifies. In re Hicks, 315 Mich App 251, 281-282, 890
NW2d 696 (2016), aff’d in part and vacated in part 500 Mich 79 (2017) (emphasis in original).
Respondent first argues that petitioner failed to make reasonable accommodations in light
of respondent’s mental-health challenges. Respondent asserts that he has a diagnosis of bipolar
disorder, ADHD, persistent depressive disorder, insomnia, unspecified personality disorder, and
PTSD. Acknowledging respondent’s issue with self-regulation, the court provided respondent
with a guardian ad litem to help him navigate the court process and the reunification process.
Respondent also had a Pathways case manager to help him with medication management, case
management, counseling, and paperwork. Respondent fails to assert what accommodations
petitioner should have made, nor has he demonstrated that he would have fared better in mitigating
his barriers to reunification had any such accommodations been made.

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Regarding parenting time, respondent notes in his brief on appeal that petitioner asserted
that respondent was offered 193 parenting-time visits, but he participated in only 27 in-person
visits and 19 virtual parenting-time visits. Respondent blames his failure to attend parenting time
on petitioner’s supposed lack of effort to mitigate the barriers to respondent’s participation in those
visits. Respondent argues that he was offered gas cards when his vehicle was not functional and
that he was never offered any other transportation for visits or the option to change the location of
the visits. Respondent claims that when he complained that he did not have WiFi access for virtual
visits, he was only offered a list of places with free WiFi that were not within walking distance for
him. Finally, he claims he was never given a prepaid cellular data card or other accommodation
that would help him.
The record belies respondent’s arguments regarding parenting time. First, respondent
ignores that he created his own issues with parenting time when he was banned from in-person
visits at petitioner’s Marquette office after multiple incidents with a caseworker where
respondent’s behavior made her feel unsafe. After being banned, respondent refused to attend
virtual visits because JD was too young to participate. Eventually, respondent and petitioner
compromised, and petitioner began holding parenting times in a Marquette library until there was
another incident with a caseworker and a new caseworker took over the case. The record also
shows that petitioner provided gas cards while respondent’s vehicle was operational. Respondent
notes that the locations with free WiFi that petitioner identified for him were not within walking
distance and were therefore insufficient; however, one case manager testified that respondent had
been seen driving around the area of his residence. Respondent next asserts that he should have
been provided a prepaid cellular data card or other accommodation; however, the record does not
show that respondent asked for a data card from either the court or petitioner during the two-year
duration of the case.
Respondent did request that parenting times occur in person closer to where he was
residing. The court was willing to enter an order providing that parenting time could occur at
respondent’s residence, so long as the children’s guardian ad litem and petitioner agreed. At the
time of termination, the court noted that respondent never progressed to unsupervised parenting
time and failed to demonstrate the requisite safety and emotional stability necessary to persuade
petitioner and the guardian ad litem to allow visits at his residence. There were multiple periods
throughout the case where respondent either simply refused to engage with virtual parenting times
or was wholly unavailable for them. Because the record demonstrates that respondent did not
participate in the parenting time offered to him, the court did not clearly err in finding that
reasonable efforts were made to engage respondent in parenting-time services.
Respondent further argues that the parenting-class resources provided by petitioner were
insufficient. Respondent and one of the caseworkers had differing testimony as to who enrolled
respondent at Pregnancy Services of Delta County; however, both agreed that respondent was
enrolled in classes. At the termination hearing, the caseworker testified that other parenting classes
were sought by petitioner, but the other options could not enroll respondent for various reasons.
Nonetheless, respondent had a duty to fully participate in services, and respondent failed to
complete the course he was enrolled in of his own volition. A few months prior to the termination
hearing, petitioner offered a virtual class through Michigan State University. Petitioner was not
able to offer that class to respondent until that time because respondent disappeared for nearly two
months and could not be reached by anyone, including his own counsel and lawyer-guardian ad

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litem. The record reflects that when respondent returned, the court and petitioner were operating
with the belief that respondent was still attending parenting classes at Pregnancy Services.
Respondent argues that the caseworkers did not provide assistance or guidance for how to
successfully interact with the children during parenting-time visits, but the caseworkers reported
that they were unable to provide feedback to respondent regarding his parenting without him
yelling at and berating the caseworkers. Thus, the court did not clearly err in finding that petitioner
made reasonable efforts to engage respondent in services meant to address his parenting-skills
barrier to reunification.
Respondent next argues that petitioner made no effort to confirm respondent’s application
for SSDI or otherwise assist with “resource management.” Respondent’s argument is misplaced
because the record shows that petitioner was aware that respondent’s application for SSDI was in
progress but understood that his mental-health provider was working with him on that application.
This Court is not sure what respondent is referring to with the terms “resource management.”
However, an additional barrier for respondent was housing, and the record reflects that respondent
had a Michigan State Housing Developmental Authority voucher, and that petitioner supplied
respondent with lists of potential residences that accepted housing vouchers and followed up to
provide the housing authority supporting documentation at respondent’s request. The record
supports the court’s finding that respondent was provided with housing applications and assistance
as a reasonable effort toward reunification.
Respondent lastly argues that petitioner made no attempts to confirm the completion of a
psychological assessment or schedule one for him. This argument is contradicted by the record.
The record reflects multiple requests from petitioner and the court for respondent to undergo and
produce a psychological evaluation. Respondent either refused such requests or produced
unsatisfactory documentation. Petitioner did not have a duty to force respondent to undergo a new
psychological evaluation or force respondent to produce the results of the one he claimed to have
undergone prior to the beginning of the case. The record reflects that respondent was continuously
provided counseling and psychiatric services through a mental-health service provider throughout
the case. Respondent refused to sign releases for the caseworkers to discuss his mental health
services with Pathways. Respondent never asserted that he needed additional mental-health
services, declined an anger management class and a domestic violence class, and was resistant to
involving petitioner further in these services. The court did not clearly err in finding that
reasonable efforts were made to address respondent’s emotional stability and mental health.
For the foregoing reasons, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the court
made a mistake in finding that petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with the
children. Therefore, the court did not clearly err.
B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent next argues that the trial court clearly erred in its finding that termination of
his parental rights was in the best interests of the children. We disagree.
Respondent does not contest that the trial court properly found a statutory ground to
terminate respondent’s parental rights. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven,
the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate

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parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). “In
deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s
bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Id. (citations omitted). The
trial court may also consider “a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with
his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being
while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 321; 964 NW2d
881 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A trial court has the duty to determine the best
interests of each child individually. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 42. “The focus at the
best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.” In re Keillor, 325 Mich App at
93 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available
to determine the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App at 713.
As to RD, the trial court found that respondent and RD were not strongly bonded, and it
noted that RD had hardly seen respondent for the two-year duration of the case and that her
behavior was dysregulated after visits. This finding is supported by the testimony of two
caseworkers at the termination trial. Additionally, the court emphasized that RD needed structure,
routine, and predictability and found that respondent could not provide the necessary components
for her to address her trauma. The record of respondent’s attendance at parenting times is evidence
supporting the court’s finding that he could not provide such consistency. The period where
respondent vanished from the case entirely without responding to any party’s attempts to contact
him provides further evidence supporting the court’s finding. Finally, the court’s finding was
supported by respondent’s lack of participation in RD’s occupational therapy and mental-health
appointments.
Concerning JD, the court noted that JD came into care with a habit of hitting her head when
she was upset, and she would resume this behavior after visits with respondent. The court also
found that JD did not have a bond with respondent, noting that she had expressed that she does not
like respondent. The court’s findings were supported by testimony from one of the caseworkers
and the foster parent of the children. The court also noted that JD had issues with emotional self-
regulation and verbal expression. It found, based on the testimony of the foster parent, that both
conditions had improved while the child was in foster care. Regarding LE, the court noted that he
came into care very underdeveloped in his gross motor skills; however, by the time of the
termination hearing, he had improved his motor skills and was happy.
As to all three children, the court looked to the advantages that the children’s foster
placement offered over return of the children to respondent’s custody. The court noted that it was
clear that the children were thriving under the foster parents’ care. This finding was supported by
a caseworker’s testimony that the middle child expressed preference for her foster father over
respondent, as well as the foster parent’s testimony concerning the services that the children were
enrolled in and their improvement in behavior. The court also considered respondent’s history of
domestic violence within the household and his lack of compliance with the case service plan. The
court noted that respondent had been the victim of domestic violence by the children’s mother and
that there were suggestions that he had perpetrated domestic violence against her. Nonetheless, it
stated that the children had in fact witnessed violence between the parents in the household and
that there was a lengthy record of police responding to the home for this reason. These findings
by the court were supported by allegations within the petitions, including the first petition, to which

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respondent pleaded no contest, and a later amended petition, to which respondent pleaded
admission. The court also found issues with respondent’s compliance with the case service plan.
As noted, respondent failed to participate in a significant portion of scheduled parenting times,
failed to complete the parenting class he was enrolled in, failed to provide a sufficient
psychological evaluation to the court and petitioner, and failed to secure housing and employment
or SSDI.
Respondent offers the following factual assertions as implicitly demonstrating that the
court’s decision was against the preponderance of the evidence. Respondent notes that he sought
out parenting classes on his own, that he found help from a government program to get his vehicle
repaired, that he showed up prepared for in-person visitation with snacks and activities, and that
he is bonded to his children. In the best-interest stage of the case, the focus is on the children, not
the parent. Respondent’s factual assertions that he offers up as support for his argument focus on
himself, not the children. The only assertion that respondent makes regarding the children is that
he is bonded with them. However, the evidence in the record reflects the opposite, that he was not
bonded with the children. He states that he showed up for in-person visits prepared, but he missed
the majority of scheduled parenting-time visits and the children needed consistency. Additionally,
the evidence put forth by respondent is largely based on respondent’s own testimony, which the
court found less credible than the testimony of petitioner’s representatives.
In conclusion, there was a preponderance of evidence supporting the court’s determination
that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of each of the minor
children. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Therefore,
the trial court did not clearly err.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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