COA 370917 PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC ALFONSO LOVE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2026
2:26 PM
v No. 370917
Wayne Circuit Court
ERIC ALFONSO LOVE, LC No. 22-005724-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BAZZI, P.J., and PATEL and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of engaging a minor for commercial
sexual activity, MCL 750.462e(a),1 for which the trial court sentenced him to 6 to 20 years’
imprisonment. On appeal, defendant raises claims of instructional error and challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He also argues that the trial court imposed
a disproportionate departure sentence that it failed to justify adequately. We affirm defendant’s
conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from events in January 2022 involving IJ, who was then 14 years old. IJ
had run away from home and was staying with her friend, EH, when the two girls were invited by
another friend, LR, to a house on Rossini Drive in Detroit. IJ and EH, who did not bring cell
phones or money, were then taken to the house in an Uber arranged by LR. When the girls arrived,
they met defendant, who asked them to engage in prostitution, but they declined the request. IJ
and EH spent the night, sleeping in a room with defendant and LR.
1 The jury acquitted defendant of participating in a human trafficking enterprise involving
kidnapping, criminal sexual conduct, or death, MCL 750.462d(b), accepting the earnings of a
prostitute, MCL 750.457, and assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82.

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The next day, defendant revealed his expectation that IJ and EH would have sexual
intercourse with various men, including his codefendant, Kevin Hampton. When IJ and EH asked
LR if they could use a cell phone to call for a ride home, LR asked defendant if the girls could use
his cell phone. Defendant became violent with LR and refused to allow the girls to use his phone.
After a discussion with defendant, IJ was led to believe she would receive “a lot” of money by
having sexual intercourse with Hampton. She also felt that she did not have a choice but to engage
in sexual intercourse with Hampton, explaining: “We needed to go. So I did it out of that.” After
IJ and Hampton had intercourse,2 defendant gave her $30. She felt “tricked out of the money,”
and an argument ensued. Defendant threatened to shoot IJ and EH before he left the house. The
girls then left and contacted the police, who interviewed the girls before obtaining and executing
a search warrant at the Rossini home. Defendant was not there when the warrant was executed
but was later arrested.
At trial, defendant maintained that he did not arrange for any of the men in the house to
have sexual intercourse with LR, IJ, or EH. However, the jury found him guilty of engaging a
minor for commercial sexual activity. At sentencing, the trial court calculated the sentencing
guidelines minimum range to be 3 to 5 years’ imprisonment, and it imposed an upward departure
sentence of 6 to 20 years. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defendant raises several claims of instructional error. First, he claims that the trial court
denied him a properly instructed jury because it failed to define certain statutory terms used in
MCL 750.462e when it gave the relevant instruction, M Crim JI 36.6 (using minors for commercial
sexual activity). Second, he contends that the trial court erred by giving the jury the general
unanimity instruction, M Crim JI 3.11, because he was entitled to a specific unanimity instruction
under People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503; 521 NW2d 275 (1994). Finally, he submits that M Crim
JI 36.7 (victim’s testimony need not be corroborated) and M Crim JI 36.8 (victim’s resistance or
lack of resistance not relevant) invaded the province of the jury by instructing it how to weigh the
evidence in violation of People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).
To preserve a claim of instructional error, a defendant must raise the challenge in the trial
court. People v Czuprynski, 325 Mich App 449, 466; 926 NW2d 282 (2018). In this case,
however, defendant did not merely fail to preserve his instructional challenges by raising them in
the trial court;3 he affirmatively waived those claims. “[W]aiver is the intentional relinquishment
2 Hampton was charged as a codefendant and ultimately pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(1)(a). He is not a party to this appeal.
3 On appeal, defendant erroneously asserts that he preserved his instructional challenges by
objecting to the proposed verdict form. But a claim of instructional error is preserved only when
the defendant raised the same claim of instructional error in the trial court as he or she later asserts
on appeal. Czuprynski, 325 Mich App at 466. Accordingly, defendant’s objection to the verdict
form did not preserve his appellate challenges to the substantive instructions.

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or abandonment of a known right.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762 n 7; 597 NW2d 130
(1999) (cleaned up). A defendant who expressly approves the jury instructions may not later seek
appellate review of those instructions, “for his waiver has extinguished any error.” People v
Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011) (citation omitted).
After the parties rested, the trial court reviewed the proposed jury instructions with counsel.
During that discussion, the court asked whether the parties had any objections to M Crim JI 3.11,
36.6, 36.7, and 36.8, and defense counsel stated that he had “[n]o objection” to those instructions.
That affirmative approval of the instructions waived the claims of instructional error defendant
now raises on appeal. See id. at 504-505.
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, reviewing the evidence
“in a light most favorable to the prosecutor to determine whether any [trier] of fact could find the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Baskerville,
333 Mich App 276, 282; 963 NW2d 620 (2020) (citation omitted). We “draw all reasonable
inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict” and resolve all evidentiary
conflicts in favor of the prosecution. Id. at 282-283 (citation omitted).
Due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v Smith, 336 Mich App 297, 308; 970 NW2d 450 (2021). To support a
conviction of engaging a minor for commercial sexual activity contrary to MCL 750.462e(a), the
prosecution must establish that: (1) “the defendant recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, or obtained [the complainant] for commercial sexual activity”; (2) at the time of the
offense, the complainant was “less than 18 years old, regardless of whether the defendant knew
[he or she] was less than 18 years old”; and (3) “the defendant intended that [the complainant]
would perform” commercial sexual activity, whether or not such activity actually occurred. M
Crim JI 36.6. “Commercial sexual activity means performing acts of sexual penetration or contact,
child sexually abusive activity, or a sexually explicit performance.” Id. (citations omitted).
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to establish that IJ was less than 18
years old at the time of the instant offense.
In this case, IJ testified that defendant paid for the Uber LR sent to transport IJ and EH to
the house on Rossini Drive. Defendant asked the girls to engage in prostitution when they arrived.
Despite the girls declining that request, defendant repeatedly pressed them to engage in sex acts
for “a lot of money.” The next day, defendant enticed IJ to have intercourse with Hampton with
the promise of money. When LR asked to use defendant’s phone so IJ and EH could call for a
ride home, defendant became violent with LR and refused to allow the girls to use his phone.
IJ testified that she felt pressured to have intercourse with Hampton so she and EH could
earn enough money to leave. Defendant and Hampton went upstairs together before the encounter,
and Hampton paid defendant. After the encounter, defendant paid IJ $30. When IJ complained
that defendant paid her less than promised, defendant became angry and threatened to shoot IJ and
EH.

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That evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant “recruited, enticed, harbored,
transported, provided, or obtained [IJ] for commercial sexual activity” with the intent that she
would perform such activity. Defendant’s conduct in repeatedly pressuring the girls to engage in
sexual activity for money supports a finding that he recruited or enticed the girls into performing
commercial sexual activity. Evidence that he paid for the Uber that transported the girls to the
Rossini address and immediately asked the girls to engage in prostitution supports an inference
that defendant arranged or paid for IJ’s transportation to the house for that purpose. Further, IJ’s
testimony that Hampton paid defendant for her services, and defendant then paid her, supports a
finding that defendant provided IJ for commercial sexual activity.
Defendant’s suggestion that IJ “took it upon herself” to engage in sexual activity with
Hampton is unpersuasive. A conviction under MCL 750.462e does not require that the minor be
unwilling, and defendant’s statement that IJ “could make money,” coupled with his subsequent
payment to her, supports the inference that he induced the transaction and intended that it occur.
The jury was entitled to disbelieve defendant’s testimony that he did not arrange for or profit from
any sexual activity at the house. Moreover, IJ testified that she did not want to have intercourse
with Hampton and did so only because she felt pressured, and we must resolve all evidentiary
conflicts in favor of the prosecution. See Baskerville, 333 Mich App at 283.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence from
which a rational juror could conclude that defendant “[r]ecruit[ed], entice[d], harbor[ed],
transport[ed], provide[d], or obtain[ed] by any means a minor for commercial sexual activity.”
MCL 750.462e(a).
C. PROPORTIONALITY
“We review a trial court’s upward departure from a defendant’s calculated guidelines range
for reasonableness,” and the reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Walden, 319 Mich App 344, 351; 901 NW2d 142 (2017). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court imposes a sentence disproportionate “to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 241; 966
NW2d 437 (2020) (citation omitted). An upward departure constitutes an abuse of discretion if
the trial court fails to “provide adequate reasons for the extent of the departure sentence imposed.”
People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 476; 902 NW2d 327 (2017).
Although the sentencing guidelines are advisory, “they remain a highly relevant
consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion,” and trial courts must consult the
guidelines when imposing a sentence. People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 391; 870 NW2d 502
(2015). A trial court may depart from the guidelines as long as the sentence imposed is reasonable.
Walden, 319 Mich App at 351. The trial court must, however, “justify the departure on the record
by explaining why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than
a different sentence would have been.” People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 315; 933 NW2d 719
(2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the trial court fails to adequately explain its
departure, we “must remand to the trial court for resentencing.” Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476.
In this case, the sentencing guidelines minimum range was 3 to 5 years. Without providing
any explanation, the trial court imposed an upward departure sentence of 6 to 20 years. Because

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the trial court articulated no explanation for the departure, we are unable to review the sentence
for reasonableness or to assess whether the extent of the departure was proportionate. See People
v Smith, 482 Mich 292, 303-304; 754 NW2d 284 (2008). The failure to justify an upward departure
constitutes an abuse of discretion, and we therefore vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
resentencing. See Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 476.4
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm defendant’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman
4 In an untimely brief, the prosecution conceded that “defendant is correct: the court’s failure to
articulate its reasoning prevents meaningful appellate review of the sentence it selected,” and
resentencing is therefore required.

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