20260109_C371918_46_371918.opn.pdf

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
FOR PUBLICATION
January 09, 2026
2:35 PM
In re K. M. ALEXANDER, Minor.
No. 371918
Lapeer Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 23-013162-NA
Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.
YOUNG, J.
After caring for the minor child, KMA, since birth, the legal guardian petitioned the trial
court to terminate parental rights and to allow the guardian to legally adopt KMA. Respondent-
parents objected and counsel was appointed for both respondent-mother and respondent-father1
and a lawyer-guardian ad litem (“L-GAL”) was appointed for the minor child. While Lapeer
County handled reimbursement for some of the costs of these appointed counsels, petitioners were
assessed $1,108.08 to pay for some of respondent-mother’s counsel’s fees and some of the L-
GAL’s fees. This is contrary to statute and court rules. We vacate the orders for reimbursement
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
KMA was born to respondent-mother and respondent-father in 2013. Respondents never
married but dated for about two-and-a-half years, beginning when they were in high school. While
respondents lived together in 2012, respondent-mother became pregnant. For part of the
pregnancy, respondent-mother lived with T. Reed. After the child was born, respondent-mother
eventually got her own apartment and the child remained with T. Reed. Meanwhile, respondent-
1 Respondent-mother and respondent-father are referred to collectively as “respondents.”

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father moved to Oklahoma. In February 2015, with respondents’ permission, the trial court granted
a petition appointing T. Reed as KMA’s legal guardian.2
On November 22, 2023, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondents’ parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(f)(i) and (f)(ii). Petitioners requested the trial court exercise jurisdiction
over the child because respondents neglected to provide support and necessary care for KMA, and
the child has a guardian but his parents failed to “provide regular and substantial support for two
years or more,” and failed to contact the child for “two years or more[.]” A preliminary hearing
was scheduled to occur on December 15, 2023. On November 28, 2023, the trial court found
respondents and the minor child needed an attorney or L-GAL. Christine G. Strasser was
appointed as L-GAL for the minor child, David N. Richardson was appointed as an attorney for
respondent-father, and Seth G. Bosch was appointed as an attorney for respondent-mother. The
preliminary hearing was adjourned to January 9, 2024.
On January 10, 2024, Bosch submitted a statement for his expenses related to representing
respondent-mother in December 2023, and the trial court ordered payment of $299 from the Lapeer
County disbursing officer. On January 31, 2024, Bosch submitted a statement for representing
respondent-mother in January 2024. On February 21, 2024, the trial court signed an order for
Lapeer County’s disbursing officer to pay $50 to Bosch. On February 16, 2024, Richardson
submitted a statement of service and the trial court ordered Lapeer County’s disbursing officer to
pay $330 to Richardson. On March 14, 2024, the parties stipulated to adjourn the preliminary
hearing to July 17, 2024. Bosch submitted a statement of service for representing respondent-
mother from March 13, 2024 until March 28, 2024. On April 23, 2024, the trial court ordered the
Lapeer County disbursing officer to pay $151 to Bosch. On June 13, 2024, the trial court ordered
petitioners to reimburse the trial court $151 for respondent-mother’s court-appointed attorney’s
services from March 13, 2024 until March 28, 2024.
On June 24, 2024, petitioners objected to the trial court’s order requiring them to reimburse
the court for respondent-mother’s court-appointed attorney fees. Petitioners asserted they were
not required to reimburse the trial court because it violated their due-process rights, and various
statutes and caselaw required the expenses be paid by the public, or the county in which the
proceedings occurred. On July 2, 2024, Strasser submitted a statement for her legal services and
expenses related to representing the minor child from December 7, 2023 until June 25, 2024. The
trial court ordered Lapeer County’s disbursing officer to pay $760.08 to Strasser.
The trial court held a hearing on July 9, 2024, addressing petitioners’ objections.
Petitioners’ counsel asserted petitioners were not obligated to reimburse the court for respondent-
mother’s attorney fees. Petitioners’ counsel further indicated respondent-mother had yet to
actually request counsel. The trial court denied the objections and refused to set aside its order.
The trial court stated petitioners were responsible for the court-appointed attorney fees of the other
2 Although the trial court’s order reflects the appointment of T. Reed as the minor child’s guardian,
certain documents contained in the record refer to A. Reed and T. Reed as the child’s “guardians,”
and they together petitioned for the termination of respondents’ parental rights and for the right to
adopt the child. We will refer to A. Reed and T. Reed collectively as “petitioners.”

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parties because they initiated the action, as opposed to the Michigan Department of Health and
Human Services. The trial court noted respondents were “indigent.” Petitioners’ counsel asserted
the trial court “sua sponte” appointed an attorney for respondent-mother before she requested one
or showed she “cannot afford an attorney” at a preliminary hearing. The trial court stated this was
the court’s “policy,” and because the “[s]tate isn’t bringing it, so the taxpayers of the [s]tate aren’t
responsible for it.” On July 12, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying petitioners’
objections. The trial court listed the hearing date as July 9, 2024. The order was labeled an “order
after preliminary hearing.”
A preliminary hearing scheduled on July 17, 2024 was adjourned “until further notice.”
On July 29, 2024, the trial court entered an order finding petitioners “to be financially able to
reimburse the court for costs incurred,” and ordering petitioners to reimburse the trial court
$760.08 “for the cost of service from [December 7, 2023] through [June 25, 2024] by Attorney
Strasser, who was appointed to represent the child[.]” The order listed the “[d]ate of hearing” as
July 29, 2024. On September 9, 2024, the trial court found petitioners “financially able to
reimburse the court for costs incurred” and ordered payment of $197 to the Lapeer County Family
Court for Bosch’s court-appointed representation of respondent-mother from April 4, 2024 until
July 16, 2024. The “[d]ate of hearing” was September 9, 2024. In total, petitioners were assessed
$1,108.08. Petitioners now appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This case asks us to evaluate the imposition of attorney fees. This Court “review[s] for an
abuse of discretion a trial court’s award of attorney fees.” Powers v Brown, 328 Mich App 617,
620; 939 NW2d 733 (2019) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Constitutional questions
and issues of statutory interpretation, as well as family division procedure under the court rules,
are reviewed de novo.” In re AMAC, 269 Mich App 533, 536; 711 NW2d 426 (2006).
B. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In termination of parental rights cases, the right to counsel is guaranteed and “the
constitutional right of due process confers on indigent parents the right to appointed counsel at
hearings that may involve the termination of their parental rights.” In re Williams, 286 Mich App
253, 275-276; 779 NW2d 286 (2009). Statutes and the court rules also guarantee the right to
counsel for respondents in termination proceedings. MCL 712A.17c(5) states: “If it appears to the
court in a proceeding under section 2(b) or (c) of this chapter that the respondent wants an attorney
and is financially unable to retain an attorney, the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the
respondent.” MCR 3.915(B)(1)(a)(i) codifies the same.
Here, the appointment of counsel was premature. A trial court is required to “advise the
respondent of the right to the assistance of an attorney at the preliminary hearing and any
subsequent hearing pursuant to MCR 3.915(B)(1)(a).” MCR 3.965(B)(6). MCL 712A.17c(5) and
MCR 3.915(B)(1)(a) instruct that the respondent must appear before the trial court, be instructed
of the right to a court-appointed attorney if the party is able to demonstrate he or she is financially
unable to retain an attorney, and then the trial court may appoint counsel.

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When the trial court entered the initial June 13, 2024 order for reimbursement of
respondent-mother’s court-appointed attorney fees, no hearings had occurred in the child
protective proceedings. Respondent-mother was never on record requesting an attorney, and the
trial court had not determined her ability to pay. Although the trial court might have believed
respondent-mother was indigent on the basis of her child support arrearages and inability to care
for the child, which resulted in the guardianship, the trial court nevertheless was required to follow
the procedure. It is also noted respondent-mother completed a financial statement indicating she
had no income or assets on February 20, 2024. Although the trial court reasonably could have
relied on this to justify its actions, its appointment of counsel occurred before this statement was
received. Further, it did not negate the fact no hearing had yet occurred.
C. ORDERS FOR REIMBURSEMENT
Even if we ignore the errors in the appointment process, and assume for the sake of
argument that respondents are entitled to court-appointed counsel, petitioner is not responsible for
paying for that counsel. Generally speaking, for court-appointed counsels, “expenses incurred in
carrying out this chapter shall be paid upon the court’s order by the county treasurer from the
county’s general fund.” MCL 712A.25(1).
However, there is some leeway for the Court to assess costs of representation against
parties. MCL 712A.17c(8) states: “If an attorney or lawyer-guardian ad litem is appointed for a
party under this act, after a determination of ability to pay the court may enter an order assessing
attorney costs against the party or the person responsible for that party’s support[.] . . .” Likewise,
MCR 3.915(E) provides:
In a child protective proceeding, when an attorney is appointed for a party under
this rule, the court may enter an order assessing costs of the representation against
the party or against a person responsible for the support of that party after a
determination of ability to pay, which order may be enforced as provided by law.
And, MCR 3.916(D) states: “In a child protective proceeding, the court may assess the cost of
providing a guardian ad litem against the party or a person responsible for the support of the party
after a determination of ability to pay, and may enforce the order of reimbursement as provided by
law.” There is nothing in the law requiring or supporting assessing costs against the party
petitioning the court. Rather, MCL 712A.17c(8), MCR 3.915(E), and MCR 3.916(D) require the
trial court to determine a party’s ability to pay for an attorney, appoint an attorney, and then assess
costs against that same party or someone responsible for supporting the party. Petitioners are not
responsible for respondent-mother. While petitioners are guardians to KMA, they are not “legally
obligated to pay for the ward from the guardian’s own money.” MCL 700.5215. Respondents are
required to pay child support and currently retain their parental rights.3
3 As of October 2024, respondent-mother had over $22,000 in arrearages. As of September 2023,
respondent-father was paying $472 monthly but had approximately $4,000 in arrearages.

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The trial court’s decision to require petitioners to reimburse the trial court for the court-
appointed attorney fees of respondent-mother and the L-GAL constituted a legal error and was
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See Powers, 328 Mich App at 620.
These errors were compounded when, on July 29, 2024, the trial court found petitioners “to be
financially able to reimburse the court for costs incurred,” and ordered petitioners to reimburse the
trial court $760.08 for Strasser’s court-appointed attorney fees. This order was entered without a
hearing, despite listing the “[d]ate of hearing” as July 29, 2024. On September 9, 2024, the trial
court found petitioners “financially able to reimburse the court for costs incurred” and ordered
them to pay $197 for respondent-mother’s court-appointed attorney fees. Again, there was no
hearing despite the “[d]ate of hearing” being listed as September 9, 2024. In total, petitioners were
assessed $1,108.08 and were told that failure to pay could result in “contempt of court
proceeding[s]” under MCL 712A.18(2). MCR 3.921(B) provides “the court shall ensure” the
parties “are notified of each hearing[.]” Yet, the trial court did not even hold the hearings, let alone
provide notice. Petitioners’ monetary interest was affected by the trial court’s decision to require
them to reimburse the trial court for the court-appointed attorney fees, and the procedures used
were insufficient to safeguard this interest. See In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 132; 809
NW2d 412 (2011).
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion and violated petitioners’ due-process rights by
requiring that they reimburse the trial court for the court-appointed attorney fees incurred by
respondent-mother and the L-GAL.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

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