COA 375344 PEOPLE OF MI V SHERI LYNN LENARTZ Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 8/14/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
-1-
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
August 14, 2026
9:54 AM
v No. 375344
Kent Circuit Court
SHERI LYNN LENARTZ, LC No. 23-009957-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: GADOLA, C.J., and RIORDAN and SWARTZLE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted1 the sentences from her plea-based convictions of
extortion, MCL 750.213, and attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III), MCL
750.520d(1)(b); MCL 750.92. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 5 to 20 years’
imprisonment for the extortion conviction and 2 to 5 years’ imprisonment for the attempted CSC-
III conviction. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by scoring three offense
variables (OVs). We agree with defendant that at least one OV was incorrectly scored and that the
guidelines change as a result. Therefore, we vacate her sentence and remand to the trial court for
resentencing.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises from a relationship dispute in Grand Rapids on July 26, 2023. On that day,
the victim—a parolee and defendant’s former boyfriend—came to defendant’s apartment to drop
off some boxes and pick up some of his belongings. Defendant asked the victim to get back
together with her, and when he refused, defendant threatened to falsely tell the police that the
victim had molested defendant’s granddaughter. Defendant then prevented the victim from
leaving and repeatedly asked him to have sex with her. Defendant and the victim eventually
entered her apartment, and the two performed oral sex on each other. The victim recorded the
1 People v Lenartz, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 9, 2025 (Docket
No. 375344).

-- 1 of 6 --

-2-
audio from the encounter on his cellular phone. Several days later, defendant falsely reported the
victim to the police for molesting defendant’s granddaughter and assaulting defendant.
Defendant’s false report was discovered shortly thereafter, once the victim disclosed the audio to
the police.
At a plea hearing, defendant pleaded guilty to extortion and no contest to attempted CSC-
III in exchange for dismissal of other charges. At sentencing, the trial court determined that the
applicable OV score was 60 points, which included, in relevant part, a 15-point score for OV 10,
MCL 777.40; a 10-point score for OV 12, MCL 777.42; and a 25-point score for OV 19, MCL
777.49. As noted, the trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of five years in prison, which
was within the minimum guidelines range of 51 to 85 months in prison.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the trial court’s “interpretation and application of the legislative
sentencing guidelines, MCL 777.1 et seq.,” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 123; 771 NW2d
655 (2009), including “the interpretation of the sentencing variables,” People v Horton, 345 Mich
App 612, 616; 8 NW3d 622 (2023). The trial court’s findings of fact “are reviewed for clear error
and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438;
835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Clear error is established when the appellate court is left with a firm and
definite conviction that an error occurred.” Horton, 345 Mich App at 616. When scoring the
guidelines, “a court may consider all record evidence, including the contents of a [presentence
investigation report], plea admissions, and testimony presented at a preliminary examination.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant raises three arguments on appeal: (1) she did not engage in predatory conduct
and therefore should not have been assigned 15 points for OV 10; (2) she did not commit two
contemporaneous felonious criminal acts against a person and therefore should not have been
assigned 10 points for OV 12; and (3) she did not threaten the security of a penal institution or
court and therefore should not have been assigned 25 points for OV 19. Defendant asserts that
OV 10 should be scored at 10 points, OV 12 should be scored at zero points, and OV 19 should be
scored at 10 points. The prosecution responds that OV 10 was correctly scored at 15 points, OV
12 should have been scored at 25 points, and OV 19 should be scored at 10 points.
In light of the prosecution’s concession that OV 19 should be scored at 10 points, not 25
points,2 thereby reducing the overall OV score of the sentencing guidelines from 60 to 45 points,
2 MCL 777.49 provides that a 25-point score for OV 19 is warranted when “[t]he offender by his
or her conduct threatened the security of a penal institution or court,” MCL 777.49(1)(a), and a
10-point score is warranted when “[t]he offender . . . interfered with or attempted to interfere with
the administration of justice,” MCL 777.49(1)(c). The parties agree that defendant did not threaten
the security of a penal institution or court, but she attempted to interfere with the administration of
justice by making a false police report.

-- 2 of 6 --

-3-
we must remand this case to the trial court for resentencing because the now-applicable guidelines
range is reduced to 45 to 75 months in prison. See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 91-92; 711
NW2d 44 (2006). Nonetheless, as the proper scores for OV 10 and OV 12 are likely to be disputed
on remand, we briefly address those two arguments.
A. OV 10
MCL 777.40 defines OV 10, in relevant part:
(1) Offense variable 10 is exploitation of a vulnerable victim. Score offense
variable 10 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the
number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:
(a) Predatory conduct was involved .............................................. 15 points
(b) The offender exploited a victim’s physical disability, mental disability,
youth or agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her
authority status .......................................................................................... 10 points
* * *
(2) The mere existence of 1 or more factors described in subsection (1) does
not automatically equate with victim vulnerability.
(3) As used in this section:
(a) “Predatory conduct” means preoffense conduct directed at a victim . . .
for the primary purpose of victimization.
(b) “Exploit” means to manipulate a victim for selfish or unethical purposes.
Exploit also means to violate section 50b of the Michigan penal code, 1931 PA 328,
MCL 750.50b, for the purpose of manipulating a victim for selfish or unethical
purposes.
(c) “Vulnerability” means the readily apparent susceptibility of a victim to
injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or temptation.
Predatory conduct is conduct that “itself created or enhanced the vulnerability in the first
place . . . .” People v Huston, 489 Mich 451, 461; 802 NW2d 261 (2011). “ ‘Predatory conduct’
under the statute is behavior that precedes the offense, directed at a person for the primary purpose
of causing that person to suffer from an injurious action or to be deceived.” People v Cannon, 481
Mich 152, 161; 749 NW2d 257 (2008). But not all preoffense conduct qualifies as predatory, as
“[f]ew criminal offenses arise utterly spontaneously and without forethought.” Huston, 489 Mich
at 461. Rather, predatory conduct encompasses “only those forms of preoffense conduct that are
commonly understood as being predatory in nature, e.g., lying in wait and stalking, as opposed to
purely opportunistic criminal conduct or preoffense conduct involving nothing more than run-of-
the-mill planning to effect a crime or subsequent escape without detection.” Id. at 462 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Further, importantly for the purposes of this case, “[t]he use of prefix

-- 3 of 6 --

-4-
‘pre’ in the term ‘preoffense’ indicates that, to be considered predatory, the conduct must have
occurred before the commission of the offense.” Cannon, 481 Mich at 160.
In this case, defendant did not engage in predatory conduct, as the trial court found, by
exploiting the victim’s parolee status to coerce him into sexual conduct. Rather, as defendant
correctly argues, her threats to have him sent to prison on the basis of his parolee status were not
preoffense conduct because they constituted the very acts of extortion for which she was convicted.
See MCL 750.213. In other words, by threatening the victim with his parolee status, defendant
committed the offense of extortion for which she was convicted. See id. Because “predatory
conduct” must occur before the commission of the offense, see Cannon, 481 Mich at 160, it follows
that threatening the victim on the basis of his parolee status cannot constitute “preoffense conduct”
for the purposes of OV 10, see MCL 777.40(1)(a). Therefore, the trial court erred by relying on
this reasoning to score 15 points for OV 10.
On appeal, the prosecution argues for the first time that defendant engaged in predatory
conduct by luring the victim to her apartment and, as a result, a 15-point score for OV 10 is
warranted on this alternate basis. We decline to address this argument because it was not addressed
by the trial court below. However, because resentencing on remand is a de novo proceeding, the
trial court may consider this argument in the first instance. See People v Lampe, 327 Mich App
104, 112; 933 NW2d 314 (2019) (“By ordering ‘resentencing’ without any specific instructions or
any prohibitions on scoring [certain] OVs, this Court returned the case to the trial court in a
presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de
novo.”).
B. OV 12
MCL 777.42 states the following, in relevant part:
(1) Offense variable 12 is contemporaneous felonious criminal acts. Score
offense variable 12 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning
the number of points attributable to the one that has the highest number of points:
(a) Three or more contemporaneous felonious criminal acts involving
crimes against a person were committed .................................................. 25 points
(b) Two contemporaneous felonious criminal acts involving crimes against
a person were committed .......................................................................... 10 points
* * *
(d) One contemporaneous felonious criminal act involving a crime against
a person was committed .............................................................................. 5 points
* * *
(g) No contemporaneous felonious criminal acts were committed ... 0 points
(2) All of the following apply to scoring offense variable 12:

-- 4 of 6 --

-5-
(a) A felonious criminal act is contemporaneous if both of the following
circumstances exist:
(i) The act occurred within 24 hours of the sentencing offense.
(ii) The act has not and will not result in a separate conviction.
The contemporaneous felonious criminal act must be distinct from the sentencing offense.
People v Light, 290 Mich App 717, 723; 803 NW2d 720 (2010). Moreover, “only the number of
underlying criminal acts is to be considered when scoring OV 12, not the number of crimes that
may be charged from those acts.” People v Stoner, 339 Mich App 429, 436; 984 NW2d 775
(2021). Employing this reasoning, we have held that when a defendant is convicted of unarmed
robbery, other forms of larceny of which the defendant also could have been convicted may not be
scored under OV 12. Light, 290 Mich App at 725-726. However, dismissed charges may
constitute contemporaneous acts. People v Billings, 283 Mich App 538, 553; 770 NW2d 893
(2009).
In this case, defendant was properly assessed, at a minimum, 10 points under OV 12 for
committing two contemporaneous felonious criminal acts against a person. MCL 777.42(1)(b).
In particular, defendant committed an act of kidnapping and an additional act of CSC-III beyond
the conduct of the attempted CSC-III conviction (oral/penile). Under MCL 750.349(1)(c), a
person commits kidnapping “if he or she knowingly restrains another person with the intent to,”
among other things, “[e]ngage in criminal sexual penetration.” Defendant threatened to have the
victim imprisoned if he did not have sex with her. In addition, defendant hit the victim and blocked
his escape with her body so he could not leave. Thus, defendant restrained the victim with intent
to engage in CSC with him. See MCL 750.349(1)(c) and (2). Therefore, defendant committed a
distinct “contemporaneous felonious criminal act[] . . . against a person” when she kidnapped the
victim, notwithstanding that the kidnapping charge was dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
See Billings, 283 Mich App at 553.
Further, defendant committed another “contemporaneous felonious criminal act[] . . .
against a person,” requiring an assessment of at least 10 points for OV 12, when she forced the
victim to perform cunnilingus on her. See MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (providing that CSC-III occurs
when a person uses “coercion” to engage in sexual penetration with another person).3 Given the
statements in the presentence investigation report, this was a second sexual penetration
accomplished through coercion. See Horton, 345 Mich App at 616.
3 “Coercion” includes “threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim.” MCL
750.520b(1)(f)(iii).

-- 5 of 6 --

-6-
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s scoring of, at a minimum, 10 points under OV 12 for
two contemporaneous felonious criminal acts against a person, namely, kidnapping the victim and
coercing him to perform cunnilingus. MCL 777.42(1)(b).4
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by scoring 15 points for OV 10 with the reasoning that defendant
engaged in predatory conduct when she exploited the victim’s parolee status. The trial court
properly assigned, at a minimum, 10 points for OV 12 because defendant engaged in at least two
contemporaneous felonious criminal acts against a person when she kidnapped the victim and
coerced him to perform oral sex on her. Finally, as the prosecution concedes, the trial court should
have assigned 10 points for OV 19.
We vacate defendant’s sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent
with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael F. Gadola
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
4 The prosecution argues that 25 points should have been assessed for OV 12 because defendant
also committed felonious assault, MCL 750.82(1), by threatening the victim with a knife, which
constitutes a third felonious criminal act against a person. We decline to address this theory
because it may be addressed in the first instance by the trial court on remand. See Lampe, 327
Mich App at 112.

-- 6 of 6 --