COA 372254 JL V NATASHA MCGHEE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/17/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JL, Minor, by Next Friend, CHANTAE LOVETT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 17, 2025
1:10 PM
v No. 372254
Wayne Circuit Court
NATASHA MCGHEE, LC No. 24-006487-NO
Defendant-Appellant.
and
DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS COMMUNITY
DISTRICT and ASHLEY GARRETT,
Defendants.
Before: TREBILCOCK, P.J., and PATEL and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Natasha McGhee, appeals from an order denying her governmental immunity
for claims arising out of her employment as a principal and a teacher’s assault of a student. We
reverse and remand for entry of judgment in her favor.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was the principal of Turning Points Academy, a Detroit Public Schools
Community District (DPSCD) school for students with special needs. In March 2023, a Turning
Points Academy teacher, Ashley Garrett, assaulted a student, JL. According to Garrett, JL spit on
and punched Garrett in the face multiple times; Garrett responded by hitting, spitting on, and
grabbing JL, causing injuries. DPSCD fired Garrett, and she ultimately pleaded guilty to fourth-
degree child abuse.

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Plaintiff, JL’s next friend, commenced this negligence lawsuit against DPSCD, Garrett,
and defendant.1 The complaint alleges four counts: gross negligence as to defendant and DPSCD,
respondeat superior as to defendant and DPSCD, vicarious liability and principal-agent
relationship as to defendant and DPSCD, and gross negligence as to Garrett. In particular, plaintiff
faults defendant for placing Garrett in JL’s classroom despite (a) Garrett not being certified as a
lead teacher (she was initially hired as substitute teacher and then assigned to be a gym teacher);
(b) being told by Garrett that she was not comfortable with the role; and (c) knowing a prior teacher
in JL’s classroom was fired for hitting a student.2 Defendant, according to Garrett, ignored those
complaints and instead told Garrett to just “deal with it.” In lieu of an answer, DPSCD and
defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing governmental
immunity barred plaintiff’s claims. See MCL 691.1407. The trial court granted DPSCD summary
disposition on all claims but denied immunity to defendant, reasoning that discovery was needed
to determine if defendant’s conduct amounted to gross negligence. Defendant appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
The governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq., grants government
employees broad immunity from tort liability if a government employee is exercising or
discharging a governmental function. Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363, 370; 871 NW2d 5 (2015),
overruled in part on other grounds by Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52, 72 n 49; 903 NW2d 366 (2017).
But MCL 691.1407(2) excepts claims against government employees acting within the scope of
their authority and exercising or discharging a governmental function if their conduct is (1) grossly
negligent and (2) the proximate cause of the injury or damage. Beals, 497 Mich at 370-371.
“The determination whether a governmental employee’s conduct constituted gross
negligence that proximately caused the complained-of injury under MCL 691.1407 is generally a
question of fact, but, if reasonable minds could not differ, a court may grant summary disposition.”
Briggs v Oakland Co, 276 Mich App 369, 374; 742 NW2d 136 (2007). This court reviews de
novo the applicability of governmental immunity. Beals, 497 Mich at 369. To survive a motion
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a “plaintiff must allege facts justifying the
application of an exception to governmental immunity.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We “consider all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accepting as true the
contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate documents specifically contradict
them.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the facts are not in dispute and reasonable
minds could not differ concerning the legal effect of those facts, whether the claim is barred by
immunity is a question for the court to decide as a matter of law.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
1 We refer to McGhee as “defendant” because she is the only defendant appealing the trial court’s
order.
2 Plaintiff does not allege JL had a history of violence towards other students or teachers.

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We focus here on proximate cause as being dispositive.3 In claims involving a government
actor’s gross negligence, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant’s negligence was both the
factual and proximate cause of injury. Ray, 501 Mich at 65. Factual causation requires showing
that “but for the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred.” Patrick v
Turkelson, 322 Mich App 595, 617; 913 NW2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A proximate cause analysis “requires a determination of whether it was foreseeable that the
defendant’s conduct could result in harm to the victim.” Ray, 501 Mich at 64. This “require[s]
considering defendant’s actions alongside any other potential proximate causes to determine
whether defendant’s actions were, or could have been, the one most immediate, efficient, and direct
cause of the injuries” and “does not entail the weighing of factual causes” of the plaintiff’s harm.
Id. at 71-72, 76 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Instead, proximate cause “involves
examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally
responsible for such consequences.” Id. at 63 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis
added). Although there can typically be multiple proximate causes that contribute to an injury,
under the GTLA, a government employee’s conduct must be “the one most immediate, efficient,
and direct cause of the injury.” Id. at 65.
With these considerations in mind, defendant is entitled to summary disposition because
no reasonable juror could conclude defendant was the proximate cause of JL’s injuries. Simply,
Garrett’s conduct—and not defendant’s—was the proximate cause of JL’s injuries, as it was the
most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of those injuries. Stated otherwise, JL’s injuries would
not have occurred but for Garrett’s conduct and arose only from a series of events as opposed to
being an immediate and direct consequence of defendant’s conduct.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter an order granting
summary disposition in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
3 We thus do not address whether defendant’s conduct constituted gross negligence.

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