COA 374806 PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD WAYNE WOOLMAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/24/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 24, 2026
9:32 AM
v No. 374806
St. Clair Circuit Court
RICHARD WAYNE WOOLMAN, LC No. 23-001958-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: MARIANI, P.J., and O’BRIEN and WALLACE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i) (sexual penetration of victim between 13 and 16
years old and member of same household as defendant); two counts of second-degree criminal
sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(b)(i) (sexual contact with victim between 13 and 16 years old
and member of same household as defendant); and one count of attempted CSC-I, MCL 750.92;
MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment
of 20 to 30 years for each CSC-I conviction, 10 to 15 years for each CSC-II conviction, and 40 to
60 months for the attempted CSC-I conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant’s convictions arose from allegations that he sexually abused his then-fiancée’s
daughter (the victim) from August 19, 2022, to August 26, 2023, when the victim was between 14
and 15 years old. At the time of the abuse, defendant had been in a relationship with the victim’s
mother for approximately seven years and had been living with the victim and her mother for at
least three. At trial, the victim testified that once she turned 14 years old, defendant began sneaking
into her room at night and touching her breasts and vagina, but the touching eventually escalated
to vaginal penetration. According to the victim, defendant sexually touched or penetrated her
nearly every day for over a year, and the encounters almost always occurred the same way:
defendant would come into her room shortly before bed while her mother was working or sleeping

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and then touch her breasts and vagina, vaginally penetrate her, or both.1 Defendant’s son, who
was living with defendant, the victim, and the victim’s mother at the time of defendant’s arrest,
testified that he never directly saw defendant act inappropriately toward the victim but that he
frequently saw defendant go into the victim’s bedroom just before bedtime, close the door, and
remain in there for 30 to 60 minutes.
During her testimony, the victim provided a detailed description of a touching incident and
stated that that type of incident happened in the same manner and under the same circumstances
“[m]ore than one time” during the year-long period that defendant abused her. The victim also
provided a detailed description of at least three incidents involving penetration and explained that
that type of incident happened in the same manner and under the same circumstances “all the time”
and nearly “every day” during the period of abuse. The victim testified that whenever the abuse
involved penetration, defendant would always end the assault by ejaculating either onto the floor
next to her bed or on the side of her bed frame. The victim further testified that if her mother was
home while the abuse was occurring, defendant would prop up his phone on an end table near her
bed so that he could monitor the home’s surveillance cameras to ensure that nobody was nearby.2
Defendant’s sexual abuse of the victim was first discovered after the victim’s mother
walked in on defendant attempting to sexually penetrate the victim.3 According to the victim’s
mother, she was at home taking a bath when she heard “a loud bang.” This startled her, so she
checked the home’s camera to see what happened, and she saw defendant in the living room
nodding his head toward the victim’s room; defendant and the victim then both walked into the
victim’s room, and defendant shut the door behind them. Concerned, the victim’s mother got out
of the bath and went to the victim’s room, and upon opening the bedroom door, she saw defendant
sitting on the victim’s bed with the victim sitting on his lap facing away from him and with him
holding onto the victim’s hips. Defendant and the victim both had their pants pulled down enough
so that their genitals were fully exposed, and the victim’s mother could see that defendant had an
erection. Defendant then pushed the victim off his lap, and the victim’s mother pulled her out of
1 The victim also provided a detailed description of one incident in which defendant vaginally
penetrated her on a desk in his makeshift office in the home’s garage during the afternoon; the
assault ended when the victim’s mother returned home unexpectedly and the home’s alarm system
notified defendant of her presence, which gave him sufficient time to put his clothes back on and
hide the victim.
2 During her testimony, the victim’s mother explained that, at defendant’s direction, she and
defendant had installed a “live feed” video camera in the living room in approximately August
2022 so that they could monitor the common areas of the home and the doorways to each of the
children’s bedrooms. Both the victim’s mother and defendant had access to the camera’s live
video transmission via an application on their cell phones. According to the victim’s mother, she
was typically unable to see the live video while she was at work and defendant was at home
because defendant would, by his own admission to her, unplug the camera during that time.
3 The victim explained that she never disclosed the sexual abuse while it was occurring because
defendant had threatened that she would “be taken away from [her] mom” and that she and her
“mom would be homeless” if she told anyone.

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the room and began hitting defendant. After some back and forth with defendant, the victim’s
mother eventually called the police to report the incident, and defendant was arrested that evening.
In addition to testimony from the victim, the victim’s mother, and defendant’s son, the
prosecution’s evidence at trial included photographs of evidence collected from the home and from
the victim’s person; expert testimony regarding the physical evidence collected and the victim’s
forensic interview shortly after defendant’s arrest; DNA test results from samples collected from
seminal fluid stains found on the victim’s bed frame and floor, which indicated that there was
“very strong support” that defendant and the victim were contributors; and testimony from the
individuals involved in the investigation. The prosecution also introduced testimony from the
sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) who medically examined the victim immediately after
defendant’s arrest, as well as a copy of the SANE’s report that she had completed while examining
the victim.
The defense introduced testimony from defendant’s daughter, who testified that she
occasionally stayed in the home and never noticed anything unusual going on between defendant
and the victim during those times. The defense also introduced testimony from an expert in
forensic biology, who testified that she was unable to recover any male DNA from the swabbed
samples collected from the victim’s body during the victim’s SANE examination. Additionally,
defendant testified on his own behalf, generally denying all of the victim’s allegations and claiming
that on the evening that the victim’s mother walked in on him with the victim, he and the victim
had simply been “wrestling” and that, in what was “a freak accident,” his penis slipped out of his
pajama pants.
Defendant was convicted and sentenced as described. This appeal followed.
II. EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES
Defendant raises two evidentiary challenges on appeal: the admission of statements the
victim made during her medical examination with the SANE, and the admission of the victim’s
testimony regarding the full scope of defendant’s acts of sexual abuse. In general, “[a] trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,” with “[p]reliminary
questions of law, including whether a rule of evidence precludes the admission of evidence, . . .
reviewed de novo.” People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110; 832 NW2d 738 (2013). Because,
however, defendant failed to object to this evidence at trial on the same grounds raised on appeal,
the issues are unpreserved and thus reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People
v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 252; 934 NW2d 693 (2019). To obtain appellate relief under this
standard, the defendant must show: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and
(3) the error affected substantial rights. People v Jones, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 362854); slip op at 3. To satisfy the third element, the defendant must show
“that the error affected the outcome of the [lower court] proceedings.” Id. at ___; slip op at 3
(quotation marks and citation omitted). And even when these three requirements are met,
“[r]eversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually
innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence.” People v Allen, 507 Mich 597,
614; 968 NW2d 532 (2021) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

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A. SANE REPORT AND CORRESPONDING TESTIMONY
Defendant first argues that the trial court reversibly erred by admitting as evidence certain
statements made by the victim to the SANE during her medical examination. Specifically,
defendant challenges the admission of the portions of the SANE’s report and corresponding trial
testimony regarding (1) the victim’s allegations of ongoing sexual abuse by defendant; (2) the
victim’s description of how defendant would ejaculate after each assault; and (3) the victim’s
statements that defendant threatened her to keep her from disclosing the abuse. According to
defendant, the statements did not satisfy the requirements of MRE 803(4) (statement made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment) and thus were
inadmissible hearsay, and they only served to impermissibly bolster the victim’s trial testimony.
“In general, hearsay—an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted—may not be admitted into evidence.” People v Green, 313 Mich App 526, 531; 884
NW2d 838 (2015); see also MRE 801(c); MRE 802. MRE 803(4), however, provides an exception
to this rule, allowing the admission of hearsay “statements made for the purpose of obtaining
medical treatment.” Jones, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4, 6. To be admissible under this
exception, the statements (1) must be “made for—and [be] reasonably necessary to—medical
treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment,” and (2) must “describe[] medical history,
past or present symptoms or sensations, their inception, or their general cause.” MRE 803(4).
“The rationale for MRE 803(4) is the existence of (1) the self-interested motivation to speak the
truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical care, and (2) the reasonable necessity
of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.” People v Shaw, 315 Mich App 668,
674; 892 NW2d 15 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Correspondingly, our caselaw has generally recognized that, to fall within the scope of this
exception, the medical examination during which the statements were made must have occurred
for the primary purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment rather than investigation, and within a
reasonable amount of time of the last alleged instance of sexual abuse. See People v Meeboer
(After Remand), 439 Mich 310, 324-325, 333-334; 484 NW2d 621 (1992); People v Duenaz, 306
Mich App 85, 95-97; 854 NW2d 531 (2014); cf. Shaw, 315 Mich App at 674-676 (concluding that
the victim’s hearsay statements were not admissible under MRE 803(4) because they were made
during an examination that occurred seven years after the last alleged instance of sexual abuse and
for the purpose of investigation rather than diagnosis and treatment). The declarant, however, need
not have “sustained any immediately apparent physical injury” to meet MRE 803(4)’s
requirements. People v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 215; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). “Particularly
in cases of sexual assault, in which the injuries might be latent, such as contracting sexually
transmitted diseases or psychological in nature, and thus not necessarily physically manifested at
all, a victim’s complete history and a recitation of the totality of the circumstances of the assault
are properly considered to be statements made for medical treatment.” Id. Our caselaw has also
recognized that a child’s identification of their abuser during a medical examination can be
reasonably necessary to obtaining proper medical treatment and to ensuring the child’s health,
including their safety upon their return home; under such circumstances, and if the identification
is otherwise sufficiently trustworthy, it may be admissible under MRE 803(4). Jones, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 6-7, citing Meeboer, 439 Mich at 324-325, and Duenaz, 306 Mich App at
96-97.

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Under this precedent, defendant has not shown reversible error in the trial court’s decision
to admit the victim’s statements discussed in the SANE’s report and the corresponding trial
testimony. As the SANE testified—and as defendant has not meaningfully attempted to rebut—
all of the victim’s statements challenged by defendant were reasonably necessary to determining
whether the victim should be evaluated and treated for potential sexually transmitted diseases and
pregnancy, as well as for any trauma and psychological injuries not physically manifested. See
Meeboer, 439 Mich at 328-330; Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 96-97; Mahone, 294 Mich App at 215.
Those injuries, once discovered, may have required referrals for other necessary medical treatment,
such as additional testing or psychological counseling. See Meeboer, 439 Mich at 329-330;
Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 96-97. The challenged statements were also reasonably necessary to
determine whether the victim would be returned to a safe, rather than an abusive, home following
the medical examination, and would “have the opportunity to heal once released from the
hospital.” Meeboer, 439 Mich at 329-330; see also Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 96-97. In addition,
the examination during which the victim made the challenged statements occurred on the evening
of defendant’s arrest, which immediately followed the victim’s mother walking in on defendant
attempting to sexually penetrate the victim, and was done while the victim “was still suffering
from emotional pain and distress from the incident.” Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 96. And although
the prosecution and police initiated the medical examination following defendant’s arrest and it
may have been performed at least in part to investigate an alleged sexual assault, this factor alone
is not dispositive. See id. Nor does defendant identify, or the record reflect, any other basis to
question the trustworthiness of the statements the victim made during the examination.
Furthermore, even if any of the challenged statements were erroneously admitted,
defendant has not demonstrated that reversal is warranted. See Allen, 507 Mich at 614. The victim
testified at length and in great detail about the near-daily sexual abuse she experienced for over a
year at the hands of defendant. She also testified about why she did not disclose the abuse, which,
according to her, was due to defendant’s threats that she would be taken away from her mother
and that her mother would get in trouble for the abuse.
Defendant stresses that the challenged statements were prejudicial because they bolstered
this testimony and, with it, the victim’s credibility. But even if so, we fail to see how such
bolstering may have affected the outcome of his trial in light of the ample other evidence
corroborating the victim’s testimony and demonstrating his guilt. The victim’s mother testified to
walking in on defendant attempting to sexually penetrate the victim in her bedroom. Defendant’s
son testified that he had, on many occasions, observed defendant going into the victim’s bedroom
just before bedtime, closing the door behind him, and remaining in there for 30 to 60 minutes. The
SANE testified that she observed a small red abrasion on the victim’s labia minora, which was
consistent with a wound caused by “rubbing friction” from “an object, a finger, [or] a penis[.]”
The victim testified that defendant, after each assault, would ejaculate either onto the floor next to
her bed or on the side of her bed frame, and personnel involved in the investigation testified that
they collected DNA samples from a total of more than 55 separate seminal fluid stains from a four-
to five-foot portion of the victim’s floor near her bed and from the side of her bed frame. Testing
of two of those samples (one from the floor and one from the bed frame) revealed that the seminal
fluid stains did not contain sperm, which is commonly seen in individuals who have had a
vasectomy, and defendant testified that he had had a vasectomy several years prior to the assaults.
The test results also revealed that there was “very strong support” for the conclusion that both the
victim and defendant, rather than any other individuals, were the DNA contributors of the samples.

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Defendant has failed to show how, given all of the evidence properly presented to the jury, any
error in the admission of the challenged statements from the SANE report and corresponding
testimony affected his substantial rights and warrants reversal. See Allen, 507 Mich at 614; Jones,
___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.4
B. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
Defendant next argues that the prosecution was erroneously permitted to admit other-acts
evidence at trial without first notifying him under MCL 768.27a of its intent to do so.5 Specifically,
defendant argues that he was only charged with seven CSC offenses, but the victim was permitted
to testify that he sexually abused her on a near-daily basis from the time of her fourteenth birthday
until the date of his arrest a little over a year later, and all of those other instances of CSC
constituted other-acts evidence requiring pretrial notice of the prosecution’s intent to introduce it.
Here too, defendant has failed to show reversible error.
MCL 768.27a(1) provides, in relevant part, that
[i]f the prosecuting attorney intends to offer evidence [that the defendant committed
another listed offense against a minor] under this section, the prosecuting attorney
4 To the extent that defendant raises an unpreserved prosecutorial-misconduct claim based on the
admission of this same evidence, we conclude that it fails for the same fundamental reasons. See
People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010); People v Dobek, 274 Mich App
58, 70-71; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
Also unavailing is defendant’s corresponding ineffective-assistance claim as to this evidence. As
discussed, defendant has not shown that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence, and counsel
is not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a futile or meritless objection. People v Head,
323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752 (2018). And, as discussed, the other evidence presented
at trial amply supported defendant’s convictions. Defendant has not demonstrated how, in light
of this other evidence, it was reasonably probable that any alleged deficiency in counsel’s
performance with respect to the SANE-related evidence was outcome determinative. See Shaw,
315 Mich App at 672.
5 Defendant argues that the prosecution failed to provide proper pretrial notice under either MCL
768.27a or MRE 404(b)(3). But it is clear that MCL 768.27a provides the relevant basis for
defendant’s challenge, given the nature of the conduct at issue. See MCL 768.27a(1) (providing
for admission of “evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense against a minor . . .
for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant”) and (2)(a) (defining a “ ‘[l]isted offense’ ” as
that term is “defined in . . . MCL 28.722”); MCL 28.722(i) (defining “ ‘[l]isted offense’ ” as “a
tier I, tier II, or tier III offense”), (t)(x) (defining “ ‘[t]ier II offense’ ” to include criminal sexual
contact (CSC-II) with a victim between 13 and 18 years old under MCL 750.520c), and (v)(iv) and
(viii) (defining “ ‘[t]ier III offense’ ” to include criminal sexual penetration (CSC-I) of a minor
victim under MCL 750.520b and attempt of the same); see also People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450,
468-477; 818 NW2d 296 (2012) (concluding that “MCL 768.27a and MRE 404(b) irreconcilably
conflict” and holding that “in cases in which [MCL 768.27a] applies, it supersedes MRE 404(b)”).

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shall disclose the evidence to the defendant at least 15 days before the scheduled
date of trial or at a later time as allowed by the court for good cause shown,
including the statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any
testimony that is expected to be offered.
Assuming the evidence of the conduct at issue required pretrial disclosure under MCL 768.27a(1),6
defendant has not explained why that disclosure requirement was not satisfied here. Both the
felony complaint and the felony information, which were filed within a few weeks of defendant’s
arrest—i.e., more than a year before defendant’s jury trial—informed defendant that the charged
offenses were based on the victim’s allegations that he had sexually abused her between August
19, 2022, and August 26, 2023. A search-warrant affidavit to collect defendant’s DNA filed
approximately two weeks after defendant’s arrest also clearly stated that the criminal investigation
and the corresponding charges were based on the victim’s allegations of near-daily sexual abuse
by defendant from the time of the victim’s fourteenth birthday until the date of defendant’s arrest.
These documents fell within the scope of the demand for discovery defendant made four days after
his arrest, and defendant does not claim he did not receive them well before his scheduled trial
date. Nor, more generally, does he claim that he did not appreciate the relevance of the conduct
at issue to the charges against him, identify exactly what evidence regarding the conduct was not
disclosed to him at least 15 days prior to trial, or explain why the evidence made available to him
prior to trial was insufficient to meet the statutory disclosure requirement.
Furthermore, defendant has not explained how any error in the prosecution’s compliance
with MCL 768.27a(1)’s disclosure requirement may have affected his substantial rights. See Allen,
507 Mich at 614; Jones, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3. Again, defendant does not claim, and
the record does not show, that defendant lacked awareness of the evidence at issue or appreciation
of its connection to the case against him. And while defendant baldly asserts that the evidence
“was blatantly improper,” he offers—and we see—no basis to conclude that it was somehow
substantively inadmissible under MCL 768.27a(1). Nor does he explain how he would have
proceeded any differently with earlier or more notice of its intended use at trial, or how any error
as to disclosure may have made a difference in the outcome of his trial in light of the above-
discussed, overwhelming evidence of his guilt. See, e.g., People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289,
302; 856 NW2d 222 (2014) (explaining that “any error in the prosecutor’s disclosure [under MCL
768.27a(1)] was harmless” given the defendant’s undisputed awareness of the evidence at issue),
citing MCR 2.613(A); cf. People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 276-280; 869 NW2d 253 (2015)
6 Defendant does not address why it is correct to consider the conduct at issue “another listed
offense” under MCL 768.27a(1) (emphasis added), given that it fell within the scope of the charged
conduct. Both the felony complaint and the felony information listed the charged conduct as
having occurred between August 19, 2022 (the victim’s fourteenth birthday) and August 26, 2023
(the date of defendant’s arrest). The record also demonstrates that the charged offenses and the
specified date range were based on the victim’s allegations that defendant had sexually abused her
nearly every day during that time period. As explained above, however, we see no basis for relief
even if compliance with MCL 768.27a(1)’s disclosure provision was required.

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(analyzing harmlessness of error in noncompliance with MRE 404(b)’s notice requirement). We
therefore see no grounds for relief as to this issue.7
III. UNANIMITY INSTRUCTION
Finally, defendant argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to a unanimous
jury verdict because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the
specific facts supporting each verdict. Because defendant failed to request a specific unanimity
instruction or challenge the trial court’s failure to give such an instruction, this issue is unpreserved
and thus reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People v Waclawski, 286 Mich
App 634, 678-679; 780 NW2d 321 (2009).
“A defendant has the right to a unanimous verdict and it is the duty of the trial court to
properly instruct the jury on this unanimity requirement.” Id. at 679 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). A “specific unanimity instruction is not required in all cases in which more than one act
is presented as evidence of the actus reus of a single criminal offense”; rather, such an instruction
is required only when alternative acts allegedly committed by the defendant are “materially
distinct,” or “there is reason to believe the jurors might be confused or disagree about the factual
basis of [the] defendant’s guilt.” People v Cooks, 446 Mich 503, 512, 524; 521 NW2d 275 (1994).
Accordingly, “where materially identical evidence is presented with respect to each act, and there
is no juror confusion, a general unanimity instruction” is sufficient. Id. at 512-513.
Here, the trial court gave a general unanimity instruction, and defendant does not provide
any legal or factual basis to conclude that this instruction was insufficient in this case. Defendant
does not explain how any of the acts in question were materially distinct, or point to anything in
the record demonstrating juror confusion. See id. at 512-513, 524. Nor is any material distinction
or juror confusion apparent from the record. As in Cooks, “the evidence offered in this case to
support each of the alleged acts . . . was materially identical”—the victim described instances of
sexual contact and sexual penetration perpetrated by defendant while the two were alone in her
bedroom and explained that defendant repeatedly abused her in the same manner from the time of
her fourteenth birthday until the time that her mother walked in on defendant attempting to sexually
penetrate her over a year later. Id. at 528-529. And also as in Cooks, the jurors received a general
unanimity instruction and never expressed confusion about their obligation to reach a unanimous
agreement for each charged offense. See id. at 529. Accordingly, defendant has not shown that
he is entitled to relief on this issue. See id.; Jones, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3.
Defendant also argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated because the
trial court, by failing to provide a specific unanimity instruction, “effectively amended the
information to include hundreds of acts that were not charged and which [defendant] never had
notice that he would have to defend against.” The record does not support this claim. As discussed
7 Defendant’s corresponding ineffective-assistance claim as to this issue is equally unavailing;
given the analysis above, defendant has not shown how counsel performed deficiently by not
seeking to object to the evidence in question for lack of pretrial notice, nor has he shown how it
was reasonably probable that, had counsel done so, the outcome of his trial would have been
different. See Head, 323 Mich App at 539; Shaw, 315 Mich App at 672.

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above, the felony information listed the date range for the charged offenses as August 19, 2022, to
August 26, 2023, and it was known since the inception of this case that the charged offenses were
based on the victim’s allegations that defendant abused her on a near-daily basis during that time
frame. The trial court’s jury instructions were consistent with this, and defendant has failed to
show any reversible error on this basis, either. See Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 678-679.
Affirmed.
/s/ Philip P. Mariani
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Randy J. Wallace

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