COA 366443 PEOPLE OF MI V TOQUILLA MYELIN JORDAN Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 2/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2026
1:11 PM
v No. 366443
Wayne Circuit Court
TOQUILLA MYELIN JORDAN, LC No. 20-004061-01-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: CAMERON, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and YOUNG, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Toquilla Jordan, appeals as of right her jury trial convictions of assault with
intent to murder, MCL 750.83, assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.84, felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6),
and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),
MCL 750.227b. Jordan was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 35
to 60 years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to murder conviction, 5 to 10 years’
imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm conviction, two to five years’
imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction and the felon in possession of
ammunition conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for each of the felony-firearm convictions,
to be served consecutive to the other convictions. We affirm for the reasons stated in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
On June 15, 2020, Jordan shot her neighbor, Patricia Funderburke, two times. Prior to the
shooting Funderburke was inside her house, but her goddaughter was sitting on the porch with a
friend. Funderburke’s goddaughter saw Jordan standing in her yard yelling at someone. When
Jordan came around a bush with a gun in her hand, Funderburke’s goddaughter exchanged “some
words that weren’t polite” with Jordan. Funderburke, who was alerted to the argument via text
message, went to the door. She testified that she saw Jordan standing in the front lawn, near the
driveway, waving a gun. Funderburke told her goddaughter and her goddaughter’s friend to be
quiet and go inside. Both girls got up as if they were going to go inside.

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However, before they could go into the house, Jordan shouted, “I’ll shoot y’all bitches, too,
and yo white ass momma.” Funderburke testified that she heard a gun go off as she was reaching
for the screen door. She had been shot in the stomach. She reached for the door again, turning,
but was shot in the left side of her back. She fell to the ground. She heard Jordan say, “I’m bout
[sic] to kill you now.” Funderburke was pulled into the house. Three more gunshots were fired.
Funderburke called 9-1-1.
Funderburke’s daughter, who was returning home, observed the shooting from a vehicle.
She saw Jordan standing in the driveway with a gun, heard the gunshots, and saw Funderburke fall
to the ground. But another witness, who was visiting a friend who lived near Funderburke, testified
that she heard someone yell, “he has a gun, he has a gun.” She stated that she saw a bearded man
shoot a gun. She added, however, that she was nearsighted, was not wearing her glasses, and that
she rushed into her friend’s house to take cover when she heard the gunshots. Following the trial,
Jordan was convicted as indicated above.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a supplemental brief filed pursuant to Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 2004-6, 471 Mich c, cii (2004), Jordan argues that her defense lawyer provided ineffective
assistance during the plea-negotiation process. Because the trial court did not conduct an
evidentiary hearing, our review “is limited to mistakes that are apparent on the record.” People v
Anderson, 322 Mich App 622, 628; 912 NW2d 607 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of his or her lawyer when
negotiating a plea. People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 591-592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014). To
establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must establish that his or her lawyer’s performance
was deficient and that, but for the deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different. People v White, 331 Mich App 106, 149; 951 NW2d 106 (2020). The
defendant’s lawyer must “properly advise [the] defendant regarding the nature of the charges or
the consequences of the guilty plea and the possible defenses to the charges to which the defendant
is pleading guilty, so [the] defendant has the ability to make an intelligent and informed choice
from among [her] alternative courses of action.” Id. at 148. When the alleged prejudice arising
from the defense lawyer’s deficient performance “is that the defendant rejected a plea offer and
stood trial, a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable
probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would
have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence,
or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence
that in fact were imposed.” Douglas, 496 Mich at 592 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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In her supplemental brief, Jordan maintains that she was offered a plea bargain by the
prosecution that would have allowed her to plead guilty to assault with intent to murder and the
corresponding felony-firearm offense. As part of the offer, she would be sentenced to a minimum
of eight years’ imprisonment for the assault offense and two years for the felony-firearm offense.1
Based upon our review of the existing record, we conclude that such an offer was never
made to Jordan. Instead, at the pretrial hearing, the prosecution offered to dismiss the remaining
counts and the sentence-enhancement if Jordan pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder and
the corresponding felony-firearm. Under this agreement, Jordan would agree to be sentenced to
18 to 50 years’ imprisonment. A second offer was made on the first day of trial that would have
required Jordan to plead guilty to assault with intent to murder and the corresponding felony-
firearm “with a sentence agreement of a 10-year minimum on the assault with intent to murder,
and a two-year consecutive on the felony firearm.” Both offers were rejected by Jordan.
Further, the terms of the offers are different from the terms of the offer that Jordan
maintains is the basis for her ineffective-assistance claim. On the second day of trial, the
prosecutor indicated that he and Jordan’s lawyer had continued to engage in plea negotiations.
The deal that they were contemplating would have included an eight-year minimum on the assault
with intent to murder charge and two years on a corresponding felony-firearm charge. The terms
of that potential offer are identical to the terms of the offer that Jordan claims she had received.
Yet, the prosecutor explained on the record that he lacked the authority to extend an offer with
such terms to the defense. As such, although Jordan may believe that a plea offer was put forward,
it is clear that no offer was actually made. Instead, the second day of trial only memorialized plea
negotiations between the defense and the prosecution that did not culminate in an offer to Jordan.
In sum, contrary to Jordan’s position on appeal, the offer that she claims her lawyer
provided ineffective assistance on was not an offer that was actually made to her by the
prosecution. Jordan’s lawyer could not have provided ineffective assistance in relation to a plea
deal that was never made.
For completeness, we consider whether Jordan was provided with ineffective assistance in
relation to the two pleas that were actually made by the prosecution. Jordan argues that she went
to trial because her lawyer advised her that she could win the case and that the “trial was in the
bag.” The record does not include any indication that she was so advised. Instead, in connection
to the first plea offer, Jordan’s lawyer advised her of the consequences of proceeding to trial instead
of pleading guilty, including that she would face a minimum 25-year sentence for the assault with
intent to commit murder charge. Jordan acknowledged that fact but stated that she still wished to
proceed to trial. And, as it relates to the second plea offer, Jordan’s lawyer likewise advised her
of the consequences of proceeding to trial instead of entering a guilty plea. Again, Jordan
1 Jordan submitted an affidavit with her Standard 4 brief alleging that this offer was made and that
her lawyer’s advice in relation to it was deficient. Because this affidavit was not part of the lower
court record, we decline to consider it. See People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 38; 755 NW2d 212
(2008) (declining to consider affidavits submitted with the defendant’s motion to remand because
the affidavits were not part of the lower court record).

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acknowledged the advice and stated that she desired to proceed to trial. On this record, therefore,
even assuming that Jordan is arguing that she received deficient assistance in relation to the first
or second plea offers, we conclude that she has failed to establish the factual predicate for her
claim. See Douglas, 496 Mich at 592.2
III. SENTENCING
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Jordan argues in a brief submitted by her appellate lawyer that she is entitled to
resentencing because the sentence imposed by the trial court violates the principle of
proportionality. A challenge to the proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence is reviewed for
reasonableness. People v Klungle, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket Nos.
364125 and 367795); slip op at 5. When a defendant’s sentences are within the “calculated
guidelines range, [the] defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the sentences are unreasonable
and disproportionate.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he proper inquiry when
reviewing a sentence for reasonableness is whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating
the principle of proportionality . . . .” People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 459-460; 902 NW2d
327 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The “principle of proportionality requires
sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 474 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. ANALYSIS
It is presumed that a within-guidelines sentence is reasonable and proportionate. People v
Posey (On Remand), 349 Mich App 199, 203; 27 NW3d 137 (2023). A proportionate sentence
generally considers “the reformation of the offender, the protection of society, the discipline of the
offender, and the deterrence of others from committing the same offense.” People v Boykin, 510
Mich 171, 183; 987 NW2d 58 (2022).
Jordan asserts that the trial court gave excessive weight to the punishment factor when
sentencing her. We disagree. When sentencing Jordan, the trial court stated that it was considering
deterrence, rehabilitation, punishment, and the “positives” in Jordan’s life, including her “loving
family,” and her “accomplishments.” Further considerations included the fact that Jordan had five
prior felony convictions and four prior misdemeanor convictions. One of these felony convictions
2 Jordan seeks a remand for an evidentiary hearing. We limit our consideration of her affidavit to
her request for a remand. See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a). In her affidavit, she averred that her lawyer
advised her not to accept a favorable plea deal before trial. Yet, she was offered multiple plea
deals, was warned of the consequences of proceeding to trial, and was apprised of the 25-year
mandatory minimum sentence that would be imposed if she was convicted of assault with intent
to murder. Moreover, Jordan’s lawyer continued to engage in plea negotiations even after the trial
began, which belies Jordan’s assertion in her affidavit that her lawyer believed the case was “in
the bag.” We, therefore, conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in this case given
that further factual development would not advance Jordan’s claim. People v Chapo, 283 Mich
App 360, 368-369; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

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was for assault with a dangerous weapon. Additionally, it is obvious that her conviction of assault
with intent to murder was an egregious offense. The fact that the crimes were predicated upon a
verbal disagreement with a neighbor and that Jordan coupled her heinous actions with racial slurs
did not lessen that egregiousness. In light of the foregoing, the sentence imposed by the court
serves to protect society from Jordan’s dangerous behavior and discipline her for the dangerous
conduct. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by violating the
principle of proportionality in sentencing Jordan to 35 to 60 years’ imprisonment.
Jordan also argues that the trial court failed to explain why the minimum sentence was
insufficient. However, the trial court was not required to “expressly explain why a within-
guidelines sentence is reasonable and proportionate.” Posey, 349 Mich App at 207. Thus, the trial
court’s failure to do so was not an error warranting resentencing.
Next, Jordan contends that the judge presiding over the sentencing hearing improperly
considered her “deplorable behavior” in the police body camera footage from her arrest. Jordan
offers no authority that a judge is not permitted to consider aspects of a defendant’s conduct that
were deemed inadmissible for the jury. Moreover, the record does not reflect that the judge
presiding over her sentencing even saw the body-cam footage given that a different judge had
presided over the hearing that resulted in it being suppressed. We conclude that Jordan’s argument
is unsupported by the facts of this case and by the law that has been presented in support of this
issue.
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

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