COA 376568 PEOPLE OF MI V JOI MONEE ARAUZA Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 3/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
March 11, 2026
1:25 PM
v No. 376568
Kent Circuit Court
JOI MONEE ARAUZA, LC No. 24-009260-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and MALDONADO and ACKERMAN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Joi Monee Arauza, appeals by delayed leave granted1 the trial court’s order
denying her motion to dismiss the charge of operating while intoxicated, MCL 257.625(1), with a
third-offense notice, MCL 257.625(9). Defendant argues that the arresting officer lacked
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We agree and reverse the trial
court’s order.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2024, Kentwood Police Department Road Patrol Officer Matthew Zaiger
was driving on 28th Street in Kentwood during his patrol shift. It was late at night, so traffic was
very light. While driving westbound on 28th Street, Officer Zaiger noticed that defendant’s
vehicle had approached him from behind with its right turn signal activated. The vehicle drove
behind him for no more than a quarter mile. Officer Zaiger testified that he was already driving
over the speed limit, although he did not know his exact speed. Nevertheless, defendant’s vehicle
was approaching so quickly that Officer Zaiger felt that he was forced to move into the left lane to
let it pass. The vehicle passed him and drove straight through two intersections with green lights,
never turning off the turn signal. The turn signal was on for a total of about 30 to 40 seconds.
1 People v Arauza, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 3, 2025 (Docket
No. 376568).

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Officer Zaiger activated the lights on his police cruiser and initiated a traffic stop. From
that traffic stop, the police obtained evidence that defendant was intoxicated, and defendant was
subsequently charged with operating while intoxicated (OWI). She moved to dismiss the charge,
arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not justified by
reasonable suspicion and that the evidence of her intoxication should be suppressed.
During the proceedings in the trial court, Officer Zaiger testified that he had been a road
patrol officer for about five months. He received some training on traffic violations but was
unfamiliar with details of the Motor Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., such as the statute for
improper lane use. He testified that the “sole reason” that he initiated the traffic stop was because
defendant used her turn signal for an extended period without turning, which he viewed as a sign
of intoxication. Officer Zaiger did not testify that defendant’s driving was erratic or showed any
signs of impairment beyond improper use of her turn signal. At the time of the stop, Officer Zaiger
believed that defendant’s improper use of her turn signal was a violation of the Motor Vehicle
Code. However, he could not identify an applicable statute and testified that he had learned after
the stop that extended use of a turn signal was not a traffic violation.
Officer Zaiger also testified that the speed limit on 28th Street was 40 miles per hour and
that he was already driving over the speed limit when defendant’s vehicle approached.2 However,
the official traffic control order set the speed limit on the relevant portion of 28th Street at 45 miles
per hour, and Officer Zaiger’s dashcam video showed that he also drove past a traffic sign stating
that the speed limit was 45 miles per hour. Defendant’s accident reconstruction expert referred to
the timestamps and the location of defendant’s vehicle in the dashcam video and calculated the
vehicle’s time-distance between each intersection. From those calculations, the defense expert
determined that defendant was driving 45.8 miles per hour.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that defendant was not
speeding and that her extended use of a turn signal was not a traffic violation. However, the court
held that the stop was constitutional, explaining that Officer Zaiger’s “articulable and reasonable
suspicion was public safety” because “another vehicle may [have] turn[ed] out in front of
defendant assuming that she would be turning right and thereby caus[e] a collision.” Alternatively,
there was reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired or “that there was some
mechanical malfunction with her vehicle, both [of] which raise a public safety risk.” According
to the trial court, these public safety risks were encompassed in the scope of MCL 257.602 and
gave Officer Zaiger reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The trial court ultimately denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss charges is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Brown, 330 Mich App 223, 229; 946 NW2d 852 (2019). “A trial court
necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “We review de novo as a question of law whether a search was supported by the
2 At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Zaiger acknowledged that he was mistaken about the speed
limit.

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constitutional standard of reasonable suspicion.” People v Dillon, 296 Mich App 506, 508; 822
NW2d 611 (2012).
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion that she
was driving while intoxicated or probable cause to believe that she had committed a traffic
violation. We agree.
“Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of
persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26,
31-32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021), citing US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. A traffic stop
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement. Pagano, 507 Mich at 32. The standard for whether a traffic stop was
reasonable depends on whether the stop was to investigate suspected criminal activity or to address
a traffic violation. Compare Kansas v Glover, 589 US 376, 380; 140 S Ct 1183; 206 L Ed 2d 412
(2020) (requiring reasonable suspicion for criminal investigation), with Whren v United States,
517 US 806, 810; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996) (requiring probable cause for traffic
violation). An officer’s subjective motivation for initiating a traffic stop is irrelevant to the
question of whether the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. Whren, 517 US at 813.
A. REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR OPERATING WHILE INTOXICATED
Although the extended use of a turn signal might be a sign of intoxication, we conclude
that the totality of the circumstances indicated that Officer Zaiger’s traffic stop was not supported
by reasonable suspicion.
A traffic stop for a criminal investigation needs to be supported only by reasonable
suspicion. Glover, 589 US at 380. Reasonable suspicion exists when there is “a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). This requires more than a hunch but less than is required
for probable cause. Id. Whether a stop is justified by reasonable suspicion is reviewed from the
officer’s perspective, allowing for “commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior.” Id. at 380-381 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[F]ewer foundational facts are
necessary to support a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved.” People v
Christie, 206 Mich App 304, 308-309; 520 NW2d 647 (1994). But the trial court still must
consider the totality of the circumstances in cases involving investigative stops. Id. (citation
omitted). “The objective facts known to the police officers who effected the traffic stop should be
considered in determining whether the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion regardless of
whether the officers subjectively relied on those facts.” People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 199; 627
NW2d 297 (2001).
It is a crime to operate a motor vehicle while intoxicated, MCL 257.625; however, officers
must have more than a conclusory allegation of drunk driving “to pass constitutional muster.”
Pagano, 507 Mich at 35. In Pagano, a bystander made a 911 call to report that the defendant was
yelling at her children and appeared “obnoxious” as she got into her car and drove away. Id. at 29-
30. From this behavior, the caller suspected that the defendant was intoxicated. Id. The police

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caught up with the defendant’s vehicle and initiated a traffic stop, even though the officer never
saw her commit any traffic violations. Id. at 30. Our Supreme Court held that the officer did not
have the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify a stop because “there was no
report of even a minor traffic infraction” and “no support for the conclusion that ‘appearing to be
obnoxious’ and yelling at one’s children creates a reasonable and articulable suspicion that one is
intoxicated.” Id. at 34-35. There were no other details to support a belief that the defendant was
intoxicated, and commonsense inferences led to the conclusion “that many parents yell at their
children, even without the aid of intoxicants.” Id. at 34.
Our Supreme Court distinguished Pagano from the circumstances in Navarette v
California, 572 US 393, 395; 134 S Ct 1683; 188 L Ed 2d 680 (2014), in which a 911 caller
reported that a suspected drunk driver had run the caller off the road. The Navarette Court
explained that, under a commonsense approach, some behaviors are recognized “as sound indicia
of drunk driving,” such as weaving all over the road, crossing over the center line, or nearly causing
a collision, can give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver is intoxicated. Id. at 402.
Accordingly, the Court held that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the
defendant’s vehicle after reports that the defendant had run another vehicle off the road because
such conduct suggested “lane-positioning problems, decreased vigilance, impaired judgment, or
some combination of those recognized drunk driving cues.” Id. at 403. The Court cautioned that
some traffic infractions, such as driving without a seatbelt or slightly over the speed limit, “are so
tenuously connected to drunk driving that a stop on those grounds alone would be constitutionally
suspect.” Id.
This Court has previously addressed the unusually long use of a turn signal in Christie, 206
Mich App at 309. In Christie, a police officer noticed the defendant’s vehicle drifting left and
right and driving over the lane markers on the road. Id. at 306. The defendant “activated his left
turn signal, traveling past numerous driveways and one side street before turning south. . . .” Id.
The turn signal was on for about two-tenths of a mile before the turn. Id. The officer initiated a
traffic stop “to investigate defendant’s extended use of his turn signal” and subsequently learned
that the defendant was intoxicated. Id. This Court held that swerving, driving on lane markers,
and activating the turn signal so early were “classic indicia of an intoxicated driver.” Id. at 309.
Under the totality of the circumstances, the officer had reasonable suspicion for the stop. Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Navarette and Christie. Defendant took only two
actions that indicated that she might have been driving while intoxicated: she drove straight
through multiple intersections with her turn signal on, and she approached Officer Zaiger’s cruiser
from behind so quickly that he felt the need to change lanes.3 She may have scared another driver,
but there was no erratic swerving or driving over lane markers as in Christie, 206 Mich App at
306, and defendant did not run anyone off the road like in Navarette, 572 US at 395.
3 As noted, Officer Zaiger incorrectly thought that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour, so it is
possible that defendant was traveling at a careful and prudent speed when she suddenly found
herself behind a police cruiser driving under the speed limit.

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Additionally, any similarity between Christie and this case does not compel a different
result. Both defendants used their turn signals for too long, but the officer in Christie saw the
defendant activate his turn signal early and eventually make a turn. Christie, 206 Mich App at
306. That behavior indicated poor judgment or spatial orientation, which was consistent with
intoxication. Id. Officer Zaiger, on the other hand, noticed that defendant’s turn signal was already
on when she was behind him, and she never made a turn before the traffic stop. There are plenty
of sober explanations for this behavior—the inability to hear the signal click or see the light on the
dashboard, distractions in the car, or an innocent lapse in memory. Further, in Christie the
extended use of the turn signal was one of several factors that under the totality of the
circumstances led to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was intoxicated, id. at 309; whereas,
the “sole reason” for the stop in the present case was defendant’s extended use of the turn signal.
The trial court emphasized the public safety risk caused by defendant driving through
intersections with her turn signal activated. However, the stop of defendant’s vehicle occurred
late at night, and the record reflects that the roadway was bereft of other vehicles. Similarly, there
was no evidence of pedestrians in the area. Given the time of day, lack of pedestrians, and lightness
of the traffic, defendant’s extended use of her turn signal did not, in practical terms, put anyone at
risk. We acknowledge that in a different case, the extended use of a turn signal on a busy roadway
or in a congested part of a city may create a risk of danger justifying a stop. However, under these
circumstances, we do not conclude there was any such justification.
The facts of Pagano, 507 Mich at 29-30, more closely match this case. Defendant’s
extended use of her turn signal may be described as “obnoxious,” like the driver’s interactions
with her children in Pagano. See id. at 35. But the extended use of a turn signal alone is not
enough to establish reasonable suspicion that a driver is intoxicated and warrant the stop of a
vehicle. Therefore, Officer Zaiger’s traffic stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion that
defendant was driving while intoxicated.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS
During the proceedings in the trial court, the prosecutor suggested that defendant may have
committed a number of traffic violations that justify the stop, including failure to turn off her turn
signal, failure to obey an officer’s traffic directions, and speeding. We conclude that there was no
probable cause to believe that defendant committed any of those infractions.
Generally, even if the police do not suspect any criminal activity, “the decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred.” Whren, 517 US at 810. “Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances
known to the police officers . . . would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that a
[violation] has been or is being committed. . . .” People v Beuschlein, 245 Mich App 744, 750;
630 NW2d 921 (2001).
In this case, Officer Zaiger had no probable cause to justify the traffic stop under
MCL 257.648 for defendant’s use of her turn signal. The Motor Vehicle Code only addresses
when a turn signal is required, not when it is prohibited. Under MCL 257.648(1), “[t]he operator
of a vehicle or bicycle upon a highway, before stopping or turning from a direct line, shall first
determine that the stopping or turning can be made in safety and shall give a signal as required in

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this section.” Neither MCL 257.648 nor any other statute addresses when a person must shut off
the signal or refrain from using it.
There also was no probable cause to justify the stop under MCL 257.602 for failing to obey
an officer’s directions. According to MCL 257.602, “[a] person shall not refuse to comply with a
lawful order or direction of a police officer when that officer, for public interest and safety, is
guiding, directing, controlling, or regulating traffic on the highways of this state.” This statute
does not apply in this case because Officer Zaiger was on a routine road patrol and was not
directing traffic at the time that he conducted the traffic stop. Furthermore, there was no evidence
that defendant refused to comply with any of his orders. The trial court indicated that reasonable
suspicion existed partly because defendant’s driving created a public safety risk encompassed in
MCL 257.602, but we find no authority to support the conclusion that public safety concerns alone
can justify a targeted traffic stop without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that
the driver violated a law.
Finally, there was no probable cause to believe that defendant was speeding, and indeed,
the prosecutor makes no argument regarding speeding on appeal. The speed limit on the relevant
section of 28th Street was 45 miles per hour. The accident reconstruction expert’s calculations,
which the trial court adopted, indicated that defendant was driving only 45.8 miles per hour. While
it is possible to commit a traffic violation by “speeding” even if driving at or under the posted
speed limit,4 there was not probable cause to believe that defendant was not driving at a careful
and prudent speed.
Accordingly, there was not probable cause that defendant committed any traffic violations
justifying the traffic stop. Therefore, we conclude that the traffic stop violated the Fourth
Amendment because there was neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause justifying the
seizure of defendant’s vehicle.
C. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Defendant further argues that Officer Zaiger’s mistake of law regarding the justification
for the traffic stop was unreasonable and that evidence of her intoxication should be suppressed
under the exclusionary rule. We agree.
When police conduct violates a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, a trial court may
apply the exclusionary rule to exclude from the defendant’s trial any evidence obtained through
the constitutional violation. United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 906; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d
4 MCL 257.627(1) provides as follows:
An individual operating a vehicle on a highway shall operate that vehicle at
a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper,
having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the highway and of any other
condition existing at the time. An individual shall not operate a vehicle on a
highway at a speed greater than that which will permit a stop within the assured,
clear distance ahead. . . .

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677 (1984). The purpose of this rule is “to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a
particular case . . . is an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of
the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Probable cause or reasonable suspicion may arise from an officer’s objectively reasonable
mistake of fact or law. Heien v North Carolina, 574 US 54, 61; 135 S Ct 530; 190 L Ed 2d 475
(2014). On the other hand, “a seizure based on an officer’s unreasonable interpretation of the law
warrants application of the exclusionary rule,” because suppression deters police from attempting
to gather evidence in clear violation of unambiguous law on the basis of subjective and erroneous
interpretations of law. People v Lucynski, 514 Mich 888, 891; 9 NW3d 327 (2024). Typically,
“objectively reasonable mistakes of law occur in exceedingly rare circumstances in which an
officer must interpret an ambiguous statute.” People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 652; 983 NW2d
827 (2022).
At the time of the traffic stop, Officer Zaiger mistakenly believed that the speed limit on
28th Street was 40 miles per hour and that the extended use of a turn signal was a violation of the
Motor Vehicle Code. Neither law was ambiguous. The traffic control order clearly set the speed
limit for the relevant section of 28th Street at 45 miles per hour, and the speed limit was also posted
on the street itself. Officer Zaiger likewise mistakenly believed that the extended use of a turn
signal was a traffic violation. As explained previously, the Motor Vehicle Code only addresses
when a turn signal is required, not when a signal is prohibited. Officer Zaiger’s general
inexperience as a police officer and unfamiliarity with traffic law resulted in honest but objectively
unreasonable mistakes.
Application of the exclusionary rule in this case will help deter law enforcement agencies
from placing new officers on road patrols without sufficient training on the Motor Vehicle Code.
This deterrent effect justifies suppression of any evidence of defendant’s intoxication obtained as
a result of Officer Zaiger’s traffic stop, which would leave no basis to maintain the OWI charge
against her. The trial court made a mistake of law when it held that no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred and the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss on that basis
was, therefore, an abuse of discretion. See Brown, 330 Mich App at 229.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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