COA 375981 PEOPLE OF MI V JALEN CHRISTOPHER GAMBLE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/11/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 11, 2026
1:21 PM
v No. 375981
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
JALEN CHRISTOPHER GAMBLE, LC No. 2024-001808-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: WALLACE, P.J., and CAMERON and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was bound over on one count of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227;
one count of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f(6); and one count of carrying a
firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant now appeals as on leave
granted1 the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence from the search and seizure
that resulted in his arrest. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 27, 2024, multiple people arrived at Bronson Hospital in Kalamazoo, Michigan
“with gunshot wounds.” One of the victims reported that 1126 West Paterson Street in Kalamazoo
was the scene of the shooting. This information was relayed over the police radio via dispatch
“somewhere between like a 15, 20-minute window” between the shooting victims arriving at the
hospital and Sergeant Brett Bylsma of the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety (KDPS)
responding to that address at approximately 2:45 a.m. The address led him to a closed-down,
former laundromat that was known by officers as a location for partying and illegal gambling in a
high crime area. As he drove west on West Paterson Street past the laundromat, Sgt. Bylsma
observed “the southeastern door had what appeared to be a cell phone flashlight illuminating inside
of it. And I could see it moving around as if it was being held on hand. It was consistent with
someone holding it in their hand in terms of height.” He saw defendant wearing a brown
1 People v Gamble, ___ Mich ___; 32 NW3d 459 (2026).

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workwear-style coat, standing next to an empty, wall-mounted former pay telephone cabinet at the
front corner of the laundromat right next to its southeastern door. He observed that defendant was
“looking around,” turning his upper body and head back and forth to scan the parking lot and east
and west on West Paterson Street, and that he was the only person who was standing near the
laundromat parking lot at that time. After Sgt. Bylsma passed the laundromat, he turned left on a
side street and then left again into a large church parking lot across the street from the laundromat,
whereupon he then saw defendant walk west from the laundromat and stop and appear to be talking
to someone that might be in or near a small white sport utility vehicle parked at the curb just west
of the house next door to the laundromat. Based on these observations, Sgt. Bylsma was suspicious
that the man in the brown coat “was acting as sort of lookout.” He then relayed the information
over police radio to responding officers, saying
something to the effect of that a black male in a brown coat was standing at the
corner of the building. I believe that I had passed along that I saw what I thought
was a cell phone flashlight inside of the building. Then explained that the
gentleman I saw is now walking westbound on Paterson. And then I instructed
Officer Mesman to make contact with that gentleman for the basis of the shooting
investigation that we were there for.
Sgt. Bylsma further testified that by “to make contact with,” he meant for Officer Mesman to detain
and question him and “ultimately I told him that if he needed to, he can Terry pat that gentleman.”2
Officer Caleb Mesman of the KDPS testified that, prior to his arrival at the scene, he received
instructions from Sgt. Bylsma to speak with defendant. Upon his arrival, Officer Mesman left his
marked patrol vehicle, walked up to defendant who was speaking with one or more occupants of
a white SUV stopped at the curb, and said to defendant, “Hey, how’s it going man, hey we heard
that there was maybe a shooting over here, do you know anything about that?” Defendant
responded, “No, not from us, we just got up here.” Officer Mesman then asked defendant for
identification. Defendant immediately appeared to become agitated and said, “I didn’t do
nothing.” Officer Mesman then told defendant, “You’re not leaving,” and “We can do this easy
or we can do this difficult.” Defendant continued to state, “I didn’t do nothing, I didn’t do nothing,
sir.” Officer Mesman then grabbed defendant’s arm and told him, “You’re being detained, okay?”
Officer Mesman repeatedly stated that they were investigating a shooting, to which defendant
responded, “That ain’t got nothing to do with me.” Defendant was then handcuffed and walked
over to Officer Mesman’s patrol vehicle parked on the street in front of the laundromat.
Defendant continued to state that he was not involved in anything. Officer Mesman asked
defendant if he had any weapons on him, to which defendant responded, “No, you can’t search
me, I didn’t do nothing. Don’t search me bro.” Officer Mesman testified that he asked defendant
“if I could search him first. He said no. I informed him I would be doing a Terry pat. As I began
to start my Terry pat, he was pulling away from me and pinning his waistband against my cruiser,”
which Officer Mesman described as a “common method” used when an individual is “concealing
something that they don’t want an officer to find.” He testified that as “I was going over the right
2 A reference to a protective pat-down search pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868;
20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).

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side of the front of his waist, I felt a hard object that I immediately recognized to be the handle of
a firearm,” which he then retrieved from defendant.
After his bindover from the district court, defendant moved to suppress his “unlawful
detainment” and “any fruits arising therefrom.” He argued that he was “subjected to an unlawful
detainment that led to an unlawful search ultimately resulting in an unlawful arrest.” The trial
court found that “with regard to reasonable suspicion, I do believe that it is here. I am not going
to grant [defendant’s] motion to suppress the pat-down that ultimately led to the retrieval of this
firearm at this time.”
Defendant now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court’s factual findings at a suppression hearing are reviewed by appellate courts
for clear error. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). “Clear error exists
when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.” People v Abbott,
330 Mich App 648, 654, 950 NW2d 478 (2019). A trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to
suppress is reviewed de novo. People v Joly, 336 Mich App 388, 395, 410; 970 NW2d 426 (2021).
“To the extent that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress involves an interpretation of the
law or the application of a constitutional standard to uncontested facts, our review is de novo.”
People v Tanner, 496 Mich 199, 206; 853 NW2d 653 (2014) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
III. REASONABLE SUSPICION AND COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE
Defendant argues that his detention was unlawful. He contends that the totality of the
circumstances did not support a finding of particularized reasonable suspicion that defendant was
engaged in criminal activity. He also argues that, even if the totality of the circumstances did
support reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in wrongdoing, Sgt. Bylsma did not sufficiently
relay his observations to Officer Mesman to support Mesman’s detention of defendant. We are
not persuaded by these arguments.
The right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as Article 1, § 11 of Michigan’s
1963 Constitution. “Generally stated, the test for what constitutes a seizure is whether, in view of
all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.” People v Bolduc (On Remand), 263 Mich App 430, 438; 688 NW2d 316
(2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The lawfulness of a search or seizure depends on
its reasonableness.” People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 406; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
“ ‘[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest.’ ” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26, 32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021),
quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 22; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). “Colloquially, a brief
detention of this sort is referred to as a Terry stop.” Pagano, 507 Mich at 32.

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Under Terry, an officer can detain a citizen for a brief investigatory stop if
the officer has reasonable suspicion that the citizen is engaged in, or is about to be
engaged in, criminal activity. While the level of suspicion required for a Terry
seizure is less than that required for probable cause to arrest, an officer must have
more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Rather, a Terry
seizure is only lawful if an officer has an objectively reasonable particularized
suspicion that the specific individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.
Whether this standard is met in a particular case is fact-specific and requires an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances known by the officer when the seizure
occurred. [People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 387; 15 NW3d 249 (2024) (quotation
marks, citations, and brackets omitted).]
“The subjective intent of the police officer is irrelevant to the validity of the stop.” People
v Dillon, 296 Mich App 506, 509; 822 NW2d 611 (2012). A Terry stop or detention typically
allows the officer to ask the individual “a moderate number of questions to determine his identity
and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions. But the detainee
is not obliged to respond. And, unless the detainee’s answers provide the officer with probable
cause to arrest him, he must then be released.” Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440; 104
S Ct 3138; 82 L Ed 2d 317 (1984). “The scope of any search or seizure must be limited to that
which is necessary to quickly confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion.” People v Barbarich, 291
Mich App 468, 473; 807 NW2d 56 (2011). The individual “may not be detained even momentarily
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not,
without more, furnish those grounds.” Florida v Royer, 460 US 491, 498; 103 S Ct 1319; 75 L Ed
2d 229 (1983).
“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not
enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”
Illinois v Wardlow, 528 US 119, 124; 120 S Ct 673; 145 L Ed 2d 570 (2000). However, “officers
are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Id.
The totality of the circumstances known by Sgt. Bylsma and Officer Mesman at the time
of defendant’s seizure supports the existence of an “objectively reasonable particularized
suspicion” that defendant was “engaged in, or about to be engaged in, criminal activity.” Prude,
513 Mich at 387. Although defendant’s presence in the high crime area alone was not “enough to
support a reasonable, particularized suspicion” that he was engaged in criminal activity, Wardlow,
428 US at 124, and neither was his refusal to listen to Officer Mesman or answer Officer Mesman’s
questions alone, see Royer, 450 US at 498, several additional factors supported Officer Mesman’s
detention of defendant.
A shooting was reported to have occurred in the area of the laundromat by one of the
shooting victims, approximately 20 minutes before Sgt. Bylsma responded to that location.
Defendant was seen standing alone, just outside the door of the closed-down, former laundromat
at 2:45 a.m. The laundromat was known by officers as a location for partying and illegal gambling
in a high crime area. Defendant was seen scanning the street and parking lot and what looked like
a hand-held cell phone flashlight could be seen moving about inside the laundromat through its
glass-paned door. Defendant appeared to leave his post at the southeast corner of the laundromat

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and walk west on West Paterson Street to speak with the occupants of a small white SUV just past
the house next door just after Sgt. Bylsma’s marked police vehicle drove past. Sgt. Bylsma was
justified in recognizing the “relevant characteristics” of the laundromat, including its reputation
for being a problematic hangout in a high crime area and reportedly being the location of the
shootings less than an hour earlier, in determining whether the totality of the circumstances of
defendant’s apparent lookout presence at the corner entrance to the laundromat was “sufficiently
suspicious to warrant further investigation.” Wardlow, 528 US at 124. Such individual factors
collectively “build to form the requisite objective basis for the particularized suspicion” that
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Prude, 513 Mich at 392-393 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Collective knowledge can demonstrate probable cause. In People v Nguyen, 305 Mich App
740; 854 NW2d 223 (2014), in addressing whether information provided by a confidential
informant to police supported the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant, this Court
held: “An arresting officer, or collectively the officers involved in an investigation (‘the police
team’ approach), must possess information demonstrating probable cause to believe that an offense
has occurred and that the defendant has committed it.” Id. at 751. We also find caselaw from
multiple federal appellate courts persuasive on this issue.3 See, e.g., United States v Lyons, 687
F3d 754, 765-766 (CA 6, 2012) (holding that the collective knowledge doctrine “impute[s]
collective knowledge among multiple law enforcement agencies, even when the evidence
demonstrates that the responding officer was wholly unaware of the specific facts that established
reasonable suspicion for the stop” and under that doctrine, “an officer may conduct a [traffic] stop
based on information obtained by fellow officers”); United States v Ramirez, 473 F3d 1026, 1033
(CA 9, 2007) (holding the collective knowledge doctrine applies “where an officer (or team of
officers), with direct personal knowledge of all the facts necessary to give rise to reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, directs or requests that another officer, not previously involved in the
investigation, conduct a stop, search, or arrest”). Certainly, this collective knowledge principle of
the investigating team of officers can demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.
Officer Mesman did not have specific details of the shooting and he did not specifically
testify to having received all of the observations Sgt. Bylsma claims he conveyed via police radio
to responding officers. However, Officer Mesman was informed, before effectuating defendant’s
stop, that the shooting had taken place near the laundromat and that defendant was the only
individual seen near the laundromat during Sgt. Bylsma’s drive-by and observation from the
church parking lot across the street. Sgt. Bylsma testified that he radioed his observations of the
phone flashlight inside the dark, defunct laundromat and defendant exhibiting the behavior of a
lookout to responding officers, and Officer Mesman testified that he received and was acting on
Sgt. Bylsma’s relayed observations. Sgt. Bylsma and Officer Mesman had collective knowledge
of this information. Accordingly, it was reasonable for Officer Mesman to suspect that defendant
was involved in criminal activity on the basis of this collective knowledge, and he had reasonable
3 “While the decisions of lower federal courts and other state courts are not binding on this Court,
they may be considered as persuasive authority.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210,
231-232; 966 NW2d 437 (2020).

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suspicion to stop defendant to investigate the shooting allegations and his related suspicious
behavior.
IV. PAT-DOWN SEARCH
Defendant argues that Officer Mesman’s pat down of his person was not justified as part
of the Terry stop because there was no existing reason to believe that defendant was armed and
dangerous.
“[A] search for weapons is reasonable during a Terry stop when there is reason to believe
that an individual is armed and dangerous.” Johnson v VanderKooi, 509 Mich 524, 539-540; 983
NW2d 779 (2022). However, the “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 US at 27.
For example, in People v Custer, 465 Mich 319; 630 NW2d 870 (2001), two police officers
were dispatched to a residence to investigate a possible trespass. Id. at 323. Upon arrival, they
observed a parked vehicle occupied by the defendant and another individual. Id. One of the
officers placed the other individual in their patrol car after this individual voluntarily removed “a
plastic baggie that contained marijuana” from his pocket. Id. at 324. The individual then “yelled
to defendant, ‘don’t tell them a f thing.’ ” Id. at 324. One of the officers proceeded to conduct a
pat-down search of defendant and felt and removed what “he believed to be a two-by-three-inch
card of blotter acid in defendant’s front pants pocket.” Id. He removed the object, placed it on the
roof of the vehicle, and, after completing the search of the defendant, he picked the object back up
and saw that it was three photographs, turned face down. Id. at 322. Turning them over, he saw
that they were “three Polaroid photographs that showed [the arrested individual] posed with large
quantities of marijuana in the living room of defendant’s house.” Id. at 324. This Court held that
“the patdown search of defendant had been legal, but that the officer should not have turned the
photographs over to look at their fronts.” Id. at 325.
Our Supreme Court first held that “after the [then-illegal] marijuana was found, the police
properly detained defendant for the purpose of conducting a limited search for weapons on the
basis of reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 327-328. Regarding “whether the patdown search of
defendant was invalid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its
counterpart in the Michigan Constitution,” the Court held that the “relevant inquiry when
determining whether the police have properly conducted a patdown search is whether the officer’s
action was justified at its inception[.]” Id. at 329 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Court further stated:
The proper focus is on the actions of the officer, not his thoughts. In the present
case, it is irrelevant that the officer was secondarily looking for drugs because the
principal purpose of the patdown search of defendant was to ensure that he did not
have any weapons. Accordingly, we find that the objective facts that prompted the
officer to determine that his safety, and that of his partner, might be at risk, were
sufficient to warrant the patdown search of defendant. [Id. at 330 (quotation marks
and citation omitted).]

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In the present case, Officer Mesman was aware of multiple shooting victims having gone
to the hospital and that one of those victims reported that 1126 West Paterson Street in Kalamazoo
was the scene of the shooting. He testified that Sgt. Bylsma told him he had seen the man in the
brown coat “looking into the building where the shooting had taken place” and Bylsma instructed
him to speak with that individual. Further, Sgt. Bylsma testified that he radioed his observations
of the phone flashlight inside the dark, defunct laundromat and defendant exhibiting the behavior
of a lookout to responding officers, and Officer Mesman testified that he received and was acting
on Sgt. Bylsma’s relayed observations. Sgt. Bylsma and Officer Mesman had collective
knowledge of this information. Further, Sgt. Bylsma testified that he told Officer Mesman that he
could Terry pat the man in the brown coat, if needed (which was based on Sgt. Bylsma’s
observations). Accordingly, although Officer Mesman was not “absolutely certain” that defendant
was armed, “a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 US at 27.
Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Mesman approached defendant and asked him whether
he knew anything about the shooting that occurred near the laundromat, which defendant denied.
After defendant refused to show identification, Officer Mesman detained defendant, handcuffing
him and walking him near Officer Mesman’s patrol vehicle.4 Officer Mesman asked defendant if
he had any weapons on him, which defendant denied, and Officer Mesman proceeded to pat down
defendant’s person, during which he found defendant’s firearm. Officer Mesman’s decision to
conduct a pat-down search of defendant’s person was “justified at its inception” to ensure that
defendant did not have any weapons. Custer, 465 Mich at 329-330. Even if a Terry stop concludes
without the suspect being arrested, that suspect could still “reach into his clothing and retrieve a
weapon” when he is released from police control, absent a Terry frisk or pat-down search.
Michigan v Long, 463 US 1032, 1051; 103 S Ct 3469; 77 L Ed 2d 1201 (1983).
Defendant argues that the evidence obtained as a result of Officer Mesman’s search must
be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Generally, evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is excluded from use
at trial under the exclusionary rule. People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 528-529; 682 NW2d 479
(2004). However, defendant’s firearm was not discovered in a search incident to an unlawful
arrest, but rather, during a pat-down search as a component of a Terry stop, which is a limited
search “to quickly confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion.” Barbarich , 291 Mich App at 473.
“Police officers are permitted to take action in order to ensure their safety during Terry stops, and
in some instances this can include the use of handcuffs[.]” People v Maggit, 319 Mich App 675,
692; 903 NW2d 868 (2017), (citing Brown v Lewis, 779 F3d 401, 415 (CA 6, 2015). “The use of
guns, handcuffs, and detention in a police cruiser do not automatically transform a Terry stop into
an arrest, but these displays of force must be warranted by the circumstances.” Brown, 779 F3d at
415 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). In light of the chaotic scene in the aftermath
of a recent alleged shooting, we find the use of handcuffs to detain and separate defendant from
4 We note that “[f]ailing to provide identification upon request by a police officer is not itself a
crime or statutory offense in Michigan.” People v Murawski, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d
___ (2023) (Docket No. 365852); slip op at 9. But in the present case, defendant was not arrested
based upon his failure to provide identification.

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that chaos, until the Terry stop and pat down could safely occur, was warranted. Accordingly,
defendant is not entitled to suppression of such evidence.
Affirmed.
/s/ Randy J. Wallace
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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