COA 367543 PEOPLE OF MI V KENT CHARLES HYNE Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 10/12/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
October 12, 2026
11:15 AM
v No. 367543
Washtenaw Circuit Court
KENT CHARLES HYNE, LC No. 21-000374-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and BAZZI and LIEVENSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Kent Charles Hyne, appeals by right his jury trial convictions of mutilation of
a dead body, MCL 750.160, concealing the death of an individual, MCL 333.2841(3), voluntary
manslaughter, MCL 750.321, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony,
MCL 750.227b (felony-firearm). Hyne was sentenced to 36 months to 10 years’ incarceration for
the mutilation conviction, 12 months to 5 years’ incarceration for the concealment conviction, 86
months to 15 years’ incarceration for the manslaughter conviction, and 24 months’ incarceration
for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. SUBJECT INCIDENT
This case arises out of the fatal shooting of the decedent, Kyle Luark, at Hyne’s property,
where Hyne resided in a house and operated a marijuana business out of a separate barn.
Approximately two weeks before the subject incident, the decedent and his friend, Michael Battle,
used Google Maps to identify businesses with the intent of stealing marijuana. During their search,
the decedent and Battle came across Hyne’s property on Google Maps, which depicted a marijuana
field and a greenhouse, suggesting that the property was being used for marijuana cultivation. At
approximately midnight on February 26, 2020, the two met at the decedent’s residence to prepare
for the theft, with the decedent preparing a backpack and certain tools, including a circular saw, a
standard pry bar, and a tarp, before driving to Hyne’s property and parking on an adjacent dirt
road. Neither the decedent nor Battle carried firearms.

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The decedent and Battle proceeded to break into the barn, where the marijuana was stored,
and Battle started loading the marijuana into a utility vehicle through the garage door of the barn
while the decedent stood watch outside. The decedent then alerted Battle that the light at the
entrance of the barn turned on. At this time, Hyne received a notification from his security system
that people were on his property. In response, Hyne acquired a firearm with a thermal scope and
headed toward the barn; he opted not to call the police in the event it was a faulty security alert.
Hyne asserted that the barn was approximately 20 steps from the deck of Hyne’s residence, and
the area was illuminated due to the motion sensors on the property. Officers testified, however,
that Hyne’s residence was approximately 22 yards from the barn.
As Hyne entered the barn, he turned the corner and saw “a man in full camouflage, face
mask, all covered up” approximately 30 feet away, who was subsequently identified as Battle.
Hyne did not aim or shoot his firearm at Battle because Hyne’s father taught him that he should
“never risk hurting anybody who wasn’t going to kill [him].” Battle fled the premises and Hyne
did not pursue Battle. Hyne noticed that the utility vehicle was running, and he feared that any
remaining people on his property were armed and intended to harm him. Then, out of the corner
of his eye, Hyne saw the decedent “slightly crouching” nearby in “an aggressive posture,” and
Hyne described the decedent as “huge” and “all covered.” Although Hyne’s vision of the decedent
was obscured due to the motion sensor light, Hyne believed that the decedent was armed. Hyne
shot the decedent six times, and he did not attempt to render aid to the decedent. Hyne then hid
out of fear that additional people were present on the property to harm him.
After “some time” Hyne returned to the decedent and he removed the decedent’s mask, but
Hyne did not recognize the decedent. Hyne collected the decedent’s items, which included a
backpack, a saw, and a pry bar, and placed them in the trash. However, Hyne placed the decedent’s
identification card into a burn barrel, and he used a front-end loader to place the decedent’s body
into the utility vehicle, and he transported the decedent to a burn pile in the middle of his property.
Hyne placed the decedent in the burn pile, added logs, poured diesel fuel, and set the pile on fire.
Hyne disposed of the decedent’s body because he feared that his family would be targeted in
retaliation for the decedent’s death. Hyne subsequently cleaned up and repaired the damage
resulting from the incident.
The following day, on February 27, 2020, the police went to Hyne’s residence to inquire
about the decedent after Battle and the decedent’s mother filed a missing-person report. The report
included false details regarding the circumstances that led the decedent and Battle to Hyne’s
property. Hyne denied recognizing the decedent from the officers’ photograph of the decedent.
On February 28, 2020, the police executed a search of Hyne’s property pursuant to a warrant and
discovered approximately 25 firearms and several hundred thousand dollars of cash. Officers
further learned that Hyne’s children were not home the night of the incident. During the police’s
subsequent interview with Hyne, Hyne immediately disclosed what transpired, but he contended
that he shot the decedent in self-defense. Police recovered the decedent’s body from the burn pit
on Hyne’s property, and the autopsy provided that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds
and the manner of death was homicide. A forensic investigation indicated that the security footage
from the night of the subject incident appeared to be deleted by Hyne.

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B. LOWER COURT PROCEEDINGS
Hyne was charged with the four offenses previously listed, in addition to possession of a
short-barreled rifle, MCL 750.224b. Before trial, the prosecution filed a notice that it intended to
introduce evidence of Hyne’s purportedly unlawful marijuana business, contending that the proof was
relevant to Hyne’s motive and intent for shooting and hiding the decedent’s body. The prosecution
further moved to bar the trial court from providing Hyne the full protection of the Self-Defense
Act (SDA), MCL 780.971 et seq., on the ground that Hyne committed several offenses at the time
of the underlying incident, including possession of a short-barreled rifle, the manufacture and
distribution of marijuana, 21 USC 841, and carrying a firearm while trafficking substances, 18
USC 924. Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that the prosecution may admit the other-acts
evidence, opining that the evidence was probative because it may establish that Hyne was
perpetrating offenses that would preclude him from claiming the protections of the SDA or
demonstrate his “motive, intent, absence of accident or mistake, or plan or system in doing an act.”
The court further determined that the evidence’s probative value was not outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice because Hyne’s allegedly unlawful acts may be “part of the res gestae providing
context to the activities of the individuals involved.” The trial court did not resolve whether Hyne
was entitled to the protection of the SDA, stating that it was required to hear the evidence presented
before ruling on the matter.
Hyne’s trial began in June 2023. The proof presented indicated that Hyne’s marijuana
business was considerable and exceeded the means of Hyne’s medical marijuana caregiver license.
One of Hyne’s employees testified that the enterprise sold tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) products
to nonmedical-marijuana customers. Additionally, numerous witnesses further testified regarding
Hyne’s prior statements that, if a person were to steal from him, Hyne would kill the person and
dispose of their body. The evidence further demonstrated that Hyne maintained a federal firearms
license and possessed several firearms, which Hyne asserted was necessary to protect against theft
and threats to his family arising from his marijuana business.
Following Hyne’s testimony, the trial court ruled regarding the appropriate jury
instructions for self-defense. The court resolved that it would include M Crim JI 7.16(2)1 in its
instructions to the jury, but it would omit M Crim JI 7.16(3),2 which pertained to the “Stand Your
1 M Crim JI 7.16(2) states:
However, a person is never required to retreat under some circumstances.
[He / She] does not need to retreat if [attacked in (his / her) own home / (he / she)
reasonably believes that an attacker is about to use a deadly weapon / (he / she) is
subjected to a sudden, fierce, and violent attack].
2 M Crim JI 7.16(3) provides, in pertinent part:
Further, a person is not required to retreat if he or she
(a) Has not or is not engaged in the commission of a crime at the time the [force /
deadly force] is used,

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Ground Act.” The trial court then asked whether defense counsel desired to place any additional
objections on the record. Defense counsel responded, “Your Honor, now that the Court has
indicated it’s going to leave in paragraph (2) of [M Crim JI] 7.16, I think that pretty much answers
the objection that I made on Friday. So I’m—I’m satisfied.” Defense counsel previously argued
that the inclusion of M Crim JI 7.16(3) was appropriate because “there is no conclusive evidence
elicit[ed] in this trial that [Hyne]—that he violated any [state] law,” and “there was no evidence
elicited that [the decedent and Battles] were lured by the fact that this was an illegal operation.”
The trial court then allowed the prosecution and defense counsel to read the jury instructions in
full, and defense counsel reiterated, “I’m satisfied, Your Honor.”
Following closing arguments, the trial court provided the following jury instructions
regarding the other-acts evidence:
You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the Defendant
committed crimes for which he is not on trial. If you believe this evidence, you
must be very careful only to consider it for certain purposes. You may only think
about whether this evidence tends to show:
(a) that the Defendant had a reason to commit the crimes charged, and;
(g) as evidence of motive or intent.
You must not consider this evidence for other purposes. For example, you
must not decide that it shows that the Defendant is a bad person or that he’s likely
to commit crimes. You must not convict the Defendant here because you think he
is guilty of other bad conduct. All of the evidence must convince you, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the Defendant committed the alleged crime or you must find
him not guilty.
As to self-defense, the court instructed the jury, in pertinent part:
A person can use deadly force in self-defense only where it is necessary to
do so. However, a person is never required to retreat if attacked in his own home,
nor if the person reasonably believes that an attacker is about to use a deadly
weapon, nor if the person is subject to a sudden fierce and violent attack.
Following five days of trial proceedings, the jury initiated deliberations on June 12, 2023,
at 4:06 p.m. The prosecution and defense counsel reaffirmed that they had no objections to the
jury instructions. The attorneys reconvened at 4:38 p.m. to answer a jury question regarding the
(b) has a legal right to be where he or she is at that time, and
* * *
(c) has an honest and reasonable belief that the use of deadly force is necessary to
prevent imminent [death / great bodily harm / sexual assault] of [himself / herself]
or another person.

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concealment offense. Later that afternoon, the jury requested additional copies of the instructions.
Before the trial court excused the jury for the evening, the court reminded the jury not to discuss
the case or conduct any research.
On June 14, 2023, at 12:01 p.m., the prosecution and defense counsel addressed a jury
question pertaining to the second-degree murder charge. Following resolution of the question, the
trial court noted that the jury had, the day before at approximately 2:30 p.m., requested the
opportunity to walk the hallways because the jurors “were getting claustrophobic.” The court had
denied the request but provided the jury with fans to assist with the airflow. Later that day on
June 14, 2023, at 1:58 p.m., the trial court read the following jury note on the record, “We have
come to an agreement on three counts out of the five. There are two counts that we cannot come
to a unanimous decision. There has been no movement for 24 hours. We are looking for guidance
on how to proceed.” The prosecution suggested that the trial court read the deadlocked-jury
instruction. Defense counsel argued that he always objected to an Allen3 charge because it
increased pressure on the jury and the jury had already expressed that it was deadlocked. The trial
court determined that it would iterate M Crim JI 3.12 in its entirety and, accordingly, did so. The
court concluded its instruction with the statement that no juror “should give up [his or her] honest
beliefs about the weight or the effect of the evidence only because of what [his or her] fellow jurors
[thought] or only for the sake of reaching agreement.”
At 4:23 p.m., defense counsel noted that the jury had been deliberating for approximately
17 hours, and 2 1/2 hours had elapsed since the last jury note. Defense counsel requested that the
trial court question the jury foreperson if “it would do [the jurors] any good to send them home for
the night to have them come back tomorrow.” The trial court agreed to send the jury home because
the jurors “may have been able to return and have constructive deliberations” after the Allen
charge. The following morning on June 15, 2023, at 8:59 a.m., the jury sent another note seeking
clarification of the definitions of murder and manslaughter, but the prosecution and defense
counsel agreed that the jury instructions already included that information.
Later that day at 4:26 p.m., defense counsel objected to the trial court’s plan to send the
jury home for the evening. Defense counsel argued that the jury had been deliberating for more
than 25 hours, and it had not made progress since the Allen charge. Defense counsel requested
that the court declare a mistrial if the jury indicated it would fail to reach a verdict given another
day. The trial court responded that the jury’s earlier note that morning demonstrated that the jury
was still “actively deliberating.” The court opined that if the jury informed the trial court a second
time that the jury was deadlocked, then the trial court “would probably” grant the request for a
mistrial, but it would not otherwise stop the deliberations.
The next day, on June 16, 2023, at 4:03 p.m., the trial court noted that the jury had been
deliberating since 8:30 a.m., but the court had not heard from the jury. Defense counsel requested
that the trial court “consider the jury hung and declare a mistrial” on the counts for which the jury
remained undecided. With the attorneys’ agreement, the trial court asked the jury if additional
time would assist the jury in reaching a verdict, to which the jury responded affirmatively. The
trial court sent another note to the jury to inquire whether it wanted to continue deliberating that
3 Allen v United States, 164 US 492; 17 S Ct 154; L Ed 528 (1896).

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day or if the jury desired to return after the long weekend, and the jury indicated that it wanted
additional time the following Tuesday. On June 20, 2023, the trial court reconvened at 9:03 a.m.
because the jury reached its verdict. The jury found Hyne guilty of the offenses of mutilation of a
dead body, concealing the death of an individual, voluntary manslaughter,4 and felony-firearm.
The jury found Hyne not guilty of possession of a short-barreled rifle. Each juror confirmed the
verdict.
Hyne subsequently moved for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, arguing that two jurors
had submitted sworn affidavits detailing juror misconduct and extraneous influences on the jury.
In her affidavit, juror LMM contended that another juror discussed the case with his son-in-law,
who is an attorney, and this juror shared his son-in-law’s thoughts on the matter with the rest of
the jury. LMM further asserted that certain members of the jury had subjected her to bullying and
harassment, to the point that the jury foreperson, ZA, had to intervene. LMM additionally “felt
forced to surrender [her] honest conviction that [Hyne] was not guilty” because of the trial court’s
supplemental deadlock instructions, the bullying, and the length of the deliberations. LMM also
alleged that she “was physically and emotionally exhausted” during deliberations, and she felt
“held hostage” until she changed her vote. In his affidavit, ZA similarly alleged that a juror had
shared information with his son-in-law and that the other jurors were hostile toward LMM.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Hyne’s motion, during which the
prosecution argued that MRE 606(b)5 prohibited juror testimony regarding jury deliberations
except for statements pertaining to extraneous influences. The prosecution further asserted that
MCL 750.422 criminalized perjury, and that juror LMM needed to be advised concerning the
possible implications of her testifying. Following LMM’s conversation with a public defender,
LMM opted not to testify at the hearing. The trial court further barred testimony regarding jury
deliberations unrelated to extraneous influences. Jury foreperson ZA testified regarding the juror
who spoke with his son-in-law, but ZA could not remember the information the other juror shared
during deliberations. ZA asserted that the information “may have” influenced his verdict.
Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Hyne’s motion opining, “The
information contained in the affidavits was not anymore clear than the information that was
presented by the witness today that lacked any assertion of specificity, and clearly based on
hearsay.” The court further stated:
Additionally, there’s a lack of particularity regarding who the attorney was,
which juror provided the information outside of this physical description that we
got today for the first time, and what type of information was allegedly shared with
the jury, other than it was about law.
4 The jury was permitted to find Hyne guilty of first-degree or second-degree murder, but it opted
to find Hyne guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter.
5 The Michigan Rules of Evidence were substantially amended on September 20, 2023, effective
January 1, 2024. See ADM File No. 2021-10, 512 Mich lxiii (2023). We rely on the rules as they
were at the time of Hyne’s trial in June 2023.

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Thus, even if I assumed that the jury was exposed to this extraneous
information, there’s no way of showing how this extraneous influence created a
real and substantial possibility that could have affected the jury’s verdict.
The trial court entered an order consistent with its statements on the record. This appeal ensued.
II. ANALYSIS
A. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE
First, Hyne contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of Hyne’s
purportedly unlawful marijuana business. We disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to admit evidence. People v
Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 143; 889 NW2d 1 (2016). We review de novo, however, any
preliminary questions of law. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Finally,
we will not reverse a nonconstitutional evidentiary error unless it is more probable than not that
the error was outcome-determinative. People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 565-566; 852 NW2d 587
(2014).
Generally, relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402. At the time of Hyne’s trial,
MRE 404(b)(1) provided:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
This list of permitted uses is illustrative, rather than exhaustive. People v Engelman, 434 Mich
204, 212; 453 NW2d 656 (1990). MRE 404(b) is a rule of inclusion rather than a rule of exclusion.
People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich 52, 64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended in other part, 445 Mich
1205 (1994). For evidence to be admissible under MRE 404(b): (1) the prosecution must offer the
evidence for a proper purpose, (2) the evidence must be relevant, (3) the probative value of the
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and (4) “the trial court may,
upon request, provid[e] a limiting instruction to the jury.” Id. at 55.
In this case, the prosecution offered the other-acts evidence for a proper purpose. As
opined by the Michigan Supreme Court, the prosecution “must first establish that the evidence is
logically relevant to a material fact in the case, as required by MRE 401 and MRE 402, and is not
simply evidence of the defendant’s character or relevant to his propensity to act in conformance
with his character.” People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 615; 790 NW2d 607 (2010). The
prosecution provided proof of Hyne’s allegedly unlawful marijuana business to demonstrate
Hyne’s intent or motive in shooting the decedent and disposing of his body rather than calling the
police.

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The contested other-acts evidence was also relevant. See Vandervliet, 444 Mich at 55.
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” MRE 401. “Evidence is inadmissible under this rule only if it is relevant solely to the
defendant’s character or criminal propensity.” Mardlin, 487 Mich at 616. In the present case, the
evidence corroborated the testimonies of Hyne’s employees regarding Hyne’s prior threats to kill
and dispose of the body of anyone who attempted to steal from his property, as well as the
substantial number of firearms kept in both his residence and the barn. Further, the subject
evidence demonstrated that Hyne initially went to significant lengths to hide what transpired, even
if he ultimately admitted to shooting the decedent and directing the police as to pertinent
evidentiary items. Rather than contact the police, Hyne moved the decedent’s body to a burn pile
on his property, disposed of the decedent’s personal items in the trash, deleted the pertinent
security footage, and cleaned up and repaired the damage resulting from the incident.
Additionally, while the prosecution referred to the unlawfulness of Hyne’s marijuana business in
its opening statement, in questions to witnesses, and in closing argument, the references were
ultimately consistent with the prosecution’s contention that Hyne acted that night with the purpose
of protecting his enterprise as opposed to in defense of himself or his family.
Hyne contends that there was a lack of substantive evidence demonstrating that the growth
and distribution of marijuana on his property was unlawful. But the witnesses’ testimonies
indicated otherwise. Adam Howes, one of Hyne’s employees since 2016, testified that while Hyne
acted as if his business was legal, the enterprise maintained between 500 and 1,000 clients, some
of whom were not registered medical marijuana patients. Howes further asserted that Hyne sold
THC to recreational marijuana customers onsite, in addition to shipping THC to online consumers.
Howes further contended that Hyne instructed Howes several times throughout the years to avoid
speaking with the police. While Hyne’s employees testified that they believed that Hyne’s
marijuana business was lawful, there was proof that the business was growing and distributing
more marijuana than permitted by law. Detective Thomas Sinks, of the Washtenaw County
Sheriff’s Office, further testified that while Hyne’s business was registered, neither Hyne nor his
employees maintained additional licensure to allow for large commercial grow operations.
“[A] registered qualifying patient who is his or her own caregiver and the caregiver to five
other qualifying patients is allowed to possess up to 72 marijuana plants and up to 15 ounces of
usable marijuana.” People v Hartwick, 498 Mich 192, 219 n 54; 870 NW2d 37 (2015); see also
MCL 333.26424(b)(2) (“For each registered qualifying patient who has specified that the primary
caregiver will be allowed under state law to cultivate marihuana for the qualifying patient, 12
marihuana plants kept in an enclosed, locked facility.”). While Hyne correctly notes that neither
the state nor the federal governments had yet charged Hyne with any offenses related to his
marijuana business, there is no requirement that Hyne face charges for the trial court to admit the
purported acts.
Next, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. See Vandervliet, 444 Mich at 55; see also MRE 403. Although the prosecution
questioned the lawfulness of Hyne’s marijuana business during trial, there was also evidence
presented that Hyne was never criminally charged regarding his marijuana business, and he did
not have any recent violations of his medical marijuana license. Hyne’s employees also testified
that they believed the business was lawful, despite the size of the operation, and Hyne did not

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attempt to conceal his enterprise. Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury
convicted Hyne because of his allegedly unlawful marijuana business. Further, we note that the
trial court is in the best position to make an MRE 403 determination. See People v Katt, 48 Mich
App 282, 306-307; 639 NW2d 815 (2001).
Lastly, the trial court provided limiting instructions to the jury. See Vandervliet, 444 Mich
at 55. A limiting instruction is generally sufficient to ensure that the jury properly considers the
evidence for its proper purposes. Mardlin, 487 Mich at 629. But even assuming the trial court
improperly admitted the other-acts evidence, it is not more probable than not that this error was
outcome-determinative. See Douglas, 496 Mich at 565-566. There was significant evidence
presented against Hyne regarding the shooting and disposal of the decedent, in addition to
testimony regarding the decedent’s and Battle’s targeting of Hyne’s property for the theft of
marijuana. Ultimately, Hyne has not established that he is entitled to relief on this basis.
B. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Next, Hyne contests the trial court’s omission of portions of the self-defense jury
instructions. A defendant, however, waives a claim of instructional error by expressly approving
the instructions. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). In the instant
case, defense counsel expressly approved the jury instructions and stated that the trial court’s
decision to read M Crim JI 7.16(2) resolved his objections to the instructions. Accordingly, this
issue is waived, and we need not address it. See id. at 504. Regardless, the trial court included
instructions that “a person is never required to retreat if attacked in his own home, nor if the person
reasonably believes that an attacker is about to use a deadly weapon, nor if the person is subject to
a sudden fierce and violent attack,” such that the jury was adequately informed to determine
whether Hyne acted in self-defense. See People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 330; 820 NW2d 229
(2012). This is further substantiated by the fact that the jury opted to find Hyne guilty of the lesser
offense of voluntary manslaughter as opposed to first-degree or second-degree murder.
C. SELF-DEFENSE ACT
Relatedly, Hyne argues that the SDA is unconstitutional for vagueness and because it
violates his Second Amendment rights. We disagree.
Hyne did not contend in the trial court that the SDA is unconstitutional, but we may still
review unpreserved constitutional challenges to a criminal statute. People v Noble, 238 Mich App
647, 651; 608 NW2d 123 (1999). We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. See People
v Fawaz, 299 Mich App 55, 64; 829 NW2d 259 (2012). “When the Second Amendment’s plain
text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v Bruen, 597 US
1, 24; 14 S Ct 2111; 213 L Ed 2d 387 (2022). There exists a presumption that a statute is
constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is “clearly apparent.” Noble, 238 Mich App at 651.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an individual “the
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Dist of Columbia v Heller, 554 US
570, 592; 128 S Ct 2783; 171 L Ed 2d 637 (2008). The Michigan Constitution also protects a

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person’s “right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself and the state.” Const 1963, art 1,
§ 6. This right is not without limits, however, Heller, 554 US at 626, and Hyne has not
demonstrated that the SDA infringed his rights under the Second Amendment. This Court has
repeatedly held, for example, that prohibiting persons who have been convicted of felonies from
possessing firearms does not violate the Second Amendment, even after recent caselaw from the
United States Supreme Court. See People v Hughes, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___
(2025) (Docket No. 367172); slip op at 14, 16. See also Heller, 554 US at 626-627. In the present
case, the prosecution did not charge Hyne simply because he carried a firearm for self-defense
purposes, rather Hyne was charged in response to his shooting and disposal of the decedent without
proper cause.
As to Hyne’s vagueness argument, this Court reviews “vagueness challenges in light of the
facts at issue.” People v Wilson, 230 Mich App 590, 593; 585 NW2d 24 (1998). The United States
and Michigan Constitutions guarantee that the state may not deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. A party may
challenge a statute for vagueness on the grounds that the statute does not “provide fair notice of
the conduct proscribed” or because the statute is “so indefinite that it confers unlimited and
unstructured discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an offense has occurred.” People
v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 174; 814 NW2d 295 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Fair notice gives a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what behavior
the statute prohibits or requires. Noble, 238 Mich App at 652. Further, an overbroad statute is one
that will likely chill constitutionally protected behavior. People v Hicks, 149 Mich App 737, 742;
386 NW2d 657 (1986).
The SDA is not vague or overbroad when it provides that there is no duty to retreat in
certain circumstances for individuals who were “not engaged in the commission of a crime at the
time he or she uses deadly force.” MCL 780.972(1) (emphasis added). While Hyne contends that
the statute precludes any person from relying on its protections if the trial court finds that the
person has committed any offense at any time, the plain language of the statute provides otherwise.
Further, as recognized by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 641;
975 NW2d 896 (2022), the SDA expanded, rather than reduced, the circumstances under which a
person is permitted to use self-defense without a duty to retreat. Thus, Hyne’s challenge fails.
D. ALLEN CHARGE
Hyne argues that he was denied his right to an impartial jury because of the trial court’s
provision of a deadlocked-jury instruction and the length of the jury deliberations. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.
People v Manning, 434 Mich 1, 7; 450 NW2d 534 (1990). A trial court should grant a mistrial
only when there is “an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs the
defendant’s ability to get a fair trial.” People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 704; 542 NW2d 921
(1995). A deadlocked jury is a “classic basis for a proper mistrial,” and we grant significant
deference to a trial court’s finding that a jury is deadlocked. People v Lett, 466 Mich 206, 219-
220; 644 NW2d 743 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The trial court is in the best
position to assess all factors that might affect whether the jury would be able to reach a verdict on
further deliberation.” People v Ackah-Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 35; 874 NW2d 172 (2015).

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Further, we review de novo instructional error. People v Spaulding, 332 Mich App 638, 652; 957
NW2d 843 (2020).
When a trial court “fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after
protracted and exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result
from pressures inherent in the situation.” Lett, 466 Mich at 220 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). The trial court may, instead of a mistrial, give the jury a supplemental instruction
commonly known as an Allen charge to encourage the jury to continue its deliberations. People v
Caddell, 332 Mich App 27, 37-38; 955 NW2d 488 (2020). “The goal of such an instruction is to
encourage further deliberation without coercing a verdict.” People v Walker, 504 Mich 267, 277;
934 NW2d 727 (2019). If the Allen charge will force a juror to surrender his or her honest
conviction, then “it is coercive” and constitutes error requiring reversal. People v Sullivan, 392
Mich 324, 334; 220 NW2d 441 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The purpose of the
jury process, however, is “to secure unanimity by comparison of views, and by arguments among
the jurors themselves.” Id. at 330 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, the length of deliberations after the Allen charge was not unreasonable
considering the complexity of the case and the five days of trial proceedings before the jury
convened. Further, the trial court did not require, or threaten to mandate, that the jury deliberate
for an extensive amount of time. See Caddell, 332 Mich App at 39; see also People v Hardin, 421
Mich 296, 318-319; 365 NW2d 101 (1984). The length of time that a jury deliberates after the
trial court provides a deadlocked-jury instruction may be indicative of whether the instruction was
coercive, but when a jury continues “to debate in earnest after receiving the supplemental
instruction,” reversal is not warranted. People v Bookout, 111 Mich App 399, 403-404; 314 NW2d
637 (1981). Additionally, given that deliberations continued for three days after the trial court’s
supplemental instructions, it is unlikely that the Allen charge coerced the jury’s verdict. The jury
was obligated to consider five charges, including the charge of open murder, which included
consideration of the lesser offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.
Moreover, the jury was further required to examine the matter of self-defense.
While Hyne contends that the trial court’s denial of the jurors’ request to walk the hallways
was improper, the court provided the jury with fans to assist with the airflow, and there is no
indication that the jury was barred from lunch breaks, access to water, or use of the bathroom. The
court further dismissed the jury each day of deliberations, and there was a break for the weekend.
Lastly, the trial court’s supplemental instruction, consistent with M Crim JI 3.12, was also not
coercive. See Walker, 504 Mich at 277. Considering the foregoing, we cannot conclude Hyne’s
right to an impartial jury was compromised.
E. JUROR MISCONDUCT
Hyne further challenges the impartiality of the jury because of alleged juror misconduct.
We disagree.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for new
trial. People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 296; 856 NW2d 222 (2014). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it chooses an outcome outside of the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). We review a trial court’s factual

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findings for clear error. People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 47; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Clear
error exists when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.
People v Jessie Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 497-498; 647 NW2d 480 (2002). Finally, we review
de novo constitutional issues. People v Idziak, 484 Mich 549, 554; 773 NW2d 616 (2009).
“A defendant tried by jury has a right to a fair and impartial jury.” People v Budzyn, 456
Mich 77, 88; 566 NW2d 229 (1997). During their deliberations, jurors may only consider evidence
that the parties presented during trial. Id. A jury’s consideration of extraneous information
deprives a defendant of his or her right of confrontation, cross-examination, and assistance of
counsel. Id. It is the trial court’s duty to properly instruct the jury on the applicable law. See
People v Traver, 502 Mich 23, 31; 917 NW2d 260 (2018). To warrant reversal, a defendant must
demonstrate that the jury was exposed to extraneous influences and that the “extraneous influences
created a real and substantial possibility” of influencing the jury’s verdict. People v Fletcher, 260
Mich App 531, 540; 679 NW2d 127 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, the
extraneous influence must be “substantially related to a material aspect of the case,” and there must
be “a direct connection between the extrinsic material and the adverse verdict.” Budzyn, 456 Mich
at 89. If the defendant establishes this, then the burden shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate
that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. However, the existence of juror
misconduct “will not warrant a new trial unless the party seeking the new trial can show that the
misconduct [was] such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or disqualify them from exercising
the powers of reason and judgment.” People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 586; 831 NW2d 243
(2013) (alteration in original; quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the instant case, although Hyne demonstrated that a juror introduced extraneous
information into the deliberation process, Hyne has not established a direct connection between
that information and the jury’s verdict. While a juror may not generally impeach his or her own
verdict with an affidavit alleging misconduct in the jury room, the trial court may consider
evidence regarding extraneous influences on the jury. Budzyn, 456 Mich at 91. When the
purported juror “misconduct relates to influences internal to the trial proceedings, courts may not
invade the sanctity of the deliberative process.” Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 539. At the time of
Hyne’s trial, MRE 606(b) provided:
Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s
mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention,
(2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror,
or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A
juror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.
“Any conduct, even if misguided, that is inherent in the deliberative process is not subject to
challenge or review.” Fletcher, 260 Mich App at 540. This Court has recognized the policy
considerations weighing against the admission of evidence concerning jury deliberations,

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including the potential for juror harassment to secure the vacatur of an adverse verdict. Id. at 539-
540.
In this case, juror LMM’s allegations of bullying are unrelated to extraneous influences on
the jury but, instead, pertain to incidents that occurred during the deliberative process. The trial
court could not use that information to set aside the verdict. See id. at 540. Hyne asserts that
bullying is “not directly related to evidence presented at trial, the law presented to the jury, or to
communications and discussions that are part of the deliberative process.” However, LMM’s
contentions relate to the other jurors’ statements to her during the jury deliberations. Thus, while
these statements should not be condoned, they were part of the internal proceedings of the jury,
and the trial court cannot invade that deliberative process. See id. at 539.
Further, Hyne has not demonstrated that extraneous information influenced the jury. The
trial court repeatedly informed the jury that it could not discuss the case with others or research
the case. Generally, it is presumed that a jury will follow the trial court’s instructions. See People
v Mahone, 294 Mich App 208, 212; 816 NW2d 436 (2011). In this case, the juror who spoke to
his son-in-law did not, apparently, adhere to these instructions. Jury foreman ZA testified that this
juror relayed his son-in-law’s legal perspective for approximately 10 seconds, and it “may have”
influenced ZA’s verdict. But ZA could not recall the nature of the information with any specificity
in either his affidavit or during the evidentiary hearing. In the absence of proof regarding what
this extraneous information was, or any indication that there was a real and substantial possibility
that the information influenced the verdict, Hyne is not entitled to relief. See Budzyn, 456 Mich
at 88-89. Moreover, even if the jury heard certain extraneous information, it is unlikely that such
affected the impartiality of the jury or disqualified it from exercising the powers of reason and
judgment, Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 586, considering the significant evidence presented against
Hyne regarding his perpetration of the underlying offenses, and the jury’s consideration of self-
defense as a mitigating circumstance with respect to the open murder charge. Thus, Hyne is not
entitled to relief.
F. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Hyne argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the lower court
proceedings. We disagree.
“Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and constitutional law.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 187; 891 NW2d
255 (2016). We review “unpreserved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for errors
apparent on the record.” People v Angelo Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 90; 808 NW2d 815 (2011).
A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan
Constitutions. See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. This right includes the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that defense
counsel’s performance was deficient, and the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
People v Taylor, 275 Mich App 177, 186; 737 NW2d 790 (2007). Defense counsel’s performance
is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of professional reasonableness. People v Jordan,
275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). A “defendant must overcome a strong

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presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial strategy.” People v Carbin, 463
Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Defense counsel’s performance is prejudicial if there
is a reasonably probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667. “Defense counsel is given wide discretion in matters
of trial strategy because many calculated risks may be necessary in order to win difficult cases.”
Unger, 278 Mich App at 242. This Court does not substitute its judgment on matters of trial
strategy or use hindsight to assess defense counsel’s competence. Id. at 242-243.
First, defense counsel’s failure to argue that the SDA was unconstitutional did not fall
below an objective standard of professional reasonableness because the failure to raise a meritless
argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v Ericksen, 288 Mich
App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). It is not clearly apparent that the SDA unconstitutionally
violated Hyne’s rights under the Second Amendment. See Noble, 238 Mich App at 651. There is
also no basis from which to find that defense counsel’s argument would have been successful in
the trial court. Moreover, Hyne cannot demonstrate prejudice by defense counsel’s failure to raise
the issue, particularly when the trial court thoroughly instructed the jury on self-defense, including
the circumstances under which Hyne was not required to retreat.
Second, defense counsel was not ineffective for neglecting to raise a duress instruction.
See Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667. For the trial court to provide a duress instruction, a defendant
must produce evidence that: (1) the “threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a
reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm,” (2) the conduct actually caused the
defendant to fear death or serious bodily harm, (3) the fear was on the defendant’s mind at the time
of the purported act, and (4) “[t]he defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm.”
People v Reichard, 505 Mich 81, 88; 949 NW2d 64 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Duress is not always an available defense to homicide. People v Gafken, 510 Mich 503, 513; 990
NW2d 826 (2022).
Although failing to request a jury instruction may constitute deficient performance, People
v Yeager, 52 Mich 478, 490; 999 NW2d 490 (2023), Hyne has not established that the defense of
duress was applicable to Hyne’s shooting of the decedent, let alone the disposal of the decedent’s
body and the concealment of his death. Specifically, as to the open murder charge, it was sound
trial strategy for defense counsel to prioritize self-defense as a mitigating circumstance as opposed
to duress. Further, it is unlikely that the jury would resolve that the conduct of the decedent and
Battle as trespassers created a reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm or that Hyne’s action
would avoid that threatened harm, as required for duress. See Reichard, 505 Mich at 88.
Additionally, while Hyne claims to have disposed of the decedent’s body out of fear that his family
would be targeted in retaliation for the decedent’s death, it is unclear how that goal would be
accomplished considering Battle was present during the shooting and escaped with the knowledge
of what transpired. Even if defense counsel should have requested the duress instruction, there is
not a reasonable likelihood that defense counsel’s allegedly deficient performance affected the
outcome of the proceedings. See Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667. The jury ultimately resolved that
Hyne did not act in self-defense, as evidenced by his voluntary manslaughter conviction, and it is
not evident that the jury was more likely to excuse Hyne’s actions under a duress instruction.
Therefore, Hyne was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

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G. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Lastly, Hyne argues that he is entitled to a new trial because of cumulative error. We
disagree.
This Court reviews a cumulative-error claim by examining the actual errors identified on
appeal to determine whether the errors cumulatively deprived defendant of a fair trial. People v
LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 591 n 12; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). “A ruling or action that is almost wrong
does not become an error on the ground that, in the same case, other rulings or actions were almost
wrong, too.” Id. A new trial is warranted when the cumulative effect of the actual errors
undermines confidence in the reliability of the verdict. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 106;
732 NW2d 546 (2007). The cumulative effect of several minor errors may constitute error
requiring reversal. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 659-660; 601 NW2d 409 (1999).
“Absent the establishment of errors, there can be no cumulative effect of errors meriting reversal.”
Dobek, 274 Mich App at 106. Because Hyne has failed to establish error affecting the validity of
the verdict, particularly given the substantial evidence supporting his convictions, he is not entitled
to relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi
/s/ Andrew J. Lievense

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