COA 373698 DIONNE MCKISSACK V RASHONDA MITCHELL Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/10/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
DIONNE MCKISSACK,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
April 10, 2026
1:21 PM
v No. 373698
Wayne Circuit Court
RASHONDA MITCHELL and TIMOTHY
ROLAND,
Defendants,
and
BERNICE O’BRYANT, NATANDRA O’BRYANT,
and MARVA TAYLOR,
LC No. 23-011342-NO
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YOUNG and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Bernice O’Bryant (“Bernice”), Natandra O’Bryant (“Natandra”),1 and Marva
Taylor (“Taylor”) appeal as of right the $1,000,000 default judgment entered against them on
December 3, 2024.2 Defendants assert they established both good cause and a meritorious defense
such that their motion to set aside the default should have been granted. We disagree and instead
affirm.
1 Given that Bernice O’Bryant, Natandra O’Bryant, and Gloria O’Bryant share the same last name,
this opinion will refer to these individuals by their first names.
2 Two additional defendants, Rashonda Mitchell and Timothy Roland, are not parties to this appeal.
Unless otherwise specified, our use of the term “defendants” in this opinion refers only to Bernice,
Natandra, and Taylor.

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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arose after plaintiff Dionne McKissack was attacked by two dogs. On July 14,
2023, McKissack was on her front lawn and noticed the two dogs. She recognized the dogs as the
same dogs from the home directly behind hers at 8250 Beaverland Road. Rashonda Mitchell and
Timothy Roland were living in the home at 8250 Beaverland Road at this time, and Mitchell owned
the two dogs.
These two dogs mauled McKissack. McKissack underwent seven surgeries, a blood
transfusion, and spent 31 days in the hospital receiving treatment. Two of McKissack’s surgeries
involved replacing a damaged vein in her arm with a vein from her leg. McKissack has no feeling
on the back of her arm and cannot use her right hand. Before the attack, McKissack worked as an
in-home health aide. Because of her injuries caused by the dog attack, McKissack can no longer
work and needs a caregiver herself.
On August 31, 2023, McKissack filed a complaint against Mitchell and Roland for
negligence and strict liability regarding the dog attack. Neither Mitchell nor Roland responded to
the complaint, and on November 1, 2023, McKissack’s attorney filed a request for an entry of
default against Mitchell and Roland.
Bernice and Natandra came into title of 8250 Beaverland Road by inheriting the property
from their mother, Gloria O’Bryant. Taylor is Gloria’s granddaughter and was added to title of
8250 Beaverland Roas as a joint tenant with Gloria before her death. After discovering this
ownership history, McKissack moved to amend her complaint and add Bernice, Natandra, and
Taylor as defendants in February 2024. An amended complaint adding defendants was filed on
March 28, 2024. It is undisputed that Bernice, Natandra and Taylor were properly served with the
summons and complaint for the instant matter.
Neither of the three defendants answered the complaint. Sometime after being served,
Bernice telephoned McKissack’s attorney’s office twice. Bernice talked with personnel at
McKissack’s attorney’s office, and asserted that neither Natandra, Taylor, nor herself lived at 8250
Beaverland Road, and that neither defendant had given permission for anyone to live there nor had
knowledge of dogs being kept at the property. On a second phone call to McKissack’s counsel’s
office, Bernice denied owning 8250 Beaverland Road. Subsequently, Bernice retrieved mail from
8250 Beaverland Road that was addressed to persons other than Bernice, Natandra, and Taylor,
and submitted that mail to McKissack’s attorney to show that neither of the three defendants
resided at the property. Proof of the phone calls and the delivery of mail beyond testimony are not
in the record.
Default was entered against Bernice and Natandra on May 22, 2024, and Taylor on July 3,
2024. On September 10, 2024, McKissack filed a motion for entry of default judgment against all
five defendants in the amount of $1,000,000. Bernice, Natandra, and Taylor state that they
appeared without counsel for an October 26, 2024, hearing on the motion that was held via Zoom.
Neither of the three defendants was able to communicate with the court because of difficulties
navigating the hearing interface. However, Natandra successfully navigated to a breakout room
on Zoom with McKissack’s attorney, where she was advised to retain counsel. We have no

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transcript of this hearing in our record. The hearing was adjourned and Bernice, Natandra, and
Taylor retained counsel the same day.
Defendants’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default on October 29, 2024. Affidavits
from Bernice, Natandra, and Taylor that accompanied the motion asserted that none of the
defendants 1) had dominion or control over the property, 2) lived at the property, 3) were aware
of nor permitted any person to live at the property, 4) owned the dogs, or 5) had control of the dogs
that were kept at 8250 Beaverland Road that attacked McKissack. McKissack filed an answer to
defendants’ motion, asking that the trial court deny the motion because defendants could not
establish good cause or a meritorious defense. A rescheduled hearing was held on November 22,
2024. At that hearing, counsel for plaintiff argued that defendants had not presented good cause,
noting “even to this day, there’s still no answer filed.” Counsel for defendants argued defendants
made some efforts, albeit not by filing an answer, but by contacting plaintiff’s counsel twice. The
trial court noted that “it’s not incumbent upon plaintiff’s attorney to provide legal counsel to the
defendants,” and ultimately observed, “I have not heard anything about good cause.” For that
reason, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to set aside default.
The trial court entered an order denying defendants’ motion to set aside the default on
November 27, 2024. On that same day, the court heard arguments on plaintiff’s motion for entry
of default judgment. Defendants and their counsel did not appear. The court took testimony from
plaintiff about the extent of her injuries and ongoing mental and physical recovery. The court
entered an order granting McKissack’s motion to enter a default judgment in the amount of
$1,000,000. Defendants now appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a decision on a motion to set aside a default for an abuse of discretion.
Shawl v Spence Bros, Inc, 280 Mich App 213, 220; 760 NW2d 674 (2008). The law favors
resolving claims on their merits yet follows a policy of honoring “properly entered” default
judgments from a lower court provided that no abuse of discretion is shown. Huntington Nat’l
Bank v Ristich, 292 Mich App 376, 390; 808 NW2d 511 (2011). “Where there has been a valid
exercise of discretion, appellate review is sharply limited.” Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury
Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 227; 600 NW2d 638 (1999). “Unless there has been a clear abuse
of discretion, a trial court’s ruling will not be set aside.” Id. “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs only
when the trial court’s decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Saffian
v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 27 NW2d 132 (2007).
B. LEGAL BACKGROUND
MCR 2.603(D)(1) provides that “a motion to set aside a default or a default judgment,
except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good
cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.” This Court has
reinforced that ‘good cause’ and ‘a meritorious defense’ are distinct elements that should be
considered separately. Shawl, 280 Mich App at 233. “Manifest injustice . . . would occur if a

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default were to be allowed to stand where a party has satisfied the ‘meritorious defense’ and ‘good
cause’ requirements of the court rule.” Huntington Nat’l Bank, 292 Mich App at 390.
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION
TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT AS DEFENDANTS FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE
The defendant bears the burden of bringing evidence to demonstrate good cause in a motion
to set aside a default. Saffian, 477 Mich at 15. To determine whether good cause has been shown,
Michigan courts employ a “totality of the circumstances test” using the following nonexhaustive
list of factors:
(1) whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline to file;
(2) if the party simply missed the deadline to file, how long after the deadline the
filing occurred;
(3) the duration between entry of the default judgment and the filing of the motion to set
aside the judgment;
(4) whether there was defective process or notice;
(5) the circumstances behind the failure to file or file timely;
(6) whether the failure was knowing or intentional;
(7) the size of the judgment and the amount of costs due under MCR 2.603(D)(4);
(8) whether the default judgment results in an ongoing liability (as with paternity or child
support); and
(9) if an insurer is involved, whether internal policies of the company were followed.
Shawl, 280 Mich App at 238.
While the trial court did not expressly apply the totality of the circumstances test, it
considered the relevant factors on the record. To revisit each, we begin with the first factor,
whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline to file. A formal
written pleading in response to a complaint is required pursuant to MCR 2.111. Here, Bernice,
Natandra and Taylor did not file an answer as required by MCR 2.108(A)(1). Instead, Bernice
asserts that after being served, she telephoned opposing counsel’s office twice where she spoke
with staff there, after which Bernice sent mail from 8250 Beaverland Road. However, as the trial
court observed, the plain language of the court rule requires a filing with the court, which Bernice,
Natandra and Taylor failed to do. Because the defendants failed to respond to the court completely,
the first factor weighs against the defendants showing good cause.
As to the next factor, the defendants did not file late; they never filed an answer to the
complaint at all. The second factor weighs against a showing of good cause.

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Moving to the third factor, this Court considers the duration between entry of the default
judgment and the filing of the motion to set aside the judgment. Michigan court rules provide that
the filing of a motion to set aside must occur “if judgment has been entered, within 21 days after
the default was entered.” MCR 2.603(D)(2)(b). Here, Bernice, Natandra, and Taylor retained
counsel on the day of the hearing on the motion for entry of default judgment, on October 25,
2024. Defendants’ counsel promptly filed a motion to set aside the default on October 29, 2024,
only four days later, and before a default judgment was entered. Thus, this factor weighs in favor
of a showing of good cause.
The fourth factor considers whether there was defective process or notice in serving the
summons and complaint to the defendants. Here, it is undisputed that Bernice, Natandra and
Taylor were properly served. The fourth factor weighs against a showing of good cause.
In consideration of the fifth factor, this Court examines the circumstances behind the failure
to file or file timely. Here, defendants attempted to appear at the hearing on the motion for entry
of default judgment held via Zoom on October 25, 2024, where they were able to log on but not
communicate with the court. However, Bernice was able to access a breakout room during the
hearing with McKissack’s attorney. Defendants assert that “as lay persons, [they] misunderstood
the legal requirement to file a written answer,” and explain they thought that appearing at the
hearing was sufficient. But the summons and complaint received by all three defendants included
a deadline for filing a response. Similarly, the notice of hearing on the motion for entry of default
judgment that Bernice, Natandra, and Taylor subsequently received also listed a date and time to
appear, along with a website link to access the hearing online. Because defendants understood the
date, time and how to access the hearing on the motion for entry of default judgment, one can
reasonably infer that the same defendants could understand the 21-day deadline to file an answer
to the complaint as well. The fifth factor weighs against a showing of good cause.
The sixth factor considers whether the failure to respond was knowing or intentional. Here,
Bernice, Natandra and Taylor assert they did not understand they had to file an answer within 21
days. But given that defendants did comprehend they should log on to a Zoom hearing on a
specific date at a certain time but did not act at all as to the answer deadline, this factor could only
be at best, neutral.
Moving to the seventh factor, we consider the size of the judgment and the amount of costs
due under MCR 2.603(D)(4). Here, the trial court entered a default judgment of $1,000,000 against
all defendants. The size of the judgment is intended to compensate McKissack for pain, suffering,
disfigurement, continued in-home care, and her inability to work that will likely last for the rest of
her life. One million dollars is a substantial amount, even split between the parties, but it is also
an amount that defendants do not contest in this Court and did not appear to contest in the trial
court. The seventh and eighth factors, then, given that defendants do not contest the size of the
judgment, only weigh slightly in favor of a showing of good cause. The ninth factor applies only
when the default involves an insurer, which is not the case here, so this factor is not considered.
The totality of the circumstances weighs against a showing of good cause to set aside the
default in this case. The factors that favor defendants do so because of their incomplete
understanding of the law and legal process, but the trial court was correct in finding that ignorance
alone is not considered good cause to set aside a default. Reed v Walsh, 170 Mich App 61, 65;

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427 NW2d 588 (1988) (lay defendant’s lack of knowledge of the law and its consequences will
not necessarily provide a reasonable excuse and good cause to set aside a default); see also Miller
v Rondeau, 174 Mich App 483, 489; 436 NW2d 397 (1989) (where defendants “talked to a couple
of lawyers” but “somehow did not get things done” did not qualify as a reasonable excuse for
missing the deadline to file).
As a general matter, good cause and meritorious defense, while distinct elements, are
typically both considered because:
When a party puts forth a meritorious defense . . . the strength of the defense . . .
will affect the “good cause” showing that is necessary. In other words, if a party
states a meritorious defense that would be absolute if proven, a lesser showing of
“good cause” will be required than if the defense were weaker, in order to prevent
a manifest injustice. [Huntington Nat’l Bank, 292 Mich App at 391 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).]
But here, the trial court was correct in deciding not to reach the meritorious defense analysis
because there was no good cause shown. Even if we agreed defendants had a possible meritorious
defense, this record lacks any indication, let alone a “clear” one, that the trial court’s ruling on
setting aside default was outside the range of reasonable outcomes.
We affirm.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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