COA 370854 PEOPLE OF MI V ERNEST KAMAIUU SPENCER Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 12/8/2025

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
December 08, 2025
12:05 PM
v No. 370854
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
ERNEST KAMAIUU SPENCER, LC No. 2023-001099-FH
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and REDFORD and FEENEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Ernest Spencer, appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of possession of
less than 25 grams of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v), and carrying a concealed
pistol in a vehicle (CCW), MCL 750.227(2). We affirm for the reasons stated in this opinion.
I. BASIC FACTS
On June 6, 2023, around 3:00 a.m., Spencer and his friend, Leesa Anstine, walked to a park
after they had smoked crack cocaine. While at the park, Spencer’s cousin, Elijah Ford, called them
over to his truck. Spencer got into the front passenger seat and Anstine got into the backseat. Ford
then drove away from the park. Within minutes, he was pulled over by Kalamazoo Public Safety
Officer Bradley Spieldenner. During the traffic stop, Officer Spieldenner recognized Spencer from
past encounters. He believed that Spencer was under the influence of drugs because he was
behaving erratically and speaking strangely. Eventually, he asked Spencer to step out of the
vehicle. Spencer complied.
Spencer then consented to Officer Spieldenner conducting a search of his person. During
that search, Spencer disclosed that he had a “crack pipe” in his pocket. Eventually, it was
determined that Spencer had an outstanding warrant for unpaid child support, so he was placed in
custody and a more thorough search of his person was conducted. During that search, a plastic
baggie was discovered in his waistband. Testing revealed that the baggie contained 0.81 grams of
cocaine. Additionally, during a search of the vehicle, Officer Spieldenner observed a loaded pistol
and an extended magazine on the seat where Spencer had been sitting. On the floorboard, behind
the driver’s seat, he also discovered a bag containing narcotics and a separate bag that contained a

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live cartridge that matched the ammunition in the firearm that had been found on Spencer’s seat.
Thereafter, Officer Spieldenner advised Spencer of his rights, which Spencer waived. Spencer
admitted that he was in possession of cocaine, but stated that he did not know anything about the
gun.
At trial, Spencer testified that he was acting under duress when he concealed the gun and
the cocaine from the police. He explained that when the police initiated the traffic stop, Ford threw
the baggie of cocaine at him, retrieved his gun from the driver’s door compartment, and pointed it
at him. He stated that because he was terrified he stuffed the baggie of cocaine into his pants.
Ford then tossed the gun and extended magazine at him. He “brushed” the gun from his lap to
under his leg just before Officer Spieldenner reached the vehicle. The duress defense was further
supported by testimony from Officer Spieldenner, who testified that he believed the bags in the
backseat belonged to Ford, not Spencer. He explained that felons often “push” their firearms on
other people so that they can avoid a charge of felon in possession of a firearm. Based upon that
rationale, Officer Spieldenner opined that Ford, who was a convicted felon, “pushed” his gun onto
Spencer.
The jury, however, rejected the duress defense and convicted Spencer of possession of less
than 25 grams of cocaine and carrying a concealed weapon. This appeal follows.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Spencer argues that his defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance at trial. “Whether
a defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel is a mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011). The court’s
factual findings are reviewed for clear error, whereas questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
B. ANALYSIS
The Michigan and United States Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance from their lawyers. People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 488; 999 NW2d 490
(2023); see also US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. “Effective assistance of counsel is
presumed, and a defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Putman, 309
Mich App 240, 248; 870 NW2d 593 (2015). “[T]he defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v Washington, 466
US 668, 687-688; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). A lawyer’s “decisions regarding what
evidence to present, what evidence to highlight during closing argument, whether to call witnesses,
and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy.” Putman, 309 Mich
App at 248. “This Court will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor will it
assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Instead, this Court must “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [the
defendant’s lawyer] may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v Pinholster, 563 US 170,
196; 131 S Ct 1388; 179 L Ed 2d 557 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Judgment
will only be set aside if the defendant can show that his or her lawyer’s deficient performance was
prejudicial to his or her defense. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).

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Prejudice exists when “there is a reasonable probably that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 US at 694.
1. QUESTIONING OFFICER SPIELDENNER
Spencer first argues that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to elicit
testimony from Officer Spieldenner that Ford “forced” the gun and drugs on Spencer. We
disagree. If the defendant’s lawyer has already presented evidence of a defense, then he or she
may be justified in choosing not to present cumulative testimony regarding the defense if doing so
would disproportionately favor the prosecutor. See People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 602-605; 623
NW2d 884 (2001). In Carbin, our Supreme Court held that a defendant’s claim failed both the
“performance” and “prejudice” parts of the Strickland test when his defense counsel chose not to
present corroborating testimony that added “nothing of substance” to the defendant’s alibi defense
but contained “new and important pieces of information favorable to the prosecution that were not
part of [previous] trial testimony.” Id. at 602, 604-605.
In this case, testimony that Ford forced Spencer to hide the gun would have been
unnecessarily cumulative. Spencer’s lawyer asked Officer Spieldenner if it was common for
felons to “push” a firearm on someone else, to which Officer Spieldenner responded, “That’s
correct.” Officer Spieldenner then stated that Ford was a convicted felon and that “it is common
for them to have other people hold their firearms.” Although the word “force” conveys duress
more effectively than “push” or “hold,” Spencer’s lawyer still captured the essence of Officer
Spieldenner’s observations from his police report.
Moreover, Spencer’s lawyer could have strategically determined that directly questioning
Officer Spieldenner regarding his use of the word “force” in the police report would backfire.
Officer Spieldenner was not in the vehicle when Ford tossed the gun and drugs to Spencer. His
belief that the gun was Ford’s and that Ford gave the gun to Spencer to conceal it was based upon
his training and experience as a police officer. Knowledge of the exact circumstances of the
exchange, however, fall firmly into the realm of speculation. See Skinner v Square D Co, 445
Mich 153, 164; 516 NW2d 475 (1994) (stating that speculation is “an explanation consistent with
known facts or conditions, but not deducible from them as a reasonable inference.”). He could
have surmised that the only way that Spencer would have taken the gun was if he was threatened
with bodily harm. But it is equally likely that he could have believed that Spencer was forced into
taking the gun and drugs because of his familial relationship with Ford or because he wanted to
avoid Ford, who was allegedly one of his drug-dealers, from being unable to supply him with drugs
in the future.
Finally, even if Officer Spieldenner testified that he believed that Ford forced Spencer to
conceal the gun, a jury still likely would have found persuasive the prosecutor’s argument that
Spencer complied with Ford not because he feared death or serious bodily harm but because he
wanted to help his cousin avoid another lengthy prison sentence and to avoid being caught himself.
On this record, the decision not to present this cumulative and speculative testimony did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness and it did not undermine confidence in the outcome
of the trial.

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2. CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Next, Spencer asserts that during closing arguments, his lawyer unreasonably failed to
emphasize Officer Spieldenner’s opinion that the gun and drugs did not belong to Spencer and that
Spencer was under the influence of drugs at the time of his arrest. A court’s review of closing
arguments is especially deferential. “Even if some of the arguments would unquestionably have
supported the defense, it does not follow that counsel was incompetent for failing to include them.
Focusing on a small number of key points may be more persuasive than a shotgun approach.”
Yarborough v Gentry, 540 US 1, 7; 124 S Ct 1; 157 L Ed 2d 1 (2003).
Here, in its closing argument, the prosecution had already provided a clear and concise
statement of Spencer’s duress, acknowledged that Officer Spieldenner thought the gun belonged
to Ford, and emphasized that a CCW conviction only requires possession, not ownership.
Spencer’s lawyer’s decision not to repeat those facts was a matter of strategy. Instead of focusing
on those points, he highlighted other evidence suggesting that Ford was the owner of the gun, such
as the matching ammunition found in Ford’s bag. He also chose to highlight that the burden was
on the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Spencer was not acting under duress.
Additionally, Spencer’s lawyer may have chosen not to mention Officer Spieldenner’s opinion
that Spencer was under the influence of drugs because Spencer himself had admitted to that, so
there was no use in emphasizing an undisputed fact. Spencer had testified that he was terrified
after Ford pointed a gun at him, and Spencer’s lawyer was trying to convince the jury that Spencer
would have feared for his life regardless of whether he was high or not. In this situation, calling
any more attention to Spencer’s impaired state of mind would only undermine his defense.
Ultimately, Spencer’s lawyer did not need to summarize all of the evidence presented at trial, and
his decision to exclude these details from Officer Spieldenner’s testimony was a matter of trial
strategy that did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
3. BODY CAMERA FOOTAGE
Next, Spencer argues that his lawyer should have introduced footage from Officer
Spieldenner’s body camera. A defense lawyer may be justified in choosing not to present certain
evidence if it would open the door to questions regarding the defendant’s criminal convictions or
other forms of impeachment. See, e.g., People v Harrison, 163 Mich App 409, 415-416; 413
NW2d 813 (1987).
Here, the body camera footage certainly included some statements that would be favorable
to Spencer. Specifically, Officer Spieldenner stated that he had known Spencer “for a while” and
that he did not “know him to carry any guns.” He further stated that Spencer “hardly even carries
the clothes on his back, most of the time.”1 He recognized that Spencer, whom he saw walking
around all the time, had no place to hide a gun with an extended magazine, and he questioned
where Spencer would even come across such a gun. That favorable evidence, however, was
1 This Court can review a video “as easily as the trial court . . . .” People v White, 294 Mich App
622, 633; 823 NW2d 118 (2011), aff’d 493 Mich 187 (2013).

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cumulative to Officer Spieldenner’s trial testimony regarding his belief that the gun was Ford’s,
not Spencer’s.
And its admission would open the door to aspects of the body camera footage that were
not favorable to the defense. For instance, the footage contradicts elements of Spencer’s
testimony, which the prosecutor could use for impeachment. First, Spencer testified that he asked
Officer Spieldenner, “[C]an I talk to you; I need to tell you something,” then he exited the car with
his hands up. The footage reveals that he never said this and never held his hands up. Spencer
testified that Ford took the magazine out of the pistol before throwing it at him, but the footage
reveals that the gun was still loaded when Officer Spieldenner found it. Given that Spencer was
the only person available to testify that Ford pointed a gun at him, his credibility as a witness was
critically important to the duress defense. Thus, the decision not to present evidence that
contradicted Spencer’s testimony was a matter of trial strategy.
For similar reasons, Spencer’s lawyer was not ineffective for failing to question Officer
Spieldenner regarding his statement that he did not know Spencer to carry guns. Questioning a
police officer about past contact with Spencer could have opened the door to evidence of his
previous crimes. Spencer argues that there was no such risk because he has never been convicted,
charged, or investigated for carrying guns. Assuming that to be true, there are other strategic
reasons not to inquire about Spencer’s previous interactions with the police. Such testimony could
unnecessarily lengthen the trial and distract from the core issue of Spencer’s defense. The
testimony could also portray Spencer in a poor light, making him less sympathetic or trustworthy
to the jury. The decision to avoid this bias and delay was a matter of trial strategy that did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness.
4. ANSTINE’S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
Next, Spencer asserts that he was denied effective assistance because his lawyer did not
seek to introduce Anstine’s statement to an officer that she got into the truck to buy drugs from
Ford.
Spencer maintains that the statement was not hearsay, so it was admissible. We agree.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.” MRE 801(c)(2). Hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception applies. MRE 802. One
exception exists for a statement against the declarant’s penal interest, which is considered
trustworthy because it exposes the declarant to criminal liability and it is “supported by
corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.” MRE 804(b)(4). Our
Supreme Court has adopted a nonexhaustive, three-factor test for determining whether the totality
of the circumstances corroborates the statement to bolster its trustworthiness in situations
involving custodial statements used to exculpate the defendant. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261,
275; 547 NW2d 280 (1996). These factors include (1) “the relationship between the confessing
party and the exculpated party”; (2) “whether the confessor made a voluntary statement after being
advised of his [constitutional] rights”; and (3) “whether there is any evidence that the statement
was made in order to curry favor with the authorities.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In this case, Anstine’s statement was clearly admissible under MRE 804(b)(4). An officer
advised her of her constitutional rights before questioning. After receiving and understanding a

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warning that anything she says can be used against her in court, a reasonable person in Anstine’s
position would not expose herself to criminal liability by admitting to purchasing drugs unless that
admission were true. See Barrera, 451 Mich at 281. Anstine and Spencer were friends, but there
is no evidence to suggest that Anstine fabricated her statement to draw scrutiny away from him.
It is also unlikely that she wanted to “curry favor” with the officer because she was not entirely
cooperative. Anstine’s statement is also corroborated by the fact that the police found a glass
smoking pipe on Spencer and Anstine, but not on Ford, which indicated that Ford was a dealer and
Anstine was a user. Given this evidence, Anstine’s statement satisfies the definition of a statement
against penal interest and would have been admissible at trial.
However, Spencer was not denied effective assistance merely because his lawyer failed to
introduce an admissible statement. Spencer’s lawyer may have reasonably believed that the
statement could detract from the duress defense. After hearing that both Anstine and Spencer were
drug users, that they went to the park and got into Ford’s truck together, and that Anstine was
buying drugs from Ford, a jury could infer that Spencer was also buying drugs from Ford. This
supports the inference that Spencer was in possession of cocaine because he had just completed a
drug transaction, not because Ford forced him at gunpoint to hide the cocaine. This inference also
contradicts Spencer’s testimony that he was not in the truck to obtain drugs. Spencer’s lawyer
may have reasonably decided that the best way to avoid these obstacles was to avoid the subject
of Anstine’s interrogation entirely. That decision was a matter of trial strategy and was not
objectively unreasonable.
Even if Spencer could overcome the presumption that his lawyer’s performance was not
deficient, he has failed to show prejudice. Anstine’s statement would have only a minimal effect
on the case. Spencer’s lawyer had already elicited testimony that Officer Spieldenner believed
that Ford owned the bag of narcotics in the backseat and the bag with ammunition that matched
the gun’s ammunition. That testimony supports Spencer’s case that Ford was a drug dealer who
owned the gun and the baggie of cocaine. Anstine’s statement that she was buying drugs from
Ford would be cumulative at best and actively harmful at worst. Consequently, the failure to
introduce this statement did not undermine confidence in Spencer’s conviction. See Carbin, 463
Mich at 604-605.
5. FORD’S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS
Finally, Spencer argues that his lawyer should have introduced Ford’s statement to Officer
Spieldenner that he was on parole for a previous CCW conviction. If an out-of-court statement is
used to demonstrate the declarant’s motive, then the statement is either nonhearsay or subject to
the hearsay exception for the declarant’s then-existing state of mind under MRE 803(3). People v
Jones (On Rehearing After Remand), 228 Mich App 191, 206; 579 NW2d 82 (1996). A statement
that directly asserts the declarant’s motive is admissible substantively under MRE 803(3). Id. On
the other hand, a statement that circumstantially shows the declarant’s motive is not hearsay if it
is only admitted for that purpose. Id.
Ford’s statement that he had been on parole for a CCW charge circumstantially
demonstrated that Ford’s desire to avoid a CCW charge motivated him to force his firearm onto
Spencer. This inference does not depend on whether Ford had a previous CCW conviction or was
on parole. Even if the statement were false, it showed that Ford was aware that a convicted felon

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can be held criminally liable for possessing a firearm. Accordingly, the statement would not be
hearsay if introduced to show motive.
However, the evidence was largely cumulative. From Officer Spieldenner’s existing
testimony, a jury already could infer that (1) felons generally know that they can be arrested for
possessing firearms, (2) this creates a motive to push their firearms onto other people, and (3) Ford
is a convicted felon, so he most likely has the same knowledge and motive. Introducing evidence
of Ford’s CCW conviction would only serve to change “most likely” to “definitely.” Furthermore,
the dispute at trial was whether Spencer voluntarily participated in hiding Ford’s gun, not whether
Ford had a motive to hide the gun in the first place. Spencer’s lawyer may have reasonably
believed that it was unnecessary to complicate the trial with additional evidence of Ford’s
conviction for such minimal benefit. Failure to present this minor piece of cumulative evidence
on a tangential issue that was fundamentally undisputed did not influence the outcome of Spencer’s
case.
C. SUMMARY
In sum, on this record, Spencer has not overcome the presumption that his lawyer provided
constitutionally effective assistance. Instead, all the challenged decisions appear to have been
matters of trial strategy that did not prejudice Spencer’s case. Reversal is unwarranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

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