COA 369317 PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY JAMES EDWARDS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 7/20/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2026
12:12 PM
V No. 369317
Missaukee Circuit Court
TIMOTHY JAMES EDWARDS, LC No. 2023-003412-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and PATEL and KOROBKIN, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury-trial convictions of three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (sexual penetration of victim under 13 years of age
by perpetrator 17 years of age or older), and five counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC-II), MCL 750.520c(2)(b) (sexual contact with victim under 13 years of age by perpetrator
17 years of age or older). The trial court sentenced defendant, as a second-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.10, to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of 25 to 50 years for each
conviction of CSC-I, and 88 to 270 months for each conviction of CSC-II. We affirm.
I. FACTS
This case arises from allegations that defendant sexually abused his step-niece, KS, and his
step-nephew, KP. From approximately 2012 to 2015, defendant lived in Lake City, Michigan,
with his brother, Allen, his sister-in-law, Cassie, the victims, and Allen’s and Cassie’s two
youngest children. Both KS and KP alleged that defendant sexually abused them while residing
in their home and babysitting them. The two victims were in their mid-teens at trial, and neither
could remember precisely when the incidents of abuse occurred or how old they were at the time
of the incidents.
KS and KP testified that they did not tell Allen and Cassie about the abuse until 2015, when
KS called them out of concern that defendant was sexually abusing their younger sibling. After
hearing the allegations, Allen and Cassie confronted defendant and forced him to leave their Lake
City home. Allen and Cassie did not report the abuse to the police or Children’s Protective
Services. The family moved to Florida and resided with Allen’s and defendant’s mother, Lori.

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The family returned to Michigan in 2022, at which time Cassie and KS reported defendant’s sexual
abuse.
Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that he had been denied
the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant first challenged trial counsel’s failure to call
character witnesses to testify about his “good sexual morals,” namely his lack of sexual interest in
children. Defendant also asserted that trial counsel failed to undertake reasonable investigation or
develop the theory that the victims fabricated their allegations against him. Specifically, defendant
alleged that Lori had threatened to force Allen, Cassie, and their family out of her home in Florida,
in retaliation for which Cassie coached the victims to accuse defendant of sexual abuse. Defendant
further alleged that trial counsel was ineffective by not seeking to have the complete video
recording of defendant’s interview with law enforcement, as opposed to selected segments,
presented to the jury. After a Ginther1 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. This
appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) call character witnesses
at trial, (2) pursue the theory that Cassie and the victims fabricated the allegations, and (3) present
the complete video recording of defendant’s interview. We disagree.
An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim presents a “mixed question of fact and
constitutional law.” People v Yeager, 511 Mich 478, 487; 999 NW2d 490 (2023). We review de
novo constitutional questions and the trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear
error. Id.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions afford criminal defendants the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 488, citing Const 1963, art 1, § 20; US Const Am VI;
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a
reasonable probability that [the] outcome would have been different.” Yeager, 511 Mich at 488
(cleaned up). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. (cleaned up). “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears
a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 539; 917 NW2d 752
(2018) (cleaned up).
We will not second-guess matters of trial strategy or “assess counsel’s competence with
the benefit of hindsight.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 237; 966 NW2d 437
(2020) (cleaned up). “Decisions regarding what evidence to present, whether to call witnesses,
and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy[.]” People v Horn, 279
Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008). “Defense counsel is given wide discretion in matters of
trial strategy because many calculated risks may be necessary in order to win difficult cases.”
People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 242; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “We give defense counsel wide
1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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discretion in matters of trial strategy because counsel may be required to take calculated risks to
win a case.” People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 83; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). “A particular strategy
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel simply because it does not work.” People v
Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 702; 915 NW2d 387 (2018) (cleaned up).
A. CHARACTER EVIDENCE
Defendant first alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present character
evidence under MRE 404 and 405 in the form of opinion and reputation that defendant was not
sexually interested in children. We disagree.
Generally, character evidence is not admissible to prove that a defendant acted in
conformity with the allegations supporting the charged offenses. MRE 404(a).2 However, MRE
404(a)(1) allows a criminal defendant to “offer evidence that he or she has a character trait that
makes it less likely that he or she committed the charged offense.” People v Roper, 286 Mich App
77, 93; 777 NW2d 483 (2009). If a defendant chooses to present such evidence, the prosecution
is entitled to present character evidence in rebuttal. Id.
MRE 405 provides as follows:
(a) In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable
into reports of relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific
instances of that person’s conduct.
The testimony at the posttrial hearing indicated that none of defendant’s proposed character
witnesses could competently attest to defendant’s good sexual morals or reputation in the
community. His proposed character witnesses all testified that defendant did not have a reputation
for having a sexual interest in children, but each also acknowledged not having spoken to defendant
or anyone in his community about his sexual morals or preferences. Trial counsel testified that he
doubted that the proposed character witnesses could properly testify regarding defendant’s
reputation for good sexual morals, and the trial court concluded that trial counsel would not have
been able to lay a proper foundation for such testimony. Defendant’s proposed witnesses did not
have sufficient knowledge of defendant’s propensity, or lack thereof, to engage in sexual acts with
children to properly offer such opinion or reputation testimony at trial. See MRE 405(a).
2 The Rules of Evidence were substantially amended, effective January 1, 2024. See 512 Mich
lxiii-cxxi (2023). For purposes of this opinion, we will rely on the versions of the rules in effect
at the time of trial.

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Defendant also argues testimony about his appropriate interactions with children would
have been admissible under MRE 405(b), because his character was an element of his CSC
charges. But defendant’s character is not an essential element of a charge of criminal sexual
conduct. See MCL 750.520b. Defendant’s proposed character witnesses were prepared to testify
at trial that defendant had always acted appropriately around children, and that they had never
observed any conduct to suggest that defendant was sexually attracted to children. Such testimony
would have been inadmissible under MRE 405(b) because defendant’s character for not acting
inappropriately around, or demonstrating a sexual interest in, children was not an essential element
to offense. “Counsel is not ineffective for failing to advance a meritless position . . . .” Head, 323
Mich App at 539 (cleaned up).
In addition to concerns about admissibility, trial counsel recognized that cross-examination
of defendant’s proposed character witnesses could have disadvantaged defendant. See Roper, 286
Mich App at 93. At the Ginther hearing, trial counsel testified that the proposed character
witnesses were very “generic” in their assertions that defendant did not sexually assault the
victims. Further, trial counsel understood that, because defendant was on probation for a felony
fraud conviction when the sexual assaults occurred, if any of defendant’s character witnesses
testified generally about defendant’s good character or truthfulness, the prosecution could have
impeached them with defendant’s criminal history. Cross-examination could have revealed how
little the witnesses interacted with defendant and the victims while defendant lived in the Lake
City home, given that none of the proposed witnesses had personal knowledge regarding what
happened or was regularly present with defendant and the victims. The record therefore indicates
that any testimony from defendant’s proposed character witnesses would have been of limited
value while creating a risk of negatively impacting the defense.
The decision whether to call defendant’s proposed character witnesses was a matter of trial
strategy, Horn, 279 Mich App at 39, for which counsel has wide discretion, Heft, 299 Mich App
at 83, and defendant has not identified or offered any evidence to overcome the strong presumption
of sound strategy in counsel’s decision. That counsel’s strategy ultimately failed does not render
his performance deficient.3 Carll, 322 Mich App at 702.
3 At oral argument, appellate counsel argued for the first time on appeal that the trial court applied
an improper standard to determine whether trial counsel’s error on this issue was outcome
determinative. Specifically, the trial court stated that trial counsel’s failure to seek admission of
character evidence was “an ordinary nonconstitutional trial error considering the weakness of the
evidence” but concluded “[t]he error does not provide grounds for a new trial because it does not
affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.”
(Emphasis added). While defendant failed to raise this argument in his brief on appeal, we agree
that this is not the proper standard. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, “a defendant
must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that [the] outcome
would have been different.” Yeager, 511 Mich at 488 (cleaned up; emphasis added). But because
we conclude that trial counsel was not deficient on this issue, the trial court’s erroneous application
of the “more probable than not” standard is a nondispositive error.

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B. FABRICATED ALLEGATIONS
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the theory that
Cassie and the victims fabricated the allegations of sexual assault as revenge against his mother,
Lori. This claim is without merit.
“Counsel always retains the duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38,
52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012) (cleaned up). The record reflects that trial counsel did in fact investigate
Lori’s claim that Cassie fabricated the allegations against defendant. Trial counsel engaged a
forensic psychiatrist, an investigator, and a polygraph examiner before determining that this theory
lacked support. Because trial counsel took steps to investigate Lori’s claim, and the truthfulness
of both defendant and the victims, we reject defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to undertake adequate investigation.
Defendant also fails to establish that trial counsel was aware of the specific motivation
defendant attributes to Cassie to fabricate the allegations and coach the victims or that counsel had
a reasonable evidentiary basis for pursuing that theory at trial. Trial counsel attempted to pursue
this theory at trial insofar as counsel asked Allen about his relationship with Lori, but the
prosecution successfully objected to that line of questioning as irrelevant. Beyond that, Lori
testified at the posttrial evidentiary hearing that Cassie specifically threatened to coach the victims
to accuse defendant of sexual assault in retaliation for a property dispute that she and Allen had
with Lori. Although Lori testified that she provided trial counsel and his investigator with
information about such threats from Allen and Cassie, she later testified that she provided trial
counsel with only a folder of information about “timelines” which did not include any
documentation about the alleged threats. Trial counsel testified that Lori largely discussed the
property dispute she had with Allen and Cassie and did not mention Cassie’s alleged threats against
her until counsel’s second or third meeting with her. In addition to the lack of evidence from Lori,
trial counsel had several concerns with pursuing the fabrication theory. Counsel explained that
Lori’s account of what happened with Allen and Cassie frequently changed, that she did not give
him a definitive answer as to why Cassie would have targeted defendant, and that Lori was
dishonest with him about key facts. The record indicates that, at the time of trial, counsel was not
aware of specific threats against defendant and otherwise lacked strong evidence to support the
fabrication theory. Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s
decision to not pursue this theory was sound trial strategy. See Heft, 299 Mich App at 83.
C. VIDEO RECORDING OF DEFENDANT’S INTERVIEW
Defendant additionally argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on
presentation to the jury of the complete video recording of defendant’s interview with law
enforcement, which kept the jury from hearing additional denials of wrongdoing from defendant.
We disagree.
In support of his argument, defendant cites MRE 106, which provides, “When a writing or
recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the
introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought
in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it.” That rule recognizes that “a thought or

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act cannot be accurately understood without considering the entire context and content in which
the thought was expressed.” People v McReavy, 436 Mich 197, 214-215; 462 NW2d 1 (1990).
However, “MRE 106 does not automatically permit an adverse party to introduce into evidence
the rest of a document once the other party mentions a portion of it. Rather, MRE 106 logically
limits the supplemental evidence to evidence that ‘ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it.’ ” People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 412 n 85; 633 NW2d 376
(2001).
Defendant’s assertions that the unplayed segments of his interview with law enforcement
were admissible at trial under MRE 106, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have
the entire video played for the jury, are without merit. Defendant did not show at the evidentiary
hearing, and has not shown on appeal, that the complete interview was necessary to understand his
statements in the segments of the video that were played for the jury. See McReavy, 436 Mich
at 214-215. In the two video segments played at trial, the jury heard defendant acknowledge that
he lived in the same home as the victims for three years, explain that he moved out of that home
because he wanted to live on his own, state that he only occasionally babysat the victims, deny
ever being alone with the victims in his bedroom, and deny ever touching the victims
inappropriately. Defendant does not explain how the jury could have better understood his denials
or explanations in the played segments by viewing the unplayed segments, or how additional
depictions of his denials were needed to balance the fairness of the played segments. The unplayed
segments included introductions, casual conversation about defendant’s job, general questions
about defendant’s relationship with Allen, allegations of child abuse, and statements from law
enforcement about the consistency of the allegations. The unplayed segments included irrelevant,
repetitive, and possibly prejudicial information, and nothing in the record indicates that these
unplayed segments were necessary for the jury to understand defendant’s statements and denials
in the segments presented at trial.
Trial counsel explained at the evidentiary hearing that he did not ask for the entire video to
be played because the unplayed segments would have added or highlighted information damaging
to the defense. For example, the jury would have heard unrelated allegations that defendant had
hit the victims and intentionally burned their fingers. The jury also would have heard positive
statements about the credibility of the victims and defendant’s statement that he had not seen the
victims since 2016, when he returned to the victims’ home to retrieve mail. Those statements
supported the prosecution’s theory that the victims disclosed defendant’s abusive conduct to Allen
and Cassie, who responded by forcing defendant out of the Lake City home and abruptly ceasing
communication with him. Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s
decision to prevent this potentially harmful or prejudicial information from being presented to the
jury was sound trial strategy. See Heft, 299 Mich App at 83.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin

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