COA 371220 JONATHAN JONES V HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 1/5/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
JONATHAN JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED
January 05, 2026
11:05 AM
v No. 371220
Wayne Circuit Court
HOME-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY and
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY
COMPANY,
LC No. 18-009868-NI
Defendants-Appellees,
and
AMERICAN COUNTRY INSURANCE
COMPANY, and SHARNETA HENDERSON,
Defendants.
Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and sued defendants Home-Owners
Insurance Company (“Home-Owners”) and Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company
(“Hartford”) for no-fault personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits and uninsured or
underinsured motorist benefits. After this Court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing
plaintiff’s claims for PIP benefits and remanded the case to the trial court, defendants moved for
an order requiring a security bond from plaintiff. Plaintiff responded to the motion, arguing that
the security bond would not be reasonable and proper. After a hearing on the motion, the trial
court ordered the security bond in the requested amount of $25,000 and the case was dismissed
when plaintiff failed to post the security bond. Plaintiff then moved for the trial court to reconsider
the order requiring the security bond because plaintiff was financially unable to pay the amount.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and this appeal was filed. Because the

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trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the security bond and denying plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case and its factual history has been examined by this Court before:
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident on October 28, 2017, in which
plaintiff’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Sharneta Henderson
in Detroit. Plaintiff alleges that he was operating a 2009 Ford Crown Victoria and
was stopped at a red light when Henderson’s vehicle, traveling at a high rate of
speed, drove through a red light and struck his vehicle. The Crown Victoria was
insured under a no-fault policy issued by [American Country Insurance Company],
which listed Sons of Alice Transportation, LLC (Sons of Alice), as the named
insured. Plaintiff also alleged that he was covered under policies issued by Home-
Owners and Hartford. The Home-Owners policy was for plaintiff’s personal
vehicle, a 2008 Mercedes, and listed plaintiff as the named insured. The Hartford
policy was for a 1994 Chevrolet pickup truck and listed Jonathan Jones, d/b/a Jones
Landscaping, as the named insured.
Plaintiff filed this action against all three insurers for recovery of no-fault PIP
benefits and also uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits. All three insurers
filed motions for summary disposition, asserting that plaintiff’s claims were barred
by antifraud provisions in the respective policies. Defendants argued that in
plaintiff’s deposition on December 18, 2018, plaintiff made material
misrepresentations regarding his physical limitations, the extent to which he
required attendant care and household replacement services, and the impact of his
injuries on his ability to work. In support of their allegations of fraud, defendants
relied on surveillance evidence from February, June, and July of 2018, which
contradicted plaintiff’s statements regarding the scope of his injuries and pain, his
physical limitations, and his inability to work. [Jones v Home-Owners Ins Co,
unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August 18, 2022 (Docket
No. 355118), p 2.]
The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition, finding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff committed fraud and that defendants were entitled to
summary disposition on the basis of the antifraud provisions in the policies.
Plaintiff then appealed the trial court’s decision granting summary disposition. This Court
affirmed the trial court’s order with respect to plaintiff’s claim for uninsured or underinsured
motorist benefits because “there [was] no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff made material
misrepresentations regarding his physical limitations, including his ability to conduct his daily
activities of living, that were established by the surveillance evidence to be factually incorrect and
untruthful.” Id. at 8 (cleaned up). But, for summary disposition on the PIP benefits claim, this
Court reversed the trial court’s decision because defendants had failed to address any statutory
right to PIP benefits in their motions for summary disposition and remanded for “a determination
of the priority of the potential insurers, whether plaintiff is entitled to benefits under a policy, and
whether the benefits arise by statute or contract.” Id. at 4 (cleaned up).

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Back in the trial court on remand, Home-Owners moved for security for costs, asking that
the trial court require plaintiff to post a bond as security for costs in the amount of $25,000 and if
plaintiff failed to file the bond, then to dismiss the case with prejudice. Citing MCR 2.109(A),
Home-Owners argued that despite summary disposition not being an option, security for costs is
appropriate because plaintiff’s claims were meritless, unwarranted, and rested on a tenuous theory
of legal liability because of plaintiff’s fraud relative to his medical treatment, based on a doctor’s
deposition that he never treated plaintiff and the surveillance of plaintiff. The $25,000 amount
was based on the “amount of discovery yet to be conducted and potential trial to be had,” requiring
review of medical records and depositions of medical professional and service providers. Hartford
concurred and joined Home-Owners’ motion. Home-Owners also filed a motion for attorney fees
under MCL 500.3148(2) because of plaintiff’s fraudulent claims.
Plaintiff responded to defendants’ motion for security costs by arguing that, as he explained
in his response to defendants’ motions for attorney fees, “there is no realm of possibility where
Plaintiff could be liable pursuant to MCL 500.3148(2), as no particular PIP claim has been shown
to be premised on fraud and even the evidence on which those allegations are based is
inadmissible.” Further, plaintiff argued that “there has never been any allegation that Plaintiff’s
significant medical claims are somehow fraudulent or that they are otherwise not payable for any
reason, meaning any possible sanctions could simply be set off from Plaintiff’s award for allowable
expenses.” Nowhere in plaintiff’s response did he mention any financial inability to pay a bond.
After a hearing on defendants’ motion for security costs where parties made similar
arguments to their briefs, the trial court granted defendants’ request for plaintiff to post a bond of
$25,000 within 14 days; if no such bond was posted, then the trial court would dismiss plaintiff’s
case without prejudice.1 Once more than 14 days had passed and without the bond posted and no
other requests by plaintiff, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s case without prejudice. Plaintiff
then moved for reconsideration of the order requiring a security bond because of his financial
inability to post any bond. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration because
plaintiff failed to raise the argument of his financial inability in opposition to defendants’ motion,
did not provide an affidavit of financial inability until over a month after the order, and offered no
explanation for his delay in submitting an affidavit. Plaintiff then appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a security
bond. “It is within a trial court’s discretion to order security, and we will not reverse unless the
imposition of security is an abuse of that discretion.” Farleigh v Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1251, 199 Mich App 631, 633-634; 502 NW2d 371 (1993). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes.”
Nowacki v Dept of Corrections, 319 Mich App 144, 148; 900 NW2d 154 (2017). “A trial court’s
1 At the motion hearing, after the trial court announced that defendants’ motion for a security bond
would be granted, defendant then asked about scheduling a hearing about the motion for attorney
fees under MCL 500.3148. Plaintiff’s counsel interjected and stated that plaintiff did not have the
money to post the bond and the case would be appealed or dismissed.

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determinations regarding the legitimacy of the claims and a party’s financial ability to post a bond
are findings of fact that are reviewed only for clear error.” In re Surety Bond for Costs, 226 Mich
App 321, 333; 573 NW2d 300 (1997). Clear error occurs if the Court is “left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Heindlmeyer v Ottawa Co Concealed
Weapons Licensing Bd, 268 Mich App 202, 214; 707 NW2d 353 (2005).
MCR 2.109 provides the following for “Security for Costs”:
(A) Motion. On motion of a party against whom a claim has been asserted in a civil
action, if it appears reasonable and proper, the court may order the opposing party
to file with the court clerk a bond with surety as required by the court in an amount
sufficient to cover all costs and other recoverable expenses that may be awarded by
the trial court, or, if the claiming party appeals, by the trial and appellate courts.
The court shall determine the amount in its discretion. MCR 3.604(E) and (F)
govern objections to the surety.
First, the trial court determines whether a security bond is reasonable and proper; then, the trial
court sets the bond at an amount sufficient to cover all costs and other recoverable expenses that
may be awarded. See MCR 2.109. If the security bond is not filed as ordered, then the trial court
may properly dismiss the party’s claim. In re Surety Bond, 226 Mich App at 332.
A. REASONABLE AND PROPER
Plaintiff argues that it was not reasonable and proper to require a security bond based on
alleged fraudulent records and plaintiff’s physical limitations. Security should be required if there
is a substantial reason for doing so, such as a “tenuous legal theory of liability” or “where there is
good reason to believe that a party’s allegations, although they cannot be summarily dismissed
under MCR 2.116, are nonetheless groundless and unwarranted.” Wells v Fruehauf Corp, 170
Mich App 326, 335; 428 NW2d 1 (1988). The trial court may consider plaintiff’s legal theories
and the likelihood of success on these theories. In re Surety Bond, 226 Mich App at 334.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered a security bond because it had a
good reason to believe that plaintiff’s claims under the no-fault act were groundless or
unwarranted. An “allowable expense” under the no-fault act is a legitimate claim and “must be
related to the insured’s injuries.” ZCD Transp, Inc v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 299 Mich App
336, 340-341; 830 NW2d 428 (2012); MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Plaintiff must prove that (1) the
expense is causally connected to the accident, (2) the expense was reasonably necessary, (3) the
expense was for the care of the injured plaintiff, (4) the expense amount was reasonable, and (5)
the expense was actually incurred. See ZCD Transp, 299 Mich App at 341-342. Plaintiff’s
arguments mostly focus on whether his actions and statements constituted fraud. Although this
may be relevant, defendants are instead using the evidence to attack the underlying claims, i.e.,
arguing that the expenses were not connected to the accident, were not reasonable, were not for
the care of injured plaintiff, or were not incurred because, based on surveillance, plaintiff was not
actually injured.
Plaintiff then argues that the trial court impermissibly considered inadmissible surveillance
evidence. The Court does not need to determine the admissibility of the surveillance evidence to

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evaluate the trial court’s decision of a security bond. Typically, motions for security bonds happen
early in the litigation process when evidence has just come to light and its admissibility for a trial
may not have yet been determined. See Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc, 186 Mich App 265,
269; 463 NW2d 254 (1990). Further, nothing in the rule dictates what the trial court may consider
when finding a good reason to believe that plaintiff’s claims are groundless or unwarranted. The
trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to set a security bond. Dunn v
Emergency Physicians Med Group, PC, 189 Mich App 519, 523; 473 NW2d 762 (1991). Also,
the trial court may “set the bond in light of [her] own experience.” Belfiori v Allis-Chalmers, Inc,
107 Mich App 595, 601; 309 NW2d 682 (1981). “Because the trial judge is permitted to set the
amount of the bond in light of [her] own experience, any proceeding to give the parties an
opportunity to be heard appears to be more than our law requires.” Dunn, 189 Mich App at 523
(cleaned up).
Based on the evidence presented to the trial court and the trial court’s experiences, it was
not clear error for the trial court to conclude as a factual matter that plaintiff’s claims might not be
legitimate. The surveillance evidence likely would damage plaintiff’s credibility in front of the
fact-finder. Even setting aside its effect on the fact-finder, such surveillance evidence would also
reasonably make a trial court question whether plaintiff could meet the causation elements for his
claims. Furthermore, the depositions of medical providers challenged the legitimacy of plaintiff’s
claims, separately and apart from any surveillance evidence. Although trial courts may err in
requiring security bond for all of a plaintiff’s claims when some of the claims have grounds, see
Zapalski v Benton, 178 Mich App 398, 405; 444 NW2d 171 (1989), plaintiff in this case has not
shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding his claims were arguably groundless and
unwarranted.
B. BOND AMOUNT
Plaintiff next argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a
security bond because plaintiff could never be liable to pay attorney fees. Essentially, plaintiff is
arguing that the trial court could not find a basis for the bond amount because plaintiff would never
be liable for any costs, and therefore, the amount should be set at $0. The trial court determines
the bond “amount in its discretion.” MCR 2.109(A). The Court reviews this discretion for abuse.
See Farleigh, 199 Mich App at 633-634.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the trial court set the amount based in part on
attorney fees, it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Plaintiff argues that attorney fees under
MCL 500.3148(2) are not a proper criterion in determining a security bond. Generally, attorney
fees are not ordinarily recoverable unless there is an exception, such as a statute that provides for
them. Dessart v Burak, 470 Mich 37, 42; 678 NW2d 615 (2004). MCL 500.3148(2) provides that
the trial court “may award an insurer a reasonable amount against a claimant as an attorney fee for
the insurer’s attorney in defending against a claim that was in some respect fraudulent or so
excessive as to have no reasonable foundation.” But, if the claimant is due benefits because of
loss resulting from the injury on which the claim is based, then an attorney fee awarded in favor
of the insurer may be taken as an offset against the benefits. MCL 500.3148(3). “Judgment may
also be entered against the claimant for any amount of an attorney fee awarded that is not offset
against benefits or otherwise paid.” Id.

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Although the “term ‘costs’ ordinarily does not encompass attorney fees unless the statute
or court rule specifically defines ‘costs’ as including attorney fees,” Dessart, 470 Mich at 42,
MCR 2.109(A) considers “all costs and other recoverable expenses” when setting the security
bond (emphasis added). The inclusion of “and other recoverable expenses” most likely refers to
consideration of attorney fees that can be recovered in deciding the amount under MCR 2.109(A).
The trial court therefore did not clearly abuse its discretion if it considered attorney fees under
MCL 500.3148(2) as other recoverable expenses.
Separately, plaintiff further argues that the attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2) are not a
proper consideration for a security bond because such consideration assumes that plaintiff’s claim
will fail and that the trial court will award fees. But, those are necessarily the assumptions that the
trial court must make when deciding a security bond. The security bond amount equals the amount
that the trial court may award assuming that plaintiff’s claims are groundless or unwarranted. So,
assuming that plaintiff’s claims are fraudulent or so excessive as to have no reasonable foundation,
the trial court would be able to award fees under MCL 500.3148(2), which therefore, makes them
a recoverable expense and a proper consideration under MCR 2.109(A).
Regardless, it is not even clear on the current record that the trial court considered such
attorney fees in setting the $25,000 amount. Although this Court encourages a trial court to
articulate the basis for its decision on a security bond and the amount, Belfiori, 107 Mich App
at 601, the trial court does not have to state with specificity its findings of fact. “Findings of fact
and conclusions of law are unnecessary in decisions on motions unless findings are required by a
particular rule.” MCR 2.517(A)(4); see Dobronski v Transamerica Life Ins Co, 347 Mich App 92,
103; 13 NW3d 895 (2023). Plaintiff argues that fees under MCL 500.3148(2) were the primary
or sole basis in the trial court’s calculation of the bond amount, but a review of the record on appeal
does not support this argument.
In defendant Home-Owner’s motion and at the motion hearing, defendant only mentions
the costs for medical expert depositions; it does not mention MCL 500.3148 in reference to the
bond amount. Plaintiff was the one to argue about the attorney fees in its response to defendants’
motion and at the hearing on the motion. Although defendants also had a motion related to MCL
500.3148(2) pending at the time, that does necessarily mean that the trial court considered such
fees in its decision, especially when the trial court and the party requesting the security bond did
not mention the attorney fees before the trial court’s decision.
Even without considering attorney fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting
the amount at $25,000. “The starting presumption in all civil cases is [that] costs shall be allowed
as a matter of course to the prevailing party.” Guerrero v Smith, 280 Mich App 647, 671; 761
NW2d 723 (2008) (cleaned up). In addition to other costs typically taxed after trial, MCL
600.2549 provides that the “fees paid for depositions of witnesses” shall be allowed as taxable
costs if filed with the clerk’s office and read into evidence. See Vanalstine v Land O’Lakes Purina
Feeds, LLC, 326 Mich App 641, 655; 929 NW2d 789 (2018). Defendants argued that the requested
amount included costs of likely depositions of medical providers if the case went to trial. Plaintiff
has not shown that costs associated with such depositions would not be taxable, nor has plaintiff
shown that the aggregate taxable costs would be demonstrably and necessarily less than the
ordered amount. For this reason, independent of the appropriateness of attorney fees or amount of

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such fees, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a bond or setting that bond at
$25,000.
C. FINANCIAL INABILITY
Finally, plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
consider plaintiff’s financial inability to pay the bond on reconsideration. Plaintiff had ample time
to provide evidence to the trial court and make a reasoned argument that he was unable to provide
a security bond and should be excused from doing so under MCR 2.109(B)(1). He failed to do so
until after the case was dismissed and he moved for reconsideration; his counsel’s brief remark at
the end of the hearing was neither evidence nor reasoned argument for discretionary relief under
the court rule. “An argument raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration does not
preserve that claim of error for appellate review.” Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs
& Mfg, LLC, 347 Mich App 280, 300-301; 14 NW3d 472 (2023). The matter has been waived, id.
at 301, and we decline to exercise our discretion to review it on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring a security bond in light of the
circumstances. Further, the trial court did not err in setting the amount of the bond based on the
arguments the parties presented. Plaintiff has waived any argument based on his inability to
provide the bond.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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