COA 375588 IN RE DAWSON MINORS Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 4/8/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
UNPUBLISHED
April 08, 2026
2:32 PM
In re DAWSON, Minors.
Nos. 375588; 376447
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2022-001217-NA
Before: KOROBKIN, P.J., and YOUNG and BAZZI, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, in Docket No. 375588, respondent-mother appeals as of right
the order terminating her parental rights to GJD and ARD, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
(conditions that led to removal still existed and were unlikely to be remedied in a reasonable period
of time), (g) (parent was financially able to care for child but failed to do so), and (j) (reasonable
likelihood of harm to child). In Docket No. 376447, respondent-father appeals as of right the same
trial court order terminating his parental rights to GJD and ARD under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(g), and (j). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent-mother and respondent-father were homeless from 2015 until 2023. They
intermittently stayed in homeless shelters and hotels. Respondent-father used illicit substances
including heroin, did not have an income, and suffered from anxiety and depression. Respondent-
father panhandled to get money to buy drugs and had been panhandling with GJD and ARD. In
May 2022, respondent-mother was prescribed medication for her diagnoses of attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), bipolar disorder, asthma, and anxiety, but she did not take
the medication.
On July 23, 2022, when respondent-mother, GJD, and ARD were living in a shelter, GJD
and respondent-mother got into a fight. Respondent-mother hit GJD with a broom, smashed his
phone, and grabbed his arm. In early August 2022, respondent-mother was asked to leave the

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shelter. Respondent-mother, GJD, and ARD spent a night at a bus stop in Detroit after they visited
respondent-father who was sleeping on the grass near a 7-Eleven convenience store.
Respondent-mother, GJD, and ARD stayed with their maternal grandmother for a few days.
On August 8, 2022, the grandmother stated that she did not want them to live with her anymore
because respondent-mother was abusive to the grandmother, GJD, and ARD. The Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an ex parte motion asking the trial court to take
protective custody of GJD and ARD. The trial court determined that it was contrary to the welfare
of GJD and ARD for them to remain in respondents’ care.
On August 29, 2022, DHHS petitioned for temporary custody of GJD and ARD.
Respondent-mother and respondent-father pleaded no contest to the facts establishing jurisdiction.
The trial court ordered them to undergo psychological and psychiatric evaluations, follow the
recommendations from the evaluations, participate in and benefit from individual counseling and
parenting classes, and maintain a legal source of income and suitable housing. Respondent-father
was ordered to have a substance-abuse assessment, follow the recommendations from the
assessment, and participate in random drug screens. Respondent-mother was ordered to participate
in the parent-partner program. Respondents were ordered to participate in supervised parenting
visits with ARD, but parenting visits with GJD were at his discretion and only if his therapist
advised that they occur.
In August 2023, respondents obtained housing but were still working on the other aspects
of their case service plans. A few months later, ARD was placed in the foster home where GJD
was placed. In April 2024, respondent-mother, respondent-father, and ARD participated in two
family therapy sessions. GJD refused to participate. At some point in April 2024, ARD went to
the hospital because she was suicidal and homicidal. ARD stayed in the hospital for two weeks.
The family therapy and parenting visits with ARD were suspended following a recommendation
from ARD’s psychiatric report.
A supplemental petition for permanent custody was filed on September 10, 2024. A
termination hearing was held on March 10, 2025. Laura Francoeur, a foster care specialist,
testified that respondents had not completed their case service plans or removed the barriers that
brought GJD and ARD into care. Although they had suitable housing, respondents were not able
to show they benefitted from parenting classes. Respondent-mother did not complete individual
therapy, the parent-partner program, or follow the recommendations from her psychiatric
evaluation. Respondent-father had not successfully participated in the substance-abuse assessment
and drug screens. Throughout the supervision under the case service plan, his drug screens were
positive for fentanyl, heroin, tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), and alcohol. Respondent-father
continued to be unemployed and had no legal source of income.
Respondent-mother testified that she had completed her case service plan. She stated that
she no longer had any mental-health issues and that she was not recommended to complete any
follow up after the psychiatric evaluation. Respondent-father testified that he had benefitted from
the parenting classes and that he had not used heroin for a year and a half. The trial court
determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondents’ parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),(g), and (j).

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A best-interests hearing was held on May 12, 2025. Francoeur testified that it was in the
best interests of the children to terminate respondents’ parental rights. Respondents again both
testified in their defense. The trial court determined that it was in GJD’s and ARD’s best interests
to terminate respondents’ parental rights because there was no bond between them and the
children, respondents had not demonstrated proper parenting or complied with their service plans,
the children each had special needs that were being met in their foster home, and the children
needed permanency. These appeals followed.
II. THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TERMINATION
Respondents argue that the trial court clearly erred by finding clear and convincing
evidence supporting statutory grounds for termination of their parental rights to GJD and ARD.
We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“This Court reviews for clear error the trial court’s ruling that a statutory ground for
termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children’s best interests.”
In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). A finding of fact is “clearly
erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “When applying the clear-error standard in parental termination cases, regard is
to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who
appeared before it.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
B. THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT TERMINATING
RESPONDENT-MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS
To terminate parental rights, “the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence
that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met.” In
re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “Only one statutory ground for
termination need be established” to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re Olive/Metts
Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41; 823 NW2d 144 (2012).
The trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence to establish statutory grounds
for termination of respondent-mother’s rights to GJD and ARD under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),
(g), and (j), which provide:
The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

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(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable
expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
reasonable time considering the child’s age.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if the child is returned to the home of
the parent.
The trial court properly found at least one statutory ground to terminate respondent-
mother’s parental rights. Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), termination of parental rights is
established when the conditions that brought the child into care continue to exist despite a
respondent being given “time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety
of services . . . .” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In other words,
termination of parental rights is proper when “the totality of the evidence amply supports that [the
respondent] ha[s] not accomplished any meaningful change in the conditions” that led to the
adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
First, in this case, more than 182 days had elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order. The initial dispositional order was issued on January 27, 2023. DHHS
petitioned to terminate respondent’s parental rights to GJD and ARD on September 10, 2024—
592 days later. Next, one of the conditions that led to adjudication was respondent-mother’s
mental health. To address her mental-health issues, respondent was ordered to participate in
individual therapy, undergo psychological and psychiatric evaluations, and follow the
recommendations from these evaluations. The recommendation from her psychological
evaluation was to participate in parenting coaching, have supportive visitation, and continue
individual therapy. According to Francoeur, respondent-mother did not successfully complete
individual therapy. Respondent-mother had not followed the recommendations from the
psychiatric evaluation including taking prescribed medication and she was not participating in
services to address her mental health. There was no indication that respondent’s mental health
was under control.
Respondent-mother contends that her mental-health issues were resolved and that she
completed her case service plan. Specifically, respondent-mother claimed that the psychiatric
evaluation produced no diagnosis and that she was not required to take medication for her mental
health. According to respondent-mother, she stopped taking medication for her mental health
diagnoses in 2022, before the adjudication trial, because she was no longer prescribed any
medication. However, evidence in the record contradicts respondent-mother’s claim. According
to the CPS investigation report that respondent-mother accepted as a factual basis for her no-

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contest plea to jurisdiction, on May 22, 2022, respondent-mother was prescribed Vyvanse,
Topamax, and Seroquel for her diagnoses of ADHD, bipolar disorder, asthma, and anxiety.
Respondent-mother did not take “the medication as prescribed . . . .”
Deferring to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility, Mota,
334 Mich App at 320, it found that respondent-mother “failed to follow through with
recommendations of court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, resulting in her mental health issues
continuing to go untreated.” Because she did not follow the recommendations from the psychiatric
evaluation or participate in individual therapy, respondent-mother did not accomplish any
meaningful change in her mental health and therefore her ability to care for the children. Williams,
286 Mich App at 272. Respondent-mother was given “time to make changes and the opportunity
to take advantage of a variety of services” to help make those changes. White, 303 Mich App at
710. Although respondent-mother completed the parenting classes and some of the other court-
ordered services, she failed to address her mental health. In light of respondent-mother’s refusal
to recognize that her mental health was an issue after 2022, even if she was provided with more
time and additional referrals to services, it is unlikely that respondent-mother would be able to
achieve any substantive improvements to her mental health in a reasonable time. In the two years
that elapsed between the date that respondent-mother was adjudicated in this case and the date of
the termination hearing, she failed to complete individual therapy and follow the recommendations
from the psychiatric evaluation. In fact, at the time termination occurred, respondent-mother
openly acknowledged she was not participating in individual therapy and had not requested a
referral for a different therapist.
As respondent-mother argues on appeal, she complied with other aspects of her case
service plan. Respondent mother had social security disability income and suitable housing.
However, respondent-mother’s untreated mental health issues threaten to destabilize these
improvements. Specifically, respondent-mother’s mental health could lead to the loss of her social
security disability income, which in turn could again lead to homelessness. Additionally,
respondent-mother completed parenting classes, which was part of her case service plan.
Nevertheless, she had the responsibility to demonstrate benefit from parenting classes. Despite
warnings that she should not be making promises to ARD about when she would come home,
respondent-mother continued to have inappropriate conversations with ARD during parenting
visits. This demonstrates that she failed to benefit from the parenting classes and improve her
parenting ability.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights to GJD and ARD was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Hudson, 294
Mich App at 264. We decline to consider the remaining statutory grounds because “[o]nly one
statutory ground for termination need be established” to terminate a respondent’s parental rights.
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41.
C. THERE WAS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT TERMINATING
RESPONDENT-FATHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS
The trial court properly found at least one statutory ground to terminate respondent-father’s
parental rights.

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Respondent-father’s substance abuse was one of the conditions that led to his adjudication.
To address his substance-abuse issues, the trial court ordered him to complete a substance-abuse
assessment, follow the recommendations from the substance-abuse assessment, and participate in
weekly, random drug screens. Although respondent-father was seeking treatment at a methadone
clinic since before August 2023, he did not have a path to be cleared from using methadone as of
March 2025. Respondent-father asserted that he anticipated going to the methadone clinic for
another 6 to 12 months. Contrary to respondent-father’s assertion on appeal that his substance
abuse was under control, during his supervision under the case service plan, respondent-father
tested positive for fentanyl, heroin, THC, and alcohol. Despite receiving methadone treatment for
more than a year, respondent-father’s substance-abuse issues were not under control. Along with
the drug screens that showed respondent-father was still abusing substances, the many drug screens
that respondent-father missed during the supervision of the case service plan were presumed
positive. Notably, during one reporting period, respondent-father missed all of the drug tests.
During another reporting period, he missed 10 of the 12 drug tests. More than two years after the
case service plan was ordered, respondent-father continued to engage in the same behavior and
was still dependent on substances, demonstrating that he failed to accomplish meaningful change
in his ability to care for GJD and ARD. Williams, 286 Mich App at 272.
Another condition that led to respondent-father’s adjudication was his failure “to provide
proper or necessary support or care for the children . . . .” To address this condition, the trial court
ordered respondent-father to maintain a “legal source of income, and suitable housing,” and “take
parenting classes.” Although respondent father attended parenting classes and obtained suitable
housing by the time of the termination hearing, he still did not have a legal source of income and
was unable to financially support his children with their necessities. Respondent-father completed
parenting classes, but, as Francoeur testified, failed to establish a benefit from them. Thus,
respondent-father did not accomplish any meaningful change in his failure to provide support for
the children. Williams, 286 Mich App at 272.
In light of respondent’s failure to comply with the case service plan, address his substance-
abuse issue, and obtain legal income, it was unlikely that he would do so in a reasonable time. In
the two years that elapsed between the date respondent-father was adjudicated and the date of the
termination hearing, respondent-father failed to establish a legal source of income or successfully
complete the substance-abuse assessment and drug screens. Therefore, the trial court did not
clearly err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights to GJD and ARD was
appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Hudson, 294 Mich App at 264.
Because “[o]nly one statutory ground for termination need be established” to terminate a
respondent-father’s parental rights, we decline to consider the remaining statutory grounds.
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41.
III. DHHS MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO REUNIFY RESPONDENTS WITH THE
CHILDREN
Respondents contend that the trial court did not make reasonable efforts to provide services
for reunification. We disagree.

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A. ISSUE PRESERVATION
“In order to preserve an argument that petitioner failed to provide ‘adequate services,’ the
respondent must ‘object or indicate that the services provided to them were somehow
inadequate . . . .’ ” In re Atchley, 341 Mich App 332, 336; 990 NW2d 685 (2022), quoting In re
Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 247; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). “The time for asserting the need for
accommodation in services is when the court adopts a service plan . . . .” Atchley, 341 Mich App
at 336, quoting In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). “However, even if a
parent does not object or otherwise indicate that the services provided were inadequate when the
initial case services plan is adopted, such an objection or challenge may also be timely if raised
later during the proceedings.” Atchley, 341 Mich App at 337. Respondent-mother failed to object
or indicate that the services provided to her were somehow inadequate, thereby failing to preserve
this issue. Id. In a dispositional review hearing, respondent-father asked the trial court for family
therapy and visitation to work on reunification with GJD and ARD, so he preserved the issue for
appellate review.
B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When the issue is preserved, we review “for clear error the trial court’s factual finding that
petitioner made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent[] with the child.” Atchley, 341 Mich App
at 338. However, when a challenge to a trial court’s finding of reasonable efforts is unpreserved,
we review the trial court’s decision “for plain error affecting substantial rights.” Id. (citation
omitted). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) the
error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error
affected substantial rights.” VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 135 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[A]n error affects substantial rights if it caused prejudice, i.e., it affected the outcome
of the proceedings.” In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 9; 761 NW2d 253 (2008).
C. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
“Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those
involving aggravated circumstances.” In re Simonetta, 340 Mich App 700, 707; 987 NW2d 919
(2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither party argues that aggravated circumstances
existed in this case, thus “termination is improper without a finding of reasonable efforts.” In re
Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79, 90; 893 NW2d 637 (2017). “As part of these reasonable efforts,
[DHHS] must create a service plan outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify
the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Id. at 85-86. A case service
plan, often referred to as a parent/agency agreement, “includes services to be provided by and
responsibilities and obligations of the agency and activities, responsibilities, and obligations of the
parent.” MCL 712A.13a(1)(d). “While [DHHS] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts
to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part
of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Respondent-mother’s mental-health issues were the primary barrier to reunification, and
the record shows that DHHS made reasonable efforts to help respondent-mother overcome this
issue. DHHS expended reasonable efforts to secure reunification by recommending and referring
respondent-mother for a service plan “outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to

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rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification.” Hicks/Brown, 500
Mich at 85-86. DHHS provided respondent-mother with multiple referrals for individual therapy,
along with psychiatric and psychological evaluations. Although respondent-mother began
participating in individual therapy, she did not complete it. She claimed that her therapist had to
discontinue therapy with her because “he was a married man,” though she “was not having a
relationship with him[.]” Respondent-mother did not notify any of the foster care workers that she
needed a referral for a new therapist or seek to complete individual therapy. Respondent-mother
completed the psychological and psychiatric evaluations, but she failed to follow the
recommendations, which she was ordered to do, including taking prescribed medication.
Respondent-mother did not complete the parent-partner program.
“Although DHHS has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to
secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of the respondent-
parent to participate in the services and demonstrate having benefited from them.” In re MJC, 349
Mich App 42, 61; 27 NW3d 122 (2023). The parent must “demonstrate sufficient compliance with
or benefit from those services specifically targeted to address the primary basis for the
adjudication . . . .” Frey, 297 Mich App at 248. In this case, respondent-mother participated in
some of the services offered, but she failed to benefit from them. Moreover, because this issue is
unpreserved, respondent-mother has the burden of proving any error caused her prejudice. MJC,
349 Mich App at 48. She has failed to meet that burden because she has not specified any
additional services DHHS could have provided for her that would have better helped her to
overcome her mental-health issues.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court failed to provide reasonable efforts at
reunification when it failed to give her adequate time to comply with the case service plan. We
disagree. Respondent-mother was given more than two years to address her mental health issues.
Yet, after two years, respondent-mother refused to acknowledge that her mental health was a cause
for concern. Thus, it is unlikely that additional time would have promoted reunification with GJD
and ARD. Therefore, there was no plain error in the trial court’s determination regarding
reasonable efforts. MJC, 349 Mich App at 57.
Next, respondent-mother argues that she should have been offered family therapy to
promote reunification with GJD and ARD. We disagree because this would not have helped her
to overcome her mental-health issues.
In April 2024, respondent-mother, respondent-father, and ARD participated in two family
therapy sessions. GJD was not involved in this therapy because he refused to participate. The
family therapy sessions stopped when ARD went to the hospital that same month because she was
suicidal and homicidal. ARD stayed in the hospital for two weeks. At the next dispositional
review hearing, the trial court determined that all parenting visits and contact would be “at the
discretion of the children.” Specifically, regarding family therapy, the trial court stated, “Family
therapy is suspended unless requested by the children and then at workers discretion.” From that
point, GJD and ARD did not want to visit with respondent-mother. Although family therapy could
have promoted the parental bond between respondent-mother and the children, respondent-mother
fails to demonstrate how family therapy would have helped her “rectify the issues that led to court
involvement and to achieve reunification.” Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85-86. Respondent-mother
did not engage in individual therapy to address her mental health, so it is unclear how family

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therapy would have addressed this concern. The family therapy would likely not have helped
respondent-mother overcome her mental-health issues, so respondent-mother has not established
plain error. MJC, 349 Mich App at 57.
D. RESPONDENT-FATHER
The trial court noted that the children came into care because of respondent-father’s
substance-abuse issues. Respondent-father was ordered to participate in services to address these
issues. He was referred for a substance-abuse assessment and random drug screens.
According to Francoeur, respondent-father did not successfully participate in substance-
abuse assessment and drug screens. Although respondent-father claimed that he completed the
case service plan and that his treatment in the methadone clinic was sufficient progress with the
case service plan, the trial court found respondent-father’s testimony to not be credible. We defer
to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility. Mota, 334 Mich App at
320.
Further, additional evidence demonstrated that respondent-father failed to benefit from the
case service plan. Despite claims that he had his substance use under control, respondent-father
continued to test positive for fentanyl, heroin, THC, and alcohol in his drug screens. The parent
must “demonstrate sufficient compliance with or benefit from those services specifically targeted
to address the primary basis for the adjudication . . . .” Frey, 297 Mich App at 248. Respondent-
father failed to benefit from the case service plan, especially related to his substance abuse. A
review of the record confirms that, under the circumstances in this case, DHHS efforts were
reasonable and designed to remove the barriers to reunification.
Respondent-father claims that he should have been provided with parenting visits and
family counseling to support his reunification with GJD and ARD. We disagree because these
services would not have helped respondent-father address the primary barrier to reunification with
his children: his substance abuse.
Respondent-father’s visitation with GJD was suspended in October 2022. Family therapy
with respondents and ARD initially started in April 2024 but stopped because of ARD’s two-week
hospital stay. The family therapy and visitation with ARD were suspended in May 2024, after
ARD’s psychiatric evaluation recommended that ARD’s contact with respondents be suspended.
Although respondent-father expressed his desire to continue the parenting visits and the family
therapy, the efforts to reunify respondent-father with the children were reasonable because these
services would not have helped respondent-father overcome his barriers to reunification. The
suspension of the parenting visits and family therapy did not contribute to respondent-father’s
failure to benefit from substance-abuse treatment. Consequently, even if the trial court had
permitted visitation and family therapy sessions to continue, it is unlikely that the result would
have been different in light of respondent-father’s failure to demonstrate that he addressed the
primary issue which was directly related to whether GJD and ARD would be safe in his care.
“If the court determines that parenting time, even if supervised, may be harmful to the
juvenile’s life, physical health, or mental well-being, the court may suspend parenting time until
the risk of harm no longer exists.” MCL 712A.13a(13). In this case, the trial court determined

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that it was harmful to ARD to continue any contact with respondents after ARD displayed signs
of stress, including nightmares and outbursts, in the times surrounding parenting visits.
Additionally, after two family therapy sessions, ARD was homicidal and suicidal. It was
reasonable for the family therapy visits to be suspended after ARD’s reaction raised a concern for
her mental well-being. If respondent-father would have exhibited a better ability to protect the
mental health of the children by showing improvements with his substance-abuse issues, then it
would have been reasonable to reattempt family therapy and parenting visits. Because respondent-
father did not—or could not—improve his substance abuse issues with the provision of reasonable
services from DHHS, the decision to forego the requested family therapy was reasonable.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that reasonable efforts were made toward
reunification. Atchley, 341 Mich App at 338. Respondent-father was either unwilling or unable
to take advantage of and benefit from the substance-abuse services offered. Frey, 297 Mich App
at 248.
IV. TERMINATION IS IN THE CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS
Respondents argue that the trial court erred in terminating their parental rights to GJD and
ARD children because it was not in their best interests. We disagree.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the trial court’s findings that termination is in a child’s best interests for clear
error. White, 303 Mich App at 713.
B. RESPONDENT-MOTHER
“Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” Olive/Metts, 297
Mich App at 40. “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d
182 (2013). “In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider
the child’s bond to the parent[;] the parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” Olive/Metts,
297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “The trial court may also consider a parent’s history
of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption.” White, 303 Mich App at 714. The trial court “should weigh all the evidence available
to it.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015). “The focus
at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent-mother’s
parental rights was in GJD’s and ARD’s best interests. White, 303 Mich App at 713. Francoeur
testified that the children did not have a bond with respondent-mother. Respondent-mother had
an “unhealthy relationship” with ARD which included respondent-mother “looking to the child for
approval, age-inappropriate conversation, which seemed parentified in nature and at times focused
on her, rather than the child.” The children’s desire not to have contact with respondent-mother

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demonstrates the lack of bond between the children and respondent-mother. Although respondent-
mother believed that she had a “perfect bond with [ARD],” and she felt a bond with GJD, the
record demonstrated that neither GJD nor ARD had any visits with respondent-mother in over a
year because they did not want any contact with her. The trial court found respondent-mother’s
testimony to be not credible. Thus, the evidence showed that the bond between respondent-mother
and the children was not healthy for GJD or ARD, which weighs in favor of termination. White,
303 Mich App at 714.
Respondent-mother’s parenting ability likewise weighed in favor of termination. Id.
Respondent’s physical abuse of GJD initially led to the trial court’s involvement in this case. “The
doctrine of anticipatory neglect recognizes that [h]ow a parent treats one child is certainly
probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App 249, 259;
952 NW2d 544 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Accordingly,
how respondent-mother treated GJD was indicative of how she may treat ARD, especially in light
of her failure to benefit from the parenting classes. Id. Although she participated in parenting
classes to improve her parenting ability, according to Francoeur, respondent-mother failed to
establish benefit from the classes. She also failed to participate in the parent-partner program.
Respondent-mother had the responsibility to demonstrate having benefited from the services.
MJC, 349 Mich App at 61. Additionally, respondent-mother’s parenting ability was concerning
in light of her visitation history with ARD. Before the visits with ARD were suspended,
respondent-mother repeatedly engaged in inappropriate conversations such as telling ARD that
she did not need to love her foster parents and making promises to ARD about when she would
come home. This indicates a lack of awareness about how this would affect ARD.
Respondent-mother’s visitation history weighs in favor of termination. White, 303 Mich
App at 714. Her parenting visits were suspended for GJD because he refused to have contact with
respondent-mother and GJD’s therapist recommended that the visits be suspended. After ARD
displayed signs of stress, including nightmares and outbursts, in the times surrounding parenting
visits, the parenting visits with ARD were suspended. With respect to respondent-mother’s
visitation history with ARD before the visits were suspended, her attendance and participation
were positive, but respondent-mother repeatedly engaged in inappropriate conversations including
making promises to ARD about when she would come home.
Meanwhile, both GJD’s and ARD’s need for permanency, stability, and finality weighed
in favor of termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The caregiver was willing to
continue providing care to the children and was open to the possibility of adoption. White, 303
Mich App at 714. ARD had special needs including autism spectrum disorder, ADHD, anxiety,
and avoidant restrictive food intake disorder, which required long-term care by a stable individual.
GJD was in treatment for anxiety and depression, and his needs were being met in the foster
placement. GJD was engaged in sports, which were therapeutic to him. The caregiver was meeting
GJD’s and ARD’s medical and emotional needs. ARD struggled with her behaviors and outbursts,
but the frequency and duration of ARD’s tantrums lessened after her hospitalization in April 2024.
According to Francoeur, respondent-mother was unable to care for the children’s special needs.
Thus, the advantages of the foster home over the parent’s home also weighed in favor of
termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.

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Respondent-mother’s failure to comply with the mental-health portion of her case service
plan also weighs in favor of termination. White, 303 Mich App at 714. Respondent-mother was
ordered to complete the parent-partner program and individual therapy, which she failed to do.
Respondent-mother did not follow the recommendation from her psychiatric evaluation to take
medications for her mental-health diagnoses. Instead, respondent-mother denied that she still had
mental-health issues and that she needed medication after 2022. Respondent’s success in obtaining
housing, which was part of the case service plan weighs against termination. Id.
The trial court determined that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in
GJD’s and ARD’s best interests. The trial court considered the lack of bond, respondent-mother’s
parenting ability, compliance with her case service plan, GJD’s and ARD’s special needs that were
being met by the caregiver, and the children’s need for permanency. As the trial court properly
considered the best-interest factors in concluding that termination was in the children’s best
interests and used the evidence produced to conclude those factors favored termination, the trial
court did not clearly err in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. White, 303 Mich App
at 709.
C. RESPONDENT-FATHER
Termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
Id. at 713. Although respondent felt bonded with GJD and ARD, there was evidence
demonstrating that this bond was unhealthy. Francoeur testified that the children did not have a
bond with respondent-father. When discussing respondent father, ARD stated, “[Respondent-
father] brings up bad memories too.” The best-interest assessment for respondent-father revealed
an “unhealthy relationship between [respondent-father] and [ARD].” In a conversation with ARD
for the best-interest assessment, respondent-father’s behavior “seemed odd, emotionally
manipulative, inappropriate and concerning in nature, as it seemed to be repeatedly seeking for a
response.” Thus, the trial court’s determination that there was no bond was not clearly erroneous.
Id. This weighed in favor of termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
Respondent-father’s parenting ability likewise weighed in favor of termination. Id.
Respondent-father’s substance abuse affected his ability to parent, which he recognized at the
adjudication trial. Respondent-father admitted that he had been “panhandling” with GJD and
ARD. Additionally, respondent-father’s failure to gain income or employment demonstrates that
he was unable to provide for the children’s basic needs, which is an essential parenting skill.
Although respondent-father completed parenting classes, which were an opportunity to improve
his parenting ability, he failed to establish benefit from them. Because he failed to benefit from
substance-abuse treatment and parenting classes, his parenting ability continued to be concerning.
As explained above, respondent-father had the responsibility to demonstrate that he benefitted
from the services provided. Frey, 297 Mich App at 248.
Contrary to respondent-father’s assertions, he failed to comply with the substance-abuse
part of his case service plan. Additionally, respondent-father failed to obtain a legal source of
income, which he was ordered to do. This weighed in favor of termination. White, 303 Mich App
at 714.

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As discussed above in the context of the children’s best interests related to respondent-
mother’s parental rights, both GJD’s and ARD’s need for permanency, stability, and finality
weighed in favor of termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. Comparing the advantages
of the foster placement over respondent-father’s home, Francoeur explained that respondent-father
was unable to care for the children’s special needs. Particularly, respondent-father did not have
his substance-abuse issues under control, which was essential to being able to deal with ARD’s
emotional needs. Accordingly, the advantages of the foster home over respondent-father’s care
also weighed in favor of termination. Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
Respondent argues that GJD and ARD were “not going to be adopted.” Respondent-father
further asserts that GJD’s and ARD’s special needs are too intense, DHHS “had difficulty finding
placement for both kids,” and GJD was “on the delinquency docket.” There is no evidence in the
record that supports respondent-father’s contention that the children were having difficulty being
placed, that GJD was on a delinquency docket, or that the children were not able to be adopted.
Rather, the caregiver indicated that she was “willing to keep both children in her home . . . .” Thus,
this likewise weighs in favor of termination. White, 303 Mich App at 714.
The trial court considered the best-interest factors in determining that termination of
respondent-father’s parental rights was in GJD’s and ARD’s best interests, and used the evidence
produced to conclude those factors favored termination. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly
err when it determined that it was in GJD’s and ARD’s best interests for respondent-father’s
parental rights to be terminated. Id. at 713-714.
Affirmed.
/s/ Daniel S. Korobkin
/s/ Adrienne N. Young
/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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