COA 378646 IN RE BENNIE JOHNSON SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST Opinion - Per Curiam - Unpublished 9/16/2026

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
In re BENNIE JOHNSON SPECIAL NEEDS
TRUST.
TERI A. JORDAN, Special Fiduciary,
Appellee,
UNPUBLISHED
September 16, 2026
12:21 PM
v No. 378646
Wayne Probate Court
TAISHA JOHNSON, Guardian, LC No. 2014-802682-TV
Appellant.
Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and GARRETT, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Taisha Johnson, appeals by leave granted1 the order suspending her as the
guardian of BJ and appointing Siporin & Associates as BJ’s temporary guardian. We reverse and
remand.
I. FACTS
In 2011, BJ suffered a traumatic brain injury as the result of a motor vehicle accident. BJ’s
sister was appointed as his conservator and guardian that same year.2 Thereafter, BJ lived with his
sister, and even though Taisha is BJ’s biological daughter, BJ’s sister adopted her. Taisha also
serves as BJ’s primary caretaker. In 2014, a special needs trust was established for BJ and BJ’s
sister was appointed as trustee.
1 In re Bennie Johnson Special Needs Trust, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
February 9, 2026 (Docket No. 378646).
2 The guardianship action is Wayne County Probate Court Docket No. 2011-768694-GA and the
conservatorship action was Wayne County Probate Court Docket No. 2014-802682-TV.

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Years later, BJ’s sister was diagnosed with dementia, and in March 2025, Taisha was
appointed as BJ’s guardian in the guardianship case. Months later, BJ’s sister was suspended as
BJ’s fiduciary in this trust case and the court appointed Teri A. Jordan, appellee, as a special
fiduciary on July 30, 2025.
In October 2025, Jordan filed a petition for instruction in this trust case. In part, Jordan
alleged that BJ’s sister had improperly withdrawn $45,000 from an estate account which had not
been used for BJ’s care. Further, Taisha had told Jordan that BJ’s sister failed to consistently pay
her and other caregivers for their services. Instead, BJ’s sister gave money to other family
members who did not provide care for BJ. According to Taisha, BJ’s sister compensated Taisha
by paying her rent and energy bill in addition to $750 per week for the daily care Taisha provided
to BJ from 6 a.m. until noon and from 4 p.m. to midnight. Taisha also told Jordan that BJ’s other
caregivers were: (1) Taisha’s 18-year-old son, who worked from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m., (2) Taisha’s
15-year-old daughter, who worked from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m., and (3) BJ’s sister’s adult son, who
worked a full-time job and provided care for BJ from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Jordan was “aghast” at
this duplicative schedule and the involvement of a minor child. Jordan secured a case manager to
assess BJ’s needs.3 Jordan also opined that Taisha had a conflict of interest as BJ’s guardian and
the primary payee of care-provider services.
Jordan sought removal of BJ’s sister as trustee, amendment of the trust to allow for the
appointment of a successor trustee, and to have BJ’s sister return the $45,000. Jordan also asked
the court to opine on the appropriateness of BJ’s care providers, the appropriate room-and-board
rate for BJ’s care, and “direction regarding the appropriateness of the Guardian[’]s court-imposed
duties coupled with the conflicting duties of a care provider.”
It appears that a hearing was scheduled in response to a request for an emergency hearing.4
The hearing notice was dated November 25, 2025, and the hearing was scheduled for the next day.
On the morning of the hearing, Taisha’s attorney appeared and filed a written objection to
Jordan’s petition for instruction and moved to strike or disregard the case manager’s report.
Taisha’s attorney specifically objected to the court (1) determining that there was an inherent
conflict in serving as both a caregiver and guardian because Michigan recognized the benefit of
having relatives provide in-home care, (2) opining on BJ’s current placement, (3) determining that
3 After meeting with BJ, Taisha, Taisha’s son, and BJ’s sister, the case manager proposed either
moving BJ to a facility specializing in providing care for patients with traumatic brain injuries or
buying a home modified to BJ’s needs where he would receive 24/7 attendant care services. If
BJ’s current placement continued, the consultant recommended that Taisha give up either her
guardian or caregiver role due to the “inherent conflict in this type of arrangement[.]”
The case manager discovered that the vehicle modified to transport BJ had license plates that had
expired over a year ago. And that Taisha could not provide names for BJ’s medical specialists or
pharmacy except for his primary care physician. The case manager observed that BJ’s sister’s
presence agitated BJ and that BJ’s sister “diverted” “the attention of caregivers paid to provide his
care[.]”
4 Not all of the documents reflected in the register of actions have been provided for our review.

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institutional placement was appropriate, and (4) relying on the case manager’s unreliable and
biased recommendation. In fact, there was no emergency as to the trust that required the court’s
immediate action.
At the hearing, a special conservator who had been appointed for BJ’s sister reported that
Adult Protective Services (APS) had received a complaint regarding financial exploitation of BJ’s
sister in August of 2025. That is when the guardianship and conservatorship petitions were filed
as to BJ’s sister. The APS investigation was ongoing and an APS worker contacted the special
conservator for BJ’s sister on November 25, 2025 to report that there was no food in BJ’s sister’s
home. BJ’s sister’s special conservator coordinated having a Kroger gift card provided. BJ’s
special conservator opined that it was concerning that Taisha had called her the prior week to
discuss BJ’s sister’s inability to access her bank accounts but never mentioned the lack of food. It
was also reported that others were driving BJ’s sister to various banks, where BJ’s sister demanded
access to her funds. BJ’s sister had income from Social Security, a pension, investments, and a
separate rental property. Moreover, several of BJ’s sister’s family members, including Taisha
were driving vehicles owned by BJ’s sister despite BJ’s sister’s special conservator being unaware
of whether BJ’s sister drove. Moreover, BJ’s sister’s special conservator had received a delinquent
bill on the vehicle Taisha used.
Taisha’s attorney argued that she had received the emergency petition for instruction at
about 4 p.m. on November 25 and filed an answer at 8:30 a.m. before the hearing that began at
9:42 a.m. Taisha’s attorney asserted that there was no emergency in this trust case and that the
required statutory notice had not been provided to all interested parties. Further, there was no
conflict of interest when a guardian received fees for providing services and the case manager’s
report was unreliable. In fact, Taisha had provided care for BJ for 14 years without issue and she
continued to provide care for BJ despite not being paid for five months.
Jordan did not dispute that matters had gone smoothly before BJ’s sister’s incapacitation.
After BJ’s sister’s incapacitation, however, Taisha had told Jordan that addressing the issues which
arose necessitated Taisha calling the police and APS. Regardless, Jordan had received funds that
could be used to pay Taisha for what had been reported to her to be three months of nonpayment
for BJ’s care. Nevertheless, the care currently being provided for BJ was not safe or beneficial.
Instead, it was volatile with the police and APS being called and Taisha not being paid and having
received an eviction notice. Additionally, BJ might not have a home if his sister was unable to
remain there with her husband due to their dementia. And Taisha’s daughter, a minor should not
be paid for services. Moreover, no tax forms were provided to document the payments made to
any of BJ’s care providers. Although these matters did not involve managing the trust’s finances,
Jordan described this as “an emergency situation” that she “would be remiss [for] not bringing this
situation to” court. Frankly, Taisha, as BJ’s guardian, should have brought this information to the
court.
Taisha’s attorney responded that the references to APS and the police were “speculative”
and “unfounded[] hearsay.” After Jordan’s appointment, there was no ongoing exploitation of
BJ’s funds. If there was an emergency with respect to BJ’s guardianship, then a petition could be
properly brought in the guardianship case to address it. At best, the court could limit who was
paid for caregiving services. Taisha’s attorney even agreed that Taisha’s daughter, as a minor,
could not be paid as a caregiver. Even so, that decision was made by BJ’s sister, not Taisha.

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Taisha’s attorney then asked the court to set the matter for a full evidentiary hearing if it was not
inclined to deny Jordan’s petition for instruction.
The probate court observed that it was concerned about minors serving as caregivers as
well as a person who worked a full-time day job serving as the nighttime caregiver on top of the
APS investigation. The court decided that it would rule on the surcharge motion as to BJ’s sister
the following week.
Taisha’s attorney then asked the court to review the objections she had filed that morning.
The court responded that it had listened to her argument; however, the attorney again asked the
court to review Tasha’s objections before it issued its opinion. The court said that it was moving
forward and appointing a temporary guardian.
Taisha’s attorney interjected that the petition at issue did not pertain to the guardianship
but was a petition for instruction as to the trust. The attorney added that before any modification
of BJ’s guardianship, a guardian ad litem needed to be appointed.5 Taisha’s attorney again asked
to make a record, which the trial court permitted.
Taisha’s attorney repeated that the petition for instruction in the trust case could not affect
the guardianship case. Instead, such relief had to be properly pled under the applicable statute and
appointment of a guardian ad litem was required. Taisha’s attorney thereafter repeated the
arguments made in her objections to Jordan’s petition for instruction.
Jordan clarified that she had not asked the court to modify the trust. Instead, she had asked
the court to opine on: (1) the appropriateness of the caregivers, who were compensated from the
trust, (2) the propriety of BJ’s current room-and-board costs in his sister’s home, and (3) the
guardian’s court-imposed duties given her “conflicting duties” as a care provider.
The court then reviewed Taisha’s written objection. The court decided:
The court, on its own, is suspending temporarily the Fiduciary[6] [Taisha].
And I am appointing [an attorney] to represent the Ward [BJ], the proposed Ward.
5 MCR 5.408(B) provides:
(1) If a petition for modification or written request for modification [of the
guardianship] comes from the legally incapacitated individual and that individual
does not have an attorney, the court shall immediately appoint an attorney.
(2) If a petition for modification or written request for modification comes from
some other party, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem. If the guardian ad
litem ascertains that the legally incapacitated individual contests the relief
requested, the court shall appoint an attorney for the legally incapacitated individual
and terminate the appointment of the guardian ad litem.
6 MCL 700.1104(e) provides that a guardian is a fiduciary.

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I’m also appointing, as a Temporary Fiduciary, to go out and do a complete
assessment, based on my concerns of what was stated on the record today regarding
minors being involved as the care giver, and the concern about the brother [sic
nephew] who works all day, that is the care giver at night.
I’ll set it for . . . January 14th at 10:30, to have a full hearing. This is only a
Temporary Guardianship. I’ll appoint Sapporn & Associates to go out and
investigate[.]
Taisha’s attorney asked if she could object to that appointment. The court explained that
that entity would be appointed for now and that could be changed later. Taisha’s attorney then
asked whether the temporary guardian could remove BJ from his sister’s home. The court ruled
that BJ would stay in his sister’s home and could only be removed after a petition was filed. Even
so, the court wanted to ensure that there were adequate funds for BJ’s food, electricity, and other
necessities. Taisha’s attorney then informed the court that while it was in recess, Taisha had sent
her about eight photographs showing that the refrigerator and cabinets in BJ’s sister’s home were
fully stocked directly contradicting what was reported by BJ’s sister’s special conservator. The
court said it would “deal with that at the next hearing[.]”
Consistent with its ruling on the record, the court entered an order adjourning the petition,
suspending Taisha as guardian, and appointing Siporin and Associates as the temporary guardian
to investigate. That same day, Taisha filed an emergency motion for reconsideration to vacate the
order suspending her as guardian and appointing a temporary guardian, and for Taisha to be
immediately reinstated as BJ’s guardian.
On December 1, 2025, Taisha filed an emergency motion to stay the probate court’s order
suspending her as guardian and appointing a temporary guardian pending appeal. Four days later,
the probate court stayed its November 26, 2025 order and reinstated Taisha as BJ’s guardian until
further order of the court.7
On December 12, 2025, Taisha filed an application for leave to appeal with motions for
immediate consideration and peremptory reversal in this Court, challenging the probate court’s
November 26, 2025 order. This Court granted the motion for immediate consideration, denied the
motion for peremptory reversal, granted the application for leave to appeal, and expedited the
appeal. In re Bennie Johnson Special Needs Trust, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals,
entered February 9, 2026 (Docket No. 378646).
II. ANALYSIS
Taisha argues that her removal as BJ’s guardian violated the Estates and Protected
Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., and due process. We agree that reversal is
warranted.
7 No order addressing Taisha’s motion for reconsideration is contained the probate court file
provided to this Court.

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A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Several standards of review are utilized in probate cases. This Court reviews
the probate court’s dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion. A probate court
abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable
and principled outcomes. We review the probate court’s findings of fact for clear
error. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when this Court is left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We review de novo any statutory
or constitutional interpretation by the probate court. [In re Guardianship of
Gerstler, 324 Mich App 494, 507; 922 NW2d 168 (2018) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).]
B. DISCUSSION
Taisha argues that the court lacked statutory authority to appoint a temporary guardian
where there was no showing that she was not effectively performing her duties and that BJ’s
welfare required immediate action. Taisha also argues that her due-process rights were violated
because appropriate notice was not given by the probate court.
The constitutions of Michigan and the United States provide that no person shall be
deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” US Const Am XIV; Const
1963, art 1, § 17. In part, procedural due process requires “notice and an opportunity to be
heard. . . .” Cary Investments, LLC v Mount Pleasant, 342 Mich App 304, 315; 994 NW2d 802
(2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The procedural due process required varies
depending on the type of action, as well as the potential risks and costs, and the interests affected.
In re Bell, 341 Mich App 596, 607; 991 NW2d 251 (2022).
The hearing notice in the trust case identified it as being about Jordan’s “EMERGENCY
PETITION FOR INSTRUCTION.” Further, Jordan’s administrative assistant emailed the
hearing’s participants advising them to “disregard the Notice of Hearing previously sent for the
Petition to Modify Guardianship as it was sent in error. . . .” Jordan’s assistant’s email added:
“There is only one matter scheduled regarding [BJ] tomorrow.” That matter was Jordan’s petition
for instruction.
In Jordan’s petition for instruction, Jordan asked the probate court to opine on whether
there was potentially a conflict of interest between Taisha’s roles as both a primary caregiver and
a guardian, on “the appropriateness of the in-home care rendered to [BJ],” seemingly focused the
cost of the number of caregivers and their overlapping schedules, the minor status of one caregiver,
and BJ’s sister’s dementia and its effect on BJ’s care in her home.
Both guardianship and trust proceedings are within the probate court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction. MCL 700.1302(b) and (c). But EPIC contains separate articles governing
guardianships for incapacitated individuals, MCL 700.5301 et seq., and trusts, MCL 700.7101 et
seq. Under MCL 700.5311,
(1) In a proceeding for the appointment or removal of an incapacitated
individual’s guardian, other than the appointment of a temporary guardian or

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temporary suspension of a guardian, or to designate a standby guardian or change
the designated standby guardian, notice of hearing must be given to each of the
following:
(a) The ward or the individual alleged to be incapacitated and that
individual’s spouse, parents, and adult children.
(b) A person who is serving as the guardian or conservator or who has the
individual’s care and custody.
(c) If known, a person named as attorney in fact under a durable power of
attorney.
(d) The standby guardian or the person nominated to be designated as
standby guardian.
(e) If no other person is notified under subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d), at
least 1 of the individual’s closest adult relatives, if any can be found. [Emphasis
added.]
In turn, MCL 700.5312 provides:
(2) If an appointed guardian is not effectively performing the guardian’s duties and
the court further finds that the legally incapacitated individual’s welfare requires
immediate action, the court may appoint, with or without notice, a temporary
guardian for the legally incapacitated individual for a specified period not to exceed
6 months.
(3) A temporary guardian is entitled to the care and custody of the ward, and the
authority of a permanent guardian previously appointed by the court is suspended
as long as a temporary guardian has authority. A temporary guardian may be
removed at any time. A temporary guardian shall make reports as the court
requires. In other respects, the provisions of this act concerning guardians apply to
temporary guardians. [Emphasis added.]
On appeal, Jordan contends that the probate court acted properly after it concluded that
Taisha was “not effectively performing the guardian’s duties” and that BJ’s “welfare required
immediate action[.]” In Jordan’s view, MCL 700.5312(2) is clear that the probate court may
properly make such a decision without notice. Id. See also MCL 700.5311(1). Consequently, in
Jordan’s view, there can be no due process violation because any opportunity to be heard would
be satisfied by the future full hearing scheduled by the probate court.
But it strikes us as odd that the probate court could make both of the required findings in
its November 26th8 order, and a mere five business days later stay that order and further order that
8 The Thanksgiving holiday was on the 27th and the court was closed for two days.

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Taisha be reinstated as BJ’s guardian. Notably, the probate court also initially ruled that BJ would
remain in his sister’s home and that BJ could only be removed after a petition was filed. And even
though the trial court specifically expressed concern over the minor and nighttime caregivers, it
did not remove them. Instead, the probate court ordered the special fiduciary to investigate, assess
the situation, and set the next hearing date seven weeks later.
Nor do the parties dispute that BJ required 24/7 attendant care after his accident in 2011.
Taisha had only recently assumed BJ’s sister’s role as BJ’s guardian and was BJ’s primary
caregiver. Taisha purportedly continued the rotation of care providers as instituted by BJ’s sister.
And Taisha and the others continued to care for BJ even though they were not paid consistently.
Taisha also reported BJ’s sister’s actions to Jordan, talked to BJ’s sister’s special conservator, and
sought the intervention of the police to address issues in BJ’s sister’s home that affected BJ. These
are not the actions of a guardian shirking their duty.9
During the hearing, the court also expressed concern about whether there were adequate
funds for BJ’s food, electricity, and other necessities. The court’s subsequent trust order, which it
later stayed, included the condition that “[f]unds are to be supplied for food to be furnished in the
home.” Significantly, Taisha attempted to challenge BJ’s special conservator’s previously
undisclosed report that APS discovered that there was no food in BJ’s sister’s home. During a
recess, Taisha sent her attorney eight photographs of BJ’s sister’s fully stocked refrigerator and
cupboards. When told about these photographs, the court said that they could be presented during
the future hearing. This along with the notice provided to Taisha about the limited nature of the
hearing in the trust case demonstrates that Taisha was prejudiced by the lack of due process.
In sum, when the probate court opted to sua sponte temporarily suspend Taisha as BJ’s
guardian, it expressed specific concerns and directed the special fiduciary to investigate. It did
not, however, remove BJ from his sister’s home, which had been modified to address his needs.
Instead, the court left BJ in his current living situation for 50 days, maintaining the status quo until
the next hearing. On this record, we conclude that the probate court clearly erred when it
determined that Taisha was “not effectively performing the guardian’s duties” and that BJ’s
“welfare required immediate action” under MCL 700.5312(2).
In any event, reversal is also required because Taisha’s suspension as guardian and the
appointment of a temporary guardian occurred during a proceeding in the trust case, not in the
ongoing probate court guardianship case. Stated otherwise, although the order appealed here was
entered in the trust case, after a hearing in the trust case on the special fiduciary’s petition for
9 The probate court did not directly address Jordan’s request to opine on whether there was a
conflict of interest in Taisha serving both as a guardian and BJ’s primary caretaker. We recognize
that a conflict of interest may arise if a guardian has dual roles that interfere with their ability to
make objective decisions in the best interests of the ward. But, as already discussed, BJ’s care
arrangements had been in place, Taisha continued to care for BJ even when she was not being
compensated, and Taisha continued to work with both the special trustee for BJ and the special
conservator for BJ’s sister to address issues affecting his care.

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instruction regarding certain financial matters, the order’s actual import was on the guardianship
case.
Our state’s “ ‘collateral bar’ rule generally prohibits a litigant from indirectly attacking a
prior judgment in a later, separate action . . . .” In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 22; 934 NW2d 610
(2019). If a litigant is prohibited from later attacking a prior judgment in a separate action, it
logically follows that a court cannot make a ruling that would be appropriate in one action in a
separate action.
MCR 2.602(D) supports this conclusion by requiring that a “signed judgment or order must
be placed in the case file.” “The” is a definite article reflecting that signed order must be placed
in the case file from which it arises, not just any case file. See Hanton v Hantz Fin Servs, Inc, 306
Mich App 654, 664; 858 NW2d 481 (2014). In this case, had the probate court entered an order
to suspend Taisha as BJ’s guardian in a completely unrelated proceeding, it would have plainly
erred. Likewise, the fact that the instant trust case was related to the guardianship case is
insufficient to circumvent the requirement that an order be entered in the correct case.
Moreover, regardless of whether the probate court had the authority to enter the order it
did in the guardianship case, the probate court’s decision to do so in the trust case had due process
implications. In probate court proceedings, the “interested persons” are entitled to receive notice
of certain hearings. See MCR 5.102 (“A petitioner, fiduciary, or other moving party must cause
to be prepared, served, and filed, a notice of hearing for all matters requiring notification of
interested persons.”); MCL 700.1401(1). And, even if, as argued by Jordan, the probate court had
properly suspended Taisha and appointed a temporary guardian under MCL 700.5312(2), the
interested persons would have been entitled to receive service of the order appealed after its entry.
See MCR 5.107(A) (“The person who obtains an order from the court must serve a copy of the
order on interested persons.”). As defined in EPIC, an interested person
includes, but is not limited to, the incumbent fiduciary; an heir, devisee, child,
spouse, creditor, and beneficiary and any other person that has a property right in
or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected
individual; a person that has priority for appointment as personal representative;
and a fiduciary representing an interested person. Identification of interested
persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the
particular purposes of, and matter involved in, a proceeding, and by the supreme
court rules. [MCL 700.1105(c).]
MCR 5.125 further defines interested parties in certain probate cases but does not specifically
address the suspension of a guardian or appointment of a temporary guardian.10 But such service
10 “The persons interested in a petition for the modification or termination of a guardianship or
conservatorship or for the removal of a guardian or a conservator are “(a) those interested in a
petition for appointment under subrule (C)(20) [guardians appointed for a minor], (22) [7-day
notice of acceptance of appointment as a guardian under MCL 700.5301], (23) [persons interested
in an appointment for an alleged incapacitated individual in this state or another state], or

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would have afforded the interested persons due process in the form of, among other things, the
opportunity to file related petitions. See MCR 5.119(A) (“An interested person may, within the
period allowed by law or these rules, file a petition and obtain a hearing with respect to the
petition.”). And, in this case, the “interested persons” in the trust case seemingly differ from those
in the guardianship case.11 As this Court explained in In re Rhea Brody Living Trust, 325 Mich
App 476, 486; 925 NW2d 921 (2018), vacated in part on other grounds 504 Mich 882 (2019):
Read in concert, MCL 700.1105(c) and MCR 5.125 demonstrate that the interested-
person inquiry is decidedly flexible and fact specific. The identity of the interested
persons can change not only over time but also depends on the nature of the
proceedings and the relief requested.
Because the order appealed was apparently entered in only the trust case, not the guardianship
case, some of the interested persons in the guardianship case would never be duly served with it.
Thus, the probate court’s disputed action could well have served to deny those parties due process
by depriving them of both notice and any reasonable opportunity to be heard on this matter.
Moving forward, the issues pertaining to BJ’s guardianship should be heard and addressed in the
probate court guardianship case to ensure that the proper interested parties are notified.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Anica Letica
/s/ Michelle M. Rick
/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
(25) [persons interested in an application for appointment of a conservator for a protected
individual in this state or another state], as the case may be, and (b) the guardian or conservator.”
MCR 5.125(C)(26).
11 We take judicial notice of the records in both the trust and guardianship cases available on the
Wayne County Probate Court’s website. <https://public.wcpc.us/eservices/> [click “I Accept –
Click Here” under Case Search, click “Case Number,” enter case number “2014-802682-TV” and
“2011-768694-GA”] (accessed September 16, 2026). See MRE 201.

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