In re Ballot Challenge in Election of Town of Clifton Select Board Member — 2026 ME 42

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 	Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 	2026 ME 42
Docket: 	SJC-26-4
Decided: 	May 4, 2026
Panel: 	STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, DOUGLAS, LIPEZ, and TAUB, JJ.
IN RE BALLOT CHALLENGE IN ELECTION OF TOWN OF CLIFTON SELECT
BOARD MEMBER
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
[¶1] 	Pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 696(1) (2026), the Town of Clifton has
submitted a petition forwarding, along with related materials, an affidavit from
Gregory Newell challenging two absentee ballots cast in an election for a
one-year position on the Town’s Select Board. Because the ballots could affect
the election result, we have original jurisdiction to determine their validity and
sit as the trial court. See id.; In re Ballot Dispute in Election of Town of Winslow
Dist. 3 Town Councilor, 2018 ME 2, ¶ 2, 176 A.3d 1290. We dismiss the petition
because the affidavit does not contain sufficient information that, if true, could
invalidate a ballot.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] The Town’s petition recites the following facts. On March 24, 2026,
the Town held a municipal election for, among other things, the Select Board
position at issue here. The candidates for the position were Steve Armenia and

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Cynthia Grant. 	Before the polls closed, the Town Clerk and Election Warden
(one person holds both positions) received and accepted absentee ballots from
two named voters. As a result of a clerical error, the Town did not count those
absentee ballots in determining the results of the election that night. The Town
announced and certified the results as 114 votes for Grant and 113 votes for
Armenia.
[¶3] The Clerk/Warden discovered the clerical error the morning after
the results were announced. On March 27, 2026, the Town resumed counting
ballots to include the two absentee ballots. Newell, a member of the public who
was present, stated that he wished to challenge the ballots, and he completed
an affidavit challenging both ballots. 	See 21-A M.R.S. § 673 (2026). 	Acting
pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 696(1), which applies if the validity of a challenged
ballot may affect the election result, the Town submitted to the Executive Clerk
of the Supreme Judicial Court materials that included Newell’s affidavit, a
“challenge certificate,” 	and 	the 	absentee 	ballots 	sealed 	in 	their 	original
envelopes. Id.; 21-A M.R.S. § 673(1), (3).
[¶4] Newell’s affidavit is a handwritten document that, after listing the
names of the two voters challenged, reads as follows with respect to the nature
of the challenge:

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Reason of the challenge of the eligibility to cast this vote
(1) 	Did not properly apply for an absentee ballot
(2) 	Additional information why this shouldn’t be cast
753-B-2 Restriction on issuing ballot
2E To any candidate, except for the candidate’s own ballot
* 	753-B 1 Subsection 7
No additional information is given as to the factual basis of the challenge.
Newell signed the affidavit, and a notary public signed it below his signature.
There is no jurat.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] “A voter of a municipality or an election official may challenge the
right of another to vote at an election in that municipality.” 21-A M.R.S. § 673;
see also 21-A M.R.S. § 757 (2026) (stating that an “absentee ballot may be
challenged the same as a regular ballot under section 673”). A challenger must
submit an affidavit that states, among other things, “the reason the particular
individual being challenged may be ineligible to vote” and “the specific source
of the information or personal knowledge upon which the challenge of the
particular individual is based.” 	21-A M.R.S. § 673(1). 	Newell’s affidavit
references 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(2)(E) (2026), which provides that “[t]he clerk
may not issue an absentee ballot . . . [t]o any candidate, except for the
candidate’s own ballot.” 	There is nothing in the affidavit, however, that
explains how that provision applies to the facts of this election or why the two

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named individuals may be ineligible to vote. The affidavit also refers to section
“753-B 1 Subsection 7.” Without any facts, however, we are unable to discern
the meaning of that reference, whether it is to 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(1) or 21-A
M.R.S. § 753-B(7).1 	More specifically, Newell does not specify any facts to
explain (1) how the identified voters did not properly apply for absentee ballots
or (2) how there was a violation of the restriction on issuing to a candidate a
ballot other than the candidate’s own.2 	See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 673(1)(A)(5),
753-B(1), (2)(E), (7).
[¶6] 	We note that in addition to a lack of any factual basis for the
challenge, the affidavit is defective in other ways. 	Section 673(1) requires a
challenger to include in the affidavit, signed “under oath administered by the
warden, the challenger’s name, address, party affiliation, status as a registered
voter in the municipality, the name of the voter challenged, . . . and a statement
that the challenger understands that making a false statement on the affidavit
is punishable under penalties of perjury.” 	21-A M.R.S. § 673(1). 	Here, the
affidavit lacks an oath administered by the Warden, a jurat, a statement of the
1 There is no 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(1)(7).
2 	Section 673(1)(A) refers to challenges lodged on the basis that a “voter is unqualified” for
specific reasons that do not expressly include improper actions by election officials. Because we
dismiss the petition as insufficient, we need not determine the precise scope of this section.

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challenger’s status as a registered voter in the municipality, and a statement
that the challenger understands that making a false statement on the affidavit
is punishable under penalties of perjury.3
[¶7] 	By statute, Newell had an obligation to provide an appropriate
affidavit setting forth the factual basis for the voters’ ineligibility and the source
of the information demonstrating that ineligibility. 	21-A M.R.S. § 673(1).
Because he did not do so, we dismiss the petition and decline to invalidate the
ballots, which must be counted. See id. § 696(1).
[¶8] The submission is DISMISSED.
Dated: May 4, 2026
/s/
VALERIE STANFILL
Chief Justice
/s/
ANDREW M. MEAD
Associate Justice
/s/
CATHERINE R. CONNORS
Associate Justice
3 	See Paradis v. Webber Hosp., 409 A.2d 672, 674-75 (Me. 1979) (holding that a statutory
requirement that a document be “under oath” is the “essential equivalent” of a requirement that it be
“sworn to”); Pineland Lumber Co. v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 33, 37-39 (Me. 1978) (holding that a statutory
requirement that a document be “sworn to” requires the document to show on its face that it was
properly verified on oath).

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/s/
RICK E. LAWRENCE
Associate Justice
/s/
WAYNE R. DOUGLAS
Associate Justice
/s/
JULIA M. LIPEZ
Associate Justice
/s/
CHRISTOPHER C. TAUB
Associate Justice