In the Matter of Broadway Services

In the Matter of Broadway Services, Inc., No. 1299, Sept. Term 2023. Opinion by
Arthur, J.

APPEALABILITY—FINAL JUDGMENTS—REMAND TO AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY

When a circuit court remands a case to an administrative agency, the question of whether
the remand is a final, appealable judgment often depends on whether the remand precedes
judicial review or whether the remand follows or results from judicial review. Generally,
remands preceding judicial review are not final judgments, and remands following or
resulting from judicial review are final judgments.

In this case, the circuit court remanded a case to the Maryland Tax Court, an
administrative agency, on the ground that the agency had not adequately articulated the
basis for its conclusion. The remand did not clearly precede or follow judicial review.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the remand was a final, appealable judgment.
The circuit court did not remand the case for further factual development. Neither party
requested the remand; rather, the court ordered the remand on its own motion. The
circuit court engaged in judicial review in the colloquial sense: it asked many questions
that went to the merits of the case, it disposed of an independent legal theory that would
have necessitated dismissal of the action, and it attempted to limit the discussion of the
merits to those issues that were still pending. Finally, the court judged the agency’s
decision to be defective in a technical, if not a substantive, sense in that the court believed
that the agency had not adequately articulated the basis for its decision.

APPEALS—LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

The law of the case doctrine dictates that, once an appellate court rules upon a question
presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts are bound by that ruling.

In this case, the Comptroller of Maryland argued that the Supreme Court of Maryland, in
a previous opinion, rejected the taxpayer’s theory that it was reselling cleaning supplies
to hospitals and should be entitled to a tax refund.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the Supreme Court did not rule on the reseller
theory and that the Court’s comment on that theory was not the law of the case. The
Court did not enunciate a holding with respect to the reseller theory in the “Conclusion”
section of its opinion. Additionally, the Court invoked Md. Rule 8-131(a) to address a
different issue that was not properly before it. It did not do so with respect to the reseller
theory.
TAX-GENERAL ARTICLE § 11-101—INTENTION TO RESELL TANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTY

Maryland imposes a sales and use tax on a retail sale in the State. The Tax-General
Article excludes a sale of tangible personal property from the definition of retail sale if
the buyer intends to resell the property in the form that the buyer receives or is to receive
the property.

In this case, the taxpayer purchased cleaning supplies and equipment in connection with
contracts under which it provided janitorial services to three hospitals. The taxpayer
argued that its purchases of supplies and equipment were not subject to sales and use tax
because it was reselling the supplies and equipment to the hospitals. The tax court
disagreed and rejected the taxpayer’s request for a tax refund.

The Appellate Court of Maryland held that the circuit court should have affirmed the tax
court’s judgment. There was substantial evidence before the tax court to support its
conclusion that the taxpayer did not resell the cleaning supplies and equipment.
Witnesses testified that the supplies and equipment did not show up as line items in any
monthly invoices that the taxpayer sent to the hospitals for the provision of management
services. Moreover, there was no evidence that the taxpayer ever submitted resale
certificates, which certify that a business is acquiring tangible personal property for the
purpose of resale, with its purchases of cleaning supplies and equipment. A reasoning
mind could find that the contracts were contracts for the provision of services, one of
which includes the provision of cleaning supplies and equipment, rather than contracts
for the resale of tangible goods.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. C-02-CV-23-000019

REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 1299

September Term, 2023
______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF
BROADWAY SERVICES INC.

______________________________________

Nazarian,
Arthur,
Zarnoch, Robert A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Arthur, J.
______________________________________

Filed: May 2, 2025

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.

2025.05.02
'00'04- 15:47:11
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
This is an appeal from an order by which the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel

County remanded an action for judicial review to the tax court because the circuit court

was unable to discern the basis for the tax court’s decision.

For the reasons stated herein, we conclude, first, that the remand order is a final

judgment and, thus, that we have appellate jurisdiction. We further conclude that the

circuit court erred in remanding the case to the tax court. Finally, we conclude that

substantial evidence supported the tax court’s decision on the sole issue before it.

Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case

with instructions to enter a judgment affirming the tax court’s decision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Comptroller’s Audit

This case has already generated reported opinions from both of Maryland’s

appellate courts: Broadway Services, Inc. v. Comptroller, 478 Md. 200 (2022) (Broadway

II); and Comptroller v. Broadway Services, Inc., 250 Md. App. 102 (2021), aff’d, 478

Md. 200 (2022) (Broadway I). In the present appeal, the appellant is the Comptroller of

Maryland; the appellee is a taxpayer, Broadway Services, Inc.

Broadway is a for-profit corporation that is wholly owned by a subsidiary of Johns

Hopkins University and the Johns Hopkins Health System. Broadway provided services

at three hospitals in the Johns Hopkins Health System. Those services include

housekeeping, security, and property and facilities management.

As part of its contracts with the hospitals, “Broadway provided janitorial

management, including furnishing cleaning supplies to the hospitals, managing overall
operations, and supervising janitorial staff.” Broadway II, 478 Md. at 210. Broadway’s

obligations “included ‘provid[ing] cleaning supplies and equipment to [the hospitals’]

personnel performing housekeeping duties in and about the facility.’” Id. at 210-11.

“Third-party vendors assessed sales tax on Broadway’s purchases of cleaning supplies[.]”

Id. at 211. Broadway paid the tax. Id.

“The vendors shipped the cleaning supplies directly to the hospitals for use by the

hospitals’ janitorial staff.” Id. Broadway’s employees did not clean the hospitals. Id.

Instead, “Broadway supervised the cleaning operations, inspected the work done by

janitorial staff, and ensured the janitorial staff correctly completed the work Broadway

assigned.” Id.

The hospitals and Broadway agreed upon an annual price for Broadway’s services,

and the hospitals paid Broadway in twelve monthly installments, each totaling one-

twelfth of a lump-sum figure. Id. The contracts with the hospitals and Broadway’s

monthly invoices “did not contain an itemized breakdown of the costs, such as the

specific costs of the cleaning supplies or of Broadway’s management expenses.” Id. Nor

were the payments adjusted based on the actual costs incurred. Id. “Instead, any

additional expenses above the agreed-upon annual rate factored into the following year’s

calculation.” Id.

The Comptroller audited Broadway for the period from December 1, 2007,

through November 30, 2011. As a result of the audit, the Comptroller assessed $9,073.93

in sales and use taxes. In response, Broadway asserted that it was actually entitled to a

tax credit and refund of $76,161.96 because, it said, the Comptroller “improperly”

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assessed sales tax on “services and products purchased for resale,” which are exempt

from taxation. See Maryland Code (1988, 2022 Repl. Vol.), § 11-101(h)(3)(ii)(1) of the

Tax-General (“TG”) Article (stating that the term “[r]etail sale” “does not include . . . a

sale of tangible personal property . . . if the buyer intends to . . . resell the tangible

personal property”). Those products, according to Broadway, were the cleaning supplies

and equipment that Broadway purchased for use by the hospitals’ housekeeping

personnel.

The Comptroller denied Broadway’s request; Broadway petitioned for judicial

review of the decision in the Maryland Tax Court. 1

B. The Tax Court’s Decision

The case reached the tax court in 2017. There, Broadway reiterated its assertion

that it had purchased the cleaning supplies and equipment for resale to the hospitals,

making them tax-exempt purchases under TG § 11-101(h)(3)(ii)(1).

In addition to claiming an exemption as a reseller of the supplies and equipment,

Broadway told the tax court that it had acted as an agent of the hospitals, which are

exempt from the sales tax. Broadway argued that, as the hospitals’ agent, it too was

exempt from the tax.

Near the conclusion of its closing argument in the tax court, Broadway briefly

mentioned John McShain, Inc. v. Comptroller, 202 Md. 68 (1953). John McShain holds

1
“The Tax Court is an adjudicatory administrative agency in the executive branch
of state government.” Comptroller v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147, 160 (2013), aff’d, 575 U.S.
542 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Comptroller v. FC-GEN
Operations Investments LLC, 482 Md. 343, 358 (2022).

3
that “building materials, purchased by an intermediary contractor for use in constructing

a building for a tax-exempt entity, were exempt from sales and use tax because the

building materials were incorporated into the realty of the physical structure, and the

exemption at issue emphasized the use of the property and not the exemption status of the

user.” Broadway II, 478 Md. at 228 (citing John McShain, Inc. v. Comptroller, 202 Md.

at 74). By analogy to John McShain, Broadway argued that the cleaning supplies and

equipment that it purchased for use by tax-exempt entities—the hospitals—should also be

exempt from sales and use tax.

The tax court found in favor of Broadway. As is apparently the custom in that

court, the judge delivered a brief and extemporaneous oral opinion that did not contain

explicit findings of fact or conclusions of law. 2

The tax court “ruled, without explanation, that Broadway’s purchases did not

satisfy the reseller exemption.” Id. at 212. 3 The court agreed, however, that Broadway

was acting as the hospitals’ agent when it purchased the supplies and equipment. The

court did not mention John McShain.

2
Under the contested cases subtitle of the Administrative Procedure Act, a final
decision or order in a contested case must contain separate statements of findings of fact
and conclusions of law. Md. Code (1984, 2021 Repl. Vol.), § 10-221(b)(1) of the State
Government Article. The contested cases subtitle does not, however, apply to the tax
court. Id. § 10-203(a)(3)(vi).
3
The substance of the tax court’s express analysis of the issue is a single sentence
in which it said, “I’m not going to call [the supplies and equipment] resold to [the
hospitals].” Id. at 229.

4
The Comptroller pursued judicial review of the tax court’s decision. On judicial

review, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County affirmed. The Comptroller noted an

appeal to this Court.

C. Broadway I

On appeal to this Court, the only question presented was whether the tax court

erred when it determined that Broadway was the hospitals’ agent. Broadway I, 250 Md.

App. at 109. This Court ruled that the tax court did err in finding an agency relationship.

Id. Consequently, we reversed the tax court’s decision. Id.

In arguing against reversal, Broadway had asserted that, even if it was not the

hospitals’ agent, we could still affirm the tax court’s decision “based on the reseller

theory that the Tax Court rejected.” Id. at 132. In response, we noted that the tax court

had “expressly considered and rejected Broadway’s reseller argument” and that it would

have been “inappropriate” to affirm the tax court’s decision “on the grounds that the

evidence could have supported a finding that the reseller exemption applied.” Id. at 133

(emphasis in original). We also noted that we could not uphold the tax court’s decision

unless it was sustainable on the tax court’s findings and for the reasons stated by the tax

court—i.e., we could uphold the decision only on the agency theory, which we had

rejected. Id.

We went on to question whether Broadway had the right to judicial review of the

tax court’s rejection of its reseller argument. We observed that, “[b]y statute, only ‘a

party who is aggrieved by the final decision’ ‘is permitted to seek judicial review.’” Id.

at 134 (quoting Md. Code (2014), § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article).

5
Nonetheless, we questioned “whether Broadway could have preserved the reseller issue

by filing a conditional cross-petition for judicial review” after the Comptroller put

Broadway’s status as a non-aggrieved party into jeopardy by filing its petition for judicial

review. Id.

“Given the novelty of the issue and the absence of any briefing on [the] topic,” we

concluded that “Broadway should not be foreclosed of the right to seek judicial review of

the Tax Court’s rejection of its reseller theory.” Id. at 134-35. Thus, we remanded the

case to the circuit court “with instructions to vacate the final decision of the tax court and

remand the case to the tax court with instructions to enter a new final decision denying

Broadway’s petition for a tax refund.” Id. at 135. By directing the tax court “to enter a

new final decision,” we contemplated that Broadway would have the right to seek judicial

review of the new decision in order to challenge the tax court’s rejection of its reseller

argument.

D. Broadway’s Petition for Certiorari

Broadway petitioned for a writ of certiorari on two issues:

1) Where tangible personal property is purchased by an intermediary
contractor for the use of a non-profit charitable institution in carrying on
its exempt purpose, are those purchases exempt from Maryland sales
and use tax in light of John McShain, Inc. v. Comptroller, [202] Md. 68
(1953) under Md. Code § 11-204 of the Tax-General Article?

2) Were the Maryland Tax Court’s factual findings supported by
substantial evidence such that the purchases in question are exempt
from Maryland sales and use tax?

6
Maryland’s highest court, now known as the Supreme Court of Maryland, granted

the petition on both issues. The Court did so even though neither the tax court nor this

Court had considered the first issue, involving John McShain.

Neither the petition nor the grant of certiorari encompassed the reseller issue.

E. Broadway II

On certiorari, the Court affirmed the judgment of this Court.

The Court began with the agency issue. Like this Court, the Court held that the

tax court “erred in concluding that Broadway acted as an agent of the hospitals when it

purchased cleaning supplies.” Broadway II, 478 Md. at 210; see also id. at 227 (stating

that “the Tax Court erred in deciding that Broadway, acting as an agent to the hospitals,

should not have been charged sales and use tax[]”). 4

Turning to the issue of John McShain, the Court acknowledged that it could not

affirm the tax court on that basis because the tax court did not rely on John McShain in its

ruling. Id. at 228. The Court concluded, however, that “reaching the issue [was] in the

interest of judicial efficiency[.]” Id. In support of that conclusion, the Court cited

Maryland Rule 8-131(a), which states, in pertinent part, that an appellate court can

consider an issue not raised in or decided by the trial court if “necessary or desirable to

guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”

4
The Court added that “an agency relationship alone is insufficient for the agent to
claim the principal’s tax-exempt status.” Broadway II, 478 Md. at 227. “For a tax-
exemption to apply, the underlying act performed by the agent must still fit within an
exemption set forth in the Maryland Code, and the parties to the agency relationship must
comply with the procedures and requirements set forth in the Maryland Code when
claiming a tax exemption.” Id. at 227-28.

7
Before explaining why it would reach the John McShain issue, the Court discussed

the limited scope of appellate review of agency decisions. The Court wrote that “the

reviewing court ‘may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s

findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.’” Id. at 229 (quoting United

Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679

(1984)). The Court recognized that Broadway had briefly mentioned John McShain in its

closing argument before the tax court, but it said that the tax court’s “oral findings of fact

and conclusions [did] not appear to be based on the McShain holding.” Id.

The Court then discussed the tax court’s ruling with respect to the reseller

exemption. The Court wrote:

The transcript shows that the Tax Court, without citing to the reseller
exemption directly, dismisses the applicability of the exemption by noting
that the Comptroller “was complaining [that Broadway] talked about
agency. . . awfully late in the game. But, [from] my perspective it seems to
be the only thing that make[s] sense.” After considering each agency factor
separately, the Tax Court continued, “[i]t’s not a clear-cut decision, . . . But
I’m going to suggest that these items were—I’m not going to call them
resold to [the hospitals]. They were purchased as agents for [the hospitals]
for the benefit of [the hospitals] so that they should not have been charged
sales tax.”

Id.

Next, the Court discussed the reseller theory and John McShain in tandem:

The Tax Court’s findings are devoid of direct analysis and conclusions
pertaining to the reseller exemption and clearly demonstrate that, from the
Tax Court’s perspective, the agency theory was the only viable theory to
support refunding the sales tax Broadway paid for its cleaning supplies
purchases. Under this Court’s general method of reviewing agency
decisions, we cannot affirm the Tax Court’s decision on McShain grounds
because the Tax Court did not rely on McShain to reach its conclusion. We
decline to substitute our own judgment for that of the Tax Court, especially

8
regarding the applicability of the reseller exemption, which is within the
Tax Court’s ambit and therefore entitled to deference. Frey [v.
Comptroller], 422 Md. [111,] 138, 29 A.3d 475 [(2011)].

Id. at 230.

The meaning of the final sentence of that paragraph—in which the Court stated

that it would not “substitute [its] judgment for that of the Tax Court, especially regarding

the applicability of the reseller exemption”—is a central issue in this appeal. 5

The Court completed its discussion of John McShain and ultimately found that any

“similarities between McShain and the facts at hand . . . do not withstand scrutiny.” Id. at

233. The Court declined to extend John McShain on this occasion. Id.

In the section of the opinion titled “Conclusion,” the Court reiterated its holdings

in specific terms. The Court “h[e]ld that the Tax Court erroneously conducted its agency

analysis as a matter of law.” Id. at 234. Additionally, the Court “h[e]ld that McShain

cannot serve as a proper basis to affirm the Tax Court” because the tax court based its

decision solely on agency principles and not “on Broadway’s theory of the reseller

exemption or this Court’s holding in McShain.” Id. Finally, the Court held that, even if

the John McShain arguments were properly before it, it “would not affirm [the tax court’s

decision] on those grounds[.]” Id. The Court affirmed the judgment of this Court.

5
To the extent that the Broadway II Court was referring to deferring to the tax
court’s conclusions of law, that statement is no longer authoritative. In Comptroller v.
FC-GEN Operations Investments LLC, 482 Md 343, 358 (2022), the Court held that, “in
connection with judicial review of a Tax Court decision in which a party alleges an error
of law, where the reviewing court determines that it is appropriate to give a degree of
deference to an agency’s interpretation of tax laws, the agency to [which] deference is
owed is the Comptroller, as the agency responsible for administering the tax laws and
promulgating regulations for that purpose, not the Tax Court.”

9
F. Remand to the Tax Court

On remand, the case returned to the tax court, which denied Broadway’s petition

for a sales and use tax refund in a one-sentence order. The tax court did not further

explain its rationale for rejecting Broadway’s contention that it had resold the supplies

and equipment to the hospitals.

Broadway petitioned for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel

County.

G. The Circuit Court’s Decision

The circuit court convened a hearing to consider the petition for judicial review.

At the hearing, the court allowed both parties to present arguments about the reseller

issue.

Broadway argued that “the only possible application of the facts to the statute”

leads to the conclusion that Broadway was purchasing the cleaning supplies and

equipment to resell them to the hospitals. The circuit court asked Broadway several

hypotheticals about the reseller theory.

After Broadway answered the circuit court’s hypotheticals, the court asked

Broadway if it agreed that the “Tax Court[,] without any explanation[,] says Broadway’s

purchase didn’t qualify for the reseller [exemption.]” Broadway replied that it disagreed

with the proposition that the tax court ruled on the merits of the reseller exemption at all,

calling that idea “a fiction the Appellate Courts adopted.” The circuit court replied that it

did not necessarily agree with Broadway’s interpretation of the appellate courts’

reasoning, but that it did agree that the tax court did not “in this last reiteration . . .

10
actually address the reseller exemption.” The circuit court opined that the tax court

rejected the reseller theory “without . . . telling [the court] why.”

When the Comptroller rose to present its argument, the court immediately asked

whether there was anything “for [the court] to review[.]” The Comptroller responded that

the tax court “does give us some indication of what it’s thinking.” For example, the

Comptroller observed, the record reflected that the relevant contracts required Broadway

to “provide” (rather than sell) the supplies and equipment to contractual employees who

were under Broadway’s supervision, and the contracts do not describe the transactions as

a “sale.” The Comptroller emphasized that, in the tax court, Broadway did not present

invoices evidencing a sale of the supplies and equipment. In addition, the Comptroller

argued that Broadway did not produce resale certificates, which certify that a business is

acquiring tangible personal property for the purpose of resale. See TG § 11-408(b)(1).

The Comptroller argued that the circuit court could uphold the tax court’s decision on

these bases, given that “all we have to find here is that there was substantial evidence in

the record to support the judge’s conclusion.”

The circuit court disagreed. The court said that its role was not to weigh evidence

from the record, but rather “to look at[]” the tax court’s decision and “the basis upon

which [it] made [its] decision.” The court acknowledged that the Comptroller had

“pick[ed] items out of the testimony” that would support the tax court’s conclusion, but

told the Comptroller that “there’s just as much or ample testimony on the other side[.]”

The court ultimately decided that it needed more information before it could

decide whether to affirm or reverse the tax court. Although neither party asked it to do

11
so, the court remanded the case to the tax court “with instructions to explain its factual

findings and legal reasoning which formulated the basis of the denial of Broadway’s

refund based on the reseller exemption.” The court concluded the hearing by stating: “I

don’t disagree that there’s ample [evidence] within the record for which [the tax court]

might be able to make [its] findings. But I think you need to know what [the findings]

are and we don’t know what they are.” 6

On several occasions during the hearing, the Comptroller invoked “the law of the

case,” a doctrine that provides that, “once an appellate court rules upon a question

presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling[.]” Scott v.

State, 379 Md. 170, 183 (2004); accord Holloway v. State, 232 Md. App. 272, 279

(2017). The Comptroller contended that that doctrine precluded Broadway from

relitigating the reseller issue because, the Comptroller said, the Broadway II Court had

decided that the reseller exception did not apply. In support of that contention, the

Comptroller cited the Court’s statement, “We decline to substitute our own judgment for

that of the Tax Court, especially regarding the applicability of the reseller exemption,

which is within the Tax Court’s ambit and therefore entitled to deference.” Broadway II,

478 Md. at 230. The circuit court was unpersuaded that the Broadway II Court had

affirmed the tax court’s rejection of Broadway’s reseller theory.

6
The parties observed that the tax court judge who decided the case in 2017 is no
longer with the court—and, in fact, only one of the judges who was on the court in 2017
was still on the court at the time. Consequently, to comply with the directions on
remand, a judge who had not heard the case in 2017 would be required to review the
record and to discern and articulate the bases for a former judge’s opinion.

12
After the circuit court remanded the case to the tax court, the Comptroller noted a

timely appeal to this Court.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Comptroller presents two questions for our review, which we quote:

1. Did the circuit court err when it remanded this case to the Tax Court
when the Supreme Court of Maryland had already raised the resale issue
sua sponte and declined to reverse the Tax Court ruling that the cleaning
supplies and equipment were not resold to the hospitals[?]

2. Did sufficient evidence in the record support the Maryland Tax Court’s
decision that the resale exclusion did not apply to Broadway’s purchases
of tangible personal property, thereby obviating the need to remand the
matter to the Tax Court[?]

For the reasons that follow, we reject the factual premise of the first question,

because it assumes that the Broadway II Court decided the resale issue when this case

was before it in 2022. We agree, however, that the tax court’s conclusion, that Broadway

did not resell the cleaning supplies and equipment to the hospitals, is supported by

substantial evidence. Consequently, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court

and remand the case with instructions to affirm the tax court’s decision.

DISCUSSION

A. Appealability

Before addressing the questions presented on appeal, we must decide an issue that

neither party raised: whether the circuit court order remanding the case to the tax court is

a final, appealable judgment. “Because the absence of a final judgment may deprive a

court of appellate jurisdiction, we can raise the issue of finality on our own motion.”

13
Zilichikhis v. Montgomery County, 223 Md. App. 158, 172 (2015). We conclude that the

order was a final judgment.

1. Final Judgments

In general, a party may appeal only “from a final judgment entered in a civil or

criminal case by a circuit court.” Maryland Code (1974, 2020 Repl. Vol.), § 12-301 of

the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”). CJP § 12-101(f) defines a final

judgment as “a judgment, decree, sentence, order, determination, decision, or other action

by a court, including an orphans’ court, from which an appeal, application for leave to

appeal, or petition for certiorari may be taken.” “[A]s this definition implies, it is

ultimately for [the appellate courts] to decide which judgments or orders are final and

therefore appealable under section 12-301.” Cant v. Bartlett, 292 Md. 611, 614 (1982)

(citations and internal quotations omitted).

Among other things, a final judgment ordinarily “must be intended by the court as

an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy[.]” Metro Maint. Sys. South

v. Milburn, Inc., 442 Md. 289, 298 (2015) (citing Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41

(1989)). To constitute a final judgment, however, an order “need not resolve the merits

of a case[.]” Id. at 299. “Even if the order does not decide and conclude the rights of the

parties, it nevertheless will be a final judgment if it terminates the proceedings in that

court and denies a party the ability to further prosecute or defend the party’s rights

concerning the subject matter of the proceeding.” Id. (citing In Re Billy W., 386 Md. 675,

689 (2005); and Brewster v. Woodhaven Bldg. & Dev., Inc., 360 Md. 602, 610 (2000)).

14
“[T]he key question is whether the order contemplates that the parties will no longer

litigate their rights in that court.” Id.

2. Remands as a Result of or Following Judicial Review vs. Remands
Preceding Judicial Review

In this case, the order at issue is a remand from the circuit court to an

administrative agency. Although a remand to an agency “may appear to be non-final in

nature,” many remands are, in fact, final, appealable judgments. Id. at 301.

When deciding whether an order remanding a case to an agency is a final

judgment, Maryland’s appellate courts have distinguished between “those remands that

are a result of a circuit court’s judicial review and those remands that precede judicial

review.” Id. at 302. As a general proposition, remands following or resulting from

judicial review are final judgments, whereas remands preceding judicial review are not

final judgments:

[A] remand after a circuit court has conducted judicial review that
precludes the parties from further contesting or defending the validity of the
agency’s decision in that court—and leaves nothing further for the court to
do—is a final judgment. But not every remand to an agency terminates the
proceedings in the circuit court. That will often be the case when the
remand precedes any judicial review by the circuit court.

Id. at 304.

To illustrate what constitutes judicial review, it is perhaps easier to illustrate what

does not constitute judicial review. Three Maryland cases provide scenarios where

remands to an agency were not final because they preceded judicial review.

In Hickory Hills Limited Partnership v. Secretary of State, 84 Md. App. 677

(1990), the Secretary of State found that a developer had not complied with a promise to

15
spend a considerable sum on road improvements during a condominium conversion. The

developer petitioned for judicial review in the circuit court. Id. at 679. Days before

argument, the Secretary moved to remand the case so that he could take additional

evidence. Id. When the parties appeared in the circuit court, the court heard the

Secretary’s motion to dismiss and “did not consider the substance of the appeal.” Id.

The circuit court remanded the case, and the developer appealed.

On the developer’s appeal, this Court concluded that the decision to remand the

case was not appealable, because it preceded judicial review. We found it relevant that,

“[i]n granting the motion for a remand, the trial court expressly stated that it was not

‘getting into the merits of the case.’” Id. at 684. Additionally, we noted that the trial

court stated it was “not going to decide . . . [issues] [o]ther than the motion that’s before

the court.” Id. In other words, this Court ruled that the remand was not a final judgment

in part because the trial court expressly chose to ignore the merits of the case at oral

argument.

In Anne Arundel County v. Rode, 214 Md. App. 702 (2013), a crossing guard was

denied unemployment insurance benefits by the Board of Appeals of the Maryland

Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (“DLLR”). The crossing guard

petitioned for judicial review, naming both the DLLR and her employer as respondents.

Before any hearing in the circuit court on the merits of the DLLR’s decision, the

DLLR moved to remand the case. The DLLR represented that it “wished to check over”

the Board of Appeals’ opinion, and “if necessary, to fine-tune it.” Id. at 704. The

agency’s concern appears to have related to a discrepancy between the transcripts of the

16
proceeding and a recording of it. Id. at 706. The circuit court held a hearing solely on

the remand issue and ordered the remand at the close of the hearing. Id. at 704-05.

On the crossing guard’s appeal, this Court held that the remand order was not

appealable as a final judgment. We noted at the outset that the remand request came

“from the administrative agency itself[]” rather than the court or the aggrieved party. Id.

at 705. We also noted that the DLLR requested the remand and that the court ordered the

remand “before there had been any remote glimmer of consideration of the merits of the

contested unemployment benefits.” Id. at 705-06. We considered both facts “important

criteria in distinguishing . . . non-final orders from final ones.” Id. at 706. We concluded

by emphasizing that the appeal was premature because the court ordered the remand

“prior to any consideration of the merits by the circuit court and in response to a request

by the DLLR itself[.]” Id. at 715.

The facts of Metro Maintenance are quite similar to those of Rode. In Metro

Maintenance, a truck driver applied to the DLLR for unemployment benefits, alleging

that his employer had mistreated him because of racial animus. Metro Maint. Sys. South

v. Milburn, Inc., 442 Md. at 294. A DLLR hearing examiner denied the truck driver’s

request for benefits, and he appealed the decision to the DLLR Board of Appeals. Id.

The Board of Appeals declined to hear the appeal, “thereby adopting the decision of the

hearing examiner as its own decision[.]” Id. at 295.

The truck driver sought judicial review in the circuit court. Instead of answering

the truck driver’s memorandum with one of its own, the DLLR did what it did in Rode—

it moved to remand the case to the Board of Appeals so it could “review [its] decision in

17
the interest of ‘judicial economy.’” Id. at 296. The circuit court held a hearing, at which

“[t]here was no discussion of the agency record or the merits of the case.” Id. The court

remanded the case; the truck driver appealed; and in an unreported opinion, this Court

held that the remand was not appealable as a final judgment.

On certiorari, the Court affirmed our ruling, employing reasoning similar to ours.

In reaching its decision, the Court observed that “the work of the Circuit Court here is not

done.” Id. at 308. The Court added that “the remand order here contemplates that

judicial review awaits the return of the case following the remand.” Id. at 309. The

Court concluded that the remand order—“issued prior to any judicial review of the

agency’s decision, at the request of the Board and with consent of the party that sought

judicial review—[was] not a final, appealable judgment.” Id. at 311.

The Metro Maintenance Court drew a distinction between cases where remand

preceded judicial review and cases where a remand followed or resulted from judicial

review. Metro Maint. Sys. South v. Milburn, Inc., 442 Md. at 300-04. For example, in

Allen v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 188 Md. 290 (1947), the circuit court remanded a case to

the Workers’ Compensation Commission with instructions to recalculate the award using

the correct statutory formula. In Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Remson, 282

Md. 168 (1978), the circuit court held that the board had misinterpreted a statutory

exception and remanded the case for reevaluation of a claim for benefits in light of the

court’s interpretation of the law. In Department of Public Safety and Correctional

Services v. LeVan, 288 Md. 533, 543 (1980), the circuit court remanded a case to the

Sundry Claims Board for the reevaluation of a claim for compensation in light of factors

18
that the court identified and the court’s interpretation of the governing statute. And in

Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1 (1981), the circuit court remanded the case to a local zoning

board because the board had erred in considering evidence submitted after the end of the

hearing. “In each of these cases, [the] Court held that the remand order was an

appealable final judgment.” Metro Maint. Sys. South v. Milburn, 442 Md. at 304.

In summary, Metro Maintenance identified two relevant categories of cases: those

that are not appealable because no judicial review had occurred before the remand and

those that are appealable because the remand occurs after judicial review. This case,

however, does not fall squarely into either category. As Broadway aptly stated in

response to this Court’s request for additional briefing on the issue of whether the circuit

court’s order is appealable, “The case at bar presents a situation that does not clearly fit

any of the examples of final and non-final remands given in the Metro Maintenance

opinion.”

On one hand, this case resembles cases like Metro Maintenance, because the

circuit court envisioned that the dispute in this case would return to the court for further

judicial review once the tax court had done more to articulate the basis for its rejection of

the reseller exemption. In that sense, the remand in this case did not “preclude[] the

parties from further contesting or defending the validity of the agency’s decision in that

court” and “leave[] nothing further for the court to do[.]” Id. at 304.

On the other hand, this case is quite different from cases like Metro Maintenance,

because the circuit court did not remand the case for further factual development, as it did

in the cases in which the courts have held that a remand was not a final judgment.

19
Moreover, in contrast to those cases, where the agency sought the remand, the agency

(the tax court) is not a party to this case, and neither party to this case requested a

remand. Instead, the court ordered the remand on its own motion even though the parties

evidently thought that the record was adequate for the court to render its decision, and

even though the party who had sought judicial review—the Comptroller—opposed the

remand.

In addition, as Broadway concedes, the circuit court’s hearing on the merits of the

tax court’s decision “constitute[d] a ‘review’ in a colloquial sense.” In contrast to what

happened in cases like Metro Maintenance, the court in this case engaged in some

measure of judicial review before it remanded the case. For example, the court

considered and rejected the Comptroller’s argument that the Broadway II Court had

disposed of the reseller theory when it wrote that it “decline[d] to substitute its judgment”

for that of the tax court, “especially regarding the applicability of the reseller exemption.”

Had the circuit court decided that issue in the Comptroller’s favor, its decision would

have obviated the perceived need for any remand to the tax court.

Furthermore, the circuit court asked many questions that went to the merits of

whether Broadway resold the cleaning supplies and equipment to the hospitals. The

circuit court also asked the parties several questions to limit the discussion of the merits

to those that were still pending in light of the appellate courts’ decisions. Only after the

circuit court determined that it did not have enough information from the tax court to rule

on the resale issue did the court decide to remand the case.

20
Finally, although the circuit court did not pass judgment on the substance of the

tax court’s decision, one could say that the circuit court reviewed the form of the decision

and found it wanting on technical grounds. In essence, the circuit court remanded the

case because it concluded that the tax court had erred by inadequately articulating the

factual basis for its conclusion on the reseller issue. In that sense, the remand followed

judicial review.

In the unusual circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the circuit court’s

remand order is sufficiently final as to authorize the Comptroller’s appeal. The court

conducted judicial review before ordering the remand. Because the circuit court did not

envision an expansion of the factual record, the remand order in this case is quite

different from the orders that have been held to be unappealable in cases like Metro

Maintenance.

In the strictest sense, this appeal presents the question of whether the circuit court

erred in remanding the case on the ground that it was unable to ascertain the basis for the

tax court’s decision. We have jurisdiction to decide an appeal from such an order. 7

7
Although practical considerations do not determine whether an order is a final
judgment, those considerations would weigh in favor of concluding that the remand order
is appealable. As previously noted (see supra n.6), the judge who decided the case in
2017 is no longer with the tax court. Consequently, the remand order requires a different
judge—probably a judge who was not even on the tax court in 2017—to review the
record and to discern and articulate what the original judge meant. In our judgment, the
judges of this Court are as capable of performing that task as the tax court judge to whom
the task would fall were the case to be remanded. Moreover, in an action for judicial
review of an agency’s decision, the appellate court looks through any decision by the
circuit court and reviews the tax court’s decision. See, e.g., Gore Enterprise Holdings,
Inc. v. Comptroller, 437 Md. 492, 503 (2014). Thus, if we can discern the basis for the

21
B. The Law of the Case Doctrine

The Comptroller argues that the law of the case doctrine “prohibits further

litigation of the resale issue in this subsequent appeal” because the Broadway II Court

“already stated” that the tax court’s resale decision should stand.

The Comptroller specifically cites the portion of the opinion that reads:

Under this Court’s general method of reviewing agency decisions, we
cannot affirm the Tax Court’s decision on McShain grounds because the
Tax Court did not rely on McShain to reach its conclusion. We decline to
substitute our own judgment for that of the Tax Court, especially regarding
the applicability of the reseller exemption, which is within the Tax Court’s
ambit and therefore entitled to deference.

Broadway II, 478 Md. at 230 (emphasis added).

The Comptroller argues that, based primarily on this language, the Broadway II

Court “squarely addressed the Tax Court’s findings that no resale occurred.” We

disagree.

“The ‘law of the case doctrine is one of appellate procedure’ that stands for the

principle that ‘[o]nce an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal,

litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law

of the case.’” MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki, 475 Md. 325, 382 (2021) (quoting Garner v.

Archers Glen Partners, Inc., 405 Md. 43, 55 (2008)). The doctrine is based on the

principle that “litigants cannot try their cases piecemeal.” Fidelity-Baltimore Nat’l Bank

& Trust Co. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 217 Md. 367, 371-72 (1958).

tax court’s decision and determine whether the tax court erred in any way, it would be
most efficient for us to do it now.

22
The Broadway II Court acknowledged that only one question was properly before

it: whether Broadway was acting as an agent of the hospitals when it purchased the

cleaning supplies and equipment. Broadway II, 478 Md. at 228. The reseller issue was

not before the Court—the Court had not granted certiorari to consider that exemption.

The Court had granted certiorari to consider the John McShain issue, but it ruled that that

issue, too, was not properly before the Court—in fact, the Court specifically stated that

John McShain was “not a basis upon which [it could] affirm the Tax Court’s decision[,]”

because that issue was not “‘[a] ground[ ] relied upon’ or an issue ‘encompassed in the

[tax court’s] final decision[.]’” Id. (quoting Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene v.

Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123 (2001)).

The Court proceeded to decide the John McShain issue even though that issue was

not properly before it. The Court said that it did so “in the interest of judicial efficiency.”

Id. It based its decision on Maryland Rule 8-131(a), which permits an appellate court to

decide an issue that was not “raised in or decided by the trial court” “if necessary or

desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”

Nowhere did the Court say that it would address the reseller issue.

The Comptroller’s argument turns on the meaning of the Court’s statement, “We

decline to substitute our own judgment for that of the Tax Court, especially regarding the

applicability of the reseller exemption, which is within the Tax Court’s ambit and

therefore entitled to deference.” Broadway II, 478 Md. at 230. Because the Court

“decline[d] to substitute [its] judgment” for that of the tax court and recognized that the

tax court’s conclusion was “entitled to deference,” the Comptroller interprets the Court’s

23
statement to mean that it tacitly affirmed the tax court’s rejection of the reseller

exception. We reject that conclusion for two reasons.

First, the “Conclusion” section of the opinion enunciates the Court’s holdings.

The Court held “that the Tax Court erroneously conducted its agency analysis as a matter

of law.” Id. at 234. The Court held “that McShain cannot serve as a proper basis to

affirm the Tax Court . . . .” Id. The Court held that “[e]ven if the McShain arguments

were properly before [the Court, it] would not affirm on those grounds . . . .” Id. The

Court identified no other holdings in its “Conclusion” section. Had the Court affirmed

the tax court’s rejection of the reseller theory, it undoubtedly would have said so in the

section of the opinion where it outlined its ruling in express terms.

Second, when the Court invoked Rule 8-131(a) to address issues that were not

properly before it, it did so only in reference to John McShain. Broadway II, 478 Md. at

228. In the related context of Rule 8-131(b), which limits the Supreme Court’s authority

to review the decisions of Maryland’s appellate courts, the Court has stated: “Case law

and common sense indicate that when we exercise the discretion afforded under

Maryland Rule 8-131(b)(1) to review a matter not raised in a petition for a writ of

certiorari or cross-petition, we say as much.” MAS Assocs., LLC v. Korotki, 475 Md. at

369. The Court did not “say as much” with respect to the reseller exemption. And

because the reseller issue was not raised in Broadway’s petition for writ of certiorari or

24
any cross-petition, the Court would have needed to state that it was exercising its

discretion to review that issue under Md. Rule 8-131(b), which it did not do. 8

The Court’s comment that it “decline[d] to substitute [its] own judgment for that

of the Tax Court, especially regarding the applicability of the reseller exemption,”

(Broadway II, 478 Md. at 230) served a different function from the one the Comptroller

proposes. The Court knew that the reseller issue would continue to be litigated, because

the Court affirmed the decision of this Court, which had allowed Broadway to seek

judicial review of the tax court’s rejection of the reseller theory if it so wished.

Broadway I, 250 Md. App at 135. By “declin[ing] to substitute [its] own judgment for

that of the Tax Court,” the Court refrained from interfering with Broadway’s ability to

pursue judicial review of its reseller theory.9

The Court’s discussion of the reseller theory is not the law of the case. Hence, we

shall proceed to the merits of the Comptroller’s appeal.

8
The Comptroller did not file a cross-petition for certiorari concerning this
Court’s determination that “Broadway should not be foreclosed of the right to seek
judicial review of the Tax Court’s rejection of its reseller theory.” Broadway I, 250 Md.
App. at 135.
9
At oral argument in Broadway II, Justice Biran asked counsel for the
Comptroller whether Broadway would be able to obtain judicial review of the John
McShain theory on remand should the Court not decide that issue. This line of
questioning suggests that the Court decided the John McShain issue because of the
possibility that Broadway might raise that issue in the future action for judicial review
this Court had authorized it to pursue. The John McShain issue had been fully briefed
and argued, and it was “in the interest of judicial efficiency” (Broadway II, 478 Md. at
228) for the Broadway II Court to decide the issue in order to limit the scope of any
subsequent action for judicial review and appeal.

25
C. The Merits of the Reseller Theory

TG § 11-101(h)(1)(i) defines a “[r]etail sale” as, among other things, “the sale of

. . . tangible personal property[.]” Maryland imposes a sales and use tax on “a retail sale

in the State” “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in” Title 11 of the Tax-General Article. TG

§ 11-102(a)(1).

One such exception is the resale exclusion. The Tax-General Article provides that

the term “‘[r]etail sale’ does not include . . . a sale of tangible personal property . . . if the

buyer intends to . . . resell the tangible personal property . . . in the form that the buyer

receives or is to receive the property[.]” TG § 11-101(h)(3)(ii)(1).

Broadway contends that its delivery of cleaning supplies and equipment to the

hospitals qualifies for the resale exemption because, it says, it “purchased these items

with the intent to transfer them to the Hospitals in unchanged form in exchange for

consideration.” Broadway argues that, because it “did not use the supplies (or even touch

them),” and because “the supplies went directly from the vendors to the Hospitals,” the

transactions do not qualify as retail sales.

The Comptroller argues that the tax court correctly rejected Broadway’s resale

exemption arguments. The Comptroller points out language in the contract between

Broadway and the hospitals that requires Broadway to “provide” the cleaning supplies

and equipment to the hospitals, not to sell the supplies and equipment to them. The

Comptroller also points out that Broadway “did not introduce any invoices showing that

it had sold the supplies to the Hospitals” and that Broadway did not “use any resale

certificates” indicating that it had the intent to resell the supplies to the hospitals.

26
Broadway argues in its brief that we are “precluded from scouring the record to

conjure reasons why the Tax Court could have rejected the reseller argument” because

“an administrative agency can only be affirmed for the reasons stated by that agency.”

(citing Classics Chicago, Inc. v. Comptroller, 189 Md. App. 695, 707 (2009)) (emphasis

omitted.) Broadway claims that, as a result, we are constrained to consider “what the Tax

Court actually said” when giving its oral opinion.

It is true that “in judicial review of agency action the court may not uphold the

agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency’s findings and for the reasons stated

by the agency.” United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO, Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679 (1984). Whether Broadway resold the cleaning supplies to the

hospitals, however, is a mixed question of fact and law—i.e., the product of the

application of legal principles to a discrete set of facts.

We “review the Tax Court’s mixed findings of fact and law for substantial

evidence in the agency record.” Comptroller v. Johns Hopkins University, 186 Md. App.

169, 181 (2009). We affirm the tax court’s mixed findings of fact and law if, “after

deferring to the Tax Court’s expertise and to the presumption that the decision is correct,

‘a reasoning mind could have reached the Tax Court’s conclusion.’” Id. (quoting NCR

Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. 118, 133-34 (1988)) (further internal citations omitted);

accord Tochterman v. Baltimore County, 163 Md. App. 385, 407 (2005) (stating that, in

applying the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court must determine whether a

reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion that the agency

reached). “Even if the Tax Court does not state the reasons for its decision, reversal is

27
not required ‘if the record discloses substantial evidence supporting the decision.’”

Comptroller v. Johns Hopkins University, 186 Md. App. at 181 (quoting Bethlehem Steel

Corp. v. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore Cty., 38 Md. App. 543, 546 (1978));

accord Siegel v. Comptroller, 186 Md. App. 411, 424 (2009). 10

There was substantial evidence before the tax court to support its conclusion that

Broadway did not resell the cleaning supplies and equipment. And, although the tax

court admittedly did not provide much detail when issuing its oral opinion concerning the

merits of the resale argument, its opinion makes clear that it rejected the argument for

two reasons: Broadway did not present monthly invoices evidencing sales to the

hospitals, and Broadway did not provide resale certificates to its vendors when

purchasing the cleaning supplies. Given the deference that we afford to administrative

agencies, we cannot say that the tax court erred in basing its decision on those two

factors.

First, witnesses testified that Broadway did not charge the hospitals separately for

the cleaning supplies and equipment, and the costs of the cleaning supplies and

equipment did not show up as line items in any monthly invoices that Broadway sent to

the hospitals. Broadway’s president, Pete Seidl, testified that Broadway presented an

annual budget to the hospitals. Then, Broadway billed the hospitals “one-twelfth of that

budget each month.” Besides cleaning supplies, the budget “includes salaries, benefits,

10
At oral argument, Broadway took the position that, on the evidence presented,
the tax court was required to find, as a matter of law, that Broadway was a reseller. Thus,
under Broadway’s view, we must affirm the tax court if there was any evidence from
which a reasoning mind could conclude that Broadway was not a reseller.

28
. . . equipment, and a management fee.” According to Mr. Seidl, Broadway does not

provide invoices to the hospitals for the cleaning supplies and equipment that the

hospitals receive every month, and Broadway does not charge separately for those

supplies and equipment.

Thomas Tartal, the Comptroller’s chief auditor, testified that, in his opinion, the

intention to resell tangible personal property in and of itself does not establish a resale.

Mr. Tartal testified that Broadway would also need to produce a resale certificate to its

vendors, stating that “they were going to resell that product.” Mr. Tartal said that

resellers must submit a resale certificate at the time of purchase: “[t]he vendor needs to

have that resale certificate on hand.” Mr. Tartal was not aware of any proof that

Broadway provided resale certificates to any vendors at the time of purchase.

Mike Kastendike, Broadway’s chief financial officer, testified that Broadway

does, in fact, issue resale certificates “on the fly” to different vendors. Mr. Kastendike

agreed with counsel for Broadway that throughout Broadway’s audit period it “used [its]

certificate for purchases in which [it] thought [it was] entitled to a resale exemption.”

Counsel for Broadway offered into evidence a blank resale certificate form, which

showed that Broadway has a sales and use tax registration number. The Comptroller

“agree[d]” that Broadway had such a registration number but objected to the form’s

admission because the certificate “wasn’t submitted to anyone.” The tax court admitted

the form into evidence “for what it’s worth.” Broadway did not offer any resale

certificates that it had actually provided to vendors in connection with its purchase of

cleaning supplies and equipment.

29
The tax court began its oral opinion by discussing the resale argument. The court

dismissed Broadway’s argument that it should not have to pay sales and use tax on its

purchases of the cleaning supplies and equipment. The court remarked that it did not

have any invoices to review, much less invoices indicating that the hospitals “purchased

the [supplies and equipment]” from Broadway. Nonetheless, the court found that it was

“pretty obvious” who “was billed directly” for the cleaning supplies and equipment. The

court “assume[d]” that all the invoices “say that Broadway purchased the [supplies and

equipment] with direct shipment to the hospital[s].” The tax court found that Broadway

and the hospitals maintained a relationship whereby all the services and supplies and

equipment were bundled together into one price that was then divided into twelve

payments a year because “this was most convenient to [the hospitals].”

The court found it relevant that Broadway never provided any resale certificates to

its vendors when purchasing the cleaning supplies and equipment. The court also found

that “[t]he problem would have been solved in some ways if the invoices from the

suppliers had mentioned [the hospitals are] the purchaser[s]” and if vendors “had a resale

certificate[.]” But, the court found, Broadway “didn’t do that.”

Based on the lack of itemized and monthly invoicing and the lack of any resale

certificates, the court rejected the proposition that Broadway resold the cleaning supplies

and equipment to the hospitals. We hold that “a reasoning mind could have reached the

Tax Court’s conclusion.” Comptroller v. Johns Hopkins University, 186 Md. App. at 181

(quoting NCR Corp. v. Comptroller, 313 Md. at 133-34) (further internal citations

omitted). The contracts look more like contracts for the provision of services, one of

30
which includes the provision of cleaning supplies and equipment, than like contracts for

the resale of tangible goods.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO
THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
ENTER AN ORDER AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE MARYLAND TAX
COURT. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE.

31