Dept. of Health v. Sheffield

Maryland Department of Health v. Jamal Lateef Sheffield, No. 1046, Sept. Term 2019.
Opinion filed on July 29, 2020, by Berger, J.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - TIMING

When a trial court issues an oral ruling that is subsequently memorialized in a written
order, a notice of appeal is timely if it has been filed within thirty days of the date upon
which the written order was entered on the docket by the clerk.

CRIMINAL LAW - POST CONVICTION PROCEEDING - COMPETENCE -
TRANSFER TO PERKINS HOSPITAL

Section 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article governing incompetency in criminal
cases refers to the competence of a “defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation
proceeding.” A post conviction proceeding is not a criminal case and a post conviction
petitioner is not a defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation proceeding.
Section 3-104 of the Criminal Procedure Article does not provide the statutory authority
for a circuit court’s grant of a post conviction petitioner’s motion to transfer from a
correctional facility to a psychiatric hospital operated by the Maryland Department of
Health for the purposes of achieving competency.

Assuming arguendo that a petitioner in a post conviction proceeding has the right to be
found competent, it does not necessarily follow that the trial court has the authority to
order the petitioner’s transfer to a psychiatric hospital. The Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services provides health care, including mental health services, to
inmates, and, if necessary, prisons may utilize the involuntary admissions provisions set
forth in Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 10-614 of the Health-General Article.

Absent statutory authority, the circuit court may not order the transfer of a post
conviction petitioner from a correctional institution to a psychiatric hospital operated by
MDH for the purpose of achieving competency.
Circuit Court for Prince George’s County
Case No. CT-96-1449X
REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1046

September Term, 2019
______________________________________

MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

v.

JAMAL LATEEF SHEFFIELD
______________________________________

Berger,
Wells,
Salmon, James P.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Berger, J.
______________________________________

Filed: July 29, 2020

Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document
is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson
2021-01-11 17:30-05:00

Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk
In 1997, Jamal Lateef Sheffield, appellant, was convicted of second-degree

murder, attempted first-degree murder, and two counts of use of a handgun in connection

with a felony or crime of violence, for which he received a life sentence.1 In 2018,

Sheffield, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and a Motion to

Transfer Sheffield to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”), an inpatient

psychiatric facility operated by the Maryland Department of Health (“MDH”). The

purpose of the transfer was the restoration of Sheffield’s competence in order to assist

counsel in his post conviction proceeding.

The trial court granted Sheffield’s motion to transfer. MDH moved to vacate the

trial court’s order transferring Sheffield, which the trial court denied. On appeal, MDH

presents the following single issue for our consideration:

Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
granting the motion to transfer Sheffield from a correctional
facility to MDH’s psychiatric facility.

For the reasons explained herein, we shall vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand

for further proceedings.

1
Sheffield was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted first-degree murder,
thirty years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder, and thirty years’ imprisonment for
each of the two counts of use of a handgun in connection with a felony or crime of
violence. The thirty-year sentence for second-degree murder was ordered to be served
consecutively to the sentence for attempted first-degree murder. One of the two
sentences for the handgun offense was to be served consecutively and the other
concurrently. The total sentence was life plus fifty years.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Following a jury trial, Sheffield was convicted of second-degree murder and

associated offenses on October 10, 1997. A notice of appeal was filed after Sheffield’s

conviction but was subsequently withdrawn. In 1998, Carol E. Chance, then-Chief of the

Collateral Review Division of the Office of the Public Defender (“OPD”), wrote a letter

to the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County indicating that she had been

asked to assist Sheffield in connection with “possible post conviction relief” and asked

that the clerk send her the docket entries for Sheffield’s case. The OPD did not file for

post conviction relief.

On April 13, 2016, Sheffield filed a pro se Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

The circuit court subsequently referred Sheffield’s petition to the Office of the Public

Defender on May 18, 2016. In late 2017 or early 2018, Sheffield sent a letter to the

circuit court.2 On May 8, 2018, the trial court sent a letter to the OPD requesting “that

you folks investigate this case.”

On December 27, 2018, Sheffield filed, through counsel, a Petition for Post

Conviction Relief and a motion seeking his transfer from Western Correctional Institute

to Perkins.3 Attached to the motion was a report from psychiatrist Dr. Solomon Meltzer.

2
The circuit court judge observed that the letter was received by the clerk on
December 15, 2017 but was not docketed until April 30, 2018. The circuit court
observed that the letter “candidly does not make sense and may indicate Mr. Sheffield
has some sort of mental health issues.”
3
The OPD assigned the case to panel attorney Lisa J. Sansone, Esq.

2
Dr. Meltzer diagnosed Sheffield with schizophrenia, noted that Sheffield was not taking

any medications at the time of his interview with Melzer, and commented that Sheffield

had been “non-compliant with psychiatric medications at various points in his

incarceration.” Dr. Meltzer expressed that, in his professional opinion, Sheffield was

“incompetent to stand trial.” Dr. Meltzer recommended that Sheffield be treated at

Perkins because it was his “understanding that Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center

provides treatment for incompetent inmates who require adjudication of post conviction

matters.” MDH, which was not a party to the post conviction action, was not served with

a copy of Sheffield’s petition or motion to transfer.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to transfer on June 20, 2019.4 MDH

was not notified of the hearing. The court heard testimony from Dr. Meltzer, who

testified that Sheffield was not competent to stand trial and “lack[ed] the ability to

participate in post conviction proceedings.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial

court found that it was “appropriate that we send [Sheffield] to Perkins.” The trial judge

issued an oral ruling granting the motion to transfer. The trial court’s grant of the motion

to transfer was docketed the same day. The court asked Sheffield’s counsel to provide a

written order for him to sign. Counsel subsequently provided the court with a written

order memorializing the previous oral ruling, and the court signed the written order on

June 24, 2019. The June 24, 2019 order required that Sheffield “be transferred from

4
At the hearing, the trial court referred to an “off the record conversation”
between the judge, the prosecutor, and counsel for Sheffield that had occurred the
previous week.

3
Western Correctional Institution to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital forthwith for treatment.”

On June 28, 2019, the trial court issued a subsequent order with an additional phrase.

Specifically, the June 28th order required that Sheffield be transferred to “Perkins

Hospital forthwith for treatment to restore competency for post conviction proceedings.”

Both the June 24, 2019 order and the June 28, 2019 order were entered by the clerk on

July 3, 2019.

On July 2, 2019, the prosecutor contacted the trial court via email and advised the

court that he had been contacted by Ms. Jo Anne Dudeck, Manager of Centralized

Admissions for MDH, who had advised him that Sheffield was “not being transported”

because the circuit court’s order “does not have language that the transfer is for a

Criminal Procedure Section 315 evaluation.”5 The parties agreed to two additional orders

for the circuit court to sign, and the trial court signed both orders on July 5, 2019. The

first provided:

The Court finds that:

1) That Mr. Sheffield is incompetent for his post conviction
proceedings and,

2) Because of a mental disorder, is a danger to self or the
person or property of another,

It is HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Maryland Criminal
Procedures Code, Section 3-106 and case law:

5
Ms. Dudeck is a Licensed Clinical Social Worker, not an attorney. Ms. Dudeck
acknowledged in her emails that “it is up to [the attorneys] what order you submit to the
court” and “[defense counsel] and the ASA and Judge can decide which order.”

4
1) that Mr. Sheffield is committed to Clifton T. Perkins
Hospital until the court finds that:

a) the defendant no longer is incompetent for his post
conviction proceedings; or

b) There is no reasonable possibility of a restoration to
competency.

THEREFORE, the Motion to Transfer is GRANTED, and Mr.
Sheffield is to be transferred from Western Correctional Institution
to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital forthwith for treatment to restore
competency for post conviction proceedings.

It is so ORDERED.

The other order entered by the trial court on July 5th was a form suggested by Ms.

Dudeck and was titled “Commitment to the Maryland Department of Health after a

Finding of Defendant’s Incompetency to Stand Trial and a Finding that by Reason of a

Mental Disorder or Mental Retardation the Defendant is a Danger to Self or the Person or

Property of Another (Criminal Procedure § 3-106).” This order appears to be the

standard form order used by most trial courts when committing an individual to MDH

pursuant to Md. Code (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), § 3-106 of the Criminal Procedure Article

(“CP”). Neither of the orders signed by the circuit court judge on July 5, 2019 were ever

docketed.

On July 11, 2019, MDH filed a motion titled Motion to Vacate Orders of June 28,

2019 and July 5, 2019. MDH argued that there was no statutory authority to support the

order of a competency determination, evaluation, or commitment in a post conviction

proceeding. Sheffield opposed the motion. Before the motion to vacate had been ruled

upon by the circuit court, on July 26, 2019, MDH noted an appeal of the four orders

5
granting the motion to transfer. On August 8, 2019, Sheffield filed a motion to dismiss

MDH’s appeal.6 MDH filed a response on August 16, 2019, and we denied the motion to

dismiss on September 3, 2019. Sheffield subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss

premised upon MDH’s delay in filing its brief. We granted MDH’s request for an

extension of time to file its brief and denied Sheffield’s motion.

DISCUSSION

In this appeal, MDH asserts that the trial court erred by committing Sheffield to

MDH because there is no statutory authority to support a commitment under the

circumstances presented in this case. As we shall explain, we agree.

First, we address Sheffield’s assertion that MDH’s July 26, 2019 appeal is

untimely. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-202(a), a “notice of appeal shall be filed within

30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” Sheffield

asserts that the trial court orally granted his motion to transfer on June 20, 2019 and that

the ruling was reflected in the electronic docket entry on the same day.7 Sheffield

6
Sheffield raised several arguments in his motion to dismiss, including that this
Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because there was no final judgment
below, that the appeal should be dismissed as untimely, and that MDH had no standing to
appeal because it was not a party to the proceeding below.
7
The electronic docket entry provides:

625 LA Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Mr.
Sheff[iel]d from WCI to Perkins Judge Green; CS-D2019
Witness/Exhibit list, filed Motion – Granted Defendant to be
transferred to Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Order to be
submitted by Counsel for Defendant Case is to be reset for

(Continued)
6
contends that the notice of appeal was due on or before July 20, 2019. We disagree. The

Court of Appeals explained in Byrum v. Horning, 360 Md. 23, 33 (2000), that “[i]t is the

entry of [a] separate document on the docket which constitutes the entry of the judgment .

. . and it is the date of that entry which commences the running of the time for noting an

appeal.” The trial court’s written orders dated June 24, 2019 and June 28, 2019 were

entered on the docket by the clerk on July 3, 2019. Furthermore, the electronic docket

entry cited by Sheffield in support of his assertion that the notice of appeal was untimely

specifically provides that an “Order [was] to be submitted by Counsel for Defendant.”

Because MDH’s notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of July 3, 2019, we reject

Sheffield’s assertion that the notice of appeal was untimely filed.

We, therefore, turn to the merits of MDH’s appeal and consider the issue of

whether the circuit court had the authority to issue an order transferring Sheffield from

Western Correctional Institute to Perkins. Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article

governs incompetency and criminal responsibility in criminal cases. The trial court’s

duties regarding competence determinations are outlined in CP § 3-104, which provides:

(a) If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case
or a violation of probation proceeding appears to the court to
be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges
incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on
evidence presented on the record, whether the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial.

Post Conviction Hearing before a judge Date to be set by the
office of Calendar Management

7
(b) If, after receiving evidence, the court finds that the
defendant is competent to stand trial, the trial shall begin as
soon as practicable or, if already begun, shall continue.

(c) At any time before final judgment, the court may
reconsider the question of whether the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial.

The statute specifically refers to a “defendant in a criminal case or violation of probation

proceeding” and requires that a court determine “whether the defendant is incompetent to

stand trial.” CP § 3-104(a). The statute permits a court to “consider the question” of a

defendant’s competence “[a]t any time before final judgment.” CP § 3-104(c).8

The case before us in this appeal is not a criminal case and does not involve a

criminal defendant. Rather, this appeal stems from Sheffield’s petition for post

conviction relief and accompanying motion to transfer. When Sheffield sought a transfer

to Perkins in order to obtain psychiatric treatment with the goal of attaining competency,

Sheffield was not a defendant in a criminal case. Sheffield, instead, was a petitioner in a

post conviction proceeding. A post conviction proceeding is not a criminal case. See

State v. Bundy, 52 Md. App. 456, 459 n.2 (1982) (“[A] post conviction proceeding is

deemed to be civil in nature[.]”); Maryland Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Kerr, 272 Md. 687, 689-90

(1974) (explaining that a post conviction proceeding “does not constitute part of the

original criminal cause, but is an independent and collateral civil inquiry into the validity

8
Indeed, the legislature could set forth a similar mechanism for the trial court’s
consideration of a petitioner’s competency in a post conviction proceeding if it were
inclined to do so.

8
of the conviction and sentence.”). This is not a situation in which, “before final

judgment,” questions arose about the competence of a “defendant in a criminal case or

violation of probation proceeding.” CP § 3-104(a), (c).

Sheffield points to no statutory authority that would support the trial court’s

transfer under the circumstances of this case.9 Rather, Sheffield points to a variety of

other sources that he asserts form the basis for the trial court’s authority to order his

transfer. Both parties discuss the United States Supreme Court case of Ryan v. Gonzalez,

568 U.S. 57 (2013), at some length in support of their opposing positions. The issue

before the Supreme Court in Ryan was “whether the incompetence of a state prisoner

require[d] suspension of the prisoner’s federal habeas corpus proceedings.” Id. at 60-61.

The Supreme Court held that the petitioners did not have a statutory right to the

suspension of federal habeas proceedings under such circumstances. Id. at 61.

The Ryan petitioners argued that two statutes formed the basis for the right to

competency in habeas proceedings, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (guaranteeing the right

to federally funded counsel in federal habeas proceedings) and 18 U.S.C. § 4241

(governing the determination of mental competency to stand trial or to undergo post-

release proceedings). The Court found that neither statute established a right to

competence in federal habeas proceedings. With respect to § 3599, the Court observed

that there was no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings, and,

9
Counsel for Sheffield conceded at oral argument that there was no statutory
authority establishing a right to competency in post conviction proceedings.

9
regardless, the right to competence in a criminal trial is grounded in due process, not in

the right to counsel. Ryan, supra, 568 U.S. at 65-66. The Court further rejected the

argument that 18 U.S.C. § 4241 formed the basis for a right to competence in federal

habeas proceedings, explaining:

By its own terms, § 4241 applies only to trial proceedings
prior to sentencing and “at any time after the commencement
of probation or supervised release.” Federal habeas
proceedings, however, commence after sentencing, and
federal habeas petitioners, by definition, are incarcerated, not
on probation.

Ryan, supra, 568 U.S. at 72.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held “that the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth

and Sixth Circuits both erred in holding that district courts must stay federal habeas

proceedings when petitioners are adjudged incompetent.” Id. at 61. The Court further

explained that although the petitioners had no statutory right to competence in habeas

proceedings, district courts had the authority to grant a stay while a petitioner attempted

to gain competence. Id. at 74 (“We do not presume that district courts need unsolicited

advice from us on how to manage their dockets. Rather, the decision to grant a stay, like

the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing, is generally left to the sound discretion of

district courts.”) (internal quotation omitted).

MDH asserts that Ryan supports its position that the trial court lacked authority to

order Sheffield’s transfer to Perkins, while Sheffield asserts that Ryan forms the basis for

the trial court’s authority to order his transfer. In our view, Ryan provides limited

persuasive value in support of or against either argument. Ryan expressly involved the

10
issue of a federal habeas petitioner’s competence in the context of a trial court’s grant of

a stay of proceedings. Whether a stay would or would not have been warranted in this

case is not the issue before us on appeal. The sole issue before this Court in the instant

appeal is whether the trial court had the authority to order that Sheffield be transferred to

Perkins. Ryan fails to provide any basis for us to infer that the trial court had such

authority.10

Sheffield points to several other sources that he asserts form the basis for the trial

court’s authority to order Sheffield’s transfer, but we remain unpersuaded. Sheffield

asserts that the Court of Appeals expressly held in the case of Washington v. Warden, 243

Md. 316 (1966), that a circuit court has the authority to order a transfer of a post

conviction petitioner to Perkins to regain competence. We do not read Washington to

support Sheffield’s position as strongly as he suggests. The issue on appeal in

10
Sheffield makes much of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Ryan of
circumstances in which a stay might be warranted. The Ryan Court explained:

If a district court concludes that the petitioner’s claim could
substantially benefit from the petitioner’s assistance, the
district court should take into account the likelihood that the
petitioner will regain competence in the foreseeable future.
Where there is no reasonable hope of competence, a stay is
inappropriate and merely frustrates the State’s attempts to
defend its presumptively valid judgment.

568 U.S. at 709. While these factors may be appropriate for a trial court’s consideration
when assessing whether to grant or deny a motion to stay post conviction proceedings,
they do not form the basis for the trial court’s authority to order that a petitioner be
transferred from Western Correctional Institute to MDH’s inpatient psychiatric facility at
Perkins.

11
Washington was whether the petitioner had sufficiently rebutted the presumption of a

knowing and intelligent waiver of an issue that had not been raised at his first post

conviction hearing. Id. at 322. When discussing whether the presumption of waiver had

been rebutted, the Court of Appeals commented that “sufficient grounds existed prior to

the hearing in 1963 for Judge Digges to order a continuance while petitioner underwent

psychiatric care at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital.” Id. at 321. The Washington Court did

not discuss anything regarding the circumstances of the petitioner’s transfer at Perkins or

the reason why the petitioner was receiving treatment at Perkins.11 We, therefore, find

Sheffield’s reliance on Washington to be misplaced.

Other sources that Sheffield asserts form the basis for the trial court’s authority to

order his transfer include Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (observing

that “inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper

assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper

assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions”), and Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312,

313-14 (1966) (addressing whether an incompetent habeas petitioner may withdraw his

certiorari petition). Strickland did not in any way address the issue of a post conviction

petitioner’s competence. Furthermore, regarding the Rees case, in Ryan, supra, the

United States Supreme Court discussed its previous opinion in Rees and declined to read

it as broadly holding that incompetence is grounds for staying habeas proceedings,

11
Washington does not discuss when, how, or why the petitioner came to be
confined at Perkins.

12
observing that Rees “provides no clear answer even to th[e] question” of whether an

incompetent habeas petitioner may withdraw his certiorari petition. 560 U.S. at 70. Nor

are we persuaded by Sheffield’s citations to out-of-state authority addressing competence

in post conviction proceedings.12

12
We shall not discuss in detail each of the four out-of-state cases cited by
Sheffield, but we observe generally that these out-of-state cases have limited utility in
this context. For example, Sheffield cites the case of Florida Dept. of Corrections v.
Watts, 800 So.2d 225 (Fla. 2001), arguing that this case held that a trial court could
commit an inmate for treatment to restore competency for post conviction proceedings
even though such commitment was not affirmatively authorized by statute. In reaching
its decision that the trial court was permitted to commit an inmate for treatment, the Watts
case specifically addressed the “unique circumstance of restoring a capital defendant to
competency in order to enable a postconviction motion to proceed” and emphasized “the
affirmative responsibility placed on trial courts and this Court with respect to the death
penalty.” Id. at 233.

The remaining out-of-state cases cited by Sheffield are similarly unavailing. In
Haraden v. State, 32 A.3d 448, 449 (Me. 2011), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
held that competence may be considered in post conviction proceedings, but the
petitioner must remain in the custody of the Department of Corrections during the period
of incompetence. People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1190 (Ill. 1990), addressed the
issue of competence in a post conviction proceeding under state law and determined that
“the court, rather than a jury, shall determine whether a petitioner is competent to consult
with his appointed counsel, and a petitioner who is found incompetent shall be remanded
to the Department of Corrections, rather than to the Department of Mental Health, until
fit.” State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Wis. 1994), set forth a process for
addressing competency in the context of post conviction proceedings, explaining that
“ordinarily this process need not include a court order for treatment to restore
competency” and observing that “meaningful postconviction relief can be provided even
though a defendant is incompetent.”

As MDH points out, other states have reached the conclusion that the standards for
competence to stand trial do not apply in the post conviction setting. See Brock v. State,
242 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that because a post conviction
proceeding “focuses on the validity of what occurred at the trial proceeding, the movant’s
present mental condition is irrelevant”) (internal quotation omitted); Ex Parte Mines, 26

(Continued)
13
Sheffield further points to the statutory right to counsel in post conviction

proceedings as purported authority for the trial court’s transfer order, which includes the

right to effective assistance of counsel in post conviction proceedings. See CP § 7-108(a)

(“[A] person is entitled to assistance of counsel and a hearing on a petition filed under

[the post conviction] title.”); Stovall v. State, 144 Md. App. 711, 715 (2002) (“[A] post

conviction petitioner . . . is entitled to the effective assistance of post conviction

counsel . . .”). Sheffield does not explain, however, how the statutory right to counsel in

post conviction proceedings provides the authority for a trial court’s transfer of a

petitioner from a correctional facility to Perkins. As we discussed supra, the United

States Supreme Court has observed the right to competence in a criminal trial is grounded

in due process, not in the right to counsel. Ryan, supra, 568 U.S. at 65-66.

Sheffield further relies upon Sibug v. State, 445 Md. 265 (2015), and Thanos v.

State, 332 Md. 511 (1993), but his contentions based upon these cases are unavailing.

Sheffield cites Sibug for the proposition that a trial court retains jurisdiction throughout a

case to make competency determinations, even through appeal and retrial. Sibug,

however, involved the issue of competency pre-trial, not in the context of a petition for

post conviction relief.13 In Sibug, the issue was a defendant’s competence before final

S.W.3d 910, 914-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (concluding that there was no right to
competence in a habeas corpus proceeding).
13
Sibug involved a defendant who had been found incompetent and then, eight
years later, without having been adjudged competent to stand trial by a judge, the

(Continued)
14
judgment, while in this case, the issue is Sheffield’s competence post final judgment.

Furthermore, as we have discussed supra, unlike the situation in Sibug, Sheffield is not a

defendant in a criminal case. Sibug is, therefore, inapplicable to this appeal.

Sheffield cites Thanos as an example of a case in which a circuit court made a

competency determination when not expressly authorized by statute.14 Specifically, the

defendant was convicted pursuant to a not guilty statement of facts. 332 Md. at 267. His
conviction was overturned for reasons unrelated to his competency and a new trial was
ordered. Id. at 278-79. When Sibug was retried, his attorney did not raise the issue of
competency until after he was found guilty; prior to sentencing, defense counsel
requested a competency evaluation. Id. at 283. The sentencing court found him
competent. Id. at 287. The issue on appeal was whether Sibug was entitled to a hearing
on competency prior to his second trial despite not specifically requesting one. The
Court of Appeals held that because the trial court had found Sibug incompetent in 1999
and “no court ever found him competent again until after his 2008 trial,” Sibug was still
under the previous finding of incompetence at the time of his 2008 trial and was entitled
to a competency determination pre-trial regardless of his attorney’s failure to raise the
issue. Id. at 315, 318.
14
Thanos involved a defendant who had been convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death in two cases in two separate counties. 322 Md. at 515. After the
Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in the St. Mary’s County case, Thanos advised
the chief attorney of the appellate division of the Office of the Public Defender that he
did not wish to pursue “any further litigation” and informed the office that he was
terminating representation. Id. at 515-16. While his direct appeal in the Garrett County
case was pending before the Court of Appeals, “Thanos wrote to the Governor,
complaining that the Office of the Public Defender insisted on filing additional motions
on his behalf against his will, and stating, ‘I’ll not appeal and as soon as the Court of
Appeals reviews my case as is mandatory, you sign that death warrant.’” Id. at 516.

After Thanos’s convictions in the Garrett County case were ultimately affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, the State filed a motion seeking a hearing and determination
regarding waiver of further review proceedings. Specifically, “[t]he State requested that
the trial court conduct a hearing to advise Thanos fully of his rights and to determine
whether he wished to waive any further rights and remedies, including his right to the

(Continued)
15
trial court determined whether a defendant who had been sentenced to death for first-

degree murder was competent to waive a statutory 240-day stay of execution. 332 Md. at

517-518. On appeal, the issues before the Court of Appeals were whether the trial court

erred in finding the defendant competent, whether the trial court erred by having the

sentencing judge make the competency determination, and whether the 240-day statutory

stay could be waived, as well as the Office of the Public Defender’s standing to bring the

appeal after the defendant had terminated representation. Id. at 518. The Court of

Appeals dismissed the appeal based upon the appellant’s lack of standing but exercised

its discretion to address the issue of whether the 240-day stay of execution could be

waived, opining that it could not be waived. Id. at 528. Thanos in no way addressed the

trial court’s authority to hold a competency hearing under the unusual circumstances

presented in that case, and we decline to read into Thanos the principle that a circuit court

has broad general authority to make competency determinations in various contexts when

not authorized by statute.

Finally, even if we assume arguendo that a petitioner in a post conviction

proceeding has a right to be found competent, it does not necessarily follow that the trial

statutory 240-day stay of execution [then set forth in Article 27, § 645A(a)(4) of the
Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.)].” 322 Md. at 516. The State asserted that if the
court concluded that Thanos had knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, it
should proceed to issue a warrant of execution. Id. The trial court held a hearing and
determined that a competency evaluation was necessary before the court could rule on the
validity of the waiver. Id. at 517. After hearing testimony from mental health
professionals, the trial court determined that Thanos was competent to waive the statutory
240-day stay. Id.

16
court has the authority to commit a petitioner to MDH for treatment. The Department of

Public Safety and Correctional Services provides health care to inmates in its custody,

including mental health services.15 Furthermore, if necessary, prisons may utilize the

involuntary admissions provisions set forth in Md. Code (1982, 2019 Repl. Vol),

§ 10-614 of the Health-General Article. See also COMAR 12.02.09.03 (setting forth the

15
Pursuant to Md. Code (1999, 2017 Repl. Vol.), § 8-101 et seq. of the
Correctional Services Article (“CS”), the Legislature charged the Commission on
Correctional Standards with “establish[ing] minimum mandatory standards applicable to
security and inmate control, inmate safety, inmate food services, inmate housing and
sanitation, inmate rights, classification, hearings, victim notification, restitution, and
administrative record keeping.” CS § 8-103(a)(1). The Commission has established
standards for inmate mental health treatment that require the individual responsible for
the administration and operation of a correctional facility to “have a written policy and
procedure . . . [g]overning the identification, housing, treatment, supervision, and referral
of a mentally ill inmate, which includes” the following provisions:

(a) Access to qualified mental health professionals;

(b) Identification of community resources available to assist;

(c) Specification of the process of evaluation and referral;

(d) Designation of the method for referral to community
resources according to established guidelines

(e) Development of comprehensive plans for treatment and
care;

(f) Maintenance of supervision records of specified activities
and occurrences; and

(g) Identification of separate and distinct living quarters[.]

COMAR 12.14.04.02A(15).

17
procedure for the Division of Corrections to transfer an inmate to a psychiatric hospital

operated by MDH).

We are not insensitive to the issue of the mental health of those who are

incarcerated. Nevertheless, absent statutory authority, the circuit court may not transfer a

post conviction petitioner from a correctional institution to a psychiatric hospital operated

by MDH for the purposes of achieving competency. We, therefore, vacate the order of

the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County granting Sheffield’s motion to transfer and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY
GRANTING SHEFFIELD’S MOTION TO
TRANSFER VACATED. CASE
REMANDED FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH
THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
APPELLEE.

18
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:

https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/cosa/1046s19cn.pdf