Maryland Attorney General Opinion 100OAG055

Gen. 55] 55

PUBLIC ETHICS LAW
ZONING AND PLANNING – REGIONAL DISTRICTS – SPECIAL
DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS RELATING TO PRINCE
GEORGE’S COUNTY
May 26, 2015

Michael W. Lord, Esq.
Executive Director
Maryland State Ethics Commission

You have asked for our opinion on how to interpret certain
campaign finance disclosure requirements set forth in “special
provisions” of the Maryland Public Ethics Law that pertain to land
use matters for the portion of Prince George’s County that is
located within the Maryland-Washington Regional District.
Within the District, the members of the Prince George’s County
Council sit as the “District Council” and, in that capacity, render
decisions on various types of land use applications. As we will
explain below, the ethics provisions in question—Part V of the
Public Ethics Law, Md. Code Ann., Gen. Prov. (“GP”) §§ 5-833
through 5-8411—were enacted over twenty years ago in response
to published reports that members of the District Council had
received significant campaign contributions from the developers
and other applicants who appeared before them.
Under the Part V ethics provisions, District Council members
must recuse themselves from a land use matter if they have
received a contribution from the applicant within a 36-month
period before the filing of the application. See GP § 5-835(b)(1).
To facilitate the recusal provision, the law also requires applicants
to submit an affidavit disclosing any payments that they have made
to a member of the District Council within the same 36-month
period. GP § 5-835(c)(1)(i). The applicant must submit the
affidavit “[a]fter an application is filed” but “at least 30 calendar
days before” the District Council’s “consideration of the
application.” GP § 5-835(c)(1), (2). Your questions relate to the
timing of the affidavit requirement and the meaning of the term
“consideration” for purposes of determining when an applicant
must submit the affidavit.

1
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references in this opinion
are to the 2014 volume of the General Provisions Article.
56 [100 Op. Att’y

The timing requirements are fairly easy to administer with
respect to special exceptions, zoning map amendments, variances,
and other quasi-judicial land use matters, where the proceeding
before the District Council is initiated by an applicant’s submission
of a written application that seeks an action specific to the
applicant’s land. In those situations, the applicant can submit the
affidavit with the application, and the District Council can ensure
compliance with the statute by waiting 30 days before taking up the
matter. The timing requirements are more difficult to apply,
however, when it comes to area master plans and sectional map
amendments—quasi-legislative actions that are formally initiated
by the District Council, not an applicant. In these proceedings,
there is no formal “application”; instead, a person who supports a
master plan or sectional map amendment with “the intent to
intensify the zoning category applicable to” the person’s land2
becomes an “applicant” merely by “appearance at a public hearing,
filing a statement in the official record, or [making an]other
similar communication to a member of the County Council or the
Planning Board.” GP § 5-833(d)(3) (defining “application”).
For these applicants—people who advocate for the “up-
zoning” of their property by testifying during council or board
proceedings—the due date for the affidavit depends on how
broadly one interprets the term “consideration.” If the Council
“considers” a matter whenever it convenes publicly to hear
testimony about it, the landowner’s appearance at that hearing
would simultaneously qualify his remarks as the “application” and
the hearing as “consideration” of his application. If so, how can
an applicant file the affidavit “after” submitting the application
but 30 days “before” the council considers it? Seemingly, the
only way to avoid this conundrum is to interpret “consideration”
to mean a later step in the council’s proceedings. That approach,
however, would potentially allow a campaign donor to appear and
advocate before the very council members whom he has
supported financially—a result that would seem to undercut the
broader purpose of the ethics provisions.3

2
A re-zoning that results in “the potential for a more intensive use”
of a parcel is generally assumed to increase the value of the property.
See Rouse-Fairwood Ltd. P’shp. v. Supervisor of Assessments, 120 Md.
App. 667, 694 (1998). Prince George’s County Zoning Ordinance lists
the zoning classes in order of intensity. See Prince George’s County
Code, § 27-109(b).
3
At the time you submitted your request for an opinion, the District
Council appears to have interpreted Part V as requiring prospective
Gen. 55] 57

In light of this apparent statutory ambiguity, you ask us two
questions:
1. What actions by the Council constitute “consideration”
such that an applicant must file an affidavit 30 days prior to that
consideration? Specifically, does consideration occur when the
Council holds a hearing on a matter that the Council will not decide
until later?
2. If an affidavit is filed inside of the 30 days of scheduled
“consideration,” can the application move forward even though the
affidavit was not filed 30 days prior to consideration?
As to your first question, we conclude that the Council
“considers” a matter when, as a body, it convenes to hear testimony
or deliberate on a matter, not merely when it convenes to render a
decision. We base that conclusion on (a) the legislative history of
the provision, which makes clear that the General Assembly
enacted the provision to guard against corruption of the Prince
George’s County land use process, (b) the statutory requirement
that we interpret the Ethics Law “liberally” to effectuate its intent,
(c) the meaning that the Court of Appeals has given the word
“consideration” in the similarly remedial Open Meetings Act, and
(d) the fact that the General Assembly expressly prohibited the
taking of “any action, directly or indirectly, with the intent to
circumvent the intent of [Part V],” GP § 5-835(f).
With respect to your second question, we conclude that Part
V does not permit the Council to move forward with an application
when the applicant has failed to provide the disclosures that might
disqualify a member. Part V does not authorize the Council to
grant exemptions from the filing deadline, and the land use powers
granted to the County by the Maryland-Washington Regional
District Act are expressly subject to Part V. GP § 5-834. The
remedial discretion of the circuit court is also limited. Upon a
petition timely filed under § 5-839(a)(1) or on appeal of a zoning
amendment under § 22-407 of the Land Use Article, the circuit
court “shall issue an order voiding” a Council action taken in

applicants to submit their affidavits at least 30 days before the date the
District Council is scheduled to hear testimony on a proposed master
plan and sectional map amendment. See Letter from Wendy Irminger,
Project Leader, Prince George’s County Planning Department, to
Property Owner (Feb. 7, 2013).
58 [100 Op. Att’y

violation of Part V. GP § 5-839(a)(2). The special provisions in
Part V thus do not authorize the Council to move forward with an
application when an applicant has not complied with the 30-day
deadline for filing the affidavit.4
I
Background
A. Land Use Planning Within the Maryland-Washington
Regional District
The Regional District Act created the Maryland-Washington
Regional District, which is made up of Montgomery County and
most of Prince George’s County. Md. Code Ann., Land Use
(“LU”) § 20-101 (2013). The Act delegates land use planning
within the District to two “district councils,” which are composed
entirely of the elected officials who serve on the County Councils
of the two counties. LU § 22-101; see Kirsch v. Prince George’s
County, 331 Md. 89, 91 (1993); Pan Am. Health Org. v.
Montgomery County, 338 Md. 214, 217 (1995); see also 84
Opinions of the Attorney General 65, 66 (1999). Relevant to our
purposes, the Prince George’s County District Council is
authorized to adopt and amend the text of the zoning law for Prince
George’s County, LU § 22-104(a), and to decide matters ranging
from the approval of general and area master plans, see Maryland-
Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco
Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 88-89 (2009), to special exceptions and
departures from design standards. See County Council of Prince
George’s County v. Billings, 420 Md. 84 (2011).
The District Council does not, however, make these decisions
on its own. The Prince George’s County Planning Board—an
unelected body—adopts certain types of plans and makes certain
4
In accordance with established policy, this Office defers to the
State Ethics Commission on the interpretation of the Public Ethics Law
and for that reason typically does not entertain opinion requests
concerning the meaning of that law. That policy is not implicated,
however, when the Commission itself seeks our aid in interpreting the
Ethics Law. We have reviewed the many advisory opinions and other
Commission materials that relate to Part V, but none resolves the
interpretive questions that we address here. See, e.g., State Ethics
Opinions Nos. 93-16 (Dec. 15, 1993); 94-3 (July 6, 1994); and 96-2 (Jan.
31, 1996). To the extent questions arise about how to apply the statute
in specific circumstances, however, those questions should be directed
to the Commission.
Gen. 55] 59

types of zoning decisions, which then may come before the County
Council sitting as the District Council.5 For some of these land use
matters, the District Council also participates in the process before
the Planning Board renders its decision. For example, the District
Council initiates the process of preparing a sectional map
amendment. Also, the District Council and the Planning Board
hear some planning matters jointly.6
B. Part V: The “Special Provisions” Applicable to the Prince
George’s County Portion of the Maryland-Washington
Regional District
Part V of the Ethics Law contains several interrelated
mechanisms for limiting the influence of campaign contributors on
the District Council’s land use decisions. For example, applicants
and their agents are prohibited from making contributions to a
member or a member’s campaign while the application is pending,
GP § 5-835(a), and must disclose their ex parte communications to
a member about an application. GP § 5-836. The two provisions
most relevant to your inquiry are the member disqualification
requirement and the applicant affidavit requirement. See GP § 5-
835(b), (c).
1. The Disqualification Requirement
A member7 of the District Council whose campaign treasurer,
continuing political committee, or slate receives a payment from an

5
Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Dev. Co., a case now pending
before the Court of Appeals, involves the standard of review to be used
by the District Council in reviewing a decision of the Planning Board.
See 440 Md. 114 (2014) (granting certiorari). While the reported
decision of the Court of Special Appeals is informative on that review
process, the case does not bear on your specific questions. See County
Council of Prince George’s County v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 217 Md. App.
310 (2014).
6
For the County Council’s explanation of the County’s planning
process, see http://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/sites/CountyCouncil/
Resources/Planning-DevelopmentProcess/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 27, 2015).
7
The term “member” is defined to “include[] any candidate or
person duly elected or appointed who takes the oath of office as a
member of the County Council for Prince George’s County and who
thereby serves on the District Council.” GP § 5-833(l); see also § 5-
60 [100 Op. Att’y

applicant during the 36-month period before the applicant submits
its application must refrain from participating in proceedings that
involve that application:
After an application has been filed, a member
may not vote or participate in any way in the
proceeding on the application if the member’s
treasurer or continuing political committee, or
a slate to which the member belongs or
belonged during the 36-month period before
the filing of the application, received a
payment during the 36-month period before
the filing of the application or during the
pendency of the application from any of the
applicants or the agents of the applicants.
GP § 5-835(b)(1). The member need not recuse himself if the
contribution came from a political action committee to which the
applicant has made a payment, so long as the applicant made the
payment “without any intent to subvert the purposes of this
subtitle” and the member returns the payment to the committee.8
GP § 5-835(b)(2).
2. The Affidavit Requirement
To facilitate the member disqualification provision, the
statute requires that an applicant for a land use approval file an
affidavit stating whether he has made a contribution to the
campaign of a Council member and, if so, to which campaign
finance entity he made it:
After an application is filed, the applicant
shall file an affidavit under oath:
(i) 1. stating to the best of the applicant’s
information, knowledge, and belief that
during the 36-month period before the filing
of the application and during the pendency of

833(f) (defining “candidate” as a “candidate for election to the County
Council who becomes a member”).
8
Part V does not affect the disclosures that campaign finance entities
must make to the State Board of Elections under the Election Law
Article. See Md. Code Ann., Elec. § 13-501 (“As to contributions to the
Prince George’s County Executive, a member of the Prince George’s
County Council, or a candidate for either of those offices, Title 5,
Subtitle 8, Part V of the General Provisions Article may apply.”).
Gen. 55] 61

the application, the applicant has not made
any payment to a member’s treasurer, a
member’s continuing political committee, or
a slate to which the member belongs or
belonged during the 36-month period before
the filing of the application; or
2. if any such payment was made,
disclosing the name of the member to whose
treasurer or continuing political committee, or
slate to which the member belongs or
belonged during the 36-month period before
the filing of the application, the payment was
made[.]
GP § 5-835(c)(1). Applicants must make the same disclosure for
contributions made by “a member of the applicant’s household,”
GP § 5-835(c)(1)(iii), and must also disclose any solicitations that
the applicant has made on a member’s behalf and identify the
member if a solicitation resulted in a contribution. GP § 5-
835(c)(1)(ii). In some circumstances, the applicant’s “agents” with
respect to an application must also file an affidavit.9 GP § 5-835(d).
Finally, “[a] supplemental affidavit shall be filed whenever a
payment is made after the original affidavit was filed.” GP § 5-
835(c)(3).
The affidavit requirement applies only to “individuals or
business entities that would be subject to this subtitle.” GP § 5-
835(c)(5). Whether a person is “subject to the subtitle” is addressed
in § 5-833, mostly through the definitions of “applicant” and
“application.”

9
The affidavit requirement applies to an applicant’s agent only if the
agent “has acted on behalf of the applicant with regard to the specific
application.” GP § 5-835(d)(1)(i). If so, the agent must file an affidavit
if the agent made or solicited a contribution for a member’s campaign
within the 36-month period before the applicant files its application. GP
§ 5-835(d)(1)(ii). The term “agent” includes a broad array of individuals
or business entities, such as architects, attorneys, engineers, and real
estate agents, “hired or retained by the applicant for any purpose relating
to the land that is the subject of an application.” GP § 5-833(b). An
applicant “is not required” to make any representation in the affidavit
about the actions “of anyone other than that applicant.” GP § 5-
835(c)(4).
62 [100 Op. Att’y

Under § 5-833(c), a person’s status as an “applicant” depends
on the type of interest the person has in the “land that is the subject
of the application.” For example, title owners, contract purchasers,
certain trustees, certain corporate directors and officers, and certain
holders of “at least a 5% interest in a business entity that has an
interest” in the land are “applicants”; certain lending institutions,
public entities, and public utilities are not. GP § 5-833(c)(3).
An “application” is defined both by the type of land use action
sought and the method by which the applicant seeks it. As to the
type of action sought, an “application” includes two categories of
requests for land use actions. The first category includes quasi-
judicial zoning and subdivision proceedings that a person initiates
by submitting a form or other materials, in the usual sense of the
word “application,” and that involve the person’s use of a particular
property. That category of applications consists of:
(1) an application for a zoning map
amendment; a special exception; a departure
from design standards; a revision to a special
exception site plan; an expansion of a legal
nonconforming use; a revision to a legal
nonconforming use site plan; or a request for
a variance from the zoning ordinance;
(2) an application to approve a
comprehensive design plan; a conceptual site
plan; or a specific design plan . . . .
GP § 5-833(d)(1), (2) (internal paragraph enumeration omitted).
The second category of application, addressed in § 5-833(d)(3),
gives rise to your question. It comprises two types of quasi-
legislative planning proceedings that are initiated by the District
Council: area master plans and sectional map amendments.10 The
General Assembly specified how a person is deemed to be an
applicant in those proceedings by broadening “application” to
include:

10
For an explanation of the sectional map amendment process in the
County, see Part 3, Division 4 of the Prince George’s County Zoning
Ordinance, §§ 27-220 through 27-228 of the Prince George’s County
Code. For an explanation of the area master plan process, see §§ 27-
640 et seq. of the County Zoning Ordinance and Greater Baden-Aquasco
Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. at 88-90. For a discussion of the quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial functions of the County Council, see Prince
George’s County v. Silverman, 58 Md. App. 41, 50-51 (1984).
Gen. 55] 63

(3) participation in adopting and approving
an area master plan or sectional map
amendment by appearance at a public hearing,
filing a statement in the official record, or
other similar communication to a member of
the County Council or the Planning Board,
where the intent is to intensify the zoning
category applicable to the land of the
applicant.
GP § 5-833(d)(3). However one qualifies as an applicant, the
affidavit must be filed with the clerk of the County Council “[a]fter
an application is filed,” GP § 5-835(c)(1), and “at least 30 calendar
days before consideration of the application by the District
Council.” GP § 5-835(c)(2); see also GP § 5-838(c) (generally
pertaining to the clerk’s duties).11
As to all of the statute’s provisions, it is a violation for an
applicant to “take any action, directly or indirectly, with the intent
to circumvent the intent of this part.” GP § 5-835(f). Other
provisions in Part V provide for enforcement through civil
remedies and criminal penalties, GP § 5-839, and specify that the
special provisions take precedence over any conflicting County
laws. GP § 5-834.

11
The Ethics Law also contains sets of “Special Provisions” for
Montgomery, Howard, and Frederick counties. Those provisions are
somewhat analogous to Part V in that all require the disclosure of certain
campaign contributions to the elected officials who decide particular
land use matters in those jurisdictions. For the Montgomery County
provisions, first enacted in 1994, see Part VI (GP §§ 5-842 through 5-
847; 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 645); for the Howard County provisions, first
enacted in 1995, see Part VIII (GP §§ 5-852 through 5-856; 1995 Md.
Laws, ch. 614); and for the Frederick County provisions, first enacted in
2007, see Part IX (GP §§ 5-857 through 5-862; 2007 Md. Laws, ch. 474).
Only the Howard County provisions define “application” in such a way
as to create a question about the disclosure deadline for persons who
participate in proceedings that they did not initiate through the
submission of a formal written application. As to that county, where the
County Executive has veto power over legislation adopted by the County
Council, the Ethics Law requires that the affidavit be filed “[w]hen an
application is filed,” GP § 5-853(a)(1), and “at least 30 calendar days
before any consideration of the application by an elected official.” GP
§ 5-853(b).
64 [100 Op. Att’y

II
The Legislative History of Part V
The provisions we construe here are the result of an arduous
legislative and judicial process. The first version was enacted in
1989 but was promptly declared void under the “single subject
rule” of Article III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution. See Porten
Sullivan Corp. v. State, 318 Md. 387 (1990). A second, more
stringent, version was introduced in the General Assembly’s 1990
session but failed. A third version, similar to the current law in
many respects, was enacted in 1992, but it, too, succumbed to a
challenge under the single-subject rule. See State v. Prince
Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68 (1993). Finally, much of
the current version of Part V was enacted in 1993, with further
modifications made in 2011. As we will describe in some detail,
each step along the way informs our understanding of the statute’s
purpose.
A. The 1989 Enactment
The story of how the General Assembly came to adopt
“special” ethics provisions for Prince George’s County land use
matters begins during the 1989 Session.12 Early in the Session, the
Prince George’s County delegation sponsored “two uncomplicated
and brief” bills concerning Prince George’s County’s authority to
impose certain energy and transfer taxes (H.B. 889 and H.B. 890),
and a third bill authorizing the imposition of development impact
fees (H.B. 891). None of the bills included ethics measures, and
all passed the House and were sent to the Senate. Porten, 318 Md.
at 389-90, 393-94.
Then, in late March of that year, various newspapers reported
on an unsuccessful attempt by Walter H. Maloney, the former
County Attorney for Prince George’s County, to disqualify five
members of the County Council from voting on a zoning
application filed by a developer that had contributed to their
campaigns. Id. at 394; E. 285, 460. According to the affidavit of
then-Senator Frank J. Komenda, who chaired the County
delegation, the case “accentuated concerns of members of the
Delegation first felt during the summer of 1988 when constituents

12
Much of this legislative history comes from the record in Porten,
which included the parties’ stipulations on the progress of the legislation
through the General Assembly. See 318 Md. at 395, n.4. Where
necessary, we will cite to the pages of the record extract on file in our
office, using the “E” designation required by Rule 8-503(b).
Gen. 55] 65

conveyed their views about perceived conflicts of interest of
Council members.” E. 255. Senator Komenda testified that the
Maloney case had “troubled community activists” and that the
Prince George’s Civic Foundation “urg[ed] a legislative remedy for
this problem.” Id. In response, the Senate delegation
subcommittee that Senator Komenda had appointed to address
House Bills 889, 890, and 891 began to draft amendments “to
address the problem.” Id. Those amendments were added onto
H.B. 890, such that “[w]hat had been essentially a one-page bill
concerning ‘Prince George’s County—Transfer Tax’ was . . .
transmogrified into lengthy emergency legislation extending to
‘Prince George’s County Council—Ethics and Taxing Authority.’”
Porten, 318 Md. at 395.
Meanwhile, the press continued to report on the council
members’ fundraising practices. On April 2, the Washington Post
reported that three council members had received one-third to one-
half of their contributions from development interests. E. 258, E.
329-30 (Retha Hill, Eugene L. Meyer, Links with Developers
Spotlighted by P.G. Bill; Council Members Deny Being Influenced,
The Washington Post (April 2, 1989)). On April 4, the Prince
George’s County Journal reported on another case in which County
Council members had been asked to abstain from voting on a
project proposed by a developer who had contributed to each of
their campaigns. E. 258 (referring to article entitled “Abstention
urged on MetroView vote”).
The special ethics law, made part of H.B. 890, passed on the
last day of the Session. 1989 Md. Laws, ch. 244. The new law
added a subtitle 6 to the State Public Ethics Law, which was then
codified in Article 40A of the Maryland Code. See Porten, 318
Md. at 389-90 (summarizing the law). In its broad outline, the law
was similar to the provisions currently in Part V; it provided for
council members to abstain from participating in land use matters
where the applicant had promoted their candidacy during the
preceding 36 months and required applicants to file affidavits
disclosing their contributions. Former Art. 40A, § 6-603. Many of
the details, however, differed. For example, the 1989 law required
applicants to file their affidavit “[a]t the time an application is
filed,” id. § 6-603(b), did not define “application” to include a
person’s appearance at hearings on sectional map amendments, and
did not address contributions made through political action
committees or to a slate of candidates that included a Council
member. Porten, 318 Md. 391, n.1. Because it was enacted as an
66 [100 Op. Att’y

emergency measure, the new law took effect upon the Governor’s
signature on May 5. Id. at 389.
The 1989 legislation had an immediate impact. Even before
the legislation was signed, the Prince George’s Chamber of
Commerce “strongly recommend[ed]” that its members exercise
“caution in considering any contribution to an elected official or
candidate for public office, whether at the local or state level.” E.
408. The Suburban Maryland Building Industry Association
(“SMBIA”) “strongly recommended that no contributions be made
to the County Executive, the County Council, or any other State or
local elected official.” E. 407 (emphasis in the original). In a May
legislative report to its members, the SMBIA stated that, “[f]rom
the standpoint of the building community, this legislation has—and
will have—a favorable impact. (Fundraisers for Council members
were starting to get out of hand in terms of their frequency, and our
industry was very heavily lobbied to contribute).” E. 604. The
report then stated, “The practice has now come to a screeching
halt.” Id., see also E. 573 (discussing legislative report).
Meanwhile, the Ethics Commission was addressing questions
about how, and to whom, the new law applied. In an extensive
response to a publicly-traded corporation’s inquiry as to the filing
requirements applicable to its stockholders, employees, and related
entities, the Ethics Commission noted that “there continue to be
other issues regarding implementation of this law” that would
require further guidance. See State Ethics Opinion No. 89-7 (June
20, 1989). In November, a Washington Post article noted that the
campaigns of the eight council members who had filed reports had
together collected only $865 after April 10, in contrast to the
$237,450 they had collected in the approximately five-month
period before the passage of the bill. Derald Everhart, Ethics law
puts crimp in donations, The Prince George’s Journal (Nov. 10,
1989).
The law was short-lived. On July 26, the Porten Sullivan
Corporation, a developer, challenged the statute on multiple
grounds, including a claim that the legislation embraced more than
one subject and thereby violated the “single subject” rule of Article
III, § 29 of the Maryland Constitution. Porten, 318 Md. at 395.
Although the circuit court denied all relief, the Court of Appeals
granted certiorari before proceedings in the Court of Special
Appeals and, on February 6, 1990, declared the ethics portions of
the statute void under the single-subject rule. Id. at 409.
Gen. 55] 67

B. The 1990 Legislation – The Extension of the Term
“Application” to Area Master Plan and Sectional Map
Amendment Proceedings
Shortly after the Court issued its decision in Porten, the
General Assembly took up consideration of a new emergency bill
(S.B. 832) designed to address continuing concerns about District
Council members’ presiding over their campaign contributors’ land
use applications. Although the new bill was similar in many
respects to the previous year’s bill, it differed in several ways
material to your question. For example, while Chapter 244 was in
effect, a question had been raised about its applicability to the
sectional map amendment process, which is initiated by the District
Council and thus does not involve an “applicant” in the traditional
sense of the word. E. 510. Senate Bill 832 proposed to resolve that
question by broadening the definition of “application” to include a
person’s “participation in adopting and approving an area master
plan or sectional map amendment by appearance at a public
hearing, filing a statement in the official record, or other similar
communication to a member of the County Council or the Planning
Board, where the intent is to intensify the zoning category
applicable to the land of the applicant.” 1990 Sess., S.B. 832
(proposed Art. 40A, § 6-601(d)(3), currently codified at GP § 5-
833(d)(3)). The 1990 bill also proposed to make the applicant’s
affidavit due “[a]fter an application is filed,” “at any time prior to
consideration of the application by the District Council,” but “in no
event . . . less than 30 calendar days prior to consideration by the
District Council of the application.”13 1990 Sess., S.B. 832
(proposed Art. 40A, § 6-602(b)(1), (2)). The bill failed.

13
The legislative record also indicates that the General Assembly was
considering other adjustments in response to questions raised in Porten.
See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Robert A. Zarnoch to Hon.
Timothy F. Maloney (Feb. 12, 1990). Those questions included whether
Chapter 244 applied to contributions to slates and political action
committees and to persons with minor connections to an applicant. See
Porten, 318 Md. at 391-92, nn. 1, 2. In addition, legislators sought our
Office’s advice on various constitutional and other issues raised by the
Court’s decision in Porten. See Letters of Assistant Attorney General
Robert A. Zarnoch to Hon. Joseph F. Vallario, Jr. (March 9, 1990), Hon.
Timothy F. Maloney (Feb. 2 and 13, 1990), Hon. Paul Pinsky (Feb. 27,
1990), and Hon. Frank J. Komenda (March 15, 1990).
68 [100 Op. Att’y

C. The 1991 Legislation and the Amendment of the Open
Meetings Act
News reports in the bill file indicate that legislation similar to
that introduced in 1990, but applicable to both Prince George’s and
Howard Counties, was introduced in the 1991 Session but again
failed.14 During that session, however, the General Assembly also
considered another reform measure, S.B. 170, which proposed to
make quasi-judicial land use proceedings subject to the State’s
Open Meetings Act. At the time, the Open Meetings Act did not
apply to a public body when it was performing a “quasi-judicial”
function, and decisions on applications for land use actions were
generally deemed quasi-judicial. Accordingly, many zoning
boards had been deliberating behind closed doors. See Wesley
Chapel Bluemount Ass’n v. Baltimore County, 347 Md. 125, 141
(1997) (“The exemption in the 1977 law for quasi-judicial
functions served, in effect, to permit zoning boards, boards of
appeals, and other administrative agencies to continue deliberating
in closed session with respect to contested case hearings.”). The
change that S.B. 170 proposed gave rise to discussion as to whether
a zoning board’s deliberations on an application, in addition to its
decision, must be carried out in public.
The bill initially proposed to clarify that the Open Meetings
Act applied “to a public body when granting a license or permit or
making a land use decision.” S.B. 170, 1991 Leg. Reg. Sess. (first
reader). It was then amended in committee to extend the Act’s
requirements to “a public body when it is meeting to consider: (1)
Granting a license or permit; or (2) A special exception, variance,
conditional use, zoning classification, the enforcement of any
zoning law or regulation, or any other zoning matter.” Id. (second
reader) (emphasis added).
Prince George’s County and other local public bodies
opposed making zoning board deliberations open to the public.
The County proposed that S.B. 170 be amended further to provide
that a public body “may conduct deliberations in closed session
after the closing of the record, but that the decision and the reason
for the decision shall be made in open session.” 1991 Sess., S.B.
14
See Andy Markowitz, Developers in probe generous to
campaigners, The Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 24, 1992) (reporting
that two delegates had introduced legislation “mirroring the 1989
measure for both Howard and Prince George’s counties” but it “died in
committee”); Andy Markowitz, Fed probe brings bill back to life, The
Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 31, 1992) (reporting that “[e]fforts to
resurrect the [1989] law in 1990 and 1991 were defeated”).
Gen. 55] 69

170, “Prince George’s County Legislative Position” (Feb. 19,
1991). The Maryland Association of Counties commented that
“this provision is dealing with quasi-judicial functions,” and that,
“[w]hile it is appropriate for the taking of testimony to be done in
an open meeting, the deliberations of such bodies should be done
in private, as are the deliberations of a jury.” 1991 Sess., S.B. 170,
“Memorandum to the Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs
Committee” (Feb. 21, 1991). The Maryland Municipal League
(“MML”) also proposed amending the bill to provide that public
bodies conducting the proceedings covered by the amendment be
required to meet in public only when “hearing testimony.” MML
stated that “there should be no requirement that the deliberations of
any quasi-judicial body be held in open session,” and that “[d]uring
these discussions candid and frank interchange is essential.”
Maryland Municipal League, Proposed Amendments to S.B. 170,
Amendment #3 (March 26, 1991).
In response to these local government concerns, an
amendment was offered to the committee that would have required
a public body to meet in public only when “hearing testimony
regarding” a land use matter and not, as the bill then read, when
“meeting to consider” such a matter. The amendment was rejected.
An undated and anonymous handwritten note in the bill file reflects
one committee’s consideration of the amendment and records the
committee’s view that the open meetings bill was an alternative to
the Prince George’s County ethics bill:
Amendment was offered to workgroup and to
full Committee. Amendment was rejected.
Committee intends to cover deliberations
concern[ing] licenses, permits, and zoning.
Decisions are to be based on the public record
& therefore saw no reason for discussion of
the public record to occur behind closed
doors. . . . Also the current perception about
local zoning processes was of concern to the
Committee and it believed that opening these
meetings would go a long way to combatting
the negative perceptions & a better 1st
approach than P[rince] G[eorge’s] Public
Ethics bills, or similar efforts.
70 [100 Op. Att’y

1991 Sess., S.B. 170, Amendment (Apr. 4, 1991) (emphasis
added).15 The bill file reflects that the amendment was later
introduced as a floor amendment and again was rejected.
The General Assembly passed S.B. 170, and the Governor
signed it into law. See 1991 Md. Laws, ch. 655. Now codified at
GP § 3-103(b)(2), the provision makes the Open Meetings Act
expressly applicable to a public body when it is “meeting to
consider: . . . a special exception, variance, conditional use, or
zoning classification, the enforcement of any zoning law or
regulation, or any other zoning matter.” In using the word
“consider,” the General Assembly was using a term that it had
already used in the Open Meetings Act and that the Court of
Appeals had already construed, for purposes of that law, as
including “the deliberative and decision-making process in its
entirety.” New Carrollton v. Rogers, 287 Md. 56, 72 (1980).
D. The 1992 Enactment
“Negative perceptions” about Prince George’s County land
use proceedings again came to the General Assembly’s attention in
1992. Early in that session, the Washington Post reported that a
federal grand jury had subpoenaed the County’s zoning records
relating to those developers who had been “among the biggest
financial contributors to County Council campaigns” and the
financial disclosure forms of all members of the Council since
1986. Michele L. Norris and Paul Duggan, P.G. Probe Eyes Top
Developers; Land-Use Inquiry Targets Council’s Ties to
Businessmen, Washington Post (Jan. 23, 1992). The article stated
that the investigation had begun “almost two years ago, when civic
groups began publicly complaining of allegedly corrupt land deals
and calling for a full investigation by the U.S. attorney’s office in
Baltimore.” Id. Citing a “federal law enforcement source,” the
article reported that FBI agents assigned to the case had gathered
“‘a lot of intelligence’ about the connections among developers,

15
Although some commentators have described such undated and
anonymous notes as “inherently dubious,” see Jack Schwartz & Amanda
Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party: The Use and
Misuse of Legislative History, 54 Md. L. Rev. 432, 453 (1995), the
Maryland appellate courts sometimes use such materials to discern
legislative intent. See id. (citing Webber v. State, 320 Md. 238, 247
(1990), Franklin Square Hosp. v. Laubach, 318 Md. 615, 621-22 (1990),
and Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 497-98 (1989)); see also McNeil v.
State, 112 Md. App. 434, 452 n.9 (1996) (relying on “undated,
handwritten notes” contained in the legislative committee’s working
papers).
Gen. 55] 71

zoning lawyers and current and former council members.” Id.
Another article in the bill file quoted the Senate President as stating
that the offices of the members of the County delegation had been
“besieged with calls from constituents . . . requesting that
legislation be introduced again” and that the delegation would meet
to consider re-introducing a county ethics bill. David Sokolik and
Maria Douglas, Reviving ethics law considered in wake of
constituents’ calls, The Prince George’s Journal (Jan. 24, 1992).
In response, the Prince George’s County Senate delegation
sponsored an ethics bill, S.B. 701, which would have imposed
affidavit requirements and deadlines that were substantially the
same as those that appear in the current law. Senate Bill 701 passed
the Senate but died in the House.
The Senate then amended H.B. 937—an unrelated piece of
legislation addressing Montgomery County planning and zoning
matters—to include the text of S.B. 701. The House passed the
amended legislation on the last day of the session and, on May 29,
1992, the Governor signed it into law. 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 643.
The life of Chapter 643 was even shorter than that of Chapter
244 of the 1989 laws, and it ended the same way. Two days after
Chapter 643 took effect, the County Executive, a committee
supporting his gubernatorial campaign, and two individuals filed a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the law
violated the single-subject rule. This time, the circuit court agreed
and declared the ethics provisions severable and void. The Court
of Appeals, again taking the case before the Court of Special
Appeals heard it, affirmed that judgment on January 12, 1993, one
day before the General Assembly convened its 1993 Session. State
v. Prince Georgians for Glendening, 329 Md. 68 (1993).
E. The Law Takes Its Current Form
Lasting ethics legislation for Prince George’s County was
finally enacted in the 1993 session. The measure was introduced
as H.B. 989, passed by the General Assembly, and signed by the
Governor. See 1993 Md. Laws, ch. 577. In most respects, the 1993
legislation established the present contours of the law; it contained
the same affidavit requirement, the same disqualification
obligation, and the same timing provisions that we construe below.
Two aspects of the current law were added in 2011, again in
response to reports of corruption in Prince George’s County. Two
months before the General Assembly convened for that session, the
72 [100 Op. Att’y

press reported the arrest of the outgoing County Executive and his
wife—a newly-elected Council member—on charges related to his
receipt of payments from developers and her tampering with and
destroying evidence. See, e.g., Paul Schwartzman, Ruben
Castaneda, and Cheryl W. Thompson, Jack Johnson, Prince
George’s county executive, and his wife, Leslie, arrested, The
Washington Post (Nov. 13, 2010). In February, 2011, Mr. Johnson
was indicted on extortion and bribery charges related to his alleged
receipt of more than $200,000 from developers starting in 2003.
See, e.g., Associated Press, Former Prince George’s County exec
Jack Johnson pleads not guilty in case, The Daily Record (March
15, 2011).
Meanwhile, Mr. Johnson’s newly-elected successor and the
County’s delegation began working on legislative proposals. After
considering a recommendation that the County Council members
be stripped of all development review powers, the delegation
instead agreed to introduce a bill to strengthen the State Ethics Law
and the County Ethics Commission and curtail the County
Council’s ability to delay development deals. See, e.g., Miranda S.
Spivack, Bill would end ‘pay to play’ in Prince George’s County,
The Washington Post (March 16, 2011) (reporting that “[t]he bill
stems in part from longtime complaints that past councils have
operated secretively, threatening developers that their plans would
be held up indefinitely unless they offered concessions or hired an
associate of a council member”).
The legislation that emerged, and was enacted, made two
changes to what is now Part V. See 2011 Md. Laws, ch. 91. The
first change strengthened the disqualification requirement. At the
time, the provisions that now comprise Part V only disqualified a
member from voting or participating on a matter if an applicant or
agent had filed an affidavit “naming the member or the member’s
continuing political committee as the recipient of a payment.” Md.
Code Ann., State Gov’t (“SG”), § 15-831(b)(2)(i) (2009 Repl.
Vol.); see also State Ethics Opinion 96-02 (concluding that a
member’s receipt of actual notice, through an interested party’s
introduction of evidence into the record of the land use proceeding,
would not disqualify the member). Chapter 91 deleted the filing of
the affidavit as the trigger for the disqualification requirement with
the result that the member’s duty no longer hinges entirely on the
applicants’ compliance with the affidavit requirement. GP § 5-
835(b)(1). The second change broadened the definition of
“payment” and other provisions in Part V to include contributions
to a slate to which a member belonged. GP §§ 5-833(m), 5-835.
Gen. 55] 73

Finally, in 2014, the relevant statutory provisions were
recodified and transferred from Part IV of Title 15 of the State
Government Article to its current place in Title 5 of the newly-
created General Provisions Article. 2014 Md. Laws, ch. 94.
During that process, the code revision committee made a number
of presumptively non-substantive wording changes to the statute,
including the affidavit and disqualification provisions we address
here. The most notable change occurred in the provision that
governs the timing of the affidavit requirement. Prior to
recodification, § 15-831(c)(2) of the State Government Article
provided:
The affidavit may be filed any time prior to consideration of
the application by the District Council, at the discretion of the
applicant. However, in no event may the affidavit be filed less
than 30 calendar days prior to consideration by the District
Council of the application.
As it now appears in Part V, the timing provision states: “The
affidavit shall be filed at least 30 calendar days before
consideration of the application by the District Council.” GP § 5-
835(c)(2). The Revisor’s note explains that “the former reference
to filing the affidavit ‘any time prior to consideration . . . at the
discretion of the applicant’ [wa]s deleted as surplusage.” Id.
(ellipsis in original).
III
Analysis
A. Calculating the Affidavit Filing Deadline
Your first question requires us to address two subsidiary
questions related to area master plan and sectional map amendment
proceedings: (1) At what point does the District Council’s
“consideration” of a person’s application begin?; and (2) If a
person “applies” by testifying at a hearing at which the District
Council is deemed to be “considering” that application, when must
that person file the affidavit about campaign contributions?
1. When “Consideration” Occurs
The Ethics Law does not define the word “consideration,” and
the appellate courts have not addressed its meaning for purposes of
Part V. The General Assembly has instructed, however, that all but
the criminal sanctions provisions of the Ethics Law must be
74 [100 Op. Att’y

“liberally construed” to accomplish the purpose behind the law.
GP § 5-102(c). The statute makes that purpose explicit. After
declaring that public “confidence and trust is eroded when the
conduct of the State’s business is subject to improper influence or
even the appearance of improper influence,” the General Assembly
stated:
For the purpose of guarding against improper
influence, the General Assembly enacts this
Maryland Public Ethics Law to require certain
government officials and employees to
disclose their financial affairs and to set
minimum ethical standards for the conduct of
State and local business.
GP § 5-102(b); see also Carroll County Ethics Comm’n v. Lennon,
119 Md. App. 49, 71 (1998) (describing the Legislature’s “clear
intent” that the State Ethics Law be “liberally construed to
accomplish this purpose”); 99 Opinions of the Attorney General
171, 186 (2014).
More generally, the Court of Appeals instructs us to
“ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the
Legislature.” Maryland Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County,
431 Md. 189, 199 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted)
(“MEDCO”). We “begin[] with the plain language of the statute,
and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language
dictates interpretation of its terminology.” Id. (citation and
quotation marks omitted); see also Blue v. Prince George’s County,
434 Md. 681, 689 (2013) (statutory language is “typically given its
ordinary meaning, viewed in context, considered in light of the
whole statute, and generally evaluated for ambiguity”). The goal
of statutory interpretation “is always to discern the legislative
purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied
by a particular provision.” People’s Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 408 Md. 336, 351 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In the end, the language “should be construed to carry
out and effectuate, or aid in, the general purposes and policies of
the statute being interpreted.” MEDCO, 431 Md. at 199 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Our discussion thus begins with the ordinary meaning of
“consideration.” In determining a word’s “ordinary meaning,” the
Court of Appeals often turns to a dictionary and has done so when
construing undefined terms within the Ethics Law. See State Ethics
Commission v. Antonetti, 365 Md. 428, 452 (2001) (construing the
term “participate” in what is now GP § 5-501); see also, e.g., Blue,
Gen. 55] 75

434 Md. at 690 (turning to “[c]ommon dictionary definitions”
when the “statute itself does not provide a specific definition”).
The 1989 edition of Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary defines
“consideration” as “continuous and careful thought,” as in, “after
long consideration he agreed to their requests.” The 1984 edition
of Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “consideration” as “1.
The act of considering; deliberation.”16 These definitions do not
confine the word to any particular stage of deliberation; they
encompass the entire process.
The dictionary definition of the term “consideration”
comports with the Court’s understanding of the word as used in the
Open Meetings Act. See New Carrollton, 287 Md. 56. The New
Carrollton Court, noting that the act “covers all meetings at which
a quorum of the . . . public body is convened ‘for the purpose of
considering or transacting public business,’” stated:
It is, therefore, the deliberative and decision-
making process in its entirety which must be
conducted in meetings open to the public
since every step of the process, including the
final decision itself, constitutes the con-
sideration or transaction of public business.
Id. at 72 (referring to a provision now codified at GP § 3-101(g)17);
see also College Park v. Cotter, 309 Md. 573, 585 (1987) (quoting
New Carrollton). Likewise, the ordinary definition of
“consideration” comports with the way the General Assembly used
the word in 1991, when it addressed the “negative perceptions”
about local zoning processes by amending the Open Meetings Act
to require a public body to meet openly when it is “meeting to

16
Black’s Law Dictionary, often consulted by the Court, see, e.g.,
Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 669 (2006) (consulting that dictionary
for an “ordinary, popular” meaning of a word), defined the noun
“consideration” only by reference to its usage in contracts law. Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Black’s defined the verb “to consider”
in its ordinary sense as: “To fix the mind on, with a view to careful
examination; to examine; to inspect. To deliberate about and ponder
over. To entertain or give heed to.” Id.
17
Under the Open Meetings Act, “meet” now means “to convene a
quorum of a public body to consider or transact public business.” GP
§ 3-101(g).
76 [100 Op. Att’y

consider” zoning matters, not just when it votes on them. See 1991
Md. Laws, ch. 655.18
We turn next to whether the ordinary meaning of
“consideration” effectuates the Legislature’s intent, or, conversely,
results in absurd and presumably unintended consequences. See,
e.g., Blue, 434 Md. at 689 (stating that “the consequences of
alternative readings” should be evaluated and absurd consequences
avoided). One potentially illogical consequence of interpreting
“consideration” to include the hearing at which the applicant-
contributor initially appears emerges quickly in the quasi-
legislative context: How can an applicant file the affidavit “[a]fter
an application has been filed” (GP § 5-835(c)(1)) but 30 days
“before” the council considers it (GP § 5-835(c)(2)) if the
application and consideration occur simultaneously? The interplay
of these two timing provisions would seem to compel the
conclusion that “consideration” of area master plans and sectional
map amendments must mean a later step in the council’s
proceedings, whether that be a subsequent hearing or the actual
decision on the application.
Although reading “consideration” to mean a later step in the
deliberative process would seem to preserve the logic of the
statute’s timing provisions, it has other limitations that weigh
against it. First, that reading would assume that the Legislature
intended to assign greater deliberative significance to one hearing
over another. We see no evidence of such intent or even a logical
basis on which to make such a distinction. Equating
“consideration” with “decision” might make logical sense, but it
would seem to be inconsistent with § 5-837, which uses another
term—“final action”—for the ultimate disposition of the
application. More importantly, an interpretation of “consideration”
that allows a Council member to attend a hearing at which a

18
For one commentator’s description of the 1991 amendment of the
Open Meetings Act as a way of promoting integrity in land use
processes, see Philip J. Tierney, Bold Promises But Baby Steps:
Maryland’s Growth Policy to the Year 2000, 23 U. Balt. L. Rev. 461,
520, n.48 (1994) (“The element of greed is . . . a factor sometimes
present in the land use regulatory process as illustrated by Maryland’s
periodic history of political corruption by local zoning officials that
prompted the state legislature and the courts to adopt a number of
reforms that include among other requirements: open meetings, Md.
Code Ann., State Gov’t §§ 10-501 to 10-512 (1993 & Supp. 1994);
public ethics and financial disclosure requirements, Md. Ann. Code art.
40A, §§ 1-101 to 7-104 (1993 & Supp. 1994); and adjudicatory
safeguards . . . .”).
Gen. 55] 77

campaign donor advocates in support of his application cannot be
squared with other provisions of the statute or with its broader
public policy goal of limiting the influence of campaign
contributions on the County’s land use process. The statute
provides that a council member “may not vote or participate in any
way” in a proceeding involving a contributor’s application. GP
§ 5-835(b)(1). Although the term “participation” is not defined in
the statute, the Court of Appeals has construed that term, in another
section of the Ethics Law, to mean “to have or take a part or share
with others (in some activity, enterprise, etc.).” Antonetti, 365 Md.
at 452 (adopting the definition in Webster’s New World College
Dictionary in construing the requirement that an official may not
“participate” in a matter if a relative has an interest in the matter).
By that standard, a council member’s presence during his
contributor’s testimony would constitute “participation” in the
proceedings.19
In our opinion, the statute’s policy goal—limiting the
influence of campaign contributions on the County’s land use
process—would be undermined if the affidavit deadline were to be
interpreted to allow a Council member to be present during a
contributor’s presentation. The General Assembly sought not only
to restrict influence, but also to improve public confidence in the
integrity of the land use process by eliminating even “the
appearance of improper influence.” GP § 5-102(a)(2) (emphasis
added). That larger goal, too, would be undermined by giving the
conflicted Council member a place at the table regardless of
whether he overtly influences the Council’s deliberation. A
member could influence, or appear to influence, his colleagues’
position on his contributor’s proposal in any number of ways
during the hearing, whether by making comments, asking
19
We recognize that the language of § 5-835(b)(1) suggests that the
disqualification provision applies only “[a]fter [a contributor’s]
application has been filed,” which could be read as authorizing the
council member to participate while that application is being filed. As
discussed above, these timing provisions seem to have been drafted for
the type of traditional application that is submitted in a quasi-judicial
proceeding, where the Council’s consideration would only come after
the application is submitted. See supra at 2. In that context, giving effect
to the timing provision in § 5-835(b)(1) makes sense. We believe it
makes considerably less sense when read in the context of proceedings
on an area master plan or sectional map amendments, which are quasi-
legislative actions that are initiated in ways other than the filing of a
traditional application.
78 [100 Op. Att’y

questions, or even just seeming to convey his approval or
disapproval of particular witnesses’ testimony. The potential for
that influence could be magnified in a jurisdiction like Prince
George’s County, where elected officials serve by district, rather
than at large. In those circumstances, “councilmanic courtesy” can
give decisive weight to an official’s views on a proposal involving
the official’s home district.20
The principles that guide the interpretation of statutes thus
suggest a broad construction of the term “consideration.” A broad
construction effectuates legislative intent, comports with the
General Assembly’s direction that the Ethics Law “be liberally
construed,” GP § 5-102(c), and gives this remedial statute the
construction necessary “to suppress the evil and advance the
remedy.” See Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215,
228 (2010). In this regard, we note the observation of the Court of
Appeals that the need for the enforcement of ethics laws is
“‘perhaps even more acute . . . at the local government level, where
the government and its citizens have greater contact with one
another.’” Antonetti, 365 Md. at 447-48 (addressing the conduct of
an employee of local board of elections, a State agency, quoting
Lennon, 119 Md. App. at 61). If anything is clear from the long
legislative history of this statute, it is the General Assembly’s
repeatedly-demonstrated concern about the erosion of public
confidence in the County’s land use process brought on by repeated
reports of abuse. It thus makes sense—and does not lead to absurd
consequences—to read the affidavit deadline in such a way as to
disqualify Council members from their contributors’ land use
applications in time to prevent them from participating in any phase
of the Council’s deliberation.
To summarize, we believe that a narrow interpretation of
“consideration” to exclude the early stages of the District Council’s

20
“In some large cities land-use decisions are determined by a system
of ‘councilmanic courtesy’: all members of the elected governing body
informally agree to follow the decision of the member from the district
where the land-use problem has arisen.” David Schleicher, City
Unplanning, 122 Yale L.J. 1670, 1710 (2013) (quoting Robert C.
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 Yale L.J. 385, 408 n.60 (1977)). The practice is related to
“local courtesy,” which is “an unwritten, commonly observed custom
where the members of both the House and the Senate of the General
Assembly defer to the representatives of a particular jurisdiction, i.e. a
county’s local legislative delegation, on matters affecting only that
district.” Getty v. Carroll County Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 724-25
n.13 (2007).
Gen. 55] 79

proceedings, whether in a meeting or by other action of that body,
would weaken the disqualification requirement, run counter to the
General Assembly’s likely understanding of the word when it
enacted the law, and conflict with the statutory requirement that the
Ethics Law be construed “liberally” to achieve its purposes. Given
the shared purpose of Part V and the Open Meetings Act to enhance
public faith in government through disclosure requirements, and
the General Assembly’s consideration of both laws as a way of
addressing the influence of campaign contributions on the District
Council’s land use decisions, we believe that the New Carrollton
definition of “consideration” applies here. In our opinion, then,
“consideration” for purposes of Part V means the Council’s
“deliberative and decision-making process in its entirety.” See
New Carrollton, 287 Md. at 72.
2. When the Affidavit Must Be Filed
We turn now to the more practical question of when, given
our conclusion above, the applicant must submit his or her
affidavit. Again, the statute contains two provisions that bear on
the issue: § 5-835(c)(1), which requires that the applicant file the
affidavit “[a]fter an application is filed,” and § 5-835(c)(2), which
requires that the affidavit be filed “at least 30 calendar days before
consideration of the application by the District Council.” When an
applicant who has contributed to a member’s campaign applies
only by testifying at a hearing, these two provisions conflict: the
first would seem to allow the applicant to file the affidavit after
testifying, while the second would require him to file it at least 30
days before testifying.
The only way to achieve the timely disqualification of the
member from the proceeding is to require the applicant to file the
affidavit before the hearing. So, given the choice between the two
timing provisions, the provision that requires that the affidavit be
filed “at least 30 calendar days before consideration of the
application,” GP § 5-835(c)(2), best effectuates the Legislature’s
intent that District Council members be timely barred from
participating in, and voting on, their contributors’ land use matters.
This conclusion is clearer still from the wording of the timing
provision prior to its recodification in 2014:
The affidavit may be filed any time prior to
consideration of the application by the District
Council, at the discretion of the applicant.
However, in no event may the affidavit be
80 [100 Op. Att’y

filed less than 30 calendar days prior to
consideration by the District Council of the
application.
Former SG § 15-831(c)(2) (emphasis added); see also Allen v.
State, 402 Md. 59, 71-72, (2007) (observing that the “[r]ecodif-
ication of statutes is presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather
than change of meaning”). In our view, the legislative intent
behind Part V would not be served by enabling an applicant to
delay a council member’s disqualification by waiting to file the
affidavit until after the hearing on whether to re-zone the planning
area in which the applicant’s land lies. See GP § 5-835(f)
(prohibiting an applicant from taking “any action, directly or
indirectly, with the intent to circumvent the intent of this part”).
We reach the same result by applying the formalistic rule that
when two provisions in a statute conflict, the more specific prevails
over the more general. See, e.g., A. S. Abell Pub. Co. v. Mezzanote,
297 Md. 26, 40 (1983) (“Ordinarily, a specific enactment prevails
over an incompatible general enactment in the same or another
statute.”). Section 5-835(c)(1) focuses on the content of the
affidavit and addresses timing only in a generally-worded preface
to its detailed description of the disclosures to be made. By
contrast, § 5-835(c)(2) focuses only on timing. Given the structure
of the section and the emphasis given to the 30-day provision in its
earlier form, we believe that § 5-835(c)(2)—“at least 30 calendar
days before consideration of the application”—provides the
operative deadline.21
In construing Part V, we have referred only to State law; our
interpretation of what it means for the District Council to
“consider” an application does not hinge on the procedures the
Council has established by ordinance. We have done so because
the General Assembly expressly provided that the County must
carry out the land use powers granted to it by the Regional District
Act “in accordance with” the Special Provisions,
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” GP § 5-834.
Moreover, an uncodified section of Part V provides that “this Act:
21
As noted above, there are similarities between the affidavit filing
deadlines in the Howard County and Prince George’s County ethics
provisions. See supra note 11. Although that might suggest that the
conclusions we reach here can be applied in Howard County as well, we
cannot rule out the possibility that the meaning of the term
“consideration” might vary with the circumstances of each county’s
“special” provisions. We do not mean to foreclose that possibility here;
we construe only the Prince George’s County provisions.
Gen. 55] 81

(1) Supersedes any Prince George’s County ordinance dealing with
subjects covered by this Act; and (2) May not be supplemented by
any Prince George’s County ordinance.” 1993 Md. Laws, ch. 577,
§ 4; see also, e.g., County Council of Prince George’s County v.
Brandywine Enters., 350 Md. 339, 346 (1998) (observing that “any
enactment concerning zoning in the county, which is at variance
with the Regional District Act, is inoperative within the district”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Northampton
Corp. v. Prince George’s County, 273 Md. 93, 96 (1974) (same).
Accordingly, a person who supports the up-zoning of property
in which he has an interest must file the contribution affidavit 30
days before any stage of the District Council’s deliberation on the
matter, no matter how that person chooses to “apply.” For
example, if a landowner “applies” by asking a Council or Planning
Commission member to initiate the process for a sectional map
amendment that would up-zone the landowner’s property, the
landowner must file his affidavit 30 days before the District
Council, as a body, addresses whether to initiate the process.
Likewise, a landowner who wishes to “apply” by appearing at a
District Council hearing on the matter must file the affidavit 30
days in advance of the hearing.
We understand that, under this interpretation, a person who
wants to participate only by speaking at a hearing before the
District Council must form that intention in time to file an affidavit
30 days in advance. We read the statute as requiring that level of
foresight because the Ethics Law expressly requires that the
County’s land use powers “shall be carried out in accordance with”
Part V. See GP § 5-834. In other words, the County must adapt
its land use decision-making process to accommodate the
requirements of Part V, not the other way around. The County must
therefore give landowners adequate notice of upcoming
proceedings that might affect their property, and landowners who
want their land up-zoned during those proceedings must plan
accordingly.
B. Whether an Application “Can Move Forward” when an
Applicant Has Failed to File the Required Affidavit 30 Days
Before the Council Meets to Consider the Application
In our view, the Council lacks the power to proceed with the
application of a person who has failed to timely file the required
affidavit. Although Part V does not explicitly provide as much, we
82 [100 Op. Att’y

believe the District Council is not authorized to proceed in the face
of an applicant’s or agent’s violation of Part V.
The Council does not have inherent zoning powers; instead,
it has only those powers that the State has granted it. See
Montgomery Pres., Inc. v. Montgomery County Planning Bd. of the
Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 424 Md.
367, 377 (2012) (“The Council can only exercise its powers under
the statute to the extent and in the manner directed by the
legislature”). As to the Prince George’s County land within the
Maryland-Washington Regional District, those powers are granted
by the Regional District Act. See Brandywine, 350 Md. at 346
(observing that “the Regional District Act is the exclusive source
of zoning authority in those areas of Prince George’s County
located within the Regional District”). Section 22-206(b) of the
Land Use Article, which authorizes the District Council to adopt
certain procedures, does not list the ethics deadlines as one of the
procedures the District Council may alter. Moreover, as we noted
in the preceding section, the District Council may only exercise its
Regional District Act powers “in accordance” with Part V. GP
§ 5-834. In our view, it would not accord with Part V for the
District Council to consider the applications of landowners who
have violated the affidavit requirement, especially as the efficacy
of the disqualification requirement hinges largely on compliance
with the affidavit requirement. See, e.g., GP § 5-839(b)(3)
(providing that a member “is guilty of violating this part only if the
member fails to abstain from voting or participating in a
proceeding, based on information contained in an affidavit”).
The importance of strict compliance with the affidavit
requirement is also reflected in the judicial review provisions of the
statute, which mandate that the circuit court “shall issue an order
voiding an official action taken by the County Council if . . . the
action taken by the County Council was in violation of this part.”
GP § 5-839(a)(2) (emphasis added). In short, “any enactment
concerning zoning in the county, which is at variance with the
Regional District Act, is inoperative within the district.”
Brandywine, 350 Md. at 346 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Finally, we note that nothing in Part V gives the District
Council the discretion to grant extensions or exceptions to the
statutory deadlines for the various disclosures that Part V requires.
Affidavits and the other disclosures required by the statute are to
be filed with the clerk of the County Council, who is to act under
the “direction and control” of the State Ethics Commission and its
Executive Director. GP § 5-838(a), (c); see also GP § 5-101(k)
Gen. 55] 83

(defining “Ethics Commission” to mean the State Ethics
Commission). The clerk “may only” perform four tasks: receive
filings, maintain records, report violations, and perform “other
ministerial duties necessary to administer this part.” GP § 5-
838(a). One of those “other ministerial duties” is putting the
affidavits in the appropriate case files; another is submitting a
“summary report” that compiles the affidavits and disclosures. GP
§ 5-838(c). The Council clerk’s duties thus resemble those of a
District or circuit court clerk; neither has the authority to extend
deadlines set by rule or law. See, e.g., Mutual Ben. Soc. of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Haywood, 257 Md. 538, 541 (1970) (court
officials’ actions “must conform to the practices as defined in the
Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure”); see also re Kaela C.,
394 Md. 432, 471-72 (2006) (because filing deadlines in the
Maryland Rules are “precise rubrics,” circuit court erred by
adopting the master’s recommendations before the five-day period
for filing exceptions had expired).
We thus conclude that the Council may not proceed with an
application when the applicant has not complied with Part V.
Although the consequences of proceeding in the absence of
affidavits will depend on the specific facts of the Council’s
decision, we agree with the Ethics Commission that an applicant’s
failure to file a timely affidavit would raise “serious questions”
about the validity of the Council’s action. See Memorandum Re:
Prince George’s County Zoning Ethics, Disclosure Participation
and Contributions Provisions—Md. Code Ann., General
Provisions §§ 5-833 – 5-839, at 4 (Oct. 1, 2014). For example, in
2012, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County struck down
the portions of a 2009 sectional map amendment that related to
properties for which affidavits were required but had not been filed.
See Accokeek, Mattawoman, Piscataway Creeks Communities
Council v. County Council of Prince George’s County, Maryland,
sitting as the District Council, CAL Nos. 09-31402 and 09-32017,
Memorandum and Order of Court (Pr. G. Cty. Cir. Ct. Sept. 7,
2012). The court ordered that those properties were to “retain their
original zones prior to the [amendment].” Id. at 5, 8.
How to implement the statute so as to avoid such
consequences will depend on factual circumstances that the District
Council is better able to anticipate than we are. That said, several
general approaches suggest themselves. It is our understanding, for
example, that the District Council already informs potential
applicants to submit their affidavits at least 30 days prior to the
scheduled hearing date at which they intend to testify. See supra
84 [100 Op. Att’y

n.3. The Council might also wish to reiterate, at the opening of
testimony, that applicants will not be allowed to testify unless they
have filed a timely affidavit. And if an applicant’s failure to file an
affidavit becomes apparent only later in the proceeding, Accokeek
would seem to suggest that the Council should remove the
applicant’s property from consideration and postpone any future
consideration of it until after a timely affidavit has been filed. We
only suggest these; what approach suits a particular set of
circumstances is best addressed by the Council in accordance with
the Ethics Commission’s guidance.
IV
Conclusion
In our opinion, the Prince George’s County District Council’s
“consideration” of an application for purposes of Part V of the
Public Ethics Law occurs whenever the District Council, as a body,
addresses the matter, whether or not the District Council intends to
act on it at that time. Further, the Council may not move forward
with an application if an applicant has failed to file the necessary
affidavit at least 30 calendar days before the matter comes before
the District Council. The Ethics Law does not grant to either the
District Council or the clerk of the County Council the discretion
to change the filing deadline or excuse applicants and agents from
it.
Brian E. Frosh
Attorney General of Maryland
Adam D. Snyder
Chief Counsel, Opinions
& Advice

* Jeffrey G. Middleton, a former intern in this office, assisted in the
preparation of this opinion.