Andoh, Francis v. State

* This is an unreported opinion. This opinion may not be cited as precedent within the rule
of stare decisis. It may be cited for persuasive value only if the citation conforms to
Maryland Rule 1-104(a)(2)(B).
Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No. C-15-CR-24-000221
UNREPORTED*
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 0246
September Term, 2025
______________________________________
FRANCIS ANDOH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Wells, C.J.,
Arthur,
Kehoe, S.,
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wells, C.J.
______________________________________
Filed: October 14, 2026

‒Unreported Opinion‒
A jury empaneled in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County convicted appellant
Francis Andoh of two counts of fourth-degree sexual offense arising out of an encounter
with the complainant, whom we refer to as V. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on
attempted second-degree rape. The court declared a mistrial as to that count and the State
later dismissed that charge. The court sentenced Andoh to 364 days incarceration on each
of the fourth-degree convictions, to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
V. testified that she met Andoh on a Christian dating application called Upward.
The two shared a Ghanaian background and Christian faith. They communicated for some
time before agreeing to meet in person on September 16, 2023. Before the date, V. testified,
the two set boundaries, agreeing that “there would be nothing that happened under the
clothing . . . everything would stay over [their] clothes, and [they] would primarily just kiss
and hold each other.” Andoh acknowledged those boundaries, and V. testified that she felt
comfortable going on a date with him.
The two met at a shopping center in Gaithersburg, spent time together, and
eventually entered Andoh’s car in a parking garage. V. testified that Andoh started kissing
her “forcefully,” so she pushed him back and told him to slow down. While they were
kissing, Andoh put his hand down her shirt and pulled her breast from her bra and began
sucking on it despite her repeatedly pushing him away and telling him to stop. V. testified
he kissed her thighs while she pushed him away and he took her hand and used it to rub his
penis through his pants over her objection. According to V.’s testimony, Andoh exposed

‒Unreported Opinion‒
2
part of his penis and pushed her head toward his penis. V. testified that she did not consent
to any of this conduct.
V. testified that she told her best friend, Joy Jackson, about the incident the same
day saying that Andoh was aggressive, and she did not enjoy the encounter. Further V.
explained to Joy she “didn’t know what to do in the situation.” She testified that she did
not disclose the full details of what happened, because she “was ashamed,” was a virgin,
and “never had any sort of sexual contact with a man.” V. told her pastor the same night
that a man had “pushed [her] further than the boundaries that [they] had discussed.” V. also
talked to her therapist about the interaction a day later.
A. The Report to Police and 911 Call
Four days after the encounter, on September 20, 2023, V. called the police and
reported the incident. At trial, when asked why it was difficult to decide to report her
encounter with Andoh to the police, V. explained:
It’s a very sensitive topic. I knew that reporting to the police would open
myself up to potentially in a situation like what we find ourselves in today,
where a lot of people that I don’t know would have a lot of questions about
an intimate encounter that I had had with somebody. And I was nervous about
going through that entire process. And since he hadn’t penetrated me, I
wasn’t sure whether or not the situation would constitute assault.
Before trial, the State moved in limine to admit a redacted recording of the 911 call
under the prompt-complaint hearsay exception. After hearing argument, the circuit court
initially ruled the call inadmissible, finding the State’s proffered explanation for the four-
day delay did not, on the proffer alone, render the report prompt. The court specifically
stated:

‒Unreported Opinion‒
3
And at this point the explanation is that she’s a virgin, she was uncertain of
what to do or fearful, confused and ashamed, which I’m not convinced is so
much of would make this a prompt report as it maybe isn’t almost is an
explanation of why the delay is, doesn’t defeat credibility.
. . .
What I am hearing is an adult female, who doesn’t live with this person and
who sounds educated or at least enough to know where to find resources. So
I’m not -- I don’t feel that the delay has been adequately explained. And
that’s not to say that it’s not understandable, but I don’t think that it rises to
the level of being prompt, under the circumstances. So unless I hear
something different at trial, my ruling is that I don’t find that the 911 call is
prompt.
After V. testified, the State asked the court to reconsider. The court did so, finding
that “for this particular person, four days is prompt,” and admitted a redacted version of
the call. The court reasoned:
So, I don’t, I’m going to say I don’t think that nothing has changed since the
State’s proffer. I’m struck by the naïveté of the witness, both by what she
said and the manner that she testifies.
I’m not referring to her disability. I find, even apart from her disability, that
this witness manifests a childlike naïveté. She talked about that before a first
date, she, they set out boundaries.
Are they going to kiss? Or is it going to be over the, what’s going to be over
the clothes, under the clothes, and how important it was to her abstinence
until marriage, and talked about her virginity, and her religious convictions.
Which I find all of that, her religious convictions seem to be at the level of,
tied in closely with her sexual behavior, akin to the defense argument in
opening statements that, for why she, why they’re alleging that she’s making
this up is that her religion is tied in with whether or not you have sex before
marriage or do certain things before marriage, and whether you touch under
the clothes or not.
And what she said regarding all of these things and how she said it, I find not
to be an average 29-year-old. I find it to be somewhat childlike, naive, and
heavily influenced by her religion, to the point where I find that four days for

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4
this particular person is not a delay. I find that this is not a witness, in my
assessment, in making this ruling, who is an average 29-year-old woman.
B. The Monitored Call Between V. and Andoh
While the police were investigating the incident, on September 28, 2023, V. called
Andoh on the phone while Detective Chaz Atherley of the Montgomery County Police
Department listened without announcing his presence. Andoh moved before trial to
suppress the recording as an unlawful interception under Maryland’s Wiretap Act. At the
July 12, 2024 motions hearing, the parties agreed the recording itself would be excluded
but that V. and Detective Atherley could testify to the contents of the call from memory.
Defense counsel expressly reserved the right to argue that “other constitutional or
evidentiary reasons” might bar such testimony. The court entered an order, “by consent,”
suppressing the recording.
Defense counsel then filed a motion for appropriate relief, contending testimony
about the call would violate Andoh’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. At an August
5, 2024 hearing, Detective Atherley testified that although he could not recall Andoh’s
statements “word-for-word,” he retained an “independent recollection of the general
conversation,” separate from the time-stamped quotations he had later transcribed into a
supplemental report after re-listening to the recording. The court found that Detective
Atherley possessed an independent memory of the substance of Andoh’s statements and
ruled that Andoh’s confrontation right was not infringed upon because Detective Atherly
could be cross-examined about his recollections so long as the recording, timestamps, and
quotation marks were not used.

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5
At trial, over Andoh’s continuing objection, both V. and Detective Atherley testified
to statements Andoh purportedly made on the call. Defense counsel proffered that certain
of these statements did not appear on the recording and asked that a transcript of the call
be marked for the record. It was marked as Court’s Exhibit 3.
C. Discovery Violation
In opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that it would have to rely on the
memories of two witnesses, referring to V. and Detective Atherley, because Detective
Atherley “didn’t take notes during that call.” On cross-examination, however, Detective
Atherley testified that he had in fact taken contemporaneous handwritten notes during the
call and had provided them to the State’s Attorney’s Office. V. had likewise testified that
she observed the detective taking notes during the call. The prosecution did not disclose or
turn over the notes in discovery.
The court found the State had committed a discovery violation, but one resulting
from negligence or confusion rather than an intentional act. Andoh sought, in order of
preference: a mistrial with prejudice; a mistrial without prejudice; the striking of Detective
Atherley’s testimony together with a missing-witness instruction; or an arrangement
precluding any further reference to the handwritten notes and permitting the detective to
clarify that his reference to “contemporaneous notes” meant the police report written
several days later.
Relying on Mason v. State, 487 Md. 216 (2024), the court denied the mistrial and
adopted the defense’s last alternative requested, reasoning that suppressing the “very

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6
damaging” notes left the defense in “a better position” and “the same position that they
were in before those notes were disclosed.”
The jury ultimately found Andoh guilty of both counts of fourth-degree sexual
offense and was unable to reach a verdict on attempted second-degree rape. The court
sentenced Andoh to concurrent flat terms of 364 days on each conviction.
This appeal followed and raised several issues for review. 1 We agree with Andoh
that the circuit court erred in admitting V.’s 911 call as prompt report of sexual assault and
remand for a new trial. To assist the circuit court on remand, we will address the second
issue regarding the taped call. We decline to address the issue regarding the mistrial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether evidence is admissible under a hearsay exception is a question of law that
we review without deference to the trial court. Vigna v. State, 241 Md. App. 704, 729
(2019) (citing Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 538 (2013)). An error in admitting evidence
requires reversal unless we are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did not affect
1 As presented in his brief, Andoh’s questions are:
1. Did the court err in admitting the complainant’s 911 call as a prompt
complaint?
2. Did the court err in denying Mr. Andoh’s motion in limine to preclude the
witnesses from testifying about the contents of the excluded monitored call?
3. Did the court err in denying Mr. Andoh’s motion for a mistrial and,
alternatively, to strike Detective Atherley’s testimony and grant a missing witness
instruction?

‒Unreported Opinion‒
7
the verdict. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659 (1976) (citing Chapman v. California, 286
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
A claimed violation of the Confrontation Clause presents a question of law that we
also review without deference to the trial court. Langley v. State, 421 Md. 560, 567 (2011)
(“The flagship question presented in the present case queries whether certain statements
admitted 	at 	trial 	were 	admitted 	in violation of 	Respondent’s 	rights 	under
the Confrontation Clause. . . . This is a question of law, which we review under a non-
deferential standard of review.”) Once it is determined that there is no Confrontation
Clause violation, however, the management of the scope of cross-examination lies within
the sound discretion of the trial court. See Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 681 (2003)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Circuit Court Erred in Admitting V.’s 911 Call as a Prompt Complaint.
A. Parties’ Contentions
Andoh contends the circuit court erred in admitting V.’s 911 call because V.’s four-
day delay in reporting was not adequately explained under the circumstances. He argues
the cases sanctioning longer reporting delays involve child victims or adults facing threats,
confinement, or a lack of opportunity to report, and that V.—a twenty-nine-year-old who
did not live with Andoh, was never threatened by him, and freely discussed the encounter
with her friend and pastor the same day—is not in that mold. In his view, the qualities on

‒Unreported Opinion‒
8
which the court relied, particularly V.’s naïveté and strong religious convictions, may
explain feelings of shame or embarrassment but do not explain an inability to report.
The State contends promptness under Rule 5-802.1(d) is a flexible, case-by-case
inquiry turning on the totality of the circumstances rather than any fixed deadline, and that
the court properly considered V.’s fear and shame, her confusion over whether the non-
penetrative conduct constituted a reportable crime, and her demonstrated naïveté and
demeanor. The State emphasizes that V. did not disclose the full extent of the details of the
assault to her friend or pastor, so those disclosures neither negate her explanation nor defeat
the promptness of her later report to police.
B. Analysis
Maryland Rule 5-802.1(d) sets forth an exception to the general prohibition against
the introduction of hearsay. 	“A statement that is one of prompt complaint of sexually
assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected if the statement is consistent with
the declarant’s testimony[,]” provided the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination. This Court has explained the underlying rationale of the prompt complaint
exception extensively. In Nelson v. State, we stated:
It is the conventional wisdom that an outraged victim of a sexual attack will
raise the hue and cry as soon as it is feasible to do so. The failure of a victim
to make a prompt complaint, therefore, may encourage a juror to look with
skepticism at the victim’s trial testimony. Unexplained earlier silence may
be 	deemed 	inconsistent 	with 	that 	trial 	testimony. [Rule 	5-802.1(d)] 	is
precisely to forestall such skepticism that the fact of a prompt complaint is
admissible as substantive evidence.
137 Md. App. 402, 414-15 (2001) (citing Cole v. State, 83 Md. App. 279, 288-93 (1990)).

‒Unreported Opinion‒
9
“The only time requirement is that the complaint have been made without a delay
which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense, in general a less
demanding time aspect than with the typical excited utterance situation.” Nelson v. State,
137 Md. App 402, 410 (2001) (quoting McCormick on Evidence (E. Cleary 3d ed.1984),
Sect. 297, 859). Although the complaint must be timely, “promptness is a flexible concept,
tied to the circumstances of the particular case.” Gaerian v. State, 159 Md. App. 527, 540
(2004) (citing State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 564 (1985)).
Maryland’s Supreme Court emphasized in State v. Werner, 302 Md. at 564,
There may be many reasons why a failure to make immediate or instant
outcry should not discredit the witness. A want of suitable opportunity, or
fear, may sometimes excuse or justify a delay. There can be no iron rule on
the subject. The law expects and requires that it should be prompt; but there
is, and can be, no particular time specified. The rule is founded upon the laws
of human nature, which induces a female thus outraged to complain at the
first opportunity.
The 	inquiry 	asks 	what 	“a 	reasonable 	victim, 	considering 	age 	and 	family
involvement and other circumstances, would probably do by way of complaining once it
became safe and feasible to do so.” Nelson, 137 Md. App. at 418. The promptness
requirement is applied with particular flexibility to child complainants because of their
“natural fear, ignorance, and susceptibility to intimidation.” Gaerian, 159 Md. App. at 542-
44. In Gaerian, a report by a thirteen-year-old made within the same month of the abuse
was prompt where the abuser was ten years older, lived in the same household, and had
threatened the victim and her family. Id. at 545. In Vigna v. State, a two-year delay was
prompt because the child victim “didn’t understand” the conduct was abusive until

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10
participating in a body-safety class in school, and then reported “[a]s soon as she
understood.” 241 Md. App. at 730-3.
We hold the circuit court erred in admitting the 911 call. Accepting, as we must, the
court’s findings that V. was sincere, ashamed, frightened, and unusually naive, those
findings still do not, as a matter of law, supply the kind of explanation that Rule 5-802.1(d)
requires to render a four-day delay prompt.
Our cases do not ask merely whether a delay is understandable or sympathetic. They
ask whether the delay is “unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence of the offense,”
Gaerian, 159 Md. App. at 542, measured by what a reasonable victim “would probably do
by way of complaining once it became safe and feasible to do so.” Nelson, 137 Md. App.
at 418. That formulation contemplates a barrier, or something that made prompt reporting
unsafe or infeasible, and then lifted. The recurring fact patterns bear this out: the child who
does not comprehend a crime occurred, Vigna, 241 Md. App. at 730-31; the victim living
with or threatened by the abuser, Gaerian, 159 Md. App. at 545; or the victim who lacks
the “suitable opportunity” to report, id. at 540. In each, the delay tracks a concrete
impediment.
V.’s 	explanation 	is 	of 	a 	different 	order. 	Shame, 	virginity, 	strong 	religious
conviction, and emotional hesitation may well explain why a victim would find reporting
difficult, but they do not identify an impediment that resolved itself after four days. The
record discloses no event on or before the fourth day that changed V.’s ability or
opportunity to call the police. On this record, nothing prevented her from reporting on the

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11
first day that did not equally exist on the fourth. A delay attributable to enduring feelings
of shame or embarrassment, however genuine, is not, without more, a delay rendered
prompt within the meaning of the rule, because it is not tied to the emergence of a safe and
feasible opportunity to report.
V. was a twenty-nine-year-old woman who had lived in the area for decades, did
not live with Andoh, and was never threatened by him. She was sufficiently comfortable
discussing her dating life that she testified during trial that she had publicly “called out”
men online for conduct she found inappropriate, including a man who had made a comment
about her breasts the month before. Most tellingly, V. spoke about her encounter with
Andoh to her best friend and her pastor the same night it occurred. She also testified that
she discussed the encounter with her therapist prior to reporting it to police as well. A
complainant who is able to disclose the incident to others within hours is not one for whom
reporting was infeasible. The ability to speak about the event demonstrates that the
opportunity to report existed from the outset.
The State’s argument that V. did not initially appreciate that the conduct was a
reportable crime, akin to the child in Vigna who did not understand she had been abused,
does not withstand scrutiny. Unlike the third-grader in Vigna, whose delay ended “[a]s
soon as she understood” the conduct was wrongful, 241 Md. App. at 731, V. understood
from the first night that Andoh had “pushed [her] further than the boundaries” they had set
and that she “wasn’t comfortable” with what happened. Her uncertainty was not about
whether Andoh had wronged her but about the legal question whether his conduct “would

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12
constitute an assault” absent penetration. A legal doubt of that sort is not the childhood
ignorance that Gaerian and Vigna describe, and it cannot bear the weight the State places
on it. If it could, virtually any delay by an adult uncertain of the criminal law would qualify
as prompt, and the requirement would lose its content.
That leaves the circuit court’s reliance on V.’s “childlike naïveté” and “strong[ ]
commit[ment] to religious convictions.” We accept those demeanor findings as not clearly
erroneous. But the legal significance the court assigned to them is another matter, and one
we review without deference. Neither naïveté nor religiosity is a recognized circumstance
that makes reporting unsafe or infeasible. They bear on why a victim might feel reluctant,
but not on her ability to report. Treating an adult complainant as though she were a child,
and thereby importing the special latitude reserved for children, because the court found
her unusually naive and devout would extend the child-complainant rationale of Gaerian
and Vigna well beyond its justification. It would also introduce an unstable standard, under
which the promptness window expands or contracts with a court’s impression of how
sophisticated or how religious an adult witness appears.
The circuit court’s own initial ruling reflected this understanding. On essentially the
same explanation, namely that V. was “a virgin,” and “uncertain of what to do or fearful,
confused[,] and ashamed[,]” the court first found the report not prompt, observing that the
explanation, while “understandable,” did not rise to the level required to be considered
prompt. That initial assessment correctly applied the rule. What changed on reconsideration
was not the explanation for the delay but the court’s impression of V.’s demeanor, a change

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13
that, for the reasons given, could not convert a legally insufficient explanation into a
sufficient one. We hold the 911 call was not admissible under Rule 5-802.1(d).
The circuit court’s error was not harmless. An error requires reversal unless the
reviewing court, “upon its own independent review of the record,” can “declare a belief,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict.” Dorsey, 276
Md. at 659 (1976). Absent such a declaration, the error “cannot be deemed ‘harmless,’”
and “a reversal is mandated.” Id.
It is well-settled that the “‘legally sanctioned function’ of the prompt complaint
exception is to bolster the credibility of the victim by corroborating her account of the
alleged assault.” Vigna, 241 Md. App. 704, 731 (2019) (citing Choate v. State, 214 Md.
App. 118, 146 (2013); Nelson, 137 Md. App. at 411). This case turned almost entirely on
V.’s credibility, and the jury’s verdict depended greatly on whether it believed V.’s
account. The erroneously admitted 911 call placed before the jury an out-of-court statement
corroborating V.’s testimony on the very point in dispute. We cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that it did not influence the verdict, and we therefore reverse and remand
for a new trial. 2
2 Our review in this case is a fact-specific inquiry concerning the admissibility of an
item of evidence. Our decision in no way should be read as commentary on the impact of
sexual assault or an assessment the credibility of a sexual assault victim.

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14
II. The Circuit Court Did Not Violate Andoh’s Confrontation Rights in Permitting
Testimony 	About 	the 	Monitored 	Call 	While 	Barring 	Use 	of 	the 	Suppressed
Recording.
A. Parties’ Contentions
Andoh contends the circuit court violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by permitting V. and
Detective Atherley to testify to Andoh’s statements on the monitored call while forbidding
any use of the call itself to impeach them or refresh their recollection. Because, he says,
the witnesses attributed to him statements he never made, the ruling left him unable to place
before the jury the inconsistencies between their testimony and the recording, depriving
him of a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination.
The State contends the recording was inadmissible for any purpose under the
Maryland Wiretap Act and that both parties had agreed the witnesses could testify from
memory while the recording itself remained excluded. Within that framework, the State
argues, defense counsel remained free to attack the witnesses’ memory and accuracy
through questioning under Rule 5-616(a), and in fact did so, eliciting that the witnesses
were recounting a months-old call from memory and had not related everything said.
B. Analysis
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the
witnesses against him[,]” U.S. Const. amend. VI, a right that includes cross-examination
directed at a witness’ “bias, interest or motive to testify falsely.” Martin v. State, 364 Md.
692, 698 (2001) (citations omitted). But the right is not unbounded. “Generally speaking,

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15
the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (emphasis in original).
The trial court has broad discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination,
and the “appropriate test to determine abuse of discretion in limiting cross-examination is
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case, the limitation inhibited the ability
of the defendant to receive a fair trial.” Martin, 364 Md. at 698. Because the jurors are “the
sole triers of fact and credibility,” the federal and state constitutions require the trial court
to allow the defense a “threshold level of inquiry” that puts before them “facts from which
the jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.”
Manchame-Guerra v. State, 457 Md. 300, 309 (2018) (quoting Martinez v. State, 416 Md.
418, 428 (2010)).
We hold the circuit court’s ruling did not violate Andoh’s confrontation right. The
limitation of which he complains flowed directly from his own agreement, and potentially
a statutory bar, and it left him with a full and fair opportunity to test the witnesses’
reliability through cross-examination.
We begin with the source of the limitation. The recording of the monitored call was
suppressed by consent of the parties at a pre-trial conference. The court entered its
suppression order “by consent,” and did not rule that the recording had been obtained in

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16
violation of Maryland’s Wiretap Act. 3 Under the framework the parties agreed upon, the
recording itself would be excluded, but V. and Detective Atherley could testify to the
contents of the call from memory. The court’s later refusal to permit use of the recording
to impeach or refresh the witnesses was thus the natural consequence of an arrangement
Andoh helped construct. Although defense counsel reserved the right to argue that “other
constitutional or evidentiary reasons” might bar the witnesses’ testimony, that reservation
went to whether the testimony could come in at all, not to a right to use the suppressed
recording against it.
More fundamentally, the ruling satisfied the constitutional threshold. The court did
not bar inquiry into the witnesses’ reliability. It barred only use of the suppressed recording,
its 	timestamps, 	and 	its 	verbatim 	quotations. 	Everything 	that 	made 	the 	witnesses’
recollection assailable remained open to cross-examination. Defense counsel was free to
establish, which they did, that V. was recounting from “best memory” a call that had
occurred some 324 days earlier, that she had not related the entire fifteen-minute
conversation, and that “other things happened on the call” she did not describe. Defense
counsel similarly confronted Detective Atherley with his prior inability to recall the
3 The Maryland Wiretap Act makes it unlawful for any person to “willfully intercept,
endeavor to intercept, or procure any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any
wire, oral, or electronic communication[.]” Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 10-
402(a)(1). During a pre-trial conference, defense counsel alleged, and the State conceded
in their appellate brief, that the recorded phone call violated the Maryland Wiretap Act.
The parties agreed that the recorded call would be excluded from evidence The circuit court
entered an order, by consent of both parties, suppressing the phone call. However, the court
did not expressly rule on whether a violation of Maryland’s Wiretap Act occurred.

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17
specific questions and answers on the call. Rule 5-616(a) expressly authorizes exactly this
mode of impeachment—”[p]roving lack of personal knowledge or weaknesses in the
capacity of the witness to perceive, remember, or communicate[.]” Andoh was in no way
foreclosed from it.
What Andoh sought was something the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee:
the use of a specific piece of evidence, barred by his own agreement, to impeach the
witnesses. While the Confrontation Clause secures “an opportunity for effective cross-
examination,” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20, we find no case law requiring the
trial court allow the particular impeachment tool the defense would prefer. Because the
jury had before it the facts from which it could “appropriately draw inferences relating to
the reliability of the witness[es]”—namely, that both were reconstructing, from memory, a
lengthy call many months in the past—the “threshold level of inquiry” was met.
Manchame-Guerra, 457 Md. at 309. Having afforded that threshold, the circuit court
permissibly exercised its discretion in declining to allow use of the suppressed recording.
We discern no constitutional violation.
We add one observation for the guidance of the circuit court on remand. Our
conclusion rests on the state of this record—in particular, the parties’ consent to the
suppression of the recording and the court’s finding that Detective Atherley possessed an
independent recollection of Andoh’s statements. Should the evidentiary posture differ on
retrial—for example, if the foundation for a witness’ independent recollection is not
established, or if the parties reach a different accommodation concerning the recording—

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18
the trial court remains free to reassess the permissible scope of examination consistent with
the principles set out above.
THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT
COURT 	FOR 	MONTGOMERY
COUNTY 	IS 	REVERSED 	AND
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
MONTGOMERY COUNTY TO PAY
THE COSTS.