Ramatoulay, Djbril v. State

Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. C-12-CR-24-000526
UNREPORTED
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 177
September Term, 2025
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DJBRIL RAMATOULAY
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
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Graeff,
Ripken,
Eyler, Deborah S.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
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PER CURIAM
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Filed: October 14, 2026
*This is a per curiam opinion. Under Rule 1-104, the opinion is not precedent within the
rule of stare decisis, nor may it be cited as persuasive authority.

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Convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County of second degree
murder of Sebashton Nocar, attempted first degree murder of Cameron Waid, and related
offenses, Djbril Ramatoulay, appellant, presents for our review a single issue: whether the
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. For the reasons that follow,
we shall affirm the judgments of the circuit court.
At trial, the State called Mr. Waid, who testified that on the evening of April 23,
2024, he drove himself, Mr. Nocar, whom Mr. Waid also knew as “Ashton,” Kieran
McNeill, and Jacob Brennan-Kazmaier to the parking lot of a Waffle House in Belcamp.
While the four men were sitting in Mr. Waid’s truck, a man that Mr. Waid identified at
trial as Mr. Ramatoulay approached the truck and spoke with Mr. Waid and Mr. Brennan-
Kazmaier. 	Mr. McNeill subsequently handed to Mr. Ramatoulay “a tiny, clear vial”
containing “drugs.” 	After Mr. Ramatoulay walked into a neighboring McDonald’s, Mr.
Waid and his companions “had a discussion about what had just happened, the exchange,
and [Mr. McNeill’s] frustration with the situation.” Mr. McNeill “got out of the vehicle”
and “approached [Mr. Ramatoulay] out front of the McDonald’s,” where “they exchanged
words.” When Mr. McNeill and Mr. Ramatoulay entered the McDonald’s, Mr. Waid, Mr.
Nocar, and Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier exited the truck and entered the McDonald’s. 	Inside
the McDonald’s, Mr. Waid, Mr. Nocar, and Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier entered the bathroom,
where they and Mr. McNeill “started an altercation” with Mr. Ramatoulay. Mr. Brennan-
Kazmaier threw “the first punch and then the rest of [the men] jumped in.” When the four
men “finished,” they “ran out of the bathroom.” Mr. Waid, Mr. McNeill, and Mr. Nocar

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entered Mr. Waid’s truck, and Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier “entered another person’s” sedan.
The sedan departed, followed by Mr. Waid.
“[L]ess than 2 minutes away,” the group met “around . . . the backside of [a] hotel.”
Mr. Waid “drove to the opposite side of the hotel” and “parked.” 	Mr. Waid, Mr. Nocar,
and Mr. McNeill exited the truck and “walked up to where [Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier and his
driver] parked,” but “they were no longer there.” The men then “received a message from
[Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier] telling [them] to come back, so [they] returned to the McDonald’s
and parked.” 	At the McDonald’s, Mr. Waid saw Mr. Ramatoulay “talking through the
window to . . . either the driver and [Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier] or one or the other.” After
Mr. Ramatoulay “walked . . . back into the McDonald’s,” Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar “exited
[the] vehicle and went . . . into the McDonald’s.” Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar’s “plan was to
go and take [Mr. Ramatoulay’s] bag and . . . watch.”
Inside the McDonald’s, Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar entered the bathroom, where they
saw Mr. Ramatoulay holding “a wrap with marijuana.” Mr. Ramatoulay asked: “Are we
good?” Mr. Nocar “asked [Mr. Ramatoulay] to hand over his bag.” Mr. Ramatoulay told
Mr. Nocar “to hold his . . . blunt, . . . and . . . then asked if [Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar] would
like to see what was in the bag.” 	After Mr. Ramatoulay “unzipped his bag,” Mr. Nocar
“grabbed the bag and there was a brief period of back and forth pulling on the bag . . . until
with one hand [he] reached and began to . . . unbutton the clasp of [Mr. Ramatoulay’s]
watch.” Mr. Waid then “heard [a] gun go off.” Mr. Waid “opened the door and ran out of
the bathroom with” Mr. Nocar, who “was then shot and killed.” 	Mr. Waid “ran out the
McDonald’s,” followed by Mr. Ramatoulay, who “fired . . . two to possibly three more

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shots.” 	Mr. Waid yelled to Mr. Brennan-Kazmaier and his driver: 	“He’s got a gun. He
shot Ashton. He shot Ashton.” Mr. Waid ran around the Waffle House, and when he did
not see Mr. Ramatoulay, Mr. Waid “went back into the McDonald’s,” “asked if [he] could
use the phone,” and “started calling [his] mom and . . . dad back and forth.” Mr. Waid later
“look[ed] back inside the restaurant portion of the McDonald’s” and “saw [Mr. Nocar] on
the floor with a pool of blood around him.”
The State also called Chelsea Wilson, who testified that she “worked with” Mr.
Ramatoulay and “was his shift manager” at the McDonald’s. At approximately 9:30 p.m.
on April 23, 2024, Ms. Wilson was working at the McDonald’s when she saw Mr.
Ramatoulay, who “had . . . a bag.” At approximately 10:00 p.m., Ms. Wilson went to the
women’s restroom. 	While Ms. Wilson was in the restroom, she heard what “sounded
definitely like a fight” and “a lot of like banging around.” 	Ms. Wilson asked a “male
manager” to check the men’s restroom, but when “he went and checked it, . . . no one was
in there.” 	Later, Ms. Wilson saw Mr. Ramatoulay “outside” and “smoking a cigarette.”
Ms. Wilson testified: “He was just like panting and stuff. Like you could tell he was kind
of like upset or something, and I just pretty much told him I don’t know what’s going on
but just go home.” At approximately 10:30 p.m., Ms. Wilson “heard three gunshots,” and
“had everybody go to the back.” Approximately three minutes later, Ms. Wilson “went out
to the lobby,” “saw the guy on the floor,” and called 911. The State also produced evidence
that Mr. Nocar died of “two gunshot wounds to [his] head.”
Following the close of the State’s case, defense counsel stated:

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Your Honor, at this time, the Defense would respectfully make a
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to each and every count in the
indictment. 	Your Honor, count 1 alleges second-degree murder. 	Even
looking at the evidence in a light that is favorable to the State, Your Honor,
the State has not met their burden as far as showing an intent to kill, an intent
to commit serious bodily harm, and there were certainly 	justified or
mitigating circumstances.
Count 2 is manslaughter. Your Honor, here, the – even looking at the
evidence in a light that is favorable to the State, the level of force here was
appropriate. 	The Defendant was not the aggressor in either encounter, per
the State’s witnesses, and there’s obviously a subjective fear because of the
evidence of feces in that clothing that Mr. [Ramatoulay] was wearing.
Your Honor, Count 3 is first-degree assault. 	The State has not met
their burden to show that there was an intent to cause serious physical injury.
Jump to Count 5, attempted first-degree murder. 	There was not a
substantial step toward completing this offense. 	There was no apparent
ability to inflict harm.
Count 6, attempted second-degree murder, Your Honor, even looking
at the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the State has not met
their burden to show there was an intent to kill or do serious bodily harm.
And again, as far as first-degree assault, Your Honor, Count 7, the
State has not met their burden to show there was an intent to cause serious
physical injury.
Count 8 and 9, Your Honor, and 10, I would submit, as well as 11.
Your Honor, 12, the State has not met their burden to show that the behavior
here engaged in was reckless, nor did it cause substantial risk or serious – or
a threat of death or serious physical injury, even looking at the evidence in a
light most favorable to the State. So Your Honor, I’d ask the Court to grant
our motion as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 for those specific reasons, and generally,
Your Honor, I’d ask the Court to grant our request as to all the charges,
incorporating this argument.
The court denied the motion.
Mr. Ramatoulay contends that because “[i]t is clear from the evidence that [he] acted
under the provocation of two successive physical attacks, . . . any rational juror would

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conclude that he did not possess the malice required for second degree murder or attempted
first-degree murder,” and hence, the court erred in denying the motion for judgment of
acquittal. 	The State counters that Mr. Ramatoulay’s contention “is not preserved for
appellate review,” or alternatively, the court “properly denied” the motion.
We disagree with the State as to whether Mr. Ramatoulay’s contention is preserved
for our review. 	It is true that defense counsel, in his argument in support of the motion,
did not state with particularity that Mr. Ramatoulay “did not possess the malice required
for” the offenses of second degree murder or attempted first degree murder. 	See Rule 4-
324(a) (“[t]he defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why [a motion for
judgment of acquittal] should be granted”). But, defense counsel argued with particularity
that the State did not meet its “burden as far as showing an intent to kill [or] commit serious
bodily harm.” 	This argument is the effective equivalent of an argument that Mr.
Ramatoulay did not possess the malice required for the specified offenses, and hence, his
contention is before us.
Nevertheless, we reject the contention. 	The State produced evidence that Mr.
Ramatoulay carried into the McDonald’s a bag containing a gun. 	After the initial
altercation between Mr. Ramatoulay and Mr. Waid and his companions in the men’s
restroom of the McDonald’s, Ms. Wilson observed that Mr. Ramatoulay “was kind of . . .
upset.” Despite Ms. Wilson’s advice to Mr. Ramatoulay that he “go home,” he stayed at
the McDonald’s. When Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar entered the restroom a second time and
encountered Mr. Ramatoulay, he asked Mr. Waid and Mr. Nocar if they “would like to see
what was in the bag,” from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Mr. Ramatoulay

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intended to produce the gun. 	Mr. Ramatoulay fired multiple shots at Mr. Nocar’s head,
and we have stated that “directing a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human anatomy
can give rise to a permitted inference of an intent to kill[.]” Harvey v. State, 111 Md. App.
401, 413 (1996). 	Also, when Mr. Waid fled the restroom, Mr. Ramatoulay pursued him
and fired multiple additional shots. 	From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ramatoulay intended to kill or commit
serious bodily harm upon Mr. Nocar and Mr. Waid, and hence, the court did not err in
denying the motion for judgment of acquittal.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR 	HARFORD 	COUNTY 	AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.