Garden Langley, LLC & Victory Langley, LLC v. Board of Assessors of the City of Quincy (August 11, 2016)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPELLATE TAX BOARD


GARDEN LANGLEY, LLC 	   v.	   BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF   
VICTORY LANGLEY, LLC			   THE CITY OF QUINCY
					
	         
Docket Nos.: F316946-F316955		   Promulgated:
		   F318565-F318574		   August 11, 2016


	These are appeals filed under the formal procedure, pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the City of Quincy ("appellee" or "assessors") to abate taxes on certain real estate in Quincy, owned by and assessed to Garden Langley LLC and Victory Langley LLC ("appellants") under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 ("fiscal years at issue").  
	Commissioner Chmielinski heard these appeals. Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose and Good joined him in the decisions for the appellee.  
	These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request of the appellants under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32. 

	David G. Saliba, Esq. for the appellants.
	
Peter Moran, Chairman and Marion Fantucchio, Assistant Assessor for the appellee. 

Findings of Fact and Report

Introduction and Jurisdiction
On the basis of all of the evidence, including the testimony and documentary exhibits entered into the record, the Appellate Tax Board ("Board") found the following facts.  
On January 1, 2011 and January 1, 2012, the relevant assessment dates for the fiscal years at issue, the appellants were the assessed owners of ten separately assessed parcels of land, which collectively comprise 2.04 acres, improved with multifamily structures.  The ten parcels are separately identified by the appellee as Parcel Numbers 5075H/28/10, 5075/27/9, 5075/25/8A, 5075/23/7A, 5075H/21/6A, 5075H/13/1, 5075/14/2, 5075H/15/3A, 5075/17/4A and 5075/19/5A, and are located at 191 and 201 Fenno Street and 7-30 Langley Circle in the City of Quincy (collectively the "subject property").  
For fiscal year 2012, the assessors separately valued the ten parcels that comprise the subject property in the collective amount of $5,848,800 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $13.75 per thousand, in the total amount of $80,421.00.  The appellants paid the tax assessed without incurring interest.  On January 5, 2012, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellants timely filed an abatement application for each individual parcel with the assessors, which they denied on April 5, 2012.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, the appellants seasonably filed a separate Petition with the Board for each of the subject parcels on June 21, 2012.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals for fiscal year 2012.
For fiscal year 2013, the assessors separately valued the subject property's ten parcels in the collective amount of $5,668,000 and assessed a tax thereon, at the rate of $14.50 per thousand, in the total amount of $82,186.00.  The appellants paid the tax due without incurring interest.  On January 7, 2013, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 59, the appellants timely filed an abatement application for each individual parcel with the assessors, which they denied on January 8, 2013.  In accordance with G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, the appellants seasonably filed a separate Petition with the Board for each of the subject parcels on February 13, 2013.  On the basis of these facts, the Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeals for fiscal year 2013.
The subject property is situated in the northeasterly section of Quincy and is part of the South Shore/Route 128 apartment submarket.  Primary access to the area is provided by Interstate 93 (the Southeast Expressway), a major route that crosses the Boston metro area in a north/south direction.  Logan International Airport is located about 11 miles from the subject property.  Public transportation is provided to the area by way of commuter rail, rapid transit, bus service and commuter boat service to Boston and surrounding communities.
The subject property's neighborhood is urban and the land uses include a mix of residential, institutional and open space.  The subject property abuts the Beachwood Knoll Elementary School to the north, the Black Creek Salt Marsh to the east, and one- and two-family residential units to the south and west.  Eastern Nazarene College is about a half mile away, as is access to the MBTA subway.  The subject property is within walking distance to the Quincy Shore Drive beaches.  
The subject property is improved with 10 three-story, four-plex buildings, each containing 4 dwelling units, for a total of 40 units that are collectively known as the Langley Circle Apartments.  Each building is a wood-frame structure that was built in 1945 and is of average construction quality and condition.  The buildings' exteriors are brick and vinyl clapboard and the roofs are composed of asphalt shingles over wood sheathing.  The buildings are situated around Langley Circle, a paper-street, pedestrian walkway with a centrally located courtyard.  
The buildings together contain a gross living area of 35,129 square feet and a rentable floor area of 28,528 square feet.  All of the units have two bedrooms and one bathroom.  Sixteen units contain 784 square feet of gross living area and the remaining twenty-four units contain 666 square feet.  Each building has a common entry hallway, plaster interior walls and hardwood flooring.  The kitchens are all furnished with a gas stove, dishwasher (but no garbage disposal), formica countertops and backsplashes, and old-style cabinets.  There is one shared laundry facility in the basement of 201 Fenno Street.  For all of the large units and for three of the smaller units, the landlord includes the cost of heat in the tenants' rent; the remaining twenty-one small units require the tenants to pay directly for the cost of the oil heat.  The units also include either a shared or a private balcony.  The units' amenities are basic, typical of older buildings.  Each unit also has one parking space in a parking garage plus unlimited unassigned outdoor parking along the rear street.
The appellants presented its case-in-chief through the testimony and appraisal report of Edward K. Wadsworth, whom the Board qualified as an expert in the area of real estate valuation, and the testimony of Alan Slawsby, the property manager for the subject property.  
Mr. Wadsworth began with an analysis of the highest and best use for the subject property.  Mr. Wadsworth testified that "although there are ten separate sites each improved with a four-unit apartment structure the property has always been operated as a single entity apartment complex" and that this 40-unit arrangement "forms the basis of our valuation."  Mr. Wadsworth testified that in forming his opinion, he had relied on Mason v. Assessors of Winchester, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2004-110, 111, an appeal "involving fifty-one contiguous, but separately assessed and taxed, parcels," each improved with a two-story duplex apartment building, for a total of 100 rental units.  In that appeal, the buildings at issue sat on smaller lots than other two-family properties in their vicinity, and substantial retrofitting would have been required to renovate the property so as to compete with other two-families in its area.  Id. at 2004-119.  Approximately ten-percent of the units were rented to low-income tenants. Id. at 2004-115.  Moreover, the property there was located in a "relatively undesirable location" and thus would have a diminished market appeal to prospective buyers.  Id. at 2004-119.  Finally, conversion to independently owned two-family housing would have required a "lengthy and costly" conversion process.  Id. at 2004-128.  The Board in Mason therefore agreed that the property's highest and best use was its continued collective use as a rental garden-style apartment complex.  Id.  
In the instant appeal, while Mr. Wadsworth made mention of the traditional highest-and-best-use factors of physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally productive, he did not analyze those factors and instead relied on the subject property's supposed similarity to the property in Mason and simply assumed that the highest and best use of the subject property was what he deemed to be its current use as a single 40-unit structure.  Mr. Wadsworth never considered analyzing a highest-and-best use as ten separate four-unit complexes.  
Mr. Wadsworth next selected the income-capitalization approach for valuing the subject property.  He first selected rental properties from Quincy that he found to be comparable to the subject property, as valued as a collective 40-unit apartment complex.  For fiscal year 2012, Mr. Wadsworth selected thirteen properties, with eight of these properties considered to be more comparable.  Mr. Wadsworth testified that he looked only for apartment complexes with greater than 25 rental units.  All of the properties had apartments consisting of four rooms with two bedrooms and one full bathroom.  The first eight comparable rentals ranged in monthly rentals from $925 to $1,250 with an average rent per month of $1,250.  For fiscal year 2013, Mr. Wadsworth selected twelve rental properties from Quincy that he found to be comparable to the subject property as valued as a 40-unit apartment complex, with eight of these properties considered to be more comparable.  All of the properties had four rooms with two bedrooms and one full bathroom.  The first eight comparable rentals ranged in monthly rentals from $925 to $1,250 with an average rent per month of $1,250.  
In analyzing these comparables, Mr. Wadsworth opined that they needed no adjustments for features including, but not limited to, unit size or amenities.  He calculated a gross potential rent for both fiscal years, deducted a vacancy and collection allowance (3% for both fiscal years at issue), added in laundry and other income, and arrived at an effective gross income of $566,756, or $14,169 per unit, for each fiscal year.
Mr. Wadsworth then used the subject property's actual expenses to project expenses for the fiscal years at issue, which he deducted from effective gross income to calculate a net operating income for each fiscal year at issue.  
Finally, Mr. Wadsworth developed his capitalization rates by reviewing national investor surveys and performing a band-of-investment analysis.  Mr. Wadsworth reconciled his analyses and settled on a capitalization rate of 7.80% for fiscal year 2012 and 7.40% for fiscal year 2013.  After applying his capitalization rates to the respective effective gross incomes, Mr. Wadsworth's final opinions of value for the subject property, assessed as a 40-unit apartment complex, were $3,900,000 for fiscal year 2012 and $4,100,000 for fiscal year 2013.  
The appellants' second witness was Alan Slawsby, the property manager of the subject property.  Mr. Slawsby testified that he has served as the property manager since 1992.  He admitted that the subject property's owners do not charge as high of a rental price as, in Mr. Slawsby's opinion, they could obtain on the market because the owners "[don't] like vacancies."  In Mr. Slawsby's opinion, the subject property is "tired" and in need of updating, particularly its 60-amp service, which he testified has been a source of many problems, particularly when tenants brought in air conditioning units.  Other issues he cited were the buildings' lack of insulation and the very outdated kitchens.
Mr. Slawsby next testified that he has managed the subject property as a unified rental entity.  He testified to the many facts that, in his opinion, supported its historical function as a unified rental complex, including: a common laundry area; a single building superintendent who responds to emergencies and performs repairs and maintenance; a common courtyard; and one master insurance policy.  On cross-examination, however, Mr. Slawsby admitted that the subject property's insurance coverage is on a per-building basis with separate policies for each of the ten buildings, as opposed to a single policy offering blanket coverage of the subject property.  He also admitted that there are separate water and sewer service and bills for each building.
The appellee then presented its case-in-chief through the testimony of three witnesses - Paul Hines, the Assistant City Attorney; Kevin Spellman, an appraiser; and Marion Fantucchio, a member of the Board of Assessors of Quincy.  
The Board qualified Mr. Hines to be an expert in local real estate law.  Mr. Hines stated that, according to property plans registered with the Land Court since the 1940s, the subject property consists of 10 separate parcels with separate deeds that could legally be sold individually and independently of each other.  He further testified that the subject property's use as a collective apartment complex consisting of ten separate duplexes is actually a non-conforming use under the current zoning restrictions, as the subject property is located in an area that has been zoned for multifamily houses.
Next, the Board qualified Mr. Spellman as an expert in the area of residential appraising, but with the understanding that Mr. Spellman's license restricts him to appraising one-to-four- family residences and land uses.  Mr. Spellman appraised two of the subject structures, 191 Fenno Street and 25 Langley Circle, as representative of the other eight buildings.  Mr. Spellman performed a sales-comparison analysis for both structures for fiscal year 2012.  For 191 Fenno Street, he used three sales of purportedly comparable four-family properties located in Quincy less than a mile away from the subject property.  His analysis is summarized below:
Property	132 Green Street	Adj.	70 Champan Street	Adj.	18 Newport Avenue	Adj.		Sale price	$475,000		$517,000		$575,000			Sale date	05/09/2010	-$ 8,300	08/20/2010	-$ 5,200	12/23/2010			Property size	9,018 sf		4,000 sf	 $10,000	5,752 sf	 $10,000		Location	Average,
Dead end		Inferior,
Commercial	 $25,000	Average, dead end			Construction quality	Average,
Masonry		Average,
Frame	 $25,000	Average, frame	 $25,000		Gross living area
rooms/bed/bath	3,172 sf
18/8/4	 $ 28,400	3,392 sf
16/8/4	 $17,400	3,696 sf
16/8/4			Below-grade finished area	Crawl, exposed earth	 $ 75,000	Full, unfinished		Full, unfinished			Heating/cooling	4-unit FWA gas/1 meter		4-unit, steam oil; no cooling	-$15,000	1-unit, steam oil; no cooling			Garage/carport	None	 $ 10,000	None	 $10,000	2-car detached	 $  5,000		Net adjustments		 $105,100		 $67,200		 $ 40,000		Adjusted sales price	$580,100		$584,200		$615,000	 		
Mr. Spellman's comparables yielded an adjusted sales range from $580,100 to $615,000.  Mr. Spellman concluded that $590,000 was the fair market value of 191 Fenno Street for fiscal year 2012.  The 191 Fenno Street parcel was assessed at $593,600 for fiscal year 2012. 
Mr. Spellman next performed a sales-comparison analysis for 25 Langley Circle, which was just under 200 square feet smaller than the 191 Fenno Street property.  Mr. Spellman's analysis utilized the same three purportedly comparable properties in Quincy.  His analysis is summarized below:
Property	132 Green Street	Adj.	70 Champan Street	Adj.	18 Newport Avenue	Adj.		Sale price	$475,000		$517,000		$575,000			Sale date	05/09/2010	-$ 8,300	08/20/2010	-$ 5,200	12/23/2010			Property size	9,018 sf		4,000 sf	 $10,000	5,752 sf	 $10,000		Location	Average,
Dead end		Inferior,
Commercial	 $25,000	Average, dead end			Construction quality	Average,
Masonry		Average,
Frame	 $25,000	Average, frame	 $25,000		Gross living area
rooms/bed/bath	3,172 sf
18/8/4	 $20,200	3,392 sf
16/8/4	 $ 9,200	3,696 sf
16/8/4	-$ 6,100		Below-grade finished area	Crawl, exposed earth	 $75,000	Full, unfinished		Full, unfinished			Heating/cooling	4-unit FWA gas/1 meter		4-unit, steam oil; no cooling	-$15,000	1-unit, steam oil; no cooling			Garage/carport	None	 $10,000	None	 $10,000	2-car detached	 $ 5,000		Net adjustments		 $96,900		 $59,000		 $33,900		Adjusted sales price	$571,900		$576,000		$608,900	 		
Mr. Spellman's comparables yielded an adjusted sales range from $571,900 to $608,900.  Mr. Spellman concluded that $580,000 was the fair market value of 25 Langley Circle for fiscal year 2012.  The 25 Langley Street parcel was assessed at $585,500 for fiscal year 2012.  
Mr. Spellman then addressed his opinion of the highest and best use of the subject property.  In his opinion, the subject's highest and best use was consistent with its assessment as 10 separate 4-family structures, because in this way the property was maximally productive.  He further opined it likely that a buyer would want to buy all 10 structures together.  On cross-examination, Mr. Spellman admitted that he did not perform a highest-and-best use analysis based on the four factors of physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally productive.  Rather, he assumed that the subject assessment accurately reflected the subject property's highest and best use.
The appellee's final witness was Ms. Fantucchio, an assessor with the appellee.  Ms. Fantucchio submitted property record cards produced and maintained by the appellee reflecting the sales of distinct four-family brick buildings.  First, she presented sales evidence for 43 and 51 Newton Avenue, two separate adjacent properties improved with four-family residences each with one bedroom.  These purportedly comparable properties were separately assessed and sold by separate deeds but reportedly as part of a package sale to the same buyer on March 31, 2011, each for $525,000.  Ms. Fantucchio next presented sales evidence for 371 and 365 Beale Street.  These were also two separate four-family, one-bedroom residences that sold by separate deed but as part of a package sale to the same buyer.  These properties sold on February 28, 2012, each for $612,500.  Finally, she presented evidence for 902 Furnace Brook Parkway and 5 Common Street, two separate adjacent properties improved with four-family residences, each with two bedrooms, which sold by separate deeds but as part of a package sale to the same buyer on October 31, 2012, each for $692,500.   
On the basis of the evidence submitted, the Board ultimately found that the appellants did not meet their burden of proving values for the subject property that were less than its assessed values for both fiscal years at issue.  First, the appellants failed to establish a highest and best use that was different from the highest and best use on which the assessment and taxation of the subject property had been based since its construction.  Mr. Wadsworth never conducted an analysis of the subject property's highest and best use, relying instead on the subject property's supposed similarity with the property in Mason.  However, there exist significant differences between the subject property and the property at issue in Mason.  Unlike the subject property, the Mason property functioned as a typical apartment complex, including several low-income units that added to the general semblance of an apartment complex.  Moreover, unlike the Mason property, which would have required lengthy and costly conversion costs, the subject property was located in a district zoned for multifamily purposes and it was already functioning as separate multifamily units, with separate deeds registered in Land Court as well as separate insurance policies and utility services and billings for each building.     
The Board also found fatal shortcomings in Mr. Wadsworth's valuation evidence.  Mr. Wadsworth did not provide any adjustments to his market-survey rents to account for differences between his purportedly comparable properties and the subject property that would affect rental income, nor did he present any market data on his expenses.  Absent adjustments to his comparable properties' rents and market data supporting his expenses, the Board found that the appellants' valuation evidence did not provide a reliable indicator of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.
Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the appellee in these appeals.

OPINION
The assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price on which a willing seller and a willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).
The appellants have the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed.  "'The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax.'"  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  "[T]he board is entitled to 'presume that the valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the taxpayers . . . prov[e] the contrary.'" General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 598 (1984) (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245). 
"Prior to valuing the subject property, its highest and best use must be ascertained, which has been defined as the use for which the property would bring the most."  Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Assessors of Agawam, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-859, 875 (citing Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 541, 542-43 (1903)); Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors of Boston, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 838, 843 (1989)(and the cases cited therein). "[T]he phrase 'highest and best use' implies the selection of a single use . . . and . . . the Board is required to make its best judgment as to what that use is likely to be, considering all the evidence presented."  New England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Assessors of Framingham, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1988-95, 150.  In determining the property's highest and best use, consideration should be given to the purpose for which the property is adapted.  See Leen v. Assessors of Boston, 345 Mass. 494, 504 (1963); Boston Gas Co., 334 Mass. at 566.  A property's highest and best use must be legally permissible, physically possible, financially feasible, and maximally productive.  Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal Of Real Estate 277-81 (13th ed., 2008); see also Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 684, 687 (1972);  DiBaise v. Town of Rowley, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 928 (1992).  Property cannot be valued on the basis of hypothetical or future uses that are remote or speculative.  See Skyline Homes, 362 Mass. at 687; Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 518 (1952); Salem Country Club, Inc. v. Peabody Redevelopment Authority, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 435 (1986).  
In the instant appeals, the appellants' expert witness, relying primarily on the subject property's supposed similarity to the property in Mason, assumed that the subject property's highest and best use was as a single apartment complex with 40 units.  However, the appellants failed to establish a highest and best use that was different from the use on which the assessment and taxation of the subject property had been based since its construction, particularly where Mr. Wadsworth never conducted an actual highest-and-best-use analysis. Mr. Wadsworth offered no analysis of any of the highest-and-best-use factors:  physically possible, legally permissible, financially feasible, and maximally productive.  See Appraisal Institute, The Appraisal Of Real Estate at 277-81.  
Furthermore, the Board noted crucial differences between the subject property and the property at issue in Mason, relied upon by the appellants as its principal support.  The evidence in that appeal established that the property there would require substantial, expensive retrofitting as well as a lengthy and costly conversion to be sold as separate multi-family residences.  Mason, Mass.  ATB  Findings of Fact and Reports 2004-119.  Moreover, the property in Mason involved the presence of several low-income housing units, further bestowing on that property the general semblance of an apartment complex.  Also unlike in Mason, the subject property the subject property is already functioning as separate multifamily units, with separate deeds registered in Land Court as well as separate insurance policies and utility services and billings for each building.  Finally, the subject property is located in a district zoned for multifamily purposes and therefore, its use as a unified 40-unit apartment complex would actually be a nonconforming use. 
Generally, real estate valuation experts, the Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost reproduction.  Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978).  "The board is not required to adopt any particular method of valuation," Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 447, 449 (1986), but the income capitalization method "is frequently applied with respect to income-producing property."  Taunton Redev. Assocs. v. Assessors of Taunton, 393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984).  
The income-capitalization method is appropriate for valuing a commercial income-producing property.  Taunton Redev. Assocs., 393 Mass. at 295.  Under the income-capitalization approach, valuation is determined by dividing net operating income by a capitalization rate.  See Assessors of Brookline v. Buehler, 396 Mass. 520, 522-23 (1986).  After accounting for vacancy and rent losses, the net-operating income is obtained by deducting the appropriate expenses.  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 397 Mass. at 452-453.  The capitalization rate should reflect the return on investment necessary to attract investment capital.  Taunton Redev. Assocs., 393 Mass. at 295.
Imputing rental income to the subject property based on fair market rentals from comparable properties is evidence of value if, once adjusted, they are indicative of the subject property's earning capacity.  See Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Auth., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 289, 293-94 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 375 Mass. 360 (1978); Library Services, Inc. v. Malden Redevelopment Auth., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 877, 878 (1980)(rescript).  In the instant appeals, however, Mr. Wadsworth offered no adjustments to his market survey rental incomes that would compensate for differences between his purportedly comparable rental properties and the subject property.  The Board thus found that his unadjusted rental figures lacked probative value.
Under the income-capitalization approach, the expenses should also reflect the market.  General Electric Co., 393 Mass. at 610; see Olympia & York State Street Co., 428 Mass. at 239, 245.  However, Mr. Wadsworth did not present any market data on expenses.  He failed to offer any concrete explanations or market-source data, and he thus failed to corroborate the subject property's actual expenses with market data.  Therefore, the Board found that Mr. Wadsworth's vacancy and other operating expenses were unsupported and thus unpersuasive. 
Absent an analysis of the subject property's highest and best use, adjustments to his purportedly comparable rental properties' rents, and any market data to support the subject property's actual expenses, the Board found that Mr. Wadsworth's appraisal report did not provide a reliable indicator of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.
The burden of proving a value that is lower than the assessed value is firmly on the appellants.  See Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 245.  The Board thus found and ruled that the appellants failed to meet their burden of proving a value for the subject property that was less than its assessed value for both fiscal years at issue.  
Accordingly, the Board issued decisions for the appellee in these appeals.

  THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD



By: _________________________________       
  Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman 





A true copy,


Attest: ________________________
	      Clerk of the Board

	

 This amount does not include the Community Preservation Act ("CPA") surcharge of $666.71.
 This amount does not include the CPA surcharge of $676.87.
 Mr. Spellman had completed a second appraisal report for fiscal year 2011, but that fiscal year is not before the Board as part of this appeal.  He did not complete an appraisal for fiscal year 2013.

ATB 2016-354