Ronald A. Gacicia v. Board of Assessors of the City of Boston (September 20, 2013)

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPELLATE TAX BOARD

RONALD A. GACICIA           v.	   BOARD OF ASSESSORS OF 	   THE CITY OF BOSTON

Docket No. F310670              	   Promulgated:
							   September 20, 2013
 
	This is an appeal filed under the formal procedure pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the refusal of the appellee, Board of Assessors of the City of Boston ("assessors" or "appellee"), to abate taxes on certain real estate located in the City of Boston owned by and assessed to Ronald A. Gacicia ("Mr. Gacicia" or "appellant" ) under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for the fiscal year 2011 ("fiscal year at issue").
	Commissioner Mulhern heard the appeal and issued a single-member decision for the appellee in accordance with G.L. c. 58A, § 1A and 831 CMR 1.20.
 These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 1.32.

Ronald A. Gacicia, pro se, for the appellant.
Nicholas Ariniello, Esq. for the appellee.  
FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT
On the basis of testimony and documents offered into evidence at the hearing of this appeal, Commissioner Mulhern ("Presiding Commissioner") made the following findings of fact. 
On January 1, 2010, the appellant was the assessed owner of a condominium unit located at 151 Tremont Street, Unit 7A ("subject property").  For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the subject property at $438,768 and assessed a tax thereon, at the residential real estate rate of $12.79 per thousand, in the total amount of $5,611.84.  The appellant timely paid the tax due without incurring any interest.  On January 19, 2011, the appellant timely filed an Application for Abatement with the assessors for the tax year at issue.  On March 15, 2011, the assessors denied the appellant's abatement application.  On March 28, 2011, the appellant seasonably filed an appeal with the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board ("Board").  On the basis of these facts, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and decide this appeal.  
The subject property is located within the condominium complex known as Tremont on the Common.  The subject property is located at the rear of the condominium complex and does not enjoy views of the Boston Common but instead faces the rear of the Boston Opera House.  The property record card lists the subject property's view as "fair." 
According to the property record card on file with the assessors, the subject property was constructed in 1968 and remodeled in 1983.  It contains 800 square feet of living space and is comprised of three rooms, including one bedroom and a "one-person" kitchen, as well as one full bathroom.  The kitchen and bathroom are both described as "semi-modern," and the subject property is rated as in overall "average" condition.  Other amenities listed on the property record card include a 60-square-foot balcony and a deeded indoor parking spot, which the appellee assessed at $55,200, with the remaining $383,568 being the assessment for the condominium unit.  The appellant also admitted in testimony that he had a second parking spot for the subject property which was not listed on the property record card.    
The appellant contended that the subject property was overvalued.  He submitted evidence, including the certified deeds and the property record cards, for six purportedly comparable units from the subject property's condominium complex.  Like the subject property, all of the purportedly comparable properties were built in 1968 and renovated in 1983.  Each of the units was also located at the rear of the building, but on higher floors than the subject property.  The specific features of each comparable-sale property are described below.
Comparable One is Unit 12C, a one-bedroom unit containing 735 square feet of living area.  Unit 12C includes a modern, "one-person" kitchen and one full luxury bathroom.  However, unlike the subject property, Unit 12C does not include a balcony or a parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 12C as in average overall condition with an "average" view.  Unit 12C sold on March 17, 2009 for $385,000.  It was assessed at $447,664 for the fiscal year at issue.
Comparable Two is Unit 15U, a one-bedroom unit containing 740 square feet of living area.  Unit 15U includes a semi-modern, "one-person" kitchen and one full bathroom.  Unit 15U also includes a 91-square-foot balcony, but unlike the subject it does not include a parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 15U as in average overall condition with a "good" view.  Unit 15U sold on April 18, 2009 for $375,000.  It was assessed at $439,166 for the fiscal year at issue.
Comparable Three is Unit 16C, a one-bedroom unit containing 735 square feet of living area.  Unit 16C includes a "one-person" kitchen and one full bathroom, neither of which have been remodeled and are in average condition.  Unlike the subject property, Unit 16C does not include a balcony or a parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 16C as in average overall condition with a "good" view.  Unit 16C sold on March 2, 2009 for $365,000.  It was assessed at $439,900 for the fiscal year at issue.
Comparable Four is Unit 21C, a one-bedroom unit containing 735 square feet of living area.  Unit 21C includes a semi-modern, "one-person" kitchen and one full bathroom.  Unit 21C does not have a balcony but does have one indoor parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 21C as in average overall condition with a "good" view.  Unit 21C sold on January 21, 2010 for $360,000.  This price did not include the indoor parking spot; that was offered for sale for an additional $69,000.  Unit 21C's total assessment for the fiscal year at issue was $456,300, including the parking spot.
Comparable Five is Unit 22C, a one-bedroom unit containing 735 square feet of living area.  Unit 22C includes a semi-modern, "one-person" kitchen and one full bathroom.  However, unlike the subject property, Unit 22C does not include a balcony or a parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 22C as in average overall condition with a "good" view.  Unit 22C sold for $363,000 on February 16, 2010.  It was assessed at $442,764 for the fiscal year at issue.
Comparable Six is Unit 9B, a one-bedroom unit containing 735 square feet of living area.  Unit 9B includes a semi-modern, "one-person" kitchen and a semi-modern full bathroom.  Unit 9B also includes a 91-square-foot balcony, but unlike the subject property it does not include a parking spot.  The property record card lists Unit 9B as in average overall condition with an "average" view.  Unit 9B sold on June 25, 2009 for $338,812.50.  It was assessed at $385,392 for the fiscal year at issue.
The appellant compiled his data into a table that compared the differences between the comparable units' sales prices and their assessed values.  He calculated a price per square foot for each of the comparable properties and then calculated an average price-per-square-foot value of $502.13.  The appellant then determined that the price per square foot for the subject property should be adjusted down to $450 to account for the subject property's lower floor and proximity to the Opera House and, therefore, its inferior view and to account for its lack of any major renovation.  The $450 per-square-foot value produced an overall value of $360,000 for the fiscal year at issue.  The appellant concluded that the subject property was over-valued by $78,768.  The appellant also contended that the indoor parking spot should not be included in the subject assessment.
On the basis of the evidence presented, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant did not meet his burden of proving over-valuation.  Specifically the appellant failed to adequately account for the significant value added to the subject property by his two parking spaces.  Even assuming, for the sake of argument that the appellant's unit should have been valued at $450 per square foot, or $360,000, including the value of the two parking spaces would result in a value well in excess of the assessed value.  
Moreover, the Presiding Commissioner disagreed with the appellant's adjustment for the subject property's lack of renovation vis-à-vis his comparable-sale properties.  Instead, the Presiding Commissioner found that the subject property's semi-modern kitchen and bathroom were in comparable or even superior condition to that of Comparables Two, Three, Four, Five and Six.  The average of the comparable-properties' sale prices was $364,468.75.  The Presiding Commissioner found that the $383,568 assessed value for the appellant's unit without consideration of the parking spaces was within the range of the comparable-sale properties' sale prices. 
Therefore, on the basis of the evidence of record, and as will be more fully explained in the following Opinion, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving a fair market value for the subject property that was less than the subject assessment.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the appellee in the instant appeal.
 
OPINION
	Assessors are required to assess real estate at its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is defined as the price at which a willing seller and a willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956).	 
	The appellant has the burden of proving that the property has a lower value than that assessed.  See Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974).  "The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the tax."  Id. (quoting Judson Freight Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)).  In appeals before the Board, a "'taxpayer may present persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing flaws or errors in the assessors' method of valuation, or by introducing affirmative evidence of value which undermines the assessors' valuation.'"  General Electric Co. v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 (1983)). 
	In the present appeal, the appellant argued that the assessors had overvalued the subject property for the fiscal year at issue.  In support of his argument, the appellant submitted	sales and assessment data relating to six units from the subject property's condominium complex.  The Board has consistently held that "[t]he fair cash value of property may often best be determined by recent sales of comparable properties in the market."  Graham v. Assessors of West Tisbury, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2007-321, 394, aff'd, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2008).  With respect to comparable-assessment data, G.L. c. 58A, § 12B provides that "at any hearing relative to the assessed fair cash valuation or classification of property, evidence as to fair cash valuation or classification of property at which assessors have assessed other property of a comparable nature or class shall be admissible."  
	However, adjustments must be made to both sales data and assessed values to account for differences between the subject property and the properties offered for comparison.  Lareau v. Assessors of Norwell, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2010-879, 889-90 (citing Graham, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 2007-402 ("The assessments in a comparable-assessment analysis, like the sale prices in a comparable-sales analysis, must also be adjusted to account for differences with the subject.")); Lupacchino v. Assessors of Southborough, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2008-1253, 1269 ("[W]ithout appropriate adjustments . . . the assessed values of [comparable] properties [do] not provide reliable indicator[s] of the subject's fair cash value."). 
In the instant appeal, the Presiding Commissioner found that the appellant's comparable-sales analysis did not adequately account for key differences between the subject property and his comparable-sale properties, particularly the subject property's two parking spaces and its balcony.  The Presiding Commissioner further disagreed with the appellant's adjustment for the subject property's lack of renovation, finding that several of the comparable-sales properties were equally lacking in updates.  Absent appropriate adjustments, the Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that the appellant's comparable-sales analysis did not provide a reliable indicator of the subject property's fair cash value for the fiscal year at issue.  The Presiding Commissioner further found and ruled that the subject property's assessment for $383,568, not including the appellant's two parking spaces, was within the range suggested by the appellant's comparable-sale properties' sale prices.   
Finally, consideration of the appellant's two parking spots in the Tremont on the Common condominium complex increases the fair cash value well in excess of the assessed value.  The Presiding Commissioner found and ruled that two indoor parking spaces in downtown Boston greatly enhanced the value of the appellant's property and therefore were properly considered in the subject assessment.  






Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the Presiding Commissioner ultimately found that the appellant failed to prove a value lower than the subject assessment for the subject property.  Accordingly, the Presiding Commissioner issued a decision for the appellee.
   
 APPELLATE TAX BOARD



		  	      By:	________________________________
Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman




A true copy,


Attest: __________________________ 
	   Clerk of the Board

 Unit 22C actually sold in two separate transactions with two separate grantors who each presumably held a half interest in the property.  The first sale, for $181,500, occurred on January 25, 2010 and the second sale, for $181,500, occurred on February 16, 2010.

ATB 2013-896