Department of State Police v. Kerry McAuliffe.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule
1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to
the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the
panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to
the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that
decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued
after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of
the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71
Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-276

DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE

vs.

KERRY MCAULIFFE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Kerry McAuliffe, the defendant, appeals from a decision and

order of the Appellate Division of the District Court Department

upholding a finding that he was responsible for failing to have

a vehicle inspection sticker under G. L. c. 90, § 20. We

affirm.

Background. On February 23, 2024, a Massachusetts State

Police trooper saw a vehicle changing lanes without using a turn

signal. The trooper pulled the vehicle over, determined that it

did not have an inspection sticker, and issued the defendant a

citation for failure to have an inspection sticker, a number

plate violation, and failure to signal.
At a District Court hearing on June 27, 2024, the defendant

argued as to the failure to have an inspection sticker that he

was not responsible because he had been improperly cited.

Specifically, the defendant argued that the citation issued to

him by the trooper listed a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20B

(emphasis added), a statute repealed in 1967, rather than G. L.

c. 90, § 20. The District Court judge heard testimony from the

trooper that the defendant admitted at the time of the stop that

he did not have an inspection sticker. The defendant also

conceded that, during the traffic stop, the trooper informed the

defendant verbally of the violation for which he was being

cited. The judge concluded that the defendant had proper notice

that he was cited for a violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20, and

found the defendant responsible.

A panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the District

Court judge's finding that the defendant was responsible for the

failure to have an inspection sticker. The panel reasoned that

the text "90/20/B" on the citation was an "administrative" code

and that the defendant was verbally informed of the reason for

the citation, by the trooper, prior to the hearing.1 This appeal

followed.

1 The District Court docket shows that the Appellate
Division held a hearing, but the panel's decision states it
reviewed "the record before us, including the audio recording of
the judicial hearing." Neither brief refers to an evidentiary

2
Discussion. The defendant argues on appeal that he cannot

be found responsible because he was erroneously charged under

G. L. c. 90, § 20B, a repealed statute, and that the panel of

the Appellate Division erred in concluding that "the reference

to '90/20/B' is just administrative coding." Appellate review

of civil motor vehicle infractions is limited to questions of

law. Burlington Police Dep't v. Hagopian, 100 Mass. App. Ct.

720, 726 (2022); G. L. c. 90C, § 3 (A) (5). Assuming, without

deciding, that the defendant has framed a question of law, our

review is constrained to the question whether the citation gave

the defendant sufficient notice of the statute he was accused of

violating.

We pause to address the fact that the defendant's

contentions are inadequate to rise to the level of appellate

argument. While we are not insensitive to the challenges of

proceeding as a self-represented litigant, such litigants are

bound by the same rules and requirements as represented parties

and are responsible for presenting the materials necessary to

permit meaningful appellate review. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a),

as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019); Brossard v. West Roxbury

Div. of the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184 (1994). The

defendant failed to meet this standard and has advanced

hearing, and no transcript was provided; nothing turns on this
discrepancy.

3
arguments without citation to any legal authority. See Mass.

R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

See also Gaffney v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 423

Mass. 1, 6 n.4 (1996) (conclusory statements in brief do not

rise to level of appellate argument); Zora v. State Ethics

Comm'n, 415 Mass. 640, 642 n.3 (1993) (same).

Notwithstanding, we choose to address whether the evidence

sufficed to establish that the defendant knew he was cited for a

violation of G. L. c. 90, § 20. Review of the citation shows

that under the section labeled "OFFENSE(S)," in a column titled

"description of offense," the defendant was accused of

"INSPECTION STICKER, NO * c90, § 20." This adequately alleged a

violation of § 20 and provided notice to the defendant of the

infraction for which he was cited. Under a column titled

"CHAP/SEC/SUB," the citation also states "A. 90/20/B"; the

defendant argues that the "90/20/B" is a reference to the

repealed statute, G. L. c. 90, § 20B. We disagree. In another

field, describing another infraction with which the defendant

was charged (that is not at issue here), the citation reads

"90/14B," referencing G. L. c. 90, § 14B. Comparing the two

fields shows that no forward slash is used between the number

and the letter when a section of a statute containing a letter

4
is referenced.2 Therefore, we conclude that that the Appellate

Division did not err and we affirm the finding that the

defendant was responsible for the violation of G. L. c. 90,

§ 20.3

Decision and order of the
Appellate Division
affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
Desmond & Allen, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: June 12, 2026.

2 Although it does not affect our conclusion that the
citation adequately charged a violation of § 20, we note that
the "/B" in this column is mysterious. One might expect a
subsection to be listed there, but § 20 has no subsections.
Those who draft and fill out these forms should take care to do
so in a manner that can leave no confusion about the charged
offense.

3 The defendant raises several other issues in his brief,
but as far as we can tell, they were not raised in the Appellate
Division. They are not mentioned in the panel's decision and
are not properly before us. Carey v. New England Organ Bank,
446 Mass. 270, 285 (2006) ("An issue not raised or argued below
may not be argued for the first time on appeal" [citation
omitted]).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

5