Stephanie J. Landvater v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-232

STEPHANIE J. LANDVATER

vs.

MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After a dispute over disability insurance benefits, the

plaintiff, Stephanie J. Landvater, filed suit in the Superior

Court against the defendant, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance

Company (MassMutual). She alleged that MassMutual breached

their contract, breached the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, violated G. L. c. 93A and G. L. c. 176D, and violated a

Vermont insurance regulation. A judge of the Superior Court

entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of MassMutual,

pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c), 365 Mass. 754 (1974).

Landvater appeals, and, discerning no error, we affirm.

Background. Landvater was an orthopedic surgeon who

practiced in Vermont. On September 14, 1992, she purchased a
disability income insurance policy from MassMutual's

predecessor.1 As relevant here, under the policy, if Landvater

became totally disabled and unable to perform her duties as an

orthopedic surgeon, she would become eligible to receive monthly

total disability benefits of $10,125 (Monthly Benefit) until the

expiration of the policy.2 The policy's expiration date was the

policy anniversary "on or next after [Landvater's] 65th

birthday." Because she turned sixty-five in December 2020, the

expiration date was September 14, 2021. After this date, the

policy was no longer in force.

In addition to purchasing this total disability policy,

Landvater also purchased a separate lifetime total disability

rider (Lifetime Rider), for which she paid MassMutual a separate

annual premium.3 The Lifetime Rider was made a part of the

policy. Under the terms of the Lifetime Rider, if Landvater

became totally disabled before the expiration date, she would be

eligible to receive additional disability benefits after the

policy expired. The Lifetime Rider states that if the

1 The predecessor was Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company, which later merged with MassMutual. There is no
dispute that MassMutual is responsible for providing coverage
under the policy terms.

2 The annual premium for this policy was $2,767.59.

3 Landvater paid a separate annual premium of $569.32 for
the Lifetime Rider.

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requirements for eligibility have been met, the benefits will

"start to accrue after the Expiration Date of the Policy."

In 2017, at the age of sixty-two, Landvater became totally

disabled. She applied for total disability benefits; MassMutual

approved her claim and began paying the Monthly Benefit

effective December 2017. In September of 2021, shortly after

Landvater turned sixty-five, MassMutual stopped paying Landvater

the Monthly Benefit and began paying her lifetime total

disability benefit under the Lifetime Rider in the amount of

$3,037.50 per month. Landvater challenged MassMutual's

calculations, contending that under the terms of the Lifetime

Rider, she was entitled to receive payments of $10,125. When

MassMutual refused to adjust her monthly payment, Landvater

filed this suit. A judge of the Superior Court granted

MassMutual's motion for judgment on the pleadings and this

appeal followed.

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. "We review de novo a

judge's order allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings

under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c)." Champa v. Weston Pub. Sch., 473

Mass. 86, 90 (2015), quoting Merriam v. Demoulas Super Mkts.,

Inc., 464 Mass. 721, 726 (2013). "A defendant's rule 12 (c)

motion is actually a motion to dismiss . . . that argues that

the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted." Ridgeley Mgmt. Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Gosnold, 82

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Mass. App. Ct. 793, 797 (2012), quoting Jarosz v. Palmer, 436

Mass. 526, 529 (2002). When determining whether the plaintiff's

claims survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings, just as

in the case of a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P.

12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), the court must "accept as true

the factual allegations in the complaint and the attached

exhibits, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's

favor," and determine if the plaintiff has a plausible claim for

relief. Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real Estate Co., 481

Mass. 13, 17 (2018).

2. Interpretation of insurance policies.4 Landvater's

claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing hinge upon the interpretation of the

language of the policy. "The interpretation of an insurance

policy is a question of law." Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Miville, 491 Mass. 489, 492 (2023), quoting City Fuel Corp. v.

National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 446 Mass. 638, 640 (2006).

"Like all contracts, an insurance policy is to be construed

according to the fair and reasonable meaning of its words." Id.

The provisions of the policy are to be construed "according to

4 We note that the parties agree that Vermont law controls.
We cite to Massachusetts law, however, as the law regarding the
interpretation of the insurance policy is identical in
Massachusetts and Vermont.

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their plain meaning if they are unambiguous." Sullivan v.

Southland Life Ins. Co., 67 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 442 (2006). A

term in an insurance policy "is ambiguous only if it is

susceptible of more than one meaning and reasonably intelligent

persons would differ as to which meaning is the proper one"

(quotation omitted). Id. at 443. Controversy between the

parties does not alone create an ambiguity, "[n]or does the mere

existence of multiple dictionary definitions of a word, without

more, suffice to create an ambiguity, for most words have

multiple definitions" (quotation omitted). Id.

Here, the parties agree that under the plain language of

the policy, Landvater is totally disabled, and her total

disability occurred before the expiration date of the policy.

The exact amount of monthly payment owed to Landvater under the

terms of the Lifetime Rider remains disputed. Landvater claims

that the language of the Lifetime Rider is ambiguous and that

she is entitled to a lifetime monthly payment of $10,125.5

MassMutual, on the other hand, contends that because Landvater's

total disability occurred seven years after she turned fifty-

five years old, under the plain and unambiguous language of the

Lifetime Rider, her lifetime monthly payment is $3,037.50.

5 The policy's annual premium summary lists the amount of
lifetime total disability benefit as $10,125 -- the same as the
Monthly Benefit.

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To determine whether the language is susceptible of two

plausible and reasonable interpretations, we turn to the

specific language of the policy. The Lifetime Rider provides

that "if [Landvater] becomes Totally Disabled before the Policy

Anniversary on or next after his/her 55th birthday, the Total

Disability Benefit will be the Monthly Benefit for this Rider"

(emphasis added). Landvater turned fifty-five years old on

December 8, 2010, and the next policy anniversary was September

14, 2011. This means that if Landvater had become disabled

before September 14, 2011, she would have been entitled to

receive the full $10,125 monthly payment once her original

policy ended and the Lifetime Rider took effect. However, as in

the case here, if Landvater became totally disabled after the

policy anniversary "on or next after his/her 55th birthday, the

Total Disability Benefit will be the Monthly Benefit for this

Rider reduced by ten percent for each year Disability begins,

after such anniversary." This means that the Lifetime Rider

monthly payment would be reduced by ten percent for each year

after September 14, 2011, that Landvater did not become "totally

disabled."

Landvater claims that the language of the Lifetime Rider is

ambiguous and that a reasonable interpretation is that her

monthly payment could be reduced by ten percent at most.

Landvater focuses her analysis on the placement of the comma

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inserted after the term "each year Disability begins" and argues

that because her disability began on only one occasion,

MassMutual could only reduce her benefits one time by ten

percent. We disagree with Landvater's reading of the policy

language. The language of the Lifetime Rider provides that, if

the policy holder is disabled after turning fifty-five years

old, the benefit will be reduced by ten percent for each

anniversary year that elapsed before her disability began.

Simply put, the calculation is based upon the time between the

policy anniversary following the insured's fifty-fifth birthday

and the start of disability. Here, from age sixty-two to age

sixty-five, Landvater was paid the Monthly Benefit of $10,125

under the total disability policy. That benefit terminated on

September 14, 2021. Without the Lifetime Rider, Landvater would

not have been entitled to any further payments. However,

because she purchased the separate benefit of the Lifetime

Rider, Landvater was entitled to receive payments after the

total disability policy expired. Therefore, in September of

2021, the policy anniversary after Landvater reached the age of

sixty-five, she stopped receiving her Monthly Benefit and began

receiving her lifetime monthly payments under the Lifetime

Rider. Since Landvater's disability occurred during the seventh

policy year following the policy anniversary after her fifty-

fifth birthday, her full monthly payment under the Lifetime

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Rider was reduced by seventy percent, which reflects a ten

percent reduction for each year her disability began after the

policy anniversary.

Reviewing Landvater's policy as a whole, we conclude that

its terms are unambiguous. There is but one reasonable

interpretation of the language of the Lifetime Rider and it does

not support Landvater's position. While we agree that the

language in the Lifetime Rider policy could be improved,

"difficulty in comprehension does not equate with ambiguity."

Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Wynn, 60 Mass.

App. Ct. 824, 827 (2004). In sum, MassMutual correctly

calculated Landvater's monthly lifetime payment under the

Lifetime Rider and, as such, judgment on the pleadings was

warranted on Landvater's claims for breach of contract and

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.6

3. Violation of Vermont Administrative Code. Landvater

also argues that MassMutual is in violation of Vermont law

because it fails to meet Vermont's minimum standards of

6 Because MassMutual's calculation of benefits was based on
a good faith -- and correct -- interpretation of the policy
language, Landvater's claim under G. L. c. 93A, based on
standards under G. L. c. 176D, must fail. See McGilloway v.
Safety Ins. Co., 488 Mass. 610, 618 (2021) ("Recovery under
G. L. c. 93A for a violation of G. L. c. 176D, § 3 [9], is
unlikely when [a]n insurance company in good faith denies a
claim of coverage on the basis of a plausible interpretation of
its insurance policy" [quotation omitted]).

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disability coverage. Under a Vermont insurance regulation, once

an insured reaches the age of sixty-two, it is unlawful for an

insurance company to reduce disability benefits by more than

fifty percent based solely upon the age of the insured. See 21-

020-001 Vt. Code R. § 7(F)(1) (1989) (requiring that "periodic

payments" of disability income protection policies "which are

payable at ages after 62 and reduced solely on the basis of age

are at least 50% of amounts payable immediately prior to 62").

Since Landvater's monthly payment under the Lifetime Rider

was the same amount as the Monthly Benefit, reduced by seventy

percent, Landvater concludes that MassMutual is in violation of

Vermont law. MassMutual counters that the pertinent regulation

defines "Disability Income Protection Coverage" as a policy that

provides "periodic payments, weekly or monthly, for a specified

period during the continuance of disability." 21-020-001 Vt.

Code R. § 7(F). MassMutual contends that the regulation is

inapplicable because Landvater's Lifetime Rider provided her

monthly benefits for her life and is not a policy for a

specified period of time. We note that neither party cited, and

we are unaware of, any case that has analyzed the applicability

of this regulation. Nevertheless, assuming without deciding

that this regulation is applicable to the Lifetime Rider at

issue in this case, MassMutual's calculations of benefits did

not run afoul of the regulation. MassMutual did not reduce

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Landvater's Monthly Benefit. Her total disability policy

expired on September 14, 2021. On that same day, because she

purchased the Lifetime Rider, Landvater's new coverage

established a new benefit for her lifetime. The Monthly Benefit

was never reduced. The Lifetime Rider is a separate source of

coverage with a separate and distinct coverage period than that

of the total disability policy, which was no longer in effect.

The fact that the Lifetime Rider calculates the amount paid

using the same Monthly Benefit as used in the total disability

policy (adjusted to reflect the year that disability occurred)

does not change the analysis. Therefore, there was no violation

of Vermont law.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Walsh & Brennan, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: January 23, 2025.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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