COMMONWEALTH vs. SAMANTHA BUCCI.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
25-P-1541
COMMONWEALTH
vs.
SAMANTHA BUCCI.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
On December 2, 2024, a jury found the defendant, Samantha
Bucci, guilty of negligently operating a motor vehicle in
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), and the judge found her
responsible for the civil motor vehicle infraction of speeding
in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 17.1 On appeal, the defendant
contends that the judge erred in denying her motion for a
required finding of not guilty for the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle charge because there was insufficient evidence to
support the negligence element. We affirm.
1 For the negligent operation charge, the defendant received
nine months of administrative probation with a sixty-day license
suspension and was required to complete the "Brains at Risk"
program. The speeding violation was placed on file.

2
Background. On June 11, 2023, the defendant met with her
friends at the Flying Rhino, a restaurant and bar, at 3 P.M. or
4 P.M because she was having a "really emotional day" following
the recent death of her father. She consumed three martinis
from about 6 P.M. to 9 P.M. and then had three tequila shots
under the belief that her friends would drive her car home. She
stopped drinking alcohol between 9:45 P.M. and 11 P.M. After
the Flying Rhino closed at about 9 P.M., the defendant and her
friends went to a karaoke bar across the street, where she
thought they would sing one song and then leave. Her friends
remained at the bar and continued to drink, so she became upset
because she had a difficult day and wanted to go home. The
defendant went back and forth between sitting in her car and
returning to the bar, where she drank water, until about 1:30
A.M. when she retrieved her keys from her friends and began
driving home.2
While the defendant was driving, she was "really upset"
with her friends and spoke to them via a hands-free telephone
call. At about 1:40 A.M., Boylston Police Officer Monaghan, who
was on patrol duty in a stationary marked cruiser on a
residential, "relatively straight road," in Boylston, saw that
the defendant was driving "well in excess of the speed limit"
2 The defendant testified that she did not feel intoxicated
at that time.

3
with a speed fluctuating between the "high 50s" and sixty-eight
miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone. He did not
see the car swerve, cross over lanes, hit the curb, or travel on
the wrong side of the road. The defendant later testified at
trial that she "did not realize how fast [she] was going,
because . . . [her] friends were calling [her]" and she was "so
distraught with [her] friends."
Officer Monaghan initiated a stop, and after a brief delay,
the defendant pulled the vehicle over. The front right tire was
positioned on the sidewalk and off the road.3 Officer Monaghan
approached the vehicle and saw the defendant "fumble[]" with her
wallet as she attempted to retrieve her driver's license. She
provided her documentation and told Officer Monaghan that she
was coming from the Flying Rhino and that she had three martinis
and at least two shots. The officer noticed that her eyes were
"red, glassy and bloodshot" and her speech appeared slurred. He
also noticed an odor of alcohol. He then asked the defendant to
perform a field sobriety test. The area where they conducted
the test was "generally flat," "clear," and "well lit." There
were no other vehicles on the road at the time, and Officer
3 At trial, the defendant testified that she intentionally
positioned her car on the curb "for the safety of the officer"
because she was trying to pull over as far as possible where
there was recent construction on the road. The officer did not
instruct her to pull onto the curb, nor did he direct her to
remove her car from the sidewalk.

4
Monaghan shut off his emergency lights to eliminate the
potential distraction. He briefly demonstrated the "walk and
turn test," and the defendant stated that she understood the
instructions and that she did not have any conditions that would
impair her ability to perform the test. There was a "solid
white painted fog line" for the defendant to follow.
At the start of the test, the defendant stepped out of
starting position. Officer Monaghan instructed her to begin the
test three times, and she finally made her first attempt after
his third request. She took a step, but "immediately stumbled
and lost her balance."4 She "tried one more time, [but] stumbled
more significantly," so he terminated the test. The defendant
told Officer Monaghan, "I knew I shouldn't have had that much.
I'm so fucked. I'm going to get a DUI." Officer Monaghan
formed the opinion that she was intoxicated and placed her under
arrest.
At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved for a
required finding of not guilty for the negligent operation
charge, which the judge denied.5 The jury subsequently found the
4 At trial, the defendant contended that she stumbled
because she was wearing "flip flop" sandals, which got caught in
a "little crack in the road." The officer did not recall her
footwear at trial.
5 The defendant had filed a written motion for a required
finding of not guilty, but she did not present an oral argument
and did not raise the motion until the judge was addressing

5
defendant guilty of negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
This appeal followed.
Discussion. When reviewing a challenge to a denial of a
motion for a required finding of not guilty, we must determine
"whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). To convict
a defendant of negligent operation of a motor vehicle pursuant
to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a), "the Commonwealth must prove that
the defendant (1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon a public way
(3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might
be endangered." Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 377,
379 (2017). The defendant contests only the third element of
negligence.
"A defendant's driving need not have been erratic to
support a conviction of negligent operation, so long as the
conduct, taken as a whole, might have endangered the lives and
safety of the public." Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App.
Ct. 367, 370 (2019). Evidence of intoxication alone or speeding
final jury instructions with the parties. Because the defendant
did not move for a required finding of not guilty until the
close of all of the evidence, we may consider evidence presented
during the defendant's case in determining whether sufficient
evidence supports the conviction. See Commonwealth v. Dustin,
476 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2016).

6
alone cannot independently prove negligent operation, but each
is a factor that can support a conclusion that the defendant
drove negligently. See Commonwealth v. Zagwyn, 482 Mass. 1020,
1022 (2019); Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 379-380.
Here, the defendant argues that neither impairment in
itself nor speeding in itself can establish negligent operation.
The defendant also argues that evidence of her pulling the car
over onto the curb should not be considered in the negligence
analysis because she had pulled onto the sidewalk "for the
safety of the officer." We are not persuaded. Here, the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient such that a rational
fact finder could find that the defendant operated her vehicle
negligently. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 369-370.
The testimony presented at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the
finding of guilty for the negligent operation charge. See
Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. Notably, it is undisputed that the
defendant traveled at a fluctuating speed between the "high 50s"
and sixty-eight miles per hour on a residential road with a
thirty-five mile per hour posted speed limit late at night after
consuming six alcoholic beverages and while engaging in an
emotionally intense telephone call. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App.
Ct. at 370-371; Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381.

7
In Commonwealth v. Ross, the court determined that a
reasonable jury could have concluded that the defendant acted
negligently where he showed signs of intoxication and drove
fifteen miles per hour above the speed limit on a two-lane
residential road lined with trees, poles, and fences. See Ross,
92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381.6 Comparably, here, the defendant
was speeding thirty-three miles per hour over the speed limit
and exhibited signs of intoxication where she admitted to
consuming six alcoholic beverages in a fairly short period of
time, failed a field sobriety test, had an odor of alcohol,
slurred her speech, had eyes that appeared glassy and bloodshot,
drove one wheel of her car onto the sidewalk when pulling over
for the officer, and told the officer, "I knew I shouldn't have
had that much. I'm so fucked. I'm going to get a DUI." See
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392-393 (2017)
(defendant found to be intoxicated where eyes were bloodshot and
glassy, speech slurred, she admitted to drinking three beers,
6 The defendant argues that the court considered the
particular road conditions when making this determination in
Ross, and these conditions were not present when the defendant
was driving. However, the principal issue in Ross was the
sufficiency of the evidence of speeding coupled with
intoxication to support a negligent operation offense. See
Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 377. Nevertheless, the road
conditions that were present during this incident were
comparable to Ross: the defendant was driving at night on a
two-lane residential road. See Ross, supra at 380.

8
parked car diagonally across two spaces, swayed when standing,
and failed two of three field sobriety tests).
While it is true that speeding alone cannot satisfy the
negligence element of negligent operation, excessive speeding
can add considerable weight in determining whether a defendant
operated a vehicle negligently, and here, the defendant was
driving nearly twice the posted speed limit. See Commonwealth
v. Duffy, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 921, 922-923 (2004) (defendant's
speed of more than twice posted speed limit posed risk to lives
and safety of public). Additionally, the defendant admits in
her testimony that she was engaged in a telephone call to the
point that she did not realize how fast she was driving. See
Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 370-371 (defendant could have
endangered public where defendant had consumed alcohol, drove
twenty to twenty-five miles per hour below speed limit, and held
cell phone while driving).7 Furthermore, while a minor civil
infraction coupled with intoxication may not always constitute
negligence, here, the defendant was driving at an excessive,
fluctuating speed while showing signs of intoxication. Contrast
7 While the defendant was not holding her cell phone nor
found in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 13B, the defendant admits
that the emotionally intense telephone call distracted the
defendant from her driving. See Teixeira, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at
370 n.4 (evidence that defendant's use of cell phone "was
definitely a distraction" supported conclusion that defendant
drove negligently).

9
Zagwyn, 482 Mass. at 1022 (scant evidence of faulty vehicle
lights considered with proof of intoxication insufficient to
support negligent operation conviction).
While the defendant also argues that evidence that she
drove one tire of her vehicle onto the curb should not be
considered in determining the defendant's negligence, the
defendant's consumption of alcohol coupled with her being
distracted and speeding is sufficient to establish negligence.
See Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381. Nevertheless, to the
extent that the defendant contends that evidence of her driving
the front wheel of her tire onto the sidewalk was not admissible
as irrelevant, she did not object to that testimony at trial.
See Commonwealth v. Shruhan, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 320, 323-324
(2016). Furthermore, the jury was not required to credit the
defendant's explanation that she pulled onto the curb for the
officer's safety and may reasonably have inferred that she did
so accidentally as a result of driving while intoxicated. See
Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014) ("Where
conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, it is for
the jury to determine where the truth lies" [quotation and
citation omitted]). Cf. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. at 392-393
(parking car crooked across two parking spaces was evidence of
intoxication).

10
Because a rational fact finder could have found that the
defendant operated her vehicle negligently beyond a reasonable
doubt, the motion for a required finding of not guilty was
properly denied. See Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Desmond,
Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.8),
Clerk
Entered: October 9, 2026.
8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.