Patrick O'Reilly Maloy

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

In re:

PATRICK O’REILLY MALOY,

Debtor.

Case No. DG 26-00023
Chapter 13
Hon. Scott W. Dales

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
PRESENT: HONORABLE SCOTT W. DALES
Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

A dispute regarding homeowner association (“HOA”) dues between the HOA, Duna Vista
Resort (“DVR”), and Patrick O’Reilly Maloy (the “Debtor”) ran its course in Michigan’s Oceana
County Circuit Court, resulting in a judgment recognizing DVR’s HOA lien against Mr. Maloy’s
residence, and authorizing a foreclosure sale of the real property commonly known as 9394 N.
Montgomery Blvd., Pentwater, Michigan (the “Property”), to satisfy the underlying debt. See
Claim No. 3-2, Exh. 2, at pp. 57-59 (the “Judgment”). Mr. Maloy lodged an appeal with the
Michigan Court of Appeals, but after the appeals court denied a stay of enforcement, he pivoted
by filing a voluntary chapter 13 petition in this court on the eve of the scheduled judicial
foreclosure sale. The filing of the petition automatically stayed the foreclosure sale and shifted his
dispute with DVR to this court.
DVR filed and amended its Proof of Claim (Claim No. 3-2) (the “Proof of Claim”) seeking
to recover $70,913.75 in HOA fees, late fees, and attorneys’ fees, and Mr. Maloy objected on the
grounds that: (1) the original Proof of Claim is fatally flawed because of a typographical error in
the case number and; (2) DVR’s claim is time-barred (either by statute or laches), and is tainted
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 1 of 14

by alleged irregularities and errors before the Oceana County Circuit Court. See Debtor’s
Objection to Proof of Claim for Duna Vista Resorts Filed March 17, 2026 (ECF No. 70); Debtor’s
Objection to Duna Vista Resorts’ Amended Proof of Claims (3-2) Dated May 5, 2026 and
Supplement to Debtor’s Objections dated May 1, 2026 (3-1) (ECF No. 93); Debtor’s Objection to
Proof of Claim for Duna Vista Resorts (3-3) (ECF No. 105); Second Supplemental Brief in Support
of Debtor’s Combined Objections (Docket Nos. 70 and 93) to Duna Vista Resorts’ Proofs of
Claims (3-1) and (3-2) and Notice of Adoption and Incorporation by Reference (ECF No. 121).
1

In addition to seeking disallowance of DVR’s claim under § 502(b),
2
Mr. Maloy seeks to reclassify
the claim as unsecured (asking this court to avoid the lien as unperfected), strike the Judgment,
and take other steps to remove what he considers to be “over 200” clouds on his title to the
Property.
DVR has responded to Mr. Maloy’s Objection, and the court set the matter for hearing on
July 22, 2026. See Response to Debtor’s Objection to Duna Vista Resorts’ Proof of Claim and
Request for Hearing (ECF No. 87); Response to Debtor’s Objection to Duna Vista Resorts’ Proof
of Claim No. 3-2 and Second Supplemental Brief (ECF No. 122). At the hearing, DVR appeared
through counsel; the Debtor, for himself, also appeared. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
took the matter under advisement.
II. JURISDICTION
The United States District Court has jurisdiction over Mr. Maloy’s chapter 13 bankruptcy

1
DVR formally withdrew Proof of Claim No. 3-3 so the court regards Proof of Claim No. 3-2 as the operative
document. See Withdrawal of Amended Claim No. 3-3 (ECF No. 86) and Notice of Withdrawal of Proof of Claim
and Deadline to Object to Proposed Withdrawal (ECF No. 89). The court will refer to ECF Nos. 70, 93, 105 and 121
collectively as the “Objection.”

2
In the text of this opinion, references to “Bankruptcy Code” or to specific statutory sections are to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1532, unless otherwise specified. References to any of the federal procedural rules simply as “Rule __,” relying on
the numbering conventions to identify the appropriate ruleset.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 2 of 14

case but has referred the case and related proceedings to the United States Bankruptcy Court. See
28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (bankruptcy jurisdiction vested in the District Court); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)
(District Court may refer bankruptcy jurisdiction to the Bankruptcy Court); W.D. Mich. LGenR
3.1 (referral). The Objection to DVR’s Proof of Claim creates a contested matter qualifying as a
“core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B) which the court “may hear and determine” with
a final order under § 157(b)(1).
Although the court has authority to resolve Mr. Maloy’s Objection, it lacks jurisdiction or
power to grant relief from, reverse, vacate or otherwise modify judgments or orders of the state
courts, as explained below regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standing and General Principles
Mr. Maloy, whose monthly chapter 13 payments and home equity will rise or fall
depending on the court’s decision about DVR’s Proof of Claim, is undoubtedly a party in interest
with a pecuniary stake in the payment (or not) of DVR’s Proof of Claim. He certainly may seek
disallowance of the claim under § 502(b), and the court will address the merits of that portion of
his objection.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, DVR’s Proof of Claim is “deemed allowed” unless a party in
interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a). The applicable rule explains that a proof of claim “signed
and filed in accordance with these rules is prima facie evidence of the claim’s validity and
amount.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). DVR supported its claim with a copy of the Judgment, an
itemization of HOA dues and attorneys’ fees, and various other documents, as noted above, and
thus arrived on the claims register with the wind at its back. In re EH Liquidating, Inc., Case No.
22-90006-SWD, 2023 WL 2637283, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2023) (describing
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 3 of 14

presumption as a “ tailwind”).
As the objecting party, Mr. Maloy has the burden of offering sufficient evidence to rebut
the presumption of validity, by a preponderance of the evidence comparable to the contents of the
claim. In re Banks, Case No. 25-20315-DOB, 2026 WL 1682163, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. June
9, 2026) (citations omitted).
To overcome the presumption of Rule 3001(f), Mr. Maloy must offer more than a mere
unsubstantiated objection to form. Id. (citing Garner v. Shier (In re Garner), 246 B.R. 617, 623
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000)). If Mr. Maloy’s proffer suffices to refute at least one of the allegations
essential to the legal sufficiency of DVR’s Proof of Claim, the burden of persuasion shifts back to
DVR, and the presumption under Rule 3001(f) vanishes like a bursting bubble. In re Hughes, 313
B.R. 205, 208 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2004).
B. Limits on Relief Under Rule 3007(b) and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
As the court previously noted, much of the relief that Mr. Maloy seeks in this Objection
falls outside the ambit of the claim objection process or the court’s jurisdiction.
First, Mr. Maloy and his Objection collide with several express prohibitions that Rule
3007(b) prescribes. For example, in seeking to avoid DVR’s lien as unperfected -- usually the
province of a trustee -- or void DVR’s lien under non-bankruptcy law, Mr. Maloy ignores the limits
of Rule 3007(b), which the court previously called to his attention. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007(b)
(“In objecting to a claim, a party in interest must not include a demand for a type of relief specified
in Rule 7001 but may include the objection in an adversary proceeding.”); see also Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 7001(b) (“the following are adversary proceedings... a proceeding to determine the validity,
priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property—except a proceeding under Rule 3012 or
Rule 4003(d)”); see also Order dated May 8, 2026 (ECF No. 74) at p. 2 (citing Rules 3007(b) and
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 4 of 14

7001(b)). Although disallowance of a claim may indirectly invalidate a lien by operation of law
under § 506(d) because a lien cannot support an invalid claim, he may not directly pursue lien
avoidance in a contested matter, such as a claim objection. A lien is an interest in property, and
the Bankruptcy Rules generally require the more robust procedures of an adversary proceeding
before affecting property interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(b). Accordingly, to the extent Mr.
Maloy seeks through his Objection an order directly avoiding or otherwise invalidating DVR’s
lien or determining the validity or extent of any interest in the Property, the court will deny that
relief for procedural reasons.
3

Second, to the extent Mr. Maloy seeks this court’s review of (and an order “striking”) the
Judgment, the court lacks jurisdiction to grant that relief, even given the pendency of Mr. Maloy’s
appeal before the Michigan Court of Appeals, as the United States Supreme Court recently held.
See T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1752 (2026)
(Rooker-Feldman bars federal trial court review of state court orders, regardless of whether the
state-court judgment remains subject to further review in state appellate proceedings); see also
Snisko v. BMO Harris, N.A. (In re Snisko), Adv. No. 25-00398, 2026 WL 2137948, at *10 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. July 23, 2026) (finding that a foreclosure judgment, though not final in the context of the
overall litigation before the state courts, is still subject to Rooker-Feldman). Again, Mr. Maloy
has a ready avenue of review in the Michigan Court of Appeals, available upon this court’s lifting
of the automatic stay and on motion in the appellate court. The court will deny without prejudice
his challenge in the nature of review of, or appeal from, the Judgment.

3
Mr. Maloy filed an adversary proceeding challenging DVR’s interests on July 23, 2026, captioned as Maloy v. Duna
Vista Resorts, Adv. No. 26-80066, but many of the conclusions the court reaches today will reverberate in the
adversary proceeding under preclusion doctrines akin to those at issue in the Objection.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 5 of 14

C. Amendment of DVR’s Miscaptioned Proof of Claim
Turning to the substance of Mr. Maloy’s Objection, the argument that DVR’s error in
listing the case number in the caption invalidates the Proof of Claim requires little discussion. In
a nutshell, Mr. Maloy argues that because DVR’s initial iteration of its claim erroneously listed
his case number as “25-00023” rather than the correct case number, “ 26-00023,” the court should
disallow the original Proof of Claim. The argument continues: the corrective amendment filed
after the claims bar date does not relate back to the original version, so the court should disallow
the amendment as untimely. When the smoke (and the mirrors) clear, Mr. Maloy claims that DVR
has forfeited its right to payment and lien due to the single erroneous digit on the first claim
document.
As DVR points out, its counsel filed the original Proof of Claim (Claim No. 3-1) in the
correct claims register and the well-documented claim form certainly gives notice to Mr. Maloy
and other interested parties of the premises and the amount of DVR’s claim. Moreover, as DVR
argues, courts routinely allow creditors to amend proofs of claim, even after the claims bar date,
employing relation-back principles akin to Rule 15(c), and they invariably permit amendments to
cure technical defects in the original claim. In re Galindez, 514 B.R. 79, 88 (Bankr. P.R. 2014)
(“Amendments to proofs of claim timely filed are to be freely allowed, whether for purposes of
particularizing the amount due under a previously-asserted right to payment, or simply to cure
technical defects in the original claim.”) (citing In re Hemmingway, 954 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1992)).
In considering whether to permit amendments to proofs of claim, courts generally employ
a two-part test: “(1) was a timely similar claim asserted against the bankruptcy estate by a formal
proof of claim or informal proof of claim; and (2) is it equitable to permit the amendment.” Keith
M. Lundin & William H. Brown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 4th Edition, § 284.1, at ¶ 3 (collecting
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 6 of 14

cases). DVR’s amended claim easily passes the test. Indeed, the court regards the error in the
caption as harmless, which Rule 9005 directs the court -- and Mr. Maloy -- to disregard. Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 9005. There is nothing inequitable about permitting DVR to amend its original claim
form to correct the case number.
D. Challenge to the Substance of DVR’s Proof of Claim
Mr. Maloy’s principal challenge to DVR’s Proof of Claim involves legal and factual errors
he contends the Oceana County Circuit Court made in rejecting his various defenses in the pre-
bankruptcy foreclosure proceedings. For example, he argues that the assessments (and liens) are
barred by the statutes of limitations or laches (cit ing Michigan’s marketable title statutes and
caselaw); he contends that DVR sued the wrong person or sued him in the wrong capacity as
trustee of the incorrect trust; he alleges that DVR’s lawyer has a disabling conflict of interest, and
so does the presiding judge -- she is supposedly biased as a cousin to DVR’s counsel by marriage.
In short, he raises a host of challenges here, as he did (except as to bias), unsuccessfully, in the
state court.
Before and during the hearing on the Objection, the court discussed the Judgment and its
possible effects on this proceeding, whether under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or sundry
preclusion doctrines. As noted above, the court lacks power to vacate or modify the Judgment (as
Mr. Maloy asked in some parts of his voluminous filings), but as the Sixth Circuit recently held,
challenges in federal court that merely undermine an earlier state court judgment implicate only
preclusion doctrines under the Full Faith and Credit statute, not the court’s jurisdiction. HPIL
Holding, Inc. v. Zhang, 168 F.4th 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2026); see also University of Maryland
Medical System Corporation, 146 S. Ct. at 1752.
Therefore, to the extent the Objection seeks not to reverse or vacate the Judgment but
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 7 of 14

simply to attack it collaterally, the court has jurisdiction to consider Mr. Maloy’s arguments
regarding the Judgment’s preclusive effect. Nevertheless, most of Mr. Maloy’s arguments must
fail under the Full Faith and Credit Statute and Michigan’s claim preclusion or res judicata
doctrine, at least to the extent DVR relies on the Judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
The Judgment, entered against Mr. Maloy “individually and as trustee of the Patrick Maloy
Trust,” awarded DVR $20,287.50 (unpaid association dues and late fees), $733.51 in court costs,
$30,152.00 in attorneys’ fees, and $1,617.61 in statutory interest, for a total amount due of
$52,790.62 (the “Judgment Amount”). In addition to the Judgment Amount, however, DVR also
seeks to recover the amounts it sought to add to the Judgment by filing its
motion to amend the
Judgment, specifically an additional $3,566.91 in dues and assessments, $85.00 in court costs,
$9,712.00 in attorneys’ fees, and $790.68 in statutory interest, for supplemental charges
totaling $14,154.59 (the “Pre-Judgment Supplement”).
DVR’s Proof of Claim enjoys not only the federal presumption just mentioned, but also
presumptions under Michigan law to the extent the Judgment recognizes and memorializes DVR’s
claim.
4
Most generally, Michigan law raises a presumption “of the regularity of all proceedings
prior to, and including the making of such order, judgment or decree.” M.C.L. § 600.2106. Thus,
even assuming the court had appellate jurisdiction to review the Judgment and proceedings of the
Oceana County Circuit Court as Mr. Maloy requests (notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine), he would have to overcome the presumption of regularity supporting the Judgment
anchoring DVR’s Proof of Claim.
Second, and more specifically, that same statute provides that the Judgment is “prima facie

4
DVR’s Proof of Claim, as discussed above, includes not only the Judgment, but additional prepetition attorneys’
fees, interest, and HOA assessments. To the extent the Proof of Claim is based on the Judgment, DVR enjoys
Michigan’s presumption, but the additional attorneys’ fees, interest and HOA assessments included in the Pre-
Judgment Supplement (and otherwise) do not.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 8 of 14

evidence of ... all facts recited therein,” a statute which the federal courts must honor under 28
U.S.C. § 1738. Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736, 745 (6th Cir. 2002).
In addition to the statutory protection of former judgments, Michigan courts have “adopted
a broad application of res judicata that bars claims arising out of the same transaction that plaintiff
could have brought but did not.” Id. at 747 (quoting Bergeron v. Busch, 579 N.W.2d 124, 126
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). In Michigan, claim preclusion has the following elements: (1) the first
action must have resulted in a decision on the merits; (2) the issues must have been resolved in the
first action, either because they were actually litigated or because they might have been raised in
the first action through reasonable diligence of the parties; and (3) both actions must be between
the same parties, or their privies. Sloan v. City of Madison Heights, 389 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Mich.
1986).

Michigan’s version of claim preclusion bars relitigating not only the claims that were
already litigated but every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties exercising
reasonable diligence could have raised but failed to do so in the prior action. C-Spine Orthopedics,
PLLC v Progressive Mich. Ins. Co., 12 N.W.3d 20, 25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2023); Dubuc, 312 F.3d at
747 (citing City of Madison Heights, 389 N.W.2d at 422); Banks, 2026 WL 1682163, at *3. And
Michigan’s preclusion law bars relitigating not only claims but also defenses, whether raised or
not, in the first court:
The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon
which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and
pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject
of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have
brought forward at the time.

City of Detroit v. Nortown Theatre, Inc., 323 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis
added and citation omitted); see also Barris v. Emmons, 139 N.W. 872, 873 (Mich. 1913) (litigants
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 9 of 14

estopped from asserting fraud as defense in later action where they asserted or could have asserted
fraud as a defense in earlier action).
Here, as noted at the outset, DVR’s Proof of Claim depends largely on the Judgment,
representing the same transaction or universe of issues the same parties presented to the Oceana
County Circuit Court. And, contrary to Mr. Maloy’s argument, Michigan courts apply res judicata
to all final judgments, including those subject to further appeal because “the longstanding rule in
Michigan is ‘that a judgment pending on appeal is deemed res judicata.’” City of Troy Bldg.
Inspector v. Hershberger, 27 Mich. App. 123, 127 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (quoting 14 Michigan
Law & Practice Judgment, § 176, p. 620).
Moreover, Mr. Maloy’s criticism of DVR’s state court counsel and his relationships (either
as his former counsel or regarding his relationship as a “cousin by marriage” to the state court
judge) do not, in this court’s view, rebut the presumption of regularity under M.C.L. § 600.2106
or lead to the conclusion that his opportunity to litigate his defenses in state court was less than
full or fair. He raised DVR’s counsel’s supposed conflict of interest based on counsel’s former
involvement with a different proceeding involving Mr. Maloy, which counsel denied, and the state
court rebuffed the challenge. Indeed, Mr. Monton emphasized that Mr. Maloy “has never been a
client” and that “[he] had never met or heard of Mr. Maloy until this case.” Transcript of Sept. 15,
2025, Hearing Before the Hon. Susan K. Sniegowski (“Tr.”) at 43:13, 43:15-16 (ECF No. 146-2).
Although it does not appear that he sought recusal in the state court based on the supposed family
ties between DVR’s counsel and the state court judge, he could have raised the issue post-
judgment, either before the trial or appellate court,
5
but he has evidently elected to run them up the

5
Mr. Maloy’s chapter 13 filing automatically stayed his appeal of the Judgment. Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 711 F.2d 60, 62 (6th. Cir. 1983). The court has said several times that Mr. Maloy may easily seek relief from
the automatic stay to pursue his appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 10 of 14

flagpole in bankruptcy court instead.
In Michigan, however, the “full and fair opportunity” prong of the claim preclusion
doctrine does not divorce original from appellate proceedings: “[t]he general rule permits re-
litigation when ‘[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have
obtained review of the judgment in the initial action...’” Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co., 677 N.W.2d
843, 847 (Mich. 2004) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 28(1) (1982)). But where,
as here, the party seeking to relitigate a claim or defense has voluntarily relinquished appellate
rights, he has had a full and fair opportunity sufficient to preclude a second bite at the apple. Id.
Because the Judgment rejected Mr. Maloy’s challenges premised on the supposed conflict
of interest of Mr. Monton, the various statutes of limitation, debt collection statutes, and a
cornucopia of other issues Mr. Maloy either could have raised or in fact raised unsuccessfully in
the state court proceeding, this court cannot permit him to relitigate them in the context of his
Objection to DVR’s claim. The Judgment estops him from relitigating those issues in support of
his Objection, at least to the extent of the Judgment Amount.
In the “sauce for the goose” department, however, the court notes that the Oceana County
Circuit Court refused to add the Pre-Judgment Supplement to the Judgment Amount. See Oceana
County Circuit Court Order dated September 15, 2025 (ECF No. 71, Exh. U, the “September
Order”).
6
With some irony (given DVR’s reliance on the preclusive effect of the Judgment in
support of its Proof of Claim), Mr. Maloy argued during last week’s hearing that if the Judgment
precludes him from challenging the Judgment or the Judgment Amount, the September Order
precludes DVR from seeking to recover the Pre-Judgment Supplement as part of its Proof of Claim.
He makes a good point.

6
In addition to the Judgment Amount and the Pre-Judgment Supplement, the Proof of Claim also includes charges
incurred after the September Order, specifically $3,968.54 (the “Post-Judgment Supplement”).
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 11 of 14

In response, DVR’s counsel argued that her client has a statutory right to collect the
assessments and, for that matter, attorneys’ fees (included as part of the lien under the by-laws),
all of which appears to be true. The problem is, as Mr. Maloy points out, DVR presented its Pre-
Judgment Supplement to the Oceana County Circuit Court, and the court rejected it by entering
the September Order. Mr. Maloy’s preclusion argument last week prompted this court to ask DVR
to supplement the record in this contested matter with a copy of its Motion to Amend the Judgment
of Foreclosure and a complete transcript of the hearing before Judge Sniegowski regarding that
motion. DVR timely complied. See Supplemental Filing (ECF No. 146).
From the Supplemental Filing, it is clear that, in support of the motion to amend before
Judge Sniegowski, DVR’s counsel cited M.C.R. 2.612(A) (governing correction of “Clerical
Mistakes”) and Mr. Maloy argued, successfully, that amending the Judgment to include the Pre-
Judgment Supplement was hardly clerical. See Tr. at 35:22-24, 51:8 - 52:1. Judge Sniegowski
agreed with Mr. Maloy and entered the September Order, stating that “the plaintiff’s [DVR’s]
motion to amend the judgment is denied in its entirety.” September Order at ¶ 2. The written
order reflects the oral ruling on-the-record that Judge Sniegowski did not “see any authority” for
increasing the Judgment. By entering that order, the judge also denied DVR’s request for
attorney’s fees -- fees DVR recently included within the Proof of Claim. Tr. a t 69:3-11.
Although the court is inclined to agree with DVR that, but for the September Order, it
would have the right to collect the Pre-Judgment Supplement,
7
Judge Sniegowski saw things

7
The delay between the Oceana County Circuit Court’s summary disposition ruling and entry of the Judgment created
risks for DVR, which that court could have mitigated under the court rules or some other authority, but it declined to
do so. See, e.g., M.C.L. § 600.3165 (providing additional relief for defaults subsequent to the judgment or installments
not due at the time of the judgment); M.C.R. 2.118 (amended or supplemental pleadings); M.C.R. 2.601(A) (except
for default judgements, Michigan courts may grant the relief a prevailing party is entitled to in a final judgment even
if that party never demanded it in the pleadings.) . Irrespective of how a later court might have ruled, the decision of
the earlier court on an issue that a litigant raised or could have raised in the first court is presumptively entitled to
preclusive effect in accordance with the law of the rendering state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 12 of 14

differently, likely given counsel’s reliance on the wrong court rule. Nevertheless, the September
Order, like the Judgment to which it relates, deserves full faith and credit in this court. As the
United States Supreme Court stated long ago, “the general and well-settled rule [is] that a
judgment, not set aside on appeal or otherwise, is equally effective as an estoppel upon the points
decided, whether the decision be right or wrong.”
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201 (1932). Just
as the court will not second-guess the Judgment, it will not second-guess the September Order, so
it will sustain the Objection to the extent it challenges the Pre-Judgment Supplement. In the several
months between entry of the September Order and the filing of Mr. Maloy’s chapter 13 petition,
DVR might have sought reconsideration from Judge Sniegowski or sought review of the
September Order in the Michigan Court of Appeals, but it did not. Like Mr. Maloy, DVR must
live with the rulings of the Oceana County Circuit Court.
8

With respect to the balance of the Proof of Claim (the Post-Judgment Supplement not
addressed in either the Judgment or the September Order), these amounts clearly post-date both
orders and therefore are not part of the “thing adjudicated” or res judicata. They are presumptively
allowed, and Mr. Maloy has given the court no reason to disallow them. The HOA charges seem
regular and consistent with the by-laws and the attorneys’ fees appear reasonable under the lodestar
analysis, particularly given Mr. Maloy’s litigious approach to the controversy.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Judgment awarded DVR a claim against Mr. Maloy, individually, for $52,790.62,
which the court is bound to respect under Michigan’s principles of claim preclusion and the Full
Faith and Credit Statute. The Proof of Claim, which enjoys a presumption as to validity and

8
In reaching today’s decision, the court is mindful that the parties may, assuming relief from the automatic stay, return
to the state court fray, and that developments in that court may serve as a basis for revisiting today’s ruling under §
502(j). These questions, however, are for another court and another day.
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 13 of 14

amount, includes amounts in addition to those the state court included in the Judgment, generally
for post-judgment attorneys’ fees and assessments. Mr. Maloy, with his hands tied by the
preclusive effect of the Judgment, has not rebutted the presumption with respect to the Judgment
Amount or the Post-Judgment Supplement, but he has successfully hoisted DVR on its own petard
with respect to the Pre-Judgment Supplement. Accordingly, the court will overrule the Objection
in part and sustain it in part.
Although the parties may be unhappy, and stuck, with the Judgment given its preclusive
effects, and although they might obtain relief from the automatic stay to return to the state courts,
the bankruptcy courts in general, and chapter 13 in particular, provide a ready forum for
negotiation, keeping in mind not just the rights of the parties, but also their interests -- including
their common interests in their autonomy and in minimizing the costs of resolving their dispute.
The court again encourages the parties to discuss settlement and reach a resolution of their own
making, free from the risk of judicial error. Absent agreement, however, today’s order, whether
correct or mistaken, will stand as the court’s resolution of this contested matter.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Objection to DVR’s Proof of
Claim is OVERRULED IN PART AND SUSTAINED IN PART: DVR’s Proof of Claim is
ALLOWED in the amount of $56,759.16 and DISALLOWED in the amount of $14,154.59.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum of Decision and
Order pursuant to Rule 9022 and LBR 5005-4 upon the Debtor, Elizabeth Clark, Esq., chapter 13
trustee, the United States Trustee, April Hulst, Esq., and all parties listed on the mailing matrix.
END OF ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated July 29, 2026
Case:26-00023-swd Doc #:147 Filed: 07/29/26 Page 14 of 14