Rivadeneira et al v. Uy et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

:
OLUYINKA RIVADENEIRA,
et al. :

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 26-139

SHERIFF MAXWELL UY, in his :
individual and official capacity
as Sheriff of Montgomery County,:
Maryland, et al.
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this
constitutional tort case are a motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment filed by Defendants Deputy Hakim
Bayyan, Deputy Lenworth Black, and Sheriff Maxwell Uy
(collectively, “Sheriff Defendants”), (ECF No. 10), a motion to
dismiss filed by Defendants 18630 Laytonsville, LLC and Behrouz
Rahmi (collectively, “Landlord Defendants”), (ECF No. 21), a
motion for leave to file non-PDF exhibits filed by the Sheriff
Defendants, (ECF No. 14), and a motion for extension of time to
file a response filed by Plaintiffs Oluyinka Rivadeneira, Jose
Rivadeneira, and Woodfield Business Center and Venues, Inc., d/b/a
Synergy Business Center, (ECF No. 24). The issues have been
briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the
Sheriff Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
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2

summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, the
Landlord Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in part and
denied in part, the Sheriff Defendants’ motion to file non-PDF
exhibits will be denied without prejudice, and Plaintiffs’ motion
for extension of time will be granted.
I. Background
1

This case stems from an aborted eviction of a business owned
by the Plaintiffs from a property owned by a subset of the
Defendants. Individual Plaintiffs Oluyinka Rivadeneira (“Ms.
Rivadeneira”) and Jose Rivadeneira (“Mr. Rivadeneira”) operated
the corporate Plaintiff Woodfield Business Center and Venues,
Inc., d/b/a Synergy Business Center (“Woodfield”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”). (ECF No. 2-1 ¶¶ 5, 6, 15). In May 2022, on behalf
of Woodfield, Ms. Rivadeneira entered into a commercial lease
agreement (“Lease Agreement”) with Defendant 18630 Laytonsville,
LLC (“18630 Laytonsville”) for approximately 5,200 square feet of
office and warehouse space in Gaithersburg, Maryland. (Id. ¶¶ 27-
28). The initial term of the Lease Agreement was from May 1, 2022,
through April 30, 2025, with a rent of $6,000 per month. (Id. ¶¶
29-30). Plaintiffs also paid a security deposit of $12,000. (Id.
¶ 31). The Lease Agreement was “facilitated and managed by”

1
Unless otherwise noted, all facts are taken from the amended
complaint and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.
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3

Defendant Peter Drury (“Mr. Drury”) and his company, The Drury
Companies, Inc. (Id. ¶ 32). As the property manager, Mr. Drury
“had the right to enter the premises at reasonable hours to inspect
the property, provided such entry did not unreasonably interfere
with Plaintiffs’ business operations.” (Id. ¶ 33). The Lease
Agreement also contained a covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Id. ¶
34). In the leased property, Plaintiffs operated the business
center “as a professional business services facility, providing
office space, meeting rooms, warehousing, and related services to
small businesses, entrepreneurs, and professionals in the
Gaithersburg area.” (Id. ¶ 36).
In 2023, a landlord-tenant action was filed in the District
Court of Maryland for Montgomery County after “a dispute arose
between Plaintiffs and Defendants regarding rent payments.”
2
(Id.
¶ 39). The court “issued a judgment in favor of Defendants and a
warrant of restitution for possession of the premises” on or about
July 6, 2023.
3
(Id. ¶ 40). Plaintiffs subsequently satisfied all

2
Plaintiffs are frequently unclear throughout the amended
complaint about which Defendants, and which Plaintiffs, took
specific actions. Plaintiffs state that a rental payment dispute
arose with “Defendants,” but does not specify which of the seven
Defendants were involved.

3
Plaintiffs state that the warrant of restitution “had an
expiration date clearly stated on its face, as required by Maryland
law.” (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 41). Plaintiffs did not attach the warrant
of restitution to the amended complaint. The Sheriff Defendants
attached the warrant of restitution, (ECF No. 13), to their motion
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4

payment obligations related to the case, but Defendants did not
notify the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office that Plaintiffs had
paid their obligation. (Id. ¶¶ 42-44). On November 3, 2023,
Defendants Deputy Lenworth Black (“Deputy Black”) and Deputy Hakim
Bayyan (“Deputy Bayyan”) arrived at the property in Gaithersburg,
accompanied by a commercial eviction crew and Defendants Mr. Drury
and John Doe. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 59). This was 120 days after the
warrant’s issuance, (id. ¶ 60), and the individual Plaintiffs were
not at the property, (id. ¶ 65). Deputy Black, holding the warrant
of restitution, and Deputy Bayyan determined that the property was
unoccupied and allowed the eviction crew to enter and begin
removing Plaintiffs’ property. (Id. ¶¶ 62, 66). Plaintiffs were
alerted to the eviction underway by their video security system.
(Id. ¶ 67). Ms. Rivadeneira used the security system’s intercom
feature to tell those inside “that the eviction was illegal, that
all monies had been paid, and that they must cease immediately and

to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Because
this document is integral to several of Plaintiffs’ claims, the
court can consider it on a motion to dismiss. Faulkenberry v.
U.S. Dep’t of Def., 670 F.Supp.3d 234, 249 (D.Md. 2023). The
warrant of restitution does not include an expiration date as
contemplated by Plaintiffs. It does, however, include the date it
was issued (July 6, 2023) and a statement saying that the sheriff
is “directed to deliver possession of the premises to the . . .
landlord or their agent or attorney and[] . . . to remove from the
premises, by force if necessary, all property of the [tenants] and
any other occupant(s) within 60 days of the date of this order.”
(ECF No. 13, at 1).
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5

leave the premises.” (Id. ¶ 69). Plaintiffs immediately called
Deputy Black on his cell phone and informed him that they had
satisfied all payment obligations and that the warrant of
restitution “had expired more than sixty days after its July 6,
2023 issuance.” (Id. ¶¶ 70–71). Deputy Black checked with Mr.
Drury, who confirmed that Plaintiffs had paid all obligations.
(Id. ¶¶ 72, 73). Deputies Black and Bayyan “directed that the
ongoing removal of additional property be halted, but ordered that
property already removed from Plaintiffs’ business suite be left
in the common area hallway rather than returned to its proper
location” inside Plaintiffs’ leased suite. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 75).
Plaintiffs’ property was damaged in the process, and they allege
that the removal “rendered the premises unusable for business
operations.” (Id. ¶¶ 77, 79).
Plaintiffs had other trouble with Mr. Drury throughout their
tenancy aside from his participation in the attempted eviction.
Plaintiffs allege “[b]eginning in 2023 and continuing through
2024, Defendant Drury engaged in a pattern of conduct designed to
interfere with Plaintiffs’ business operations, harass Plaintiffs,
and drive them from the premises.” (Id. ¶ 45). In support,
Plaintiffs cite two occasions. First, on or about November 1,
2023, Mr. Drury contacted Ms. Rivadeneira to say that the building
owner wanted to install a sprinkler system, and an installation
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6

person needed to do a walkthrough of the property. (Id. ¶¶ 46-
47). Mr. Drury apparently did the walkthrough with Defendant John
Doe, who was also present at the attempted eviction days later.
(Id. ¶ 80). Plaintiffs believe that “the walkthrough had been a
reconnaissance mission to survey the premises and identify
valuable property for theft during the planned illegal eviction.”
(Id. ¶ 81). Plaintiffs do not appear to allege that anything was
actually stolen during the attempted eviction; rather, they allege
that Mr. Drury “gave specific instructions to John Doe and the
eviction crew regarding which items to remove and which items to
leave behind to potentially claim after the illegal eviction.”
(Id. ¶ 82). Second, Mr. Drury interrupted a “closed-door business
meeting” with a potential tenant at the property on March 25, 2024.
(Id. ¶¶ 50-51). Mr. Drury “made verbal threats to Plaintiff
Oluyinka Rivadeneira, stating that she would be evicted and
demanding that all future business agreements be cancelled.” (Id.
¶ 52). The potential tenant then declined to do business with
Woodfield; due to word spreading about the interaction, “at least
four other Gaithersburg-area businesses decided not to pursue
leasing agreements” with Woodfield. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 56).
Finally, Plaintiffs state “[o]n or about May 22, 2024-more
than six months after the illegal eviction-Defendants Drury,
[Behrouz] Rahmi, and/or [18630 Laytonsville] filed or caused to be
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7

filed criminal charges against Plaintiffs for malicious
destruction of property.”
4
(Id. ¶ 96). Plaintiffs allege that
these allegations were false and filed in order to “retaliat[e]
against Plaintiffs for challenging the illegal eviction and
seeking to vindicate their rights.” (Id. ¶ 97). The charges
against Plaintiffs “were dismissed via nolle prosequi” on or about
June 28, 2024. (Id. ¶ 101).
Plaintiffs filed an action in the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County on October 31, 2025. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1). The amended complaint
(ECF No. 2-1) brings fifteen counts: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for
violating the Fourth Amendment (Count I) and Fourteenth Amendment
(Count II) against Deputies Black and Bayyan, violation of Article
26 (Count III) and Article 24 (Count IV) of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights against the Sheriff Defendants, violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Mr. Drury and the Landlord Defendants
(Count V), malicious prosecution against Mr. Drury and the Landlord
Defendants (Count VI), “abuse of process” against Mr. Drury and
the Landlord Defendants (Count VII),
5
intentional interference with
business relations and prospective economic advantage against Mr.

4
Defendant Rahmi is identified as the “owner or principal”
of 18630 Laytonsville. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 22).

5
The amended complaint contains two counts designated Count
VIII and no count designated Count VII. The court assumes this is
in error and will refer to the abuse of process count as Count
VII.
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8

Drury and the Landlord Defendants (Count VIII), breach of contract
– covenant of quiet enjoyment against the Landlord Defendants
(Count IX), trespass against Mr. Drury and the Landlord Defendants
(Count X), conversion against all Defendants (Count XI),
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mr. Drury and
the Landlord Defendants (Count XII), negligence against the
Sheriff Defendants (Count XIII), gross negligence against the
Sheriff Defendants (Count XIV), and civil conspiracy under
Maryland law against all Defendants (Count XV).
The Sheriff Defendants removed the case to this court on
January 14, 2026. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Drury filed an answer on
February 5, 2026. (ECF No. 9). The Sheriff Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on
February 13, 2026, (ECF No. 10), followed by a motion for leave to
file non-PDF exhibits on February 24, 2026, (ECF No. 14).
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on February
28, 2026, (ECF No. 17), but did not oppose the motion for leave to
file the exhibits. The Sheriff Defendants filed a reply in support
of their motion to dismiss on March 11, 2026. (ECF No. 19). The
Landlord Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 2, 2026.
(ECF No. 21). On April 24, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion for
extension of time to file a response to the motion to dismiss,
(ECF No. 24), as well as the opposition to the motion to dismiss,
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(ECF No. 25). The Landlord Defendants filed a reply on May 7,
2026. (ECF No. 26).
II. Sheriff Defendants’ Motion
The Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment. (ECF No. 10). When a party moves to dismiss
or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, it invokes the
court’s discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). This Rule provides
that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion must be treated
as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
The court “has ‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to
accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is
offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it,
thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not
consider it.’” Wells-Bey v. Kopp, No. 12-cv-2319-ELH, 2013 WL
1700927, at *5 (D.Md. Apr. 16, 2013) (quoting 5C Wright & Miller’s
Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3
d
ed. 2004, 2012 Supp.)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has articulated two
requirements for proper conversion of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion: notice
and a reasonable opportunity for discovery.
See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns,
Inc. v. Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4
th

Cir. 2013). When the movant expressly
captions its motion “in the alternative” as
one for summary judgment and submits matters
outside the pleadings for the court’s
consideration, the parties are deemed to be on
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10

notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may
occur. See Moret v. Harvey, 381 F.Supp.2d
458, 464 (D.Md. 2005).

Jackson v. Sagal, 370 F.Supp.3d 592, 598 (D.Md. 2019). For the
party opposing conversion to summary judgment to raise adequately
that it has not had a sufficient opportunity for discovery, “the
non-movant must typically file an affidavit or declaration under
Rule 56(d), explaining the ‘specified reasons’ why ‘it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition.’” Id. (quoting
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)).
As noted above, the Sheriff Defendants styled their motion as
one to dismiss or for summary judgment, thus the notice requirement
has been satisfied. Plaintiffs oppose the conversion to summary
judgment in their opposition, (ECF No. 17-1, at 3), and include a
declaration from Ms. Rivadeneira identifying specific information
they hope to receive through discovery that would allow them to
“fairly oppose Defendants’ attempt to obtain summary judgment,”
(id. at 25). Plaintiffs include information such as “Sheriff’s
Office procedures for scheduling and verifying warrants of
restitution, including any tracking of the warrant’s express 60-
day directive” and “[c]ommunications between Sheriff’s Office
personnel and the landlord/agent concerning payment status,
satisfaction, and whether the eviction should proceed.” (Id.).
These materials bear directly on the unresolved issues in the case.
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Because of the outstanding factual issues and the clear request
for discovery, the court will limit the Sheriff Defendants’ motion
to a motion to dismiss.
III. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint. Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 F.3d 480, 483 (4
th
Cir. 2006). The court “must accept the
complaint’s factual allegations as true and construe the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Barnett v. Inova
Health Care Servs., 125 F.4th 465, 469 (4
th
Cir. 2025) (citing
Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 589 (4
th
Cir. 2024)). A
complaint must only satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has
not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
A Rule 8(a)(2) “showing” requires “stat[ing] a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that defendant is liable for the misconduct
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12

alleged.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 299–300 (4
th
Cir. 2021)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, as
are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to
actual events, United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604
F.2d 844, 847 (4
th
Cir. 1979). The court may consider documents
attached to the complaint on a motion to dismiss, as well as
documents integral to the complaint that are attached to the motion
to dismiss if there is no dispute about their authenticity.
Faulkenberry v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 670 F.Supp.3d 234, 249 (D.Md.
2023).
IV. Analysis
Between the two motions, the Sheriff Defendants and Landlord
Defendants have moved to dismiss all fifteen counts in the amended
complaint. Some threshold issues have been raised or are apparent
from the amended complaint.
A. Woodfield as a Plaintiff
Defendants raise a threshold issue of the appropriate
Plaintiffs.
6
They argue that Woodfield lacked the power to

6
Defendants characterize this argument as “standing” related.
Plaintiffs are correct that the capacity of a party is different
from standing. See In re Total Auto Fin. LLC, --- F.4th ---, 2026
WL 2251900 (4
th
Cir. Aug. 5, 2026) (discussing “the claim-ownership
principle” and when shareholders may, and may not, bring an claim
that belongs to the corporation). Whether the individual
Plaintiffs may bring certain of the claims asserted in the amended
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13

initiate this lawsuit at the time of filing because the company’s
charter had been forfeited. (ECF Nos. 10, at 10-11; 21, at 4-5).
In support, both groups of Defendants point to the Maryland State
Department of Assessments and Taxation (“SDAT”) website, which
shows that Woodfield’s charter was forfeited on October 1, 2025,
just a month before Plaintiffs filed their complaint.
7
Plaintiffs
do not dispute that the corporation’s charter was forfeited but
argue that the corporation’s status at the time of the filing is
irrelevant, as the issue was “cured” when the business was revived
on March 29, 2026. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend.
(ECF No. 25, at 5).
Defendants have the correct interpretation of the law.
According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(2), a corporation’s “[c]apacity to
sue or be sued is determined . . . by the law under which it was

complaint has not been raised by Defendants. Because Plaintiffs
will be allowed to amend to assert claims on behalf of the
corporation again, consideration of “claim ownership” can be
deferred for now.

7
“[C]ourts are permitted to consider facts and documents
subject to judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgment.” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l,
Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 607 (4
th
Cir. 2015) (citing Clatterbuck v. City
of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4
th
Cir. 2015)). Courts in
this district have previously taken judicial notice of information
available on Maryland’s SDAT website, as they are publicly
available records. See, e.g., Auto USA, Inc. v. DHL Express (USA),
Inc., No. 16-cv-3580-ELH, 2017 WL 839525, at *4 (D.Md. Mar. 3,
2017) (taking judicial notice “of the fact that SDAT forfeited
[the plaintiff]’s corporate charter . . . many months before the
suit was filed here”).
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14

organized.” Plaintiffs do not deny that Woodfield is a Maryland
company that was not in good standing at the time the amended
complaint was filed. (ECF No. 25, at 5). Under Maryland law, a
corporation cannot “validate a lawsuit that it initiated when its
charter was forfeited – and therefore, it legally did not exist –
by reviving its charter.” Tri-Cnty. Unlimited, Inc. v. Kids First
Swim Sch. Inc., 191 Md.App. 613, 621 (2010); see also Dual Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 383 Md. 151, 163 (2004) (“[G]enerally any
suit filed on behalf of [the corporation] while its charter was
forfeit, was a nullity as a matter of Maryland law.”). Woodfield
will be dismissed as a Plaintiff. Plaintiffs will be granted leave
to amend to reinstitute appropriate claims of Woodfield.
B. Motion for Leave to File Video Exhibits
On February 24, 2026, the Sheriff Defendants filed a motion
for leave to file non-PDF exhibits. (ECF No. 14). The motion
seeks to file two videos. (Id. at 1). No opposition was filed.
Because the videos are not being filed to contradict Plaintiffs’
essential allegations, the motion will be denied and the videos
will not be considered on the motion to dismiss.
While district courts are permitted to consider documents
attached to a motion to dismiss under certain circumstances, the
Fourth Circuit has articulated slightly different considerations
for video recordings such as these. “[A] district court can
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15

consider a video submitted at the motion to dismiss stage when (1)
the video is ‘integral’ to the complaint and its authenticity is
not challenged, but (2) only to the extent that the video ‘clearly
depicts a set of facts contrary to those alleged in the complaint,’
or ‘blatantly contradicts’ the plaintiff’s allegations, rendering
the plaintiff’s allegations implausible.” Doriety for Est. of
Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670, 679-80 (4
th
Cir. 2024) (quoting
Saalim v. Walmart, Inc., 97 F.4th 995, 1002 (6
th
Cir. 2024)).
The videos that the Sheriff Defendants seek to file are the
body-worn camera footage of the eviction from Deputies Black and
Bayyan. (ECF Nos. 10, at 5; 14). Defendants do not contend that
the videos show information that “blatantly contradicts”
Plaintiffs’ allegations; rather, the videos appear to support
Plaintiffs’ essential facts about the eviction’s beginning and
ending. Because the videos are not submitted to contradict the
amended complaint, the submission of the video exhibits is
premature. The court will deny the motion for leave to file the
non-PDF exhibits without prejudice to renewal at the appropriate
time. See Dillard v. Am. Ass’n of State Highway & Transp. Offs.,
No. 24-cv-1154-TJS, 2025 WL 1029552, at *2 (D.Md. Apr. 7, 2025)
(denying the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file physical exhibit
without prejudice to renewal, because the plaintiff did not need
to substantiate the claims in his complaint at the pleading stage);
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16

Jones v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. 24-cv-652-BAH, 2025 WL 896385, at
*6 (D.Md. Mar. 24, 2025) (“Because the physical exhibits do not
appear to directly contravene the complaint, they are of little
import to the Court’s analysis, which focuses on the sufficiency
of the allegations in the complaint.”).
C. Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply
On April 24, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
file their opposition to the Landlord Defendants’ motion to dismiss
out of time, (ECF No. 24), after the court pointed out in a
paperless order the day before that the opposition had not been
received, (ECF No. 23). Defendants
8
did not consent to the motion;
Defendants apparently noted to Plaintiffs, however, that they did
not intend to file an opposition to the request. (ECF No. 24, at
2). No opposition was filed.
Another court in this district previously described the
liberal standard for motions for extension of time:
A motion for extension of time should be
liberally granted at the court’s discretion,
where the motion is timely filed and good
cause exists. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). [. . .]
Where a motion is not timely filed, a movant
must demonstrate the existence of both good
cause for granting the extension and excusable
neglect regarding the motion’s untimely
filing. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2); see Chamblee v.
Old Dominion Sec. Co., LLC, No. 3:13cv820,
2014 WL 1415095[] (E.D.Va. Apr. 10, 2014). A

8
Plaintiffs, again, do not specify if “Defendants” refers to
only the Landlord Defendants, or all Defendants.
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17

court should consider four factors when
determining whether excusable neglect exists:
(1) the danger of prejudice to the adverse
party; (2) the length of the delay; (3)
whether the delay was within the reasonable
control of the movant; and (4) whether the
movant acted in good faith. Pioneer Ins.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380, 395[] (1993). Even where a
motion for extension is not timely filed,
courts often liberally grant such requests
under their own discretion. See Tindall[ v.
First Solar], 892 F.3d [1043,] 1048[ (9
th
Cir.
2018)]; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“[A]
court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.”).

Louise Trauma Ctr., LLC v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No.
23-cv-2846-RDB, 2024 WL 3555043, at *3 (D.Md. July 26, 2024), rev’d
on other grounds, 147 F.4th 495 (4
th
Cir. 2025). The motion for
extension of time was not timely filed; it was filed the day after
the court requested an update from Plaintiffs about whether they
planned to file an opposition after the due date came and went.
Defendants did not oppose the motion, however, and Plaintiffs acted
promptly to file the motion alongside the opposition to the motion
to dismiss the day after the court’s paperless order. The court
will grant the motion for extension of time and consider
Plaintiffs’ opposition.
D. Sheriff Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
1. Capacity of Sheriff Defendants
The amended complaint is internally inconsistent in
describing the capacity of Defendants Deputy Black and Deputy
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18

Bayyan. In the caption of the amended complaint, both are listed
with “individually” next to their names. (ECF No. 2-1, at 1). In
the body of the amended complaint, however, Plaintiffs state that
they are suing both Deputy Black and Deputy Bayyan in their
“official and individual capacities.” (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26).
An “official” capacity claim is another way of pleading a
claim against the governmental entity for which a person is an
agent. This is to be contrasted with an allegation that an
individual was acting under color of law in an individual capacity
claim.
The court will assume that Plaintiffs are suing Deputies Black
and Bayyan in both their individual and official capacities, and
the clerk will be directed to amend the case caption accordingly.
9

The claims under § 1983, however, cannot proceed against them in
their “official” capacities. The Sheriff Defendants contend that
the § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims against Deputies Black and
Bayyan should be dismissed because they were acting in their
official capacities. (ECF No. 10-1, at 10-11). Under Maryland
law, the Sheriff Defendants qualify as state officials. Paulone
v. City of Frederick, 787 F.Supp.2d 360, 375 (D.Md. 2011)

9
Plaintiffs are consistent in stating that Sheriff Maxwell
Uy is sued in both his individual capacity and official capacity
as Sheriff of Montgomery County, Maryland. (ECF No. 2-1, at 1;
id. ¶ 24).
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19

(collecting cases). The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the
§ 1983 claims against Deputies Black and Bayyan in their official
capacities will be dismissed.
This distinction, however, is only material for the federal
claims. In Maryland, “the particular official/individual capacity
dichotomy that is part of § 1983 law does not apply to state
constitutional violations.” Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 373
(1991). Instead, any state constitutional violation claims are
brought against the Sheriff Defendants in their individual
capacities only. Graham v. Maryland, 738 F.Supp.3d 644, 657 (D.Md.
2024).
2. Counts I and II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss the two claims against
Deputies Black and Bayyan brought under § 1983: one under the
Fourth Amendment (Count I) and one under the Fourteenth Amendment
(Count II). Both claims rest on the officers’ actions during the
attempted eviction, with nearly identical language. (Compare ECF
No. 2-1 ¶ 108, with id. ¶ 116). Plaintiffs contend that they
suffered a Fourteenth Amendment violation when Deputies Black and
Bayyan “deprived Plaintiffs of their property interests by
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20

executing an expired warrant and forcibly evicting them from the
premises without due process of law.” (Id. ¶ 116). But
“[d]ressing a Fourth Amendment claim up in due process language
does not transform it into a Fourteenth Amendment claim.” Smith
v. Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 885 (4
th
Cir. 2022) (citing Manuel
v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 366–67 (2017); United States v.
Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 302 (4
th
Cir. 1990)). The two claims rest
on the same activity, and the claim is more accurately pleaded
under the Fourth Amendment. See Lehan v. Wilson, No. 21-cv-0362-
BAH, 2025 WL 1261168, at *6 n.5 (D.Md. Apr. 30, 2025) (citing
Travelpiece, 31 F.4th at 884-85) (considering a claim under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for an unlawful seizure “as a
claim implicating the Fourth Amendment alone”). The § 1983 claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II) will be dismissed.
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must show that (1)
the defendant deprived her of a right secured by the Constitution
or the laws of the United States and (2) [the] deprivation was
achieved by the defendants acting under color of state law.” Dent
v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Dep’t, 745 F.Supp.2d 648, 656 (D.Md.
2010) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 696–97 (1976)).
Defendants do not dispute that they were acting under color of
state law; indeed, they were state officials acting pursuant to a
warrant at the time of the events at issue. The Sheriff Defendants
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21

move to dismiss on the ground that Deputies Black and Bayyan did
not deprive Plaintiffs of their Fourth Amendment rights. (ECF No.
10-1, at 12).
Plaintiffs allege deprivation in the form of an unreasonable
seizure. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 109). The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has previously held that
police participation in an eviction can implicate the Fourth
Amendment. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 69 (1992).
In Soldal, a landlord asked sheriff deputies to help him remove
the plaintiffs’ mobile home from his property. Id. at 58. The
sheriff deputies and landlord knew they did not have a lawful
eviction order but, nevertheless, removed the plaintiffs’ mobile
home from the landlord’s property. Id. at 59. The plaintiffs
brought a claim under § 1983 alleging the eviction violated their
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. In finding that the plaintiffs’
eviction was a seizure, the Supreme Court explained that a seizure
of property occurs when “there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Id.
at 61 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
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22

(1984)). The eviction in Soldal took place without a valid warrant
or lawful eviction order, but the Court stopped short of finding
a Fourth Amendment violation and remanded the issue of whether the
seizure was reasonable. Id. at 61–62, 72.
Indeed, even where law enforcement reasonably relied on a
facially valid warrant that was later found invalid, the Supreme
Court has held that law enforcement’s actions passed
constitutional muster. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922 (1984). In some circumstances, however, a warrant “may be so
facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot
reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923 (citing
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988–91 (1984)).
Although the landlord obtained a warrant of restitution in
this case, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the warrant was
expired – and therefore facially deficient - at the time it was
executed. The District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County
issued the warrant of restitution on July 6, 2023. (ECF No. 13,
at 1). The warrant’s instructions to the executing officers read,
in pertinent part:
[Y]ou are directed to deliver possession of
the premises to the plaintiff/landlord or
their agent or attorney and, unless local law
requires otherwise, to remove from the
premises, by force if necessary, all property
of the defendant(s)/tenant(s) and any other
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23

occupant(s) within 60 days of the date of this
order.
Id.
The Sheriff Defendants contend the warrant was not expired
because the 60-day period referred to the need for the landlord to
call and schedule the eviction, not the Sheriff Defendants’ need
to execute the warrant. (ECF No. 10-1, at 13). In support of
this claim, the Sheriff Defendants cite Md. Code Ann., Real Prop.
§ 8-401(f)(iii) and Westminster Mgmt., LLC v. Smith, 486 Md. 616
(2024). (Id. at 13–14). In Westminster Mgmt., the court noted,
“[t]he landlord has 60 days from the date of judgment to request
the warrant, and 60 days from the date the warrant is issued to
act on it, or the judgment of possession is stricken.” Westminster
Mgmt., 486 Md. at 629 n.7 (citing Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-
401(f)(ii)–(iii)). The language in Westminster Mgmt. largely
mirrors the statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
If the landlord orders a warrant of
restitution but takes no action on the warrant
within 60 days from the later of the date the
court issues the order for the warrant or the
date as otherwise extended by the court:
1. The warrant of restitution shall expire and
the judgment for possession shall be
stricken[.]

Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 8-401(f)(iii).
Section 8-401(f) and Westminster Mgmt. specify consequences
for when a landlord fails to act on a warrant of restitution within
60 days. But the face of the warrant contains instructions for
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24

its execution by law enforcement, which is not contemplated in
either of those authorities. The warrant directed officers to
conduct the eviction within 60 days of its issuance in July 2023,
but Deputies Black and Bayyan did not execute it until November 3,
2023. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 58). Thus, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged
that the warrant was expired when Deputies Black and Bayyan
executed it.
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not require a
warrant to have an expiration date to be valid, the Fourth Circuit
has held that execution of a warrant outside of its judicially
authorized period can violate the Fourth Amendment. See Yanez-
Marquez v. Lynch, 789 F.3d 434, 468 (4
th
Cir. 2015) (holding
nighttime execution of a daytime warrant violated petitioner’s
Fourth Amendment rights). Thus, on a motion to dismiss, with
questions of fact viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs,
they have sufficiently pleaded a plausible Fourth Amendment
violation.
The claim, however, will only move forward against Deputies
Black and Bayyan in their individual capacities. See, e.g., Hafer
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“Personal-capacity suits[] . . .
seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for
actions taken under color of state law. Thus, ‘[o]n the merits,
to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough
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25

to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused
the deprivation of a federal right.’” (quoting Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985))).
3. Counts III and IV: Maryland Declaration of Rights
Plaintiffs bring two claims under the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, the state law analogues of their federal constitutional
claims. Count III is brought under Article 26, which protects the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and is
read “in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment.” Dent, 745
F.Supp.2d at 661 (quoting Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 452–
53 (2000)). “As such, the disposition of Plaintiff[s’] § 1983
claim under the Fourth Amendment ‘dictates the same result on
[their] Article 26 claim.’” Id. (quoting Mazuz v. Maryland, 442
F.3d 217, 231 (4
th
Cir. 2006)). The motion to dismiss Count III
against Deputies Black and Bayyan is denied.
Unlike their § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs also bring the Article
26 count against Sheriff Uy. Plaintiffs seek to hold Sheriff Uy
liable through either respondeat superior or supervisory liability
theories.
10
(ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 159). The Sheriff Defendants move to

10
In the language of their amended complaint, Plaintiffs seem
to be seeking to hold the county or the state accountable for the
actions of the officers. (See ECF No. 2-1 ¶¶ 159 (“Maryland courts
have recognized that constitutional violations can be based on
patterns or practices similar to Monell claims under federal
law.”), 161 (“The State of Maryland is appropriately held
answerable for the acts of its sheriff deputies because it can
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26

dismiss only on the grounds that the warrant of restitution was
valid. (ECF No. 10-1, at 14). As described above, Plaintiffs
have plausibly alleged that the warrant was expired when Deputies
Black and Bayyan executed it. The motion to dismiss Count III
will be denied as against Sheriff Uy as well.
Count IV is brought under Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights. Article 24 is read in pari materia with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Samuels v. Tschechtelin, 135 Md.App.
483, 523 (2000) (“[Maryland] courts have long equated the Due
Process Clause and Article 24.”). As with Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the crux of their constitutional argument is about
the seizure of their property and is more properly pleaded under
Article 26. See Randall v. Peaco, 175 Md.App. 320, 330 (2007)
(applying the same Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to a claim
brought under both Article 24 and Article 26); Mendoza v. Anne
Arundel County, No. 23-cv-01383-JRR, 2024 WL 1243839, at *7-8
(D.Md. Mar. 22, 2024). Count IV will be dismissed against the
Sheriff Defendants.

avoid such misconduct through adequate training and supervision
and can prevent repetition by disciplining negligent
employees.”)). Plaintiffs brought this case against Sheriff Uy
rather than the county or the state. Defendants did not move to
dismiss on this basis.
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27

4. Counts XIII and XIV: Negligence and Gross Negligence
The Sheriff Defendants are immune from negligence claims
under the Maryland Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”). The MTCA “grants
immunity to State personnel from liability ‘for a tortious act or
omission that is within the scope of the public duties of the State
personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence.’”
Francis v. Maryland, No. 21-cv-1365-ELH, 2023 WL 2456553, at *23
(D.Md. Mar. 10, 2023) (quoting Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §
5-522(b) (West)). Count XIII, a negligence claim, will be
dismissed against the Sheriff Defendants. Because the MTCA
expressly excludes immunity from gross negligence, the court will
consider if Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded gross negligence
under Count XIV to survive a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged gross negligence by
Deputies Black and Bayyan.
Gross negligence is “an intentional failure to
perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard
of the consequences as affecting the life or
property of another,” Cooper v. Rodriguez, 443
Md. 680, [708] (2015) (citation omitted)—
“something more than simple negligence, and
likely more akin to reckless conduct,” Barbre[
v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187 (2007)] (quoting
Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
384 Md. 213, [229] (2004)). A government
official commits gross negligence “only when
he or she inflicts injury intentionally or is
so utterly indifferent to the rights of others
that he or she acts as if such rights did not
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28

exist.” Cooper, [443 Md. at 708] (brackets
and citation omitted).

Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 127-28 (4
th
Cir. 2018). The warrant
of restitution stated on its face that law enforcement must deliver
the property to the landlord within 60 days of the date of the
warrant. The eviction did not occur until approximately 120 days
after the warrant of restitution was signed. With all facts
construed in favor of Plaintiffs, the court cannot say as a matter
of law that this was not gross negligence.
The opposite is true, however, for Sheriff Uy. In support of
their gross negligence claim, Plaintiffs only say “Defendant
Sheriff Uy’s failure to implement basic verification procedures,
tracking of expiration dates, and immediate cease-and-restore
protocols, in the face of obvious risks of unlawful evictions,
likewise constituted gross negligence in supervision and policy.”
(ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 251). This is too conclusory and vague to support
the high bar for gross negligence. The gross negligence claim
against Sheriff Uy will be dismissed.
E. Landlord Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
1. Count V: 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Plaintiffs’ Count V is a claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 against Defendants Drury, Rahmi, and 18630 Laytonsville,
which the latter two have moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 21, at 5-
6). Section 1981 “guarantees, among other things, ‘[a]ll persons
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29

. . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as
is enjoyed by white citizens.’” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 330 (2020) (alteration in
original). In order to prevail under § 1981, Plaintiffs “must
initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, [they]
would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.”
Id. at 341.
The Landlord Defendants argue that the § 1981 claim should be
dismissed because the corporate Plaintiff, Woodfield, was the only
Plaintiff who was a party to the contract and was defunct at the
time of filing. (ECF No. 21, at 5-6). This may be true, but the
claim has a more fundamental problem: Plaintiffs have not plausibly
alleged a claim under § 1981.
11
Far from plausibly alleging that
their race was a but-for cause of their alleged deprivation,
Plaintiffs provide no facts in support of such a claim. Plaintiffs
only state “[u]pon information and belief, no non-Black tenants
managed or supervised by Drury were subjected to comparable
treatment or interference with their contractual or business
rights.” (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 194e). Pleading solely “upon information
and belief” is insufficient. Kashdan v. George Mason Univ., 70

11
While the Landlord Defendants did not raise this argument,
district courts may sua sponte dismiss inadequate claims under
Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs are given notice and an opportunity to
amend their complaint. Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch.,
989 F.3d 282, 290-91 (4
th
Cir. 2021).
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30

F.4th 694, 702 (4
th
Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of a claim
where the plaintiff’s allegations were “far too speculative,” and
the complaint was “devoid of facts supporting the allegations that
were pleaded upon information and belief”). Plaintiffs plead no
additional facts about the actions of either Defendant Rahmi or
18630 Laytonsville, instead seeking to hold them accountable for
Mr. Drury’s actions “under the doctrine of respondeat superior and
agency principles.” (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 196). But those assertions
are too vague to state a claim against Mr. Drury or the Landlord
Defendants. The Fourth Circuit has found such conclusory
assertions insufficient to state a § 1981 claim:
Without factual detail, we are unable to infer
that [the defendant] intended to interfere
with a contractual interest of [the plaintiff]
on the basis of race. Instead, we are left
with just the sort of “labels, conclusions,
recitations of a claim[’s] elements and naked
assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement,” ACA Fin. Guar. Corp.[ v. City of
Buena Vista], 917 F.3d [206,] 211[ (4
th
Cir.
2019)], that the Supreme Court (and our Court)
have held will not suffice to meet the Rule 8
standard, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678[]; see also
Lemon v. Myers Bigel, P.A., 985 F.3d 392, 394
(4
th
Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of a §
1981 complaint because it alleged only facts
supporting “that [the plaintiff] was treated
differently, not that she was treated
differently because of her race”).

Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 306 (4
th
Cir. 2022) (final
alteration in original). Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim will be
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31

dismissed against the Landlord Defendants, but Plaintiffs will be
given an opportunity to amend to provide more factual information.
a. Impact on Defendant Drury
The court may sua sponte dismiss meritless claims against
nonmoving parties where the plaintiffs have had an opportunity to
argue the legal sufficiency of their claims. See J & J Sports
Prods., Inc. v. MayrealII, LLC, 849 F.Supp.2d 586, 592 (D.Md. 2012)
(granting a motion to dismiss as to all defendants because the
claims against the nonmoving defendant were “indistinguishable”
from those against the moving defendant, and because the “plaintiff
[had] a full opportunity to brief the sufficiency of the
allegations and, as a matter of law, they [were] equally deficient
as to [the nonmoving defendant]” (collecting cases)).
While Mr. Drury answered the complaint, (ECF No. 9), and has
not moved to dismiss, the § 1981 claim against him is equally
deficient. As described above, Plaintiffs try to hold all Landlord
Defendants and Mr. Drury accountable based on a single “upon
information and belief” assertion. Plaintiffs argued the legal
sufficiency of their claims in their opposition to the Landlord
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25, at 7-8). Accordingly,
Count V will be dismissed against Defendant Drury as well, with
Plaintiffs given leave to amend to provide additional facts in
support of their claim.
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2. Mr. Drury as Agent of Landlord Defendants
Much of the Landlord Defendants’ motion to dismiss rests on
the premise that Mr. Drury was not their agent, and therefore they
cannot be held liable for any of his actions. (ECF No. 21, at 6-
10, 11–12, 14-16). The Landlord Defendants argue that Mr. Drury
was an independent contractor, and they should be protected from
liability. (Id. at 9).
Landlord Defendants’ heavy reliance on the term “independent
contractor” is misplaced. The actual test for agency under
Maryland law does not include such a distinction:
An agency relationship “is a legal concept
which depends upon the existence of required
factual elements: the manifestation by the
principal that the agent shall act for him,
the agent’s acceptance of the undertaking and
the understanding of the parties that the
principal is to be in control of the
undertaking.” Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 1, cmt. (1958); see Insurance Company of
North America v. Miller, 362 Md. 361, 373[]
(2001); Green v. H & R Block, Inc., 355 Md.
488, 503[] (1999). Although such a
relationship is not necessarily contractual in
nature, it is always consensual. Insurance
Co. Of N. Amer., 362 Md. at 373[], citing
Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Gamble, 160 Md. 534,
539[] (1931). The ultimate question is one of
intent, of both the principal and the agent.
Id.; Howard Cleaners v. Perman, 227 Md. 291,
295[] (1961). We have recognized three
factors as having particular relevance to the
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33

determination of an agency relationship.
These factors are:
(1) The agent’s power to alter the legal
relations of the principal;
(2) The agent’s duty to act primarily for the
benefit of the principal; and
(3) The principal’s right to control the
agent.
Green, 355 Md. at 503[], citing United Capitol
Ins. v. Kapiloff, 155 F.3d 488, 498 (4
th
Cir.
1998); Proctor v. Holden, 75 Md.App. 1, 20[],
cert. denied sub nom., 313 Md. 506, [](1988);
Schear v[.] Motel Management Corp., 61 Md.App.
670, 687[] (1985) (stating the factors derive
from sections 12–14 of the Restatement);
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 12–14
(1958). The three factors are evaluated
within the totality of the circumstances.
Green, 355 Md. at 506[]. The presence of all
three factors is not required for a finding of
an agency relationship. Id.

Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 26-
27 (2005).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Mr. Drury was an
agent of the Landlord Defendants. The facts available on the
motion to dismiss have plausibly alleged that Mr. Drury had “the
power to alter the legal relations of” the Landlord Defendants.
In the Lease Agreement that the Landlord Defendants attached to
their motion to dismiss, Mr. Drury signed on behalf of the
“Landlord,” (ECF No. 21-1, at 6),
12
elsewhere identified as Mr.
Rahmi, (id. at 5). The rental payment provision states that

12
The Lease Agreement is integral to and relied on in the
amended complaint and the parties do not dispute its authenticity.

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34

payment should be made to Mr. Drury’s company, not directly to
either of the Landlord Defendants. (Id. at 1). Plaintiffs have
also alleged facts showing that Mr. Drury had “the duty to act
primarily for the benefit of” the Landlord Defendants. In the
amended complaint, all the interaction that Plaintiffs had with
the Landlord Defendants was through Mr. Drury, who was carrying
out the request to put in a sprinkler system, present at the
eviction, and aware that Plaintiffs had paid off the amount in the
warrant of restitution that 18630 Laytonsville had secured. For
purposes of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs have sufficiently
alleged that Mr. Drury was an agent of the Landlord Defendants
such that they can be liable for his actions.
13

3. Count VI: Malicious Prosecution
The Landlord Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiffs’
malicious prosecution claim. Under Maryland law, “[t]he elements
of malicious prosecution are ‘(1) the defendant instituted a
criminal proceeding against the plaintiff; (2) the criminal
proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the defendant

13
This conclusion also has an important impact on the claims
against Mr. Drury. Because nearly all the claims against the
Landlord Defendants are solely supported by facts about Mr. Drury,
the claims against them are “indistinguishable” such that it is
appropriate to dismiss any claims against Mr. Drury that are found
to be insufficient against the Landlord Defendants. See J & J
Sports Prods., Inc. v. MayrealII, LLC, 849 F.Supp.2d 586, 592
(D.Md. 2012).
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35

did not have probable cause to institute the proceeding; and (4)
the defendant acted with malice or a primary purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice.’” Garcia v. Montgomery County,
145 F.Supp.3d 492, 523 (D.Md. 2015) (quoting Okwa v. Harper, 360
Md. 161, 183 (2000)).
Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts sufficient to meet elements
three and four of the test. The few paragraphs about this count
are both vague and conclusory. Plaintiffs allege that the Landlord
Defendants “filed or caused to be filed criminal charges against
Plaintiffs for malicious destruction of property,” but these
charges were “based on false allegations and were filed for the
improper purpose of retaliating against Plaintiffs.” (ECF No. 2-
1 ¶¶ 96-97). This is far too conclusory to raise the plausible
inference that there was no probable cause to institute the
proceeding, or that the Defendants acted with malice or another
improper purpose. The court cannot grasp at straws to fill in the
factual gaps. The malicious prosecution claim will be dismissed
against the Landlord Defendants and Mr. Drury, as the claim is
equally deficient as to his involvement.
4. Count VII: Abuse of Process
Plaintiffs bring an abuse of process claim against the
Landlord Defendants for both the attempted prosecution and the
attempted eviction. (Id. ¶ 204).
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To state a cause of action for abuse of process
(i.e., a legal proceeding or action), a party
must allege facts sufficient to satisfy three
elements: “first, that the defendant wilfully
used process,” such as a subpoena or a
protective order, “after it has issued in a
manner not contemplated by law; second, that
the defendant acted to satisfy an ulterior
motive; and third, that damages resulted from
the defendant’s perverted use of process.”
One Thousand Fleet[ Ltd. P’ship v. Guerriero],
346 Md. [29,] 38[ (1997)] (citations omitted).

Charles v. Charles, 265 Md.App. 631, 649, cert. denied sub nom.,
Charles v. Summerfield, 492 Md. 439 (2025). “A cause of action
for civil abuse of process in Maryland requires that the plaintiff
establish that an arrest of the person or a seizure of property of
the plaintiff resulted from the abuse of process.” One Thousand
Fleet, 346 Md. at 45 (citing Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219,
231 (1888)).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded an abuse of process
claim related to the attempted eviction. Plaintiffs allege that
the Landlord Defendants, through their agent Mr. Drury, pursued an
eviction based on an expired warrant of restitution when they knew
that Plaintiffs had cured the debt owed in the warrant. This is
an instance of “process regularly issued but then abused in the
manner of its execution.” Herring v. Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 21
Md.App. 517, 530 (1974). The Landlord Defendants’ only argument
to dismiss the claim is that they cannot be held liable for the
actions of Mr. Drury. (ECF No. 21, at 7-10). This argument is
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37

unavailing; as described above, Plaintiffs have sufficiently
pleaded that Mr. Drury was the agent of the Landlord Defendants.
The abuse of process claim related to the criminal charges is
not adequately pleaded. The “mere issuance of process itself . .
. is not actionable, even if it is done with ulterior motive or
bad intention.” Lilly v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 694 F.Supp.3d 569,
593 (D. Md. 2023) (quoting Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners
Ass’n, 157 Md.App. 504, 530 (2004)). Moreover, Plaintiffs do not
allege how, if at all, the criminal charges resulted in an arrest
of the person (as opposed to a summons) or the seizure of property.
The motion to dismiss Count VII will be denied as to the attempted
eviction but granted as to the criminal charges.
5. Count VIII: Intentional Interference with Business
Relations and Prospective Economic Advantage
Count VIII is a claim for intentional interference with
business relations and prospective economic advantage. Under
Maryland law, to succeed on a claim of tortious interference, the
following elements must be shown: “(1) intentional and wil[l]ful
acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their
lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of
the defendants (which constitutes malice); and (4) actual damage
and loss resulting.” Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon
Evander & Assocs., Inc., 336 Md. 635, 652 (1994) (quoting Willner
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38

v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 355 (1909)). “[T]he two general types
of tort actions for interference with business relationships are
inducing the breach of an existing contract and, more broadly,
maliciously or wrongfully interfering with economic relationships
in the absence of a breach of contract.” S. Volkswagen, Inc. v.
Centrix Fin., LLC, 357 F.Supp.2d 837, 851 (D.Md. 2005) (alteration
in original) (quoting Nat. Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47,
69 (1984)).
For liability to attach, the interference must be “wrongful
or unlawful.” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Merling, 326 Md. 329, 343
(1992) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court of Maryland “has
explained that ‘. . . an act of tortious interference with economic
relations is characterized by the defendant’s specific purpose to
interfere, and . . . acts which incidentally affect another’s
business relationship are not a sufficient basis for the tort.’”
Hebbeler v. First Mariner Bank, No. 17-cv-3641-ELH, 2020 WL
1033586, at *18 (D.Md. Mar. 2, 2020) (quoting Alexander & Alexander
Inc., 336 Md. at 656).
Defendants first argue that Woodfield is the only Plaintiff
with standing to bring this claim. (ECF No. 21, at 10).
14
As a
general rule, “a shareholder or member of a corporation or LLC may

14
Once again, “claim ownership” is not the same as Article
III standing. See supra note 6.
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not recover for tortious interference of the business or contract
of the corporation or LLC.” Baron Fin. Corp. v. Natanzon, 471
F.Supp.2d 535, 540 (D.Md. 2006) (citing, inter alia, First Com.
Bank, N.A. v. Walker, 333 Ark. 100, 109 (1998)). But this is not
as sweeping a rule as it seems. Plaintiffs are bringing a claim
of tortious interference with “business relations and prospective
economic advantage,” but do not identify any particular contracts.
(ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 209). If Plaintiffs have pleaded that the Landlord
Defendants sought to interfere with their individual prospective
business relations, their claim can move forward:
Simply put, [the individual plaintiff] does
not allege that the [defendants] intended to
harm [the company plaintiff], that they acted
improperly to do so, and that [the individual
plaintiff], as the owner of [the company
plaintiff], was harmed economically as a
result. The claim has a slight but important
difference. [The individual plaintiff]
alleges that the [defendants] intended to harm
him and acted improperly to do so. Therefore,
[the individual plaintiff may] bring this
claim.

Press v. United States, No. 17-cv-1667-JKB, 2018 WL 2237492, at *8
(D.Md. May 16, 2018).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of intentional
interference with business relations against the Landlord
Defendants. First, Plaintiffs identify the intentional and
willful acts of the Landlord Defendants as the attempted eviction,
Mr. Drury interrupting a business meeting in March 2024, comments
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from Mr. Drury, and the filing of criminal charges against
Plaintiffs. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 211). They have sufficiently alleged
that these actions were “calculated to cause damage to [Plaintiffs]
in their lawful business:” during a client meeting, Mr. Drury
allegedly “made verbal threats to Plaintiff Oluyinka Rivadeneira,
stating that she would be evicted and demanding that all future
business agreements be cancelled.” (Id. ¶ 52). At this stage,
they have sufficiently alleged the third element, that these
actions were “done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage
and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the
defendant.” Mr. Drury was present at the eviction and did not
tell the Deputies that Plaintiffs had paid the money due on the
warrant of restitution, rendering it void and removing any right
he had to interfere with their property. Finally, Plaintiffs have
alleged damages resulting from the Landlord Defendants’ actions,
including the loss of their business relationship with Keith Tate.
(Id. ¶ 214). The motion to dismiss Count VIII will be denied.
6. Count IX: Breach of Contract
Plaintiffs bring a breach of contract claim against the
Landlord Defendants, specifically asserting that they breached the
covenant of quiet enjoyment. (Id. ¶¶ 216-21). Plaintiffs point
specifically to paragraph 17 of the Lease Agreement, which promised
the tenant “exclusive, quiet, peaceable and undisturbed and
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uninterrupted possession of the Leased Premises during the term of
this Lease.” (Id. ¶ 218). “Under Maryland law, a claim for breach
of contract must ‘allege with certainty and definiteness facts
showing a contractual obligation owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff and a breach of that obligation by the defendant.’”
Titan Custom Cabinets, Inc. v. Truist Bank, 505 F.Supp.3d 558, 567
(D.Md. 2020) (quoting Cont’l Masonry Co. v. Verdel Constr. Co.,
279 Md. 476, 480 (1977)).
The individual Plaintiffs’ claim fails at the threshold.
Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Commercial Lease Agreement executed
on May 1, 2022, constituted a valid and enforceable contract
between Plaintiff Oluyinka Rivadeneira and Defendant 18630
Laytonsville, LLC.” (ECF No. 2-1 ¶¶ 217). The Lease Agreement
itself, however, is between 18630 Laytonsville and Woodfield. (ECF
No. 21-1, at 1). While Plaintiff Ms. Rivadeneira signed the
contract, she signed “[w]ith authority to bind [Woodfield],” not
in her individual capacity, (id. at 6):
While these allegations create a plausible
claim for relief with respect to [the
corporate plaintiff], they do not provide any
basis for a breach of contract claim by [the
individual plaintiff] individually. “The
basic Maryland rule is that privity of
contract is a prerequisite for recovery on
that contract.” Safer v. Perper, 569 F.2d 87,
94 (D.C.Cir. 1977). [The individual
plaintiff] was simply not a party to the
contract which was allegedly breached, and
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therefore, fails to allege breach of contract
in this case.

Titan Custom Cabinets, 505 F.Supp.3d at 567. Plaintiffs did not
provide any basis for the court to find that they were third-party
beneficiaries to the contract or otherwise should be able to
enforce its provisions. On this record, Count IX will be
dismissed, albeit without prejudice as it might be reasserted by
Woodfield.
7. Count X: Trespass
Plaintiffs bring a trespass claim against the Landlord
Defendants based on two events: Mr. Drury’s interruption of a
business meeting at the property on March 25, 2024, (ECF No. 2-1
¶ 224), and the attempted eviction on November 3, 2023, (id. ¶
226).
“In order to prevail on a cause of action for trespass, the
plaintiff must establish: (1) an interference with a possessory
interest in his property; (2) through the defendant[s’] physical
act or force against that property; (3) which was executed without
[Plaintiffs’] consent.” Graham, 738 F.Supp.3d at 649 (alterations
in original) (quoting Royal Inv. Grp., LLC v. Wang, 183 Md.App.
406, 445 (2008)). The Landlord Defendants argue that the Lease
Agreement allowed them to enter the premises, “just not at an
unreasonable hour and not to substantially interfere in business
operations,” thus the entrance could not have been without
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Plaintiffs’ consent. (ECF No. 21, at 14 (citing ECF No. 21-1 ¶
12)). The Landlord Defendants also argue that the individual
Plaintiffs did not have a possessory interest in the premises and
cannot bring a claim for trespass. (Id.)
The Landlord Defendants are correct that the individual
Plaintiffs did not have a possessory interest in the commercial
property. The Lease Agreement was between 18630 Laytonsville and
Woodfield. (ECF No. 21-1, at 1). As such, Mr. and Ms. Rivadeneira
“had no personal possessory interest in the office” and cannot
succeed on a trespass claim. Callender v. Callender, No. 17-cv-
3249-TDC, 2020 WL 1083162, at *7 (D.Md. Mar. 6, 2020) (finding no
possessory interest in the property for a business owner when the
business was the party to the lease). The trespass claim will be
dismissed against the Landlord Defendants and Mr. Drury but may be
reasserted in an amended complaint by Woodfield.
8. Count XII: Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress
The Landlord Defendants move to dismiss the claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) only on the
grounds that Mr. Drury was not their agent. While that argument
is unavailing, Plaintiffs simply have not plausibly alleged such
a claim, and it will be dismissed regardless.
To bring an IIED claim under Maryland law, Plaintiffs must
prove “(1) intentional or reckless conduct (2) that is extreme or
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outrageous (3) and caused (4) the plaintiff's severe emotional
distress.” Nicholson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, No. 20-cv-3146-DKC,
2023 WL 4549741, at *10 (D.Md. July 14, 2023) (citing Caldor, Inc.
v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 641-42 (1993)). There is a high bar;
“[l]iability accrues only ‘for conduct exceeding all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is
especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of
a very serious kind.’” McPherson v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 494
F.Supp.3d 269, 286 (D.Md. 2020) (quoting Ky. Fried Chicken Nat’l
Mgmt. Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663, 670 (1992)).
Plaintiffs’ facts supporting the IIED claim are a mix of
conclusory allegations and facts insufficient to state a claim.
While the events related to their tenancy were no doubt distressing
to the Rivadeneiras, they have not alleged severe emotional
distress:
Even if this Court were to find that
Defendants’ alleged actions meet the standard
for extreme and outrageous conduct, the claim
would still fail because the allegations do
not support the fourth element of severe
emotional distress. A plaintiff must show “a
severely disabling emotional response to the
defendant’s conduct.” Harris[ v. Jones], [281
Md. 560, 570 (1977)]. Emotional distress must
be “so severe that no reasonable [person]
could be expected to endure it.” Id.[ at 571]
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
cmt. j). To meet this requirement, a
plaintiff must “state with reasonable
certainty the nature, intensity or duration of
the alleged emotional injury.” Manikhi[ v.
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45

Mass Transit Admin.], [360 Md. 333, 370
(2000)].

Adams v. Cameron, No. 20-cv-3739-TDC, 2021 WL 5280978, at *9 (D.Md.
Nov. 12, 2021) (third alteration in original). Plaintiffs state
they experienced “severe emotional distress, including anxiety,
humiliation, fear and anguish. Plaintiffs’ emotional distress was
severe and has resulted in ongoing psychological harm.” (ECF No.
2-1 ¶¶ 239–40). “This general description is insufficient.”
Adams, 2021 WL 5280978, at *9; see also Manikhi, 360 Md. at 368-
69 (collecting cases showing the high bar for finding severe
emotional distress to sustain an IIED claim in Maryland). The
IIED claim will be dismissed against the Landlord Defendants and
Mr. Drury.
F. All Moving Defendants
Two claims are brought against all Defendants: conversion
(Count XI) and civil conspiracy (Count XV). Both the Sheriff
Defendants and the Landlord Defendants moved to dismiss each count.
1. Count XI: Conversion
Both the Landlord Defendants and the Sheriff Defendants move
to dismiss the conversion claim brought against them, asserting
that a temporary interference is not sufficient to give rise to
such a claim. (ECF Nos. 10-1, at 14–16; 21, at 15).
The tort of conversion is “any distinct act of ownership or
dominion exerted by one person over the personal property of
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another in denial of his right or inconsistent with it.” Allied
Inv. Corp. v. Jasen, 354 Md. 547, 560 (1999) (quoting Interstate
Ins. Co. v. Logan, 205 Md. 583, 588–89 (1954)) (citing Merchs.’
Nat’l Bank v. Williams, 110 Md. 334 (1909)). Plaintiffs must
allege a serious interference with their rights to possess the
property. “[F]actors to weigh in determining a serious
interference include: (1) the nature and length of Defendant’s
control; (2) Defendant’s intent to displace Plaintiff’s control;
(3) Defendant’s good faith; (4) the nature and length of
Plaintiff’s right of control; (5) harm to the property; and (6)
Plaintiff’s inconvenience and expense.” Equity Prime Mortg., LLC
v. 1st Fin., Inc., No. 17-cv-3754-ADC, 2021 WL 3930707, at *10
(D.Md. Sep. 2, 2021) (citing Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Assocs.,
Inc., 852 F.Supp. 372, 411 (D.Md. 1994)).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim of conversion
against the Sheriff Defendants. The Sheriff Defendants carried
out the warrant, despite the long-overdue deadline, and exercised
dominion over Plaintiffs “substantial personal property” located
at the space leased to Plaintiffs’ business. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 230).
While the interference with Plaintiffs’ possessory interest was
temporary, Plaintiffs allege that much of their property “was
damaged during the removal process and while left in the hallway,
including broken furniture, damaged equipment, and disorganized
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files and business records.” (Id. ¶ 77). On these facts,
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a conversion claim against
the Sheriff Defendants.
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently stated a claim of
conversion against the Landlord Defendants. The Landlord
Defendants, through their agent Mr. Drury, proceeded with the
attempted eviction on November 3, 2023, despite the knowledge that
Plaintiffs had cured by paying the outstanding debt due on the
warrant of restitution. The Landlord Defendants, through their
agent Mr. Drury, exercised dominion over Plaintiffs “substantial
personal property” located at the space leased to Plaintiffs’
business. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 230). Again, while the interference
with Plaintiffs’ possessory interest was temporary, Plaintiffs
allege that much of their property “was damaged during the removal
process and while left in the hallway, including broken furniture,
damaged equipment, and disorganized files and business records.”
(Id. ¶ 77). On these facts, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged
a conversion claim against the Landlord Defendants.
2. Count XV: Civil Conspiracy
“In Maryland, a claim for civil conspiracy requires proof of
the following elements: 1) a confederation of two or more persons
by agreement or understanding; 2) some unlawful or tortious act
done in furtherance of the conspiracy or use of unlawful or
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tortious means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal; and 3)
actual legal damage resulting to the plaintiff.” Lilly, 694
F.Supp.3d at 592 (citing Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 397 Md. 108,
154 (2007)). The Sheriff Defendants move to dismiss the civil
conspiracy count, asserting that Plaintiffs have not alleged that
they formed an agreement or understanding with each other or any
other Defendants. (ECF No. 10-1, at 18–20). The Landlord
Defendants move to dismiss on the basis that Mr. Drury was not
their agent. (ECF No. 21, at 16–17).
Even in their amended complaint, Plaintiffs fail to allege
that the Sheriff Defendants were part of an agreement or
understanding related to Plaintiffs. They allege “[w]hile the
Sheriff Defendants may not have been original conspirators with
knowledge of the fraudulent walkthrough or theft planning, they
joined or ratified the conspiracy through their deliberate conduct
in executing a facially expired warrant and, critically, through
their failure to properly remedy the unlawful eviction once its
illegality was confirmed.” (ECF No. 2-1 ¶ 263). But
“[i]ndependent acts of two wrongdoers do not make a conspiracy.”
Lilly, 694 F.Supp.3d at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting
Murdaugh Volkswagen, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of S.C., 639 F.2d
1073, 1076 (4
th
Cir. 1981)). Plaintiffs provide only conclusory
assertions that any of the Sheriff Defendants had any kind of
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agreement or understanding with the other Defendants. Plaintiffs
“fail to state when the alleged conspiracy was formed, and also to
present any facts tending to show that such agreement was, in fact,
reached.” Id. The civil conspiracy claim in Count XV will be
dismissed as against the Sheriff Defendants.
Plaintiffs have, however, successfully pleaded a conspiracy
claim against Landlord Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that Mr.
Drury and Defendant John Doe walked through the commercial space
just a few days before the attempted eviction, where they were
both present. (ECF No. 2-1 ¶¶ 260, 261). None of the Landlord
Defendants notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office that
Plaintiffs had paid off the debt that gave rise to the warrant of
restitution and instead worked toward evicting Plaintiffs. (Id.
¶ 270). Landlord Defendants only move to dismiss on the grounds
that Mr. Drury was not their agent. (ECF No. 21, at 16-17). As
the court described above, that argument is unavailing. On these
facts, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a conspiracy, and the
Landlord Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count XV will be denied.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Sheriff Defendants’ motion to
dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part, the Landlord
Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied
in part, the Sheriff Defendants’ motion to file non-PDF exhibits
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will be denied without prejudice, and Plaintiffs’ motion for
extension of time will be granted. If, as contemplated, Plaintiffs
elect to amend, they should take care to identify and specify with
precision the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs on whose behalf each claim
is asserted, as well as against which Defendant or Defendants each
claim is asserted, along with sufficient factual detail validly to
state a claim. A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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