Vinny's Towing & Recovery v. KBI Solutions LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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VINNY'S TOWING & RECOVERY,
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Plaintiff,
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V.
* Civil No. 24-1044-BAH
KBI SOLUTIONS LLC ET AL.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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Plaintiff Vinny's Towing & Recovery ("Vinny's Towing") brought suit against KBI
Solutions LLC ("KBI") and JB Hunt Transport, Inc. ("JB Hunt" or "JBH") ( collectively
"Defendants") alleging claims under Maryland Jaw arising from the towing and recovery of an
overturned tractor trailer. ECF 3. JB Hunt filed a cross-claim against KBI, ECF 5, and a third-
party complaint against E&M Express Trucking, LLC ("E&M"), ECF 12. Pending before the
Court are four motions filed by JB Hunt: two motions to strike the expert testimony of Wayne
Sullivan, ECFs 49 & 66, a motion for summary judgment, ECF 67, and a motion for default
judgmentas to KBI, ECF 68. Vinny's Towing filed oppositions to the motions to strike and motion
for summary judgment, ECFs 69 & 70, and JB Hunt filed replies, ECFs 72 & 73. Also pending
before the Court is Vinny's Towing's response to the Court's order to show cause, ECF 71,
wherein Vinny's Towing requests an extension of time to effect service on KBI and E&M. ECF
74. Several filings include memoranda of law and exhibits.
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The Court has reviewed all relevant
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The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-
generated page numbers at the top of the page.
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filings and finds that no 1hearing is,necessary. See Loe. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). Accordingly, for
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the reasons stated belO\~, all four of JB Hunt's pending motions are DENIED; Vinny's Towing
and JB Hunt are GRANTED additional time to serve KBI; and JB Hunt is DIRECTED to file a
motion for default judgment ag!linst E&M or a report as to why such motion would be
inappropriate.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2022, a tractor trailer, including a trailer owned by JB Hunt, was involved
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in a four-vehicle accident on Inter.state 70 in Washington County, Maryland. ECF 67-2 (State of
Maryland motor vehicle crash report), at 2; ECF 69-5, at 2; ECF 69-6 (deposition of Vinny's
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Towing's Chief Operating Officer, Dustin Wiles), at 82, 81:7-10. The tractor trailer overturned
and hit the guard rail on, the side of the interstate. ECF 67-2, at 2.
Maryland State Police responded to the scene and contacted Vinny's Towing to provide
towing and recovery sei:vices for the tractor trailer. ECF 69-6, at 85-86, 84:22-85: I, at 87, 86:11-
13. Vinny's Towing is,a towing and recovery business located in Frederick, Maryland. Id at 6,
5:14-15, at 26, 25:4-7., It is on several "police towing lists .. : to perform police initiated towing
... for that police depat1ment," including for the Maryland State Police. Id. at 63-64, 62: 16-63 :2.
Vinny's Towing has been on the Maryland State Police towing list for over ten years. Id at 64,
63:8-11.
The load in the trailer invqlved in the accident was brokered by JB Hunt to E&M Express.
ECF 67-3, at 2. E&M Express was under a contract that "strictly prohibit[ed] double-brokering,"
but it nonetheless "double-brokered the subject load to Defendant KBI without [JB Hunt]'s
knowledge" or permission. Id
The tractor itself is labeled with KBI's logo, ECF 69-6, at 97, 96:7-9, and the Maryland
State Police report identified KBI as the owner of the tractor, ECF 67-2, at 3. However, when
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Dustin Wiles, Chief Operating Officer for Vinny's Towing, responded to the scene on December
21, 2022, the truck owner, "Carlos," "represented himself as JB Hunt." ECF 69-6, at 131, 130:14-
16. The driver of the tractor trailer also said he was working for JB Hunt. Id. at 98, 97:9-10 ("He
said he was. He was working for JB Hunt."). That "gentleman ... logged into the JB Hunt app
when he was on the side of the site" and showed Wiles a bill of lading that named JB Hunt as the
operating carrier. Id. at 97-98, 96:11-97:3; see also 69-3, at 1. On December 22, 2022, Carlos
called Wiles and "gave [him] authorization to do the [towing] job." ECF 69-6, at 131, 130:4-7.
Vinny's Towing was also "in contact with JB Hunt," who Wiles did not recall authorized recovery
of the trailer. Id. at 132-133, 131:14-132:1. On December 27, 2022, Vinny's Towing began
recovery of the overturned tractor trailer. Id. at 113, 112:20-22.
After the towing and recovery service was complete, John Hardy, a JB Hunt representative,
requested an invoice from Vinny's Towing. Id. at 142, 141 :11-15; ECF 67-2, at 4. The invoice
was for approximately $188,471.33, excluding storage or administration fees. ECF 69-6, at 149-
150, 148:19-149:5; ECF 67-6, at 3. JB Hunt "object[ed] to the invoice as excessive and outrageous
under the circumstances," refused to pay it, and told Vinny's Towing that it should attempt to
recover expenses from KBI. ECF 67-3, at 4-5; ECF 67-6, at 3; ECF 69-4, at 1.
On November 13, 2023, Vinny's Towing filed this lawsuit against both JB Hunt and KBI
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, bringing claims for quantum meruit and breach of
contract against KBI (counts I and II), and quantum meruit against JB Hunt (count III). ECF 3
(state court complaint). After being served on March 18, 2024, see ECF 1, at 1, JB Hunt filed an
answer in state court, ECF 4, along with a crossclaim against KBI, ECF 5. JB Hunt then removed
the case to federal court on April 10, 2024, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. ECF 1, at 2. On
September 3, 2024, JB Hunt filed a third-party complaint against E&M. ECF 12.
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In the meantime; Vinny's Towing received an extension to September 30, 2024, to serve
KBI. ECF 8 (order to show cause); ECF 11 (order extending service deadline). Vinny'_s Towing
then filed a motion for 'alternativ~ service, ECF 22, which was denied on November 18, 2024.
ECF 25 (memorandum opinion); ~CF 26 (order). Vinny's Towing was provided an additional
forty-five days from the: denial of~e motion for alternative service to serve KBI. ECF 26, at 1.
JB Hunt moved for default judgment on its crossclaim against KBI and E&M. ECF 29
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(motion for entry of default against E&M); ECF 37 (motion for Clerk's entry of default against
KBI); ECF 42 (motion for defaultjudgment against E&M); ECF 43 (motion for default judgment
against KBI). JB Hunt's motions for default judgment were denied because "the Court ha[d]
doubts as to whether KBI and E&M ha[d] been properly served." ECF 56, at 2; ECF 57.
A scheduling order enter~d, ECF 44, and Vinny's Towing and JB Hunt commenced
discovery .. JB Hunt has now filed :two motions to strike the testimony of Vinny's Towing's expert
witness, Wayne Sullivan ("Sullivan"), ECFs 49 & 66, a motion for summary judgment as to
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Vinny's Towing's quantum meniit claim against JB Hunt, ECF 67, and a motion for default
judgment as to KBI, ECF 68. These motions are ripe for disposition. Vinny's Towing has also
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requested further time tp serve Kl3I and E&M. ECF 64, at 2; ECF 74, at 1.
II. MOTIONS TO STRIKE, (ECFS 49 & 66)
JB Hunt has filed two motions to strike or, alternatively, exclude Sullivan's expert
testimony on behalf ofiVinny's Towing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c) and under
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Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403. ECF 49, at 1; ECF 66, at 1. Given that the arguments in
these motions overlap, fhe Court will address them together.
A. Exclusion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides a mechanism for sanctions for discovery
violations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37. JB Hunt contends that Vinny's Towing's expert witness reports
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under Rule 26(a)(2) were untimely and insufficient, warranting exclusion of Sullivan's expert
testimony pursuant to Rule 37. ECF 49-1, at 8.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires a litigant to disclose the identity of any
expert witness they may use at trial along with a written report prepared and signed by the witness.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The Rule requires that the expert report must contain "(i) a complete
statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; (ii) the facts
or data considered by the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize
or support them; (iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in
the previous 10 years; (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid
for the study and testimony in the case." Id. "A report is complete, and compliant with Rule
26(a)(2), ifit is sufficiently detailed.such that 'surprise is eliminated, unnecessary depositions are
avoided and costs are reduced."' Wiseman v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. SAG-16-04030, 2017
WL 2865013, at * 1 (D. Md. July 5, 2017) (quoting Sullivan v. Glock, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 497, 503
(D. Md. 1997)).
Vinny's Towing's Rule 26(a)(2) disclosures were due on November 10, 2025. ECF 44, at
2. According to JB Hunt, Vinny's Towing produced its first expert disclosure two days late-on
November 12, 2025. ECF 49-1, at 2. This expert report consfsted of"a single page" with "a word-
for-word recitation of the narrative section of Plaintiff's invoice" along with a sentence stating that
Sullivan "reviewed this invoice and certify the charges are reasonable and customary within the
geographical area." ECF 49-1, at 2; see also ECF 49-3, at 8 (invoice summary), at 12-13 (expert
report). The Court agrees with JB Hunt that this expert report was both untimely and insufficient.
Vinny's Towing provides no excuse for its untimeliness in submitting the report. ECF 58, at 3.
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Moreover, Sullivan's·first expert :report fails to comport with the basic requirements of Rule
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26(a)(2), as it does not include, at minimum a "complete statement of all opinions the witness will
express and the basis a(ld reasons! for them," or "the facts or data considered by the witness in
forming them." Fed. R.:Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). "The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the district courts in this circuit are clear that an expert report
should be a comprehensive docum;ent that, by itself, provides all the expert's opinions that will be
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offered at trial, along with the bases for those opinions." Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Nvidia Corp., 314
F.R.D. 190, 198 (E.D. Va. 2016) (citing Campbell v. United States, 470 F. App'x 153 (4th Cir.
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2012)). As JB Hunt correctly notes, Sullivan merely copied Vinny's Towing's invoice summary
word-for-word and then added a, single sentence certifying that he believes "the charges are
reasonable and customary." ECF 49-3, at 13. As such, Sullivan's first expert report is
insufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B).
In recognition of the deficiencies of the first report, Vinny's Towing submitted a second,
more fulsome expert report a week later, on November 19, 2025. See ECF 49-4; ECF 58, at 3. Of
course, Sullivan's seco1;1d expert report was still untimely, but Vinny's Towing characterizes the
second report as a supplementation under Rule 26(e). ECF 58, at J; see also Fed, R. Civ. P.
26(e)(l) (requiring "[al party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)" to "supplement its
disclosure or response'! if it "le~s that in some material respect the disclosure or response is
incomplete or incorrect"). JB Hunt contends that the second expert report is still insufficient
because it does not include a complete list of cases in which Sullivan has testified as an expert in
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the past four years. ECF 66-2, at :I I.
As noted, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) requires an expert to include in their
written report "a list ofi all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified
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as an expert at trial or by deposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(v). Sullivan's second report
includes three cases in which he testified: "Autobarn v. Miller v. Wampole-Miller Inc. No. 1 :22
CV-03374-LKG, "Troy Brave v. Grantsville Truck and Trailer LLC," and "Mand N Towing (P.O.
County District Court)." ECF 49-4, at 8 (formatting altered). According to JB Hunt, Sullivan's
case list "was false, as it listed cases in which he had not testified and left off cases in which he
did testify." ECF 66-2, at 5. The deposition reflects that Sullivan does not keep track of, and did
not remember, all the cases in which he has testified as an expert: ECF 66-7, at 13, 47:8-13.
Moreover, Sullivan identified at least one case, Crete v. Sullivan, in which he testified as an expert
within the last four years that he did not include in his case list. Id. at 16, 57:22-58:17. Given
that Vinny's Towing does not rebut that Sullivan's expert report includes an inaccurate and
incomplete case list, see ECF 70, Sullivan's second expert report is also deficient for that reason.
Thus, the Court turns to the appropriate sanction.
"Rule 37(c)(l) provides that 'ifa party fails to provide information or identify a witness as
required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply
evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is
harmless."' Hatami v. Hatami, Civ. No. WDQ-14-4004, 2015 WL 4509815, at *3 (D. Md. July
24, 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(l)). "A court has 'broad discretion' to determine whether
an untimely discovery disclosure is substantially justified or harmless." Disney Enterprises, Inc.
v. Kappas, 923 F. Supp. 2d 788, 796 (E.D. Va. 2013). To determine whether there is substantial
justification or harmlessness, courts may conside_r "( 1) the surprise to the party against whom the
evidence would be offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the surprise; (3) the extent to which
allowing the evidence would disrupt the trial; ( 4) the importance of the evidence; and (5) the
nondisclosing party's explanation for its failure to disclose the evidence." Southern States Rack
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and Fixture, Inc. v. She/:win-Williams Co., 318 F.3d 592, 596-97 (4th Cir. 2003). "District courts
need not expressly consider each Southern States factor." Wiseman, 2017 WL 2865013,.at *2.
JB Hunt seeks to exclude Sullivan's testimony in its entirety. ECF 66-2, at 11. The Court
concludes that exclusion is too harsh a sanction for the deficiencies described above. Several
factors weigh in Vinny'is Towing',s favor. Both parties agree that Sullivan's expert testimony is
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essential to Vinny's Toy.,ing's claifUS-ECF 49-1, at 11; ECF 58, at 4. Any surprise to JB Hunt is
minimal since Vinny's Towing submitted its expert reports only slightly after the deadline, and JB
. . .
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Hunt has had the opportunity to df?pose Sullivan on the contents of both reports. Cf Clear Touch
Interactive, Inc. v. Ockers Co., 171 F.4th 715 (4th Cir. 2026) (finding no abuse of discretion where
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the district court excluqed a witness that was disclosed after the discovery deadline because·the
defendant "was robbed of the opportunity to depose him and to properly prepare for cross-
examining him at trial"). And as
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no trial date has been set, surprise on the eve of trial resulting
from Plaintiffs late submission is:not a factor. Hatami, 2015 WL 4509815, at *3 ("[N]o trial date
has been set, and there~ore surprise on the eve of trial as a result of Plaintiffs late submission is
not a concern."). Moreover, any surprise could be cured by ordering Sullivan to provide a fulsome
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case list to JB Hunt, if ~B Hunt w6re·to request one.
However, the fifth factor :weighs in favor of JB Hunt. Vinny's Towing's provides no
justification for the delay in submitting its first expert report. ECF 58, at 3. It, however, contends
that Sullivan's second expert report was not late, but a supplementation under Rule 26(e). The
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Court finds this explan~tion lacki9g. Sullivan's second expert report is not a true supplementation,
i.e., one that corrects in~dvertent errors or omissions, but instead an attempt at "an end-run around
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the normal timetable f1r conducting discovery" through "supplementing an expert report with a
new and improved exp~rt report,'.' Kappos, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 795 (quoting East West, LLC v.
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Rahman, No. 1:1 lcvl380, 2012 WL 4105129, at *6 (E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2012)). Nor has Vinny's
Towing attempted to explain its failure to provide information regarding Sullivan's prior testimony
as required by the Federal Rules. See ECF 58; ECF 70.
Nevertheless, weighing the factors overall, the Court concludes that these deficits do not
warrant the harsh sanction of striking Sullivan's expert testimony in its entirety. "Excluding expert
testimony is an extreme sanction and, if the evidence is critical, one not normally to be imposed
absent a showing of willful deception or flagrant disregard of the court order by the proponent."
Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Nat'[ Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, Civ. No. DKC-13-1822, 2014
WL 3055568, at *8 (D. Md. July 3, 2014) (citation modified). Given that exclusion of Sullivan's
testimony is particularly harsh and may be outcome determinative, JB Hunt's motion to exclude
his testimony under Rule 37(c) is denied. CJ Metts v. Airtran Airways, Inc., Civ. No. DKC-10-
0466, 2010 WL 4183020, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 2010) (denying exclusion of expert testimony
under Rule 37(c)(l) where "[s]triking expert testimony is a particularly harsh sanction.and in this
case almost certainly would be outcome determinative") ..
B. Exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence
JB Hunt contends that even if not excluded for discovery violations, Sullivan's testimony
should still be excluded under Federal Rules of Evid_ence 702 and 403. ECF 49-1, at 11; ECF 66-
2, at 13.
"Federal Rule of Evidence 702 pr.ovides that an expert who is qualified 'by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise' if 'the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific [ or otherwise specialized] knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue."' Halig v. Nat'[ Bd of Examiners
of Optometry, Inc., Civ. No. BAH-22-2118, 2024 WL 3253561, at *4 (D. Md. July 1, 2024)
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)). "The proponent of
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the expert bears tlie b1den to derμonstrate that their witness is· qualified to testify as an expert."
Id. (citing Fed. R.•Evid! 702). "A district court considering the admissibility of expert testimony
exercises a gate keeping function to assess whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable
and relevant." Id. (quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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"The reliability inquiry should be a flexible one, and should focus on the principles and
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methodology employed' and not the conclusions reached." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Ruffin v. Shaw:Indus., Inc., 149 F.3d 294,296 (4th Cir. 1998)). "In order for an opinion
to be reliable, it must be 'based mi sufficient facts or data,' 'the product of reliable principles and
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methods,' and 'reflect[ :J a reliabl
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e application of the principles and methods to the facts of the
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case."' Id. (quotil).g Fec;l. R. Evid.'702 (b)-(d)). "Furthermore, 'the court need not determine that
the expert testimony a litigant seeks to offer into evidence is irrefutable or certainly correct."' Id.
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(quoting Westberry, 17~ F.3d at 2pl).
JB Hunt argues that Sullivan's expert testimony is not reliable because his "'opinions' are
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not based on any applicable facts or data," he "conducted no investigation," and he "did not use
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any methodology in rea,ching his opinion." ECF 66-2, at 14-15 (emphasis omitted). "The Fourth
Circuit has held that an ;expert may testify on the basis of either 'experience alone,' or 'experience
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in conjunction with other knowledge, skill, training or education."' Bunting Graphics, Inc. v.
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Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., Civ. No. LKG-19-2323, 2022 WL 14664724, at *7 (D. Md. Oct.
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25, 2022) (quoting US.!v. Wilson,,484 F.3d 267,274 (4th Cir. 2007)). Here, neither party disputes
that Sullivan possesses general expertise about the towing industry based on his over fifty years of
experience. ECF 49-1', at 13. Sullivan's expert report states that he considered towing industry
standards for billing O\cer the years, see ECF 49-4, at 4, along with photos of the accident scene,
the weather the d~y of the recovery, and his own experience, to conclude that Vinny's Towing's
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invoice for towing and recovery of the overturned tractor trailer was reasonable. ECF 49-4, at 7.
Although JB Hunt takes issue with what they view as holes in Sullivan's expert opinion;see, e.g.,
66-2, at 15 (arguing Sullivan "completely ignored the police report, police bodycam footage, and
police dashcam footage"), "[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking
shaky but admissible evidence," rather than exclusion. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig.,
Civ. No. RDB-10-0318, 2013 WL 1855980, at *3 (D. Md. May 1, 2013) (quoting Daubert, 509
U.S. at 595); see also Joyner v. Walmart, Inc., Civ. No. EA-25-1300, 2026 WL 1593319, at *5 (D.
Md. June 3, 2026) ("[Q]uestions regarding the factual underpinnings of the [expert witness']
opinion affect the weight and credibility of the witness' assessment, not its admissibility." ( citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Sullivan's testimony is sufficiently reliable and
will not be excluded for that reason.
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JB Hunt also briefly asserts that Sullivan's testimony should be excluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 because it is "conclusory, speculative, and unsupported" and "has the
potential to be both powerful and quite misleading." ECF 49-1, at 14-15 (internal quotations
omitted). Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that "[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. JB Hunt fails to explain how
Sullivan's testimony would be misleading to a jury except to assert that it is "conclusory,
speculative, and unsupported." ECF 49-1, at 14. Without more, the Court cannot conclude that
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JB Hunt does not argue that Sullivan's proffered expert testimony is irrelevant.
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exclusion is appropriat~ under Rule 403 at this time. Accordingly, Sullivan's testimony will not
be excluded on this basis. JB Hunt's motions to strike, ECFs 49 and 66, are denied.
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III. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF 67)
JB Hunt moves (or summ~ judgment on Vinny's Towing's quantum meruit claim against
it. ECF 67.
A. Legal Sfandard
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted
"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether
it is so one-sided that one party m~st prevail as a matter oflaw." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 ([986).
"Once a motion for summary judglI!ent is properly made and supported, the opposing party
has the burden of showing that a g~nuine factual dispute exists." Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh
House, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 3d 369,372 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S.:574, 585-86 (1986)). "A dispute is genuine if 'a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."' Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,313
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp .. of Am., 673 F.3d 323,330 (4th Cir. 2012)).
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"A fact is material ifit 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Id. (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment
.... " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).
The Court must: view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all reasonable inforences in that party's favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per
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curiam); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007), and the Court "may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence," Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing
Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). For this reason, summary
judgment ordinarily is inappropriate when there is conflicting evidence because it is the function
of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes, including matters of witness credibility. See Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431,442 (4th Cir. 2006); Dennis v. Columbia Colleton
Med Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002).
At the same time, the Court must "prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses frorri
proceeding to trial." Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d. 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). "The existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations or denials,
without more, are insufficient to withstand a swnmary judgment motion." Progressive Am. Ins.
Co., 608 F. Supp. 3d at 372 (citing Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir.
2020)).
B. Analysis
Vinny's Towing brings one claim for quantum meruit against JB Hunt. ECF 3, at 5.
Maryland law distinguishes between two types of quantum meruit claims, one based on an implied-
in-fact contract (usually designated as quantum meruit) and the other based on an implied-in-law
contract (usually designated as unjust enrichment).". Kantsevoy v. LumenR LLC, 301 F. Supp. 3d
577, 598 (D. Md. 2018) (quoting Sanders v. Mueller, 133 Fed.Appx. 37, 42 n.3 (4th Cir. 2005)).
"[B]oth theories are predicated on recovering for services rendered with the expectation of
payment and where the other party expected, or 'should have expected,' to pay for them, even
though these expectations were not communicated expressly." Aton Ctr., Inc. v. CareFirst of
Maryland, Inc., Civ. No. DKC-20-3170, 2021 WL 1856622, at *8 (D. Md. May 10, 2021) (quoting
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Kantsevoy, 301 F. Supp.: 3d at 598~99). As JB Hunt points out, the amended complaint does not
identify which theory of quantum meruit Vinny's Towing wishes to pursue. ECF 67-1, at 7. The
Court will therefore analyze Vinny's Towing's quantum meruit claim against JB Hunt under both
theories.
1. Implied-in-Fact Contract
An implied-in-fact contract is "an agreement which legitimately can be inferred from
intention of the parties as evidenced by the circumstances and the ordinary course of dealing and
the common understanding of men." Kantsevoy, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 598 (quoting Cnty. Comm 'rs
of Caroline Cnty. v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. 2000)). "An implied-
in-fact contract is inferred from ·conduct of parties and arises where plaintiff, without being
requested to do so, reni:lers services under circumstances indicating that he expects to be paid
therefore, and defendant, knowing such circumstances, avails himself of [the] benefit of those
services." Id. (internal quotation μiarks omitted) (quoting Dashiell, 747 A.2d at 606 n.6). "The
services must be render~d under such circumstances as to indicate that the person rendering them
expected to be paid therefor, and that the recipient expected, or should have expected, to pay for
them." Mogavero v. Silverstein, 790 A.2d 43, 53 (Md. App. 2002) (citation omitted). "Recovery
on a contract implied in fact ... i,s based on the amount that the parties intended as the contract
price or, if that amount is unexpressed, the fair market value of the plaintiffs services." Id. "An
implied-in-fact contract:refers to t~at class of obligations which arises from mutual. agreement and
intent to promise, when the agre!'!ment and promise have simply not been expressed in words.
Despite the fact that no words of promise or agreement have been used, such transactions are
nevertheless true contracts, and may properly be called inferred contracts or contracts implied in
fact." Kantsevoy, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 598-99 (emphasis in Mohiuddin) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mohiuddin, 9 A.3d at 865). To establish a quantum meruit claim based on an
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implied in fact contract, Vinny's Towing must establish (1) that it rendered valuable services to
JB Hunt; (2) that Vinny's Towing intended to receive compensation for those services; and (3)
that the services were rendered under such circumstances that reasonably notified JB Hunt that
Vinny's, in providing the services, intended to be compensated. Int'! Waste Indus. Corp. v. Cape
Env't Mgmt., Inc., 988 F. Supp. 2d 542, 554 (D. Md. 2013), ajf'd, 588 F. App'x 213 (4th Cir.
2014).
Here, JB Hunt does not argue that Vinny's Towing did not render valuable services or
intend to receive compensation for those services. ECF 67-1, at 7. Instead, JB Hunt contests the
third element and argues that it "was not aware that Plaintiff had performed any services related
to JBH's trailer until after Plaintiffs services were complete" and that Vinny's Towing's corporate
designee "conceded that JB Hunt did not contract, request, or authorize any work by Plaintiff
related to the subject trailer or the Occurrence." Id The Court concludes that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to this element. As noted, JB Hunt denies that it had any knowledge of
Vinny's Towing's services until after the recovery services were complete. ECF 67-3, at 4
( answering that JB Hunt learned for the first time "that Vinny's ha[ d] possession of a JBH trailer"
on December 28, 2022, after the recovery service was complete). However, Vinny's Towing's
corporate designee, Dustin Wiles, testified that on December 22, 2022, the truck owner, Carlos,
"represented himself as [with] JB Hunt" and gave authorization for Vinny's Towing to complete
the recovery. ECF 69-6, at 131, 130:5-16. Moreover, Wiles observed that the driver of the tractor
trailer "logged into the JB Hunt app when he was on the side of the site" and explicitly said he
"was working for JB Hunt." Id at 98, 97:1-11. On the date of the recovery, December 27, 2022,
Vinny's Towing still "had information that J.B. Hunt was the carrier," id. at 96, 95:7-10, based on
Carlos' representation, id. at 98, 97:10-11, at 99, 98:11-15. And while the dates are not clear, at
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some point, Vinny's Towing repre~entatives "did get in contact with JB Hunt," but Wiles did not
recall that JB Hunt gave authorization to recover the trailer. Id. at 132-133, 131 :14-132:1.
If a jury were to. credit Wiles' testimony, it could conclude that JB Hunt was reasonably
notified that Vinny's Towing intended to be compensated for the recovery of JB Hunt's trailer.
J .
According to Wiles' testimony, at least one representative of JB Hunt was aware of Vinny's
Towing's intention to provide clean-up services for JB Hunt's trailer, Id. at 132-133, 131:14-
132:1, which customarily involves billing for such a service, see id. at 68, 67:1-12 (discussing
' •
how rates are set for to'Ying on behalf of the Maryland State Police). Indeed, JB Hunt requested
an invoice for Vinny's Jowing's services after the recovery was completed. ECF 69-6, at 142,
141 :11-15; ECF 67-2, at 4. The recovery service was also the subject of discussion between Carlos
• and the driver, who held themselves out as JB Hunt representatives. Id. at 98, 97: 1-11. That JB
Hunt did not explicitly authorize, the work is of no moment, as authorization would create an
express contract, and a J:>reach of express contract claim is not alleged here. See Troy Brave LLC,
2023 WL 6244658, at f5 (explaining that a breach of contract claim involves a defendant that
owed a plaintiff a contractual obligation and a breach of that obligation ( citing WSC/2005 LLC v.
Trio Ventures Assocs., 190 A.3d 255,267 (Md. 2018))). The Court cannot conclude that there is
no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether services were rendered under such circumstances
' .
that reasonably notified JB Hunt that Vinny's Towing intended to be compensated. Accordingly,
summary judgment is d,enied as to a quantum meruit based on an implied-in-fact contract theory.
2. Implied-in-Law Contract
"In contrast to express and,implied-in-fact contracts, a contract implied-in-law, also known
as a 'quasi-contract' or unjust enrichment, is a '[l]egal fiction invented by common law courts to
permit recovery by contractual remedy in cases where, in fact, there is no contract, but where
circumstances are such that justice warrants a recovery as though there had been a promise."'
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Kantsevoy, 301 F. Supp. 3d at 599 (Maryland Cas. Co. v. Blackstone Int'/ Ltd., 114 A.3d 676,689
(Md. 2015)). "However, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts are not based on the apparent
intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are
obligations created by law for reasons ofjustice." Id. ( emphasis in Mohiuddin) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Mohiuddin, 9 A.3d at 865). To prevail under this theory, Vinny's Towing
must establish "(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the defendant of
the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendantto retain the benefit
without the payment of its value." Moon v. Veritas Techs. LLC, Civ. No. BAH-21-2750, 2025
WL 1865709, at *11 (D. Md. July 7, 2025).
JB Hunt contends that there was no benefit conferred upon it, that it had no knowledge or
appreciation of Vinny's Towing's services until after the recovery was complete, and that it did
not retain any benefit from Vinny's Towing because the "trailer was a total loss." ECF 67-1, at 8.
First, there is a question of material fact as to whether a benefit was conferred upon JB Hunt. JB
Hunt contends that no benefit was conferred upon it because it "was not the operating motor
carrier." Id However, the trailer involved in the accident was owned by IB Hunt and Vinny's
Towing provided services to remove the overturned trailer from the highway. Moreover, Wiles
testified that JB Hunt's status as the carrier was not dispositive as to whether Vinny's Towing
would seek payment from IB Hunt. ECF 67-5, at 8, 150:3-10 (Q: "And so if JB Hunt was not the
carrier for this - for this load, you would not be seeking the full amount of the invoice from JB
Hunt. Is that accurate?"; A: "That is incorrect. It would be whoever contracted for the carrier and
the representation of the carrier."). Accordingly, a factfinder could conclude that the recovery
service was a benefit conferred upon JB Hunt. Next, whether JB Hunt had knowledge of the
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benefit at the time of the incident 'is immaterial. "Maryland courts have previously opined that a
defendant need not necessarily h~ve contemporaneous knowledge of the benefit conferred unto
them in determining the sufficiency of a quantum meruit claim." Troy Brave, LLC v. Grantsville
Truck & Trailer, LLC, Civ. No. JMC-22-02409, 2023 WL 6244658, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 26, 2023) ..
"If a plaintiff is mistaken as to the duties or rights that he or she owes another and because of his
'
mistake confers a benefit upon another, that plaintiff is often entitled to recover the value of that
'
benefit, in spite of the fi:ict that the recipient was giv~n no opportunity to decline it." Hill v. Cross
Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343,355 (Md. 2007) (citation modified). Moreover, even if
JB Hunt's knowledge ~ere material, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether JB Hunt was
aware of the recovery service given that Wiles testified that he communicated with JB Hunt
I
"before the ... recovery." ECF ~9-6, at 132, 131:14-20. Finally, regardless of the value of the
trailer after the accident, a factfinder could conclude that JB Hunt has retained the benefit of
Vinny's Towing's clean up servic~s by not having to provide any services of its own to collect its
damaged trailer. Cf Troy Brave, ILLC, 2023 WL 6244658, at *7 (noting that "[a]t some point in
'
time following the accident a towing service would necessarily have to clear the wreckage").
Accordingly, summary 'judgment ,is denied as to any quantum meruit claim based on a theory of
implied-in-law contract:. For thesi,: reasons, JB Hunt's motion for summary judgment is denied.
IV. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF 68}
JB Hunt also moves for default judgment on its cross claim against KBI. ECF 68.
1. Legal Standard
Pursuant [to] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), "[w]hen a party against whom a
' '
judgment for affirmati~e relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is
shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." The Court may conduct
' . .
hearings or makel referrals when pecessary to determine the damages, establish the truth of any
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allegation by evidence, or investigate any other matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Thereafter, the
court may enter default judgment at the plaintiffs request and with notice to the defaulting party.
Id.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. has announced a
"strong policy" in favor of deciding cases on their merits, United States v. Schaffer Equip. Co,, 11
F.3d 450, 453 ( 4th Cir. 1993), default judgment may be appropriate when a party is unresponsive.
S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh, 359 F. Supp. 2d 418,421 (D. Md. 2005) (citing Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d
831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
Plaintiff, however, is not automatically entitled to default judgment simply because the
defendant has not responded. Rather, entry of default judgment is left to the sound discretion 9f
the court See, e.g., Choice Hotels Int'!, Inc. v. Jai Shree Navdurga, LLC, Civ. No. DKC-11-2893,
2012 WL 5995248, at *1 (D. Md. Nov. 29, 2012); see also Choice Hotels Int'!, Inc. v. Austin Area
Hospitality, lnq., Civ. No. TDC-15-0516, 2015 WL 6123523, at *1 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2015).
2. Analysis
i. Service
Before addressing whether KBI is liable and, if so, what damages it is liable for, the Court
must address whether KBI has been properly served and nonetheless failed to file a responsive
pleading. See Maryland State Firemen's Ass'n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353,354 (D. Md. 1996) ("It
is axiomatic that service of process must be effective under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
before a default or a default judgment may be entered against a defendant."). JB Hunt contends
that KBI was properly served "via USPS Certified Mail on May 8, 2025" to the owner of KBI,
Carlos Banks, at "727 Mount Prospect Avenue, NE, Newark, NJ 07104." ECF 68-1, at 2-3.
Rule 4(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs service on a corporation within
the United States. See Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h). This rule allows for a corporation to receive service of
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process by any means allowed by the state where the district court is located, or the state where
service is to be effected. See Fed R. Civ. P. 4(h)(l)(A). Subsection (l)(B) authorizes service upon
a corporation "by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing
'
or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process and-if the agel}t is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires-by also mailing
a copy of each to the defendant." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(l)(B).
In Maryland, where the district court is located for purposes of Rule 4(h), service is made
upon a limited liability ~ompany by serving its resident agent. See Md. R. 2-124(h). Pursuant to
that rule, "[ s ]ervice is made upon a limited liability company by serving its resident agent. If the
limited liability company has no resident agent or if a good faith attempt to serve the resident agent
has failed, service may be ma,de upon any member or other person expressly or impliedly
authorized to receive service of pr\)cess." Id. Further, service can be perfected "by mailing to the
person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it by certified
mail requesting: 'Restricted Delivery-show to whom, date, address of delivery."' Md. R. 2-
121(a)(3).
In New Jersey, where JB Hunt sought to effect service on Carlos Banks, "[t]he primary
method of obtaining in personam jurisdiction over a defendant [] is by causing the summons and
complaint to be personally served within [New Jersey] pursuant to [N.J. Ct.] R. 4:4-3." N.J. Ct.
R. 4:4-4(a). "Service may be '[u]pon a corporation, by serving a copy of the summons and
complaint in the manner prescribed by paragraph (a)(l) of this rule on any officer, director, trustee
or managing or general agent .... "' Resol. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Design One Bldg. Sys. Inc.,
No. 23-1289, 2024 WL 4471728, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2024) (citing N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a)(6)). As
it relates to service by mail, NJ. Ct. R. 4:4-3(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f personal
20
'
ii
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service cannot be effected after a reasonable and good faith attempt, which shall be described with
specificity in the proof of service required by R. 4:4-7, service may be made by mailing a copy of
the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the usual
place of abode of the defendant or a person authorized by rule of law to accept service for the
defendant or, with postal instructions to deliver to addressee only, to defendant's place of business ·
or employment." N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-3(a). Rule 4:4-7 provides that "[i]f service is made by mail, the
party making service shall make proof thereof by affidavit which shall also include the facts of the
failure to effect personal service and the facts of the affiant' s diligent inquiry to determine
defendant's place of abode, _business or employment. With the proof shall be filed the affidavit or
affidavits of inquiry, if any, required by R. 4:4-4 and R. 4:4-5."
Thus, under N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-3, service by mail is not effective "unless plaintiff first made
'a reasonable and good faith attempt' to serve defendant personally." Beniquez v. At/. Supply,
LLC, No. CV 22-06198 (CPO), 2024 WL 4903599, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2024) (citing City of
Passaic v. Shennett, 390 N.J. Super. 475, 483 (App. Div. 2007J). As noted in the relevant rule,
before service by mail can be permitted, an affidavit must be submitted demonstrating "that despite
diligent effort and inquiry, personal service [within New Jersey] cannot be made." Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Est. of Matesic, 2016 WL 3763340, at *2 (D.N.J. July 14, 2016) (quoting N.J.
Ct. R. 4:4-4(b )(1 )). Diligent efforts have been described as requiring an "energetic effort to search
and find a defendant whose address is unknown, or who is allegedly evading service, before
resorting to .alternate means of substitute service." Tucker v. Nault, No. CV 22-4719 (CPO/SAK),
2023 WL 5346603, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2023) (citation omitted). Finally, "a party who
effectuates service by certified mail must submit 'the return receipt card' or a 'printout of the
electronic confirmation of delivery [ containing] an image of the recipient's signature."'. Mouzone
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v. W Mkt. AssocititionslLLC, No. CV 25-6317 (ES) (JSA), 2025 WL 2989112, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct.
'
6, 2025) (quoting'Wingate Inns Int'!, Inc. v. Hanna G.N. Corp., 2022 WL 154398, at *2 (D.N.J.
'
Jan. 18, 2022)). •
Accordingto JBHunt, "KBI is a single-member limited liability company" of which Carlos
Banks ("Banks") is the I sole organizer. ECF 68-1, at 2. JB Hunt also submits records from the
I ,
' '
Pennsylvania Department of State reflecting the same. ECF 68-3, at 1. The address for KBI is
listed as "242 Sna'pdragon Way, Rear Lot, Allentown, PA 18104." See ECF 68-2, at l; ECF 68-
3, at l; ECF 68-4, at ~-JB Hunt unsuccessfully attempted to personally serve Banks at the
Pennsylvania address v\a private process server on September 16, 17, and 18, 2024. ECF 68-7, at
1. JB Hunt then "ran a ~kip trace c:in Carlos Banks in an attempt to find an updated address," which
revealed a personal address of727 Mount Prospect Ave NE, Newark, NJ 07104 from March 2019
'
to April 2025. EGF 68-8, at 1. JB Hunt attempted to personally serve Banks at that Newark, New
:
I
Jersey address via private process server on May 3, 2025. ECF 68-9, at 1. The affidavit from the
process server reflects that he "attempted to serve the above named individual/entity" on May 3,
2025, and that "the entity moved." ECF 68-9, at 1 ( capitalization altered). JB Hunt then attempted
'
service via certified mail to "KBI Solutions, LLC, ATTN: Carlos Banks, 727 Mount Prospect Ave.
I .
NE, Newark, NJ 07104." ECF 39, at 1. The certified mail is reflected as "delivered left with
individual," ECF B9-l, ,at 2 ( capitalization altered), and the signature of the recipient is illegible,
id. at 1.
:
The record reflects that KBI has not been properly served. The evidence submitted by JB
Hunt shows that Banks
1
stopped residing at the New Jersey address in April of 2025, see ECF 68-
8, at 1, and the private process server that attempted service in May of 2025 confirmed that "the
entity moved," see EC!f 68-9, at 1 (capitalization altered). And although certified niail was "left
I
22
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with [an] individual," ECF 39-1, at 2 (capitalization altered), it is not clear that individual was
Banks, especially given that the recipient's signature is illegible, id. at 1, and noting that Banks
had purportedly moved from that address in April of 2025. Because the record shows that Banks
no longer lived at the New Jersey address when service was attempted, service on KBI is not
complete. As JB Hunt has failed to effect service on KBI, the motion for default judgment is
denied and the entry of default against KBI is vacated. See Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that without valid service of process, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment against the defendant); Hodges v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civ. No. CBD-14-0891, 2014 WL 5797754, at *3 (D. Md.
Nov. 5, 2014) (noting that "proper service is a pre-requisite for an entry of default, and entry of
default is a pre-requisite for a default judgment").
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a plaintiff 120 days to properly serve a
defendant after a complaint is filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). JB Hunt's deadline to serve KBI
has long passed. See ECF 26, at 1 ( ordering JB Hunt to serve KBI by January 2, 2025); ECF 56
(denying JB Hunt's first motion for. default judgment against KBI but inviting JB Hunt to re-file
the motion after addressing service deficiencies). If a defendant is not served within that period,
Rule 4(m) requires a court-on motion, or on its own, after notice to the Plaintiff, to "dismiss the
action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). "But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must
extend the time for service for an appropriate period." Id. Given that both JB Hunt and Vinny's
Towing have failed to timely serve KBI, the Court addresses both parties on this subject below.
B. Extension of Service
In a January 22, 2026 status report, Vinny's Towing informally requested an extension of
time to serve KBI and E&M. ECF 64, at 2. Because Vinny's Towing did not address the Rule
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4(m) good cause standard in making its request, the Court ordered Vinny's Towing to showcause
as to why the deadline to serve KBI and E&M should be extended. ECF 71, at 3. Vinny's Towing
'
responded to the show ?ause order and requested additional time to serve KBI and E&M along
with leave to file a motion for alternative service to serve Progressive Insurance Company, "who
is believed to be the lial:iility insurance carrier for KBI." ECF 74, at 5-6.
"Federal courts have identified several non-exhaustive factors that may guide the
discretionary decision ~f whether to enlarge the service period." United States ex rel. Arthur v.
THDAm., Inc., Civ. No, ELH-16-2571, 2025 WL 1518884, at *7 (D. Md. May 28, 2025) (quoting
Brodnik v. Harris, DAFi22-312, ~023 WL 2872684, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 10, 2023)). "These
factors include the following: '(i) the possibility of prejudice to the defendant, (ii) the length of the
delay and its impact on the proceedings, (iii) the reason(s) for the delay and whether the delay was
within the plaintiff's control, (iv) whether the plaintiff sought an extension before the deadline, (v)
the plaintiff's good faith, (vi) the plaintiff's pro se status, (vii) any prejudice to the plaintiff, such
as by operation of statutes oflimitation that may bar refiling, and (viii) whether time has previously
been extended."' Id. (quoting Brodnik, 2023 WL 2872684, at *2).
In response to the show cause order, Vinny's Towing contends that "KBI exhibits ghost
I
like qualities and is plll1)oseful in.placing obstacles to block service attempts." ECF 74, at 3. It
does not explain, however, the "~bstacles" that KBI has used to "block service attempts." Id.
Vinny's Towing also "cannot speak to the status of E&M trucking." Id. at 2. Vinny's Towing
also contends that "a : default judgment against KBI could help resolve this matter with a
. '
contribution of funds" from its insurer, Progressive Insurance." Id. at 2. Vinny's contentions are
generally unsupported J:,y any evidence and thus fail to establish good cause to enlarge the service
window.
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Nevertheless, "[i]f good cause is not shown, the Court may still choose to extend the time
for service but is not required to do so." Grier v. United States Dep 't of Housing and Urban
Development, Civ. No. PWG-21-2165, 2022 WL 17467671, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 6, 2022) (citing
Davis v. Univ. ofN Carolina at Greensboro, WLO-19-661, 2022 WL 3586093, at *4 (M.D.N.C.
Aug. 22, 2022)). Here, because Vinny's Towing and JB Hunt have both encountered difficulties
serving KBI, the Court will provide an additional sixty (60) days for both parties to serve KBI.
Further extensions are unlikely to be granted. As to Vinny's Towing's request for leave to file a
motion for alternative service, the Court notes that leave of court is not required to file such a
motion. However, if Vinny's Towing decides to file a motion for alternative service, it shall do so
within fourteen (14) days of this Order.
The Court will deny Vinny's Towing's request as it relates to E&M because Vinny's
Towing has not named E&M as a defendant in its complaint and, therefore, there is no service
deadline for Vinny's Towing to extend. However, the Court observes that the record does not
reflect that E&M has been served with JB Hunt's third-party complaint. See ECF 56, at 2 (denying
default judgment because "the Court has doubts as to whether KBI and E&M have been properly
served"). In a January 22, 2026 status report, JB Hunt asserted that it "believe[ d) it has properly
served [E&M] and will submit the appropriate documentation to the Court in the renewed motions
for default judgment." ECF 63, at 3. However, JB Hunt has not submitted any proof of service
nor filed a motion for default judgment as to E&M. Accordingly, the Court orders JB Hunt to
either file and serve by mail on E&M a motion for default judgment (including proof of valid
service) or provide a report as to why such a motion would be inappropriate, within 30 days of the
issuance of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order.
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V. CONCLUSION
I
For the foregoing reasons,: JB Hunt's motions to strike, ECF 49 and ECF 66, motion for
summary judgment, EGF 67, and motion for default judgment, ECF 68, are denied. Vinny's
I
Towing and JB Hunt arp granted sixty (60) days from the date of this order to effectuate service
I
on KBI. If Vinny's Towing wishes to file a motion permitting alternative service on KBI, it shall
I
do so within fourteen (H) days from the date of this order. JB Hunt is directed to either file and
serve by mail on E&M a motion for default judgment (including proof of valid service) or provide
: '
a report as to why such! a motion ,would be inappropriate, within 30 days of the issuance of this
I
memorandum opinion and the accompanying order.
I
A separate implementing order will issue.
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Dated: August 13;2026
26
Isl
Brendan A. Hurson
United States District Judge
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