Tale-Toc v. Falvey et al

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

EZEQUIEL TALE-TOC CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-2214

JOSEPH FALVEY, ET AL SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) filed by Defendants
Sheriff Randy Smith, in his official capacity, and Joseph Falvey, in his
individual capacity. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a hit-and-run accident in a Home Depot parking
lot and the subsequent arrest and detainment of Plaintiff Ezequiel Tale-Toc.
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Amended Complaint while referring
to an hour-long surveillance video of the store’s parking lot.
1

On September 30, 2024, Michael Bodron (“Bodron”) parked his gray
Chevrolet Corvette in the parking lot of a Home Depot store in Covington,
Louisiana.
2
Bodron entered the store, and, while he was inside, multiple
vehicles pulled in and out of the spot next to the Bodron’s driver side. At

1
Doc. 12.
2
Bodron is not a party to this action.
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approximately the 42:40-minute mark, Bodron returned to his vehicle, noticed
damage to his front driver’s side bumper, “leaned over[,] and appeared to take
a photograph with his phone.”
3
Bodron then loaded items into his vehicle and
went back inside the store. Approximately eight minutes after Bodron
reentered the store, Plaintiff parked a black truck in the spot next to Bodron’s
driver side and entered the store. A few minutes later, Bodron returned to his
Corvette, remaining outside of the vehicle. Plaintiff then returned to his truck,
loaded something into its bed, and drove away, without damaging Bodron’s
Corvette. Although Bodron was still standing outside his vehicle, Bodron never
spoke to or interacted with Plaintiff. Sometime later, Defendant Deputy
Joseph Falvey (“Falvey”) of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office (“STPSO”)
arrived at the scene to investigate the damage to Bodron’s vehicle. Falvey
spoke with the store’s loss prevention manager and obtained an hour-long
video of the parking lot, beginning when Bodron pulled into his parking space.
Using the video and photos obtained from Facebook, Falvey determined that
Plaintiff parked and exited the black truck, a Toyota Tundra owned by his
fiancée, and entered the store around the video’s 51:30-minute mark. Falvey
attempted to speak with Plaintiff by phone and at his home but was unable to
contact him. Falvey then submitted an Affidavit for Arrest Warrant
(“Affidavit”) that (1) omitted the fact that Bodron first noticed and took a photo
of the damage to his vehicle before Plaintiff arrived at the scene and (2)
misstated the number and sequence of vehicles that were parked in the spot
next to Bodron’s driver side during the video. Using the faulty Affidavit, Falvey
sought and procured a warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff was arrested on
a misdemeanor hit-and-run charge, and because of that pending charge, the

3
Doc. 12 at 3.
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Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) requested to place Plaintiff in its custody. Plaintiff was held in ICE
custody for more than four months, but the criminal charges were ultimately
dismissed when the “State Nolle Prossed said matter due to proof of factual
innocence of the crime.”
4
Following the dismissal of his criminal charges,
Plaintiff was released from ICE custody.
Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Falvey in his
individual capacity for unlawful arrest in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment rights and a state law claim for malicious prosecution against
Falvey and Randy Smith (“Sheriff Smith”) in his official capacity as Sheriff of
the STPSO. On December 22, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
original Complaint.
5
Plaintiff timely amended his Complaint pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B), and the Court denied Defendants’
Motion as moot. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint for failure to state a claim. In support of their Motion, Defendants
submit a Crash Report, the Arrest Warrant and Affidavit, the hour-long
surveillance video of the parking lot, the report detailing Plaintiff’s arrest,
ICE’s Immigration Detainer, and a copy of Plaintiff’s criminal history. For the
reasons stated below, the Court excludes the Crash Report, the report detailing
Plaintiff’s arrest, the Immigration Detainer, and the copy of Plaintiff’s criminal
history for the purposes of the instant Motion.
6

4
Id. at 7 (purportedly quoting the state court’s minute entry from an April 24, 2025 hearing).
5
Doc. 10.
6
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
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LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”
7
A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
8

A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
9
The court need not, however,
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
10
To be legally
sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer possibility” that the
plaintiff’s claims are true.
11
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or
‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’” will not suffice.
12

If
it is apparent from the face of the complaint that an insurmountable bar to
relief exists and the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, the court must dismiss the
claim.
13
The court’s review is limited to the complaint and any documents
attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced
by the complaint.
14

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Because the parties have attached matters outside the pleadings, the
Court must first consider whether to exclude the matters or to consider the

7
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 547 (2007)).
8
Id.
9
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
10
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
14
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Motion as one for summary judgment. A court may, at its discretion, exclude
matters presented that are outside of the pleadings; however, if the court does
not exclude these matters, it must treat the motion as one for summary
judgment under Rule 56.
15
As a narrow exception, a court may treat documents
attached to a motion to dismiss as a part of the pleadings without converting
the motion into one for summary judgment if the complaint refers to the
documents, and the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim.
16
The Arrest
Warrant, which attaches Falvey’s Affidavit in support of his application for the
arrest warrant, and the surveillance video, identified as Exhibits 2 and 3 to the
instant Motion, fall into this exception because both are referred to in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and are central to Plaintiff’s claims.
17
The
remaining Exhibits—the Crash Report, the report detailing Plaintiff’s arrest,
the Immigration Detainer, and the copy of Plaintiff’s criminal history—do not
assist the Court in resolving this matter on the merits, where little, if any,
discovery has been conducted.
18
The Court thus uses its “complete discretion”

15
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
16
Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Collins,
224 F.3d at 498–99).
17
“The Fifth Circuit has not articulated a specific test to determine when an exhibit is central
to a plaintiff's claims, but ‘case law does suggest . . . that a document satisfies the centrality
component when it is necessary to establish an element of one of the plaintiff's claims.’”
Truong v. Magnolia Fleet, LLC, 724 F. Supp. 3d 568, 574 (E.D. La. 2024) (quoting Antero
Res. Corp. v. C&R Downhole Drilling, No. 16-CV-668, 2019 WL 13193898, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
July 22, 2019)).
18
The Court notes that Defendants did not ask the Court to convert this Motion to one for
summary judgment or argue that these documents could be considered under Rule 12(b)(6).
Conversely, Defendants did ask the Court to consider the Affidavit and surveillance video,
arguing that they were referred to in the Amended Complaint and were central to Plaintiff’s
claims.
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to exclude these attachments and will analyze this Motion under the applicable
Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
19

Turning to the merits of the instant Motion, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff has failed to state a valid Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful
arrest and that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to overcome the
independent intermediary doctrine or qualified immunity. As to Plaintiff’s
state law malicious prosecution claim, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff
failed to allege sufficient facts to support malicious intent or justify a claim
against Sheriff Smith. Defendants also invoke immunity under Louisiana law,
contest Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, and argue that Plaintiff
cannot show a causal connection between his claims and his ICE detention.
Plaintiff opposes. The Court considers each of Defendants’ arguments in turn.
A. Unlawful Arrest Claim
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead an
unlawful arrest claim where (1) Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant
supported by probable cause; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege that any purported
misstatement or omission in Falvey’s application for a warrant was material
to a finding of probable cause; and (3) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
Falvey acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. Defendants further argue
that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to overcome the independent
intermediary doctrine.
Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful arrest are based on both Malley and
Franks liability. Pursuant to Malley v. Briggs, “an officer can be held liable for

19
See General Retail Services, Inc. v. Wireless Toyz Franchise, LLC, 255 F. App’x 775, 783
(5th Cir. 2007) (“It is well known that when ‘matters outside the pleading’ are presented
with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court has complete discretion to
either accept or exclude the evidence.”).
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a false arrest despite the issuance of an arrest warrant by a magistrate if the
affidavit the officer presented to the magistrate was ‘so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.’”
20
“The
Malley wrong is not the presentment of false evidence, but the obvious failure
of accurately presented evidence to support the probable cause required for the
issuance of a warrant.”
21
Conversely, under Franks v. Delaware, an official
violates the Fourth Amendment when the official makes materially false
statements—either deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth—in
support of a warrant that are necessary to a court’s finding of probable cause.
22

The Fifth Circuit has extended the applicability of Franks beyond affirmatively
false statements to material omissions.
23
Under Franks, a court must consider
whether an official’s statements or omissions were “necessary to [a] finding of
probable cause.”
24

While ordinarily, a Plaintiff may plead alternative theories of liability,
25

Franks and Malley claims are mutually exclusive in that “a warrant affidavit
that facially lacks probable cause can’t trigger the Franks analysis,” and
instead “must be assessed under Malley.”
26
Accordingly, to determine whether

20
Wilson v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 344–45 (1986)).
21
Id. (citing Melton v. Phillips, 875 F. 3d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 2017)).
22
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
23
Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 258 n.5 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Fifth Circuit has
interpreted Franks liability to also include liability for an officer who makes knowing and
intentional omissions that result in a warrant being issued without probable cause.”)
(emphasis in original).
24
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.
25
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(3).
26
Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 286 (5th Cir. 2021) (Higginson, J. concurring) (citing
Blake v. Lambert, 921 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2019)). “That is because if a warrant affidavit
lacks probable cause on its face, any included false statement or omission can’t be material
to the existence of probable cause.” Id. (citing Kohler v. Englade, 470 F.3d 1104, 1113 (5th
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Plaintiff has pleaded a viable Franks or Malley claim, the Court must first
determine whether the Falvey’s Affidavit facially lacked probable cause.
27

a. Probable Cause
“Probable cause exists when all of the facts known by a police officer ‘are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed,
or was in the process of committing, an offense.’”
28
“The test for probable cause
is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’”
29
Courts must examine
the totality of the circumstances to decide “whether there is a fair probability
that a crime occurred.”
30
A “requisite ‘fair probability’ is something more than
a bare suspicion, but need not reach the fifty percent mark.”
31
Importantly,
“evidence that the arrestee was innocent of the crime is not necessarily
dispositive of whether the officer had probable cause to conduct the arrest
because ‘probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.’”
32

Reviewing only the allegations in Falvey’s Affidavit and assuming, as
one must, that those allegations are true, probable cause existed for Plaintiff’s
arrest. Falvey’s Affidavit reads as follows:

Cir. 2006) (“Th[e] materiality analysis presumes that the warrant affidavit, on its face,
supports a finding of probable cause.”)).
27
“The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and of fact. Whether the
circumstances alleged to show it probable are true, and existed, is a matter of fact; but
whether, supposing them to be true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of law.”
Munajj v. City of Fredericksburg, No. 25-50535, 2026 WL 897005, at *2 n.1 (5th Cir. Apr. 1,
2026) (quoting Reitz v. Woods, 85 F.4th 780, 788 (5th Cir. 2023)).
28
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, 17 F.4th 532, 543 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Texas v. Kleinert,
855 F.3d 305, 316 (5th Cir. 2017)).
29
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371
(2003)).
30
United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation modified).
31
Id.
32
Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 165 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 244 n.13 (1983)).
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I, Joseph Falvey, with the St Tammany Parish Sheriff’s
Office, certify under oath based on the information outlined below,
that there is probable cause to believe Ezequiel Taletoc on or about
the date(s) of 09-30-2024 did commit:

1 Count(s) of 14:100-- Hit and Run Driving-- (Misdemeanor)

within this state and Parish at: 40 Park Place, Covington, LA
70433 in St. Tammany Parish and the jurisdiction of the 22nd
Judicial District Court, contrary to the form of the statutes of the
State of Louisiana in such case made and provided, and against
the peace and dignity of the same, in that the following did occur:

On Monday September 30, 2024, at or about 1048 hours, Deputy
Joseph Falvey, Unit 1224, was dispatched to Home Depot, 48 Park
Place Drive, Covington, LA, to investigate a Hit and Run Crash.

During the investigation deputy Falvey was able to determine a
Hit and Run crash of a 1999 Chevrolet Corvette had occurred in
the parking lot between 0930 and 1045 hours that day. Deputy
Falvey was able to obtain camera footage from the store’s loss
prevention personnel. In the footage Deputy Falvey observed the
Corvette parked in the parking lot, and while it was parked three
vehicles entered and exited the parking spot along the driver side
of the vehicle. While the second vehicle, a white sedan was parked
next to the Corvette, the Corvette owner, Michael Bodron, was
observed exiting the store, walking to the vehicle, and returning
back into the store.

While in the store, the white sedan left, and a black Toyota Tundra
Pickup truck entered the spot. The Tundra had difficulty getting
into the parking spot and repositioned, before parking the vehicle,
offset in the parking spot closer to the Corvette. The driver, a petite
Hispanic male with medium length black hair, entered the store,
and Mr. Bodron exited the store shortly thereafter. When Mr.
Bodron approached his vehicle, he immediately noticed damage to
the front driver side corner of his Corvette.

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Deputy Falvey was able to utilize the Flock Automated License
Plate Reader (ALPR) cameras to identify the Tundra, based off the
Rigid brand toolbox and the trailer hitch attached to the rear.
Deputy Falvey was able to determine the truck had Louisiana
License Plate Z320464, which was registered to Valerie Alexi
Ponce.

The registered address of the Tundra was 70446 2nd Street,
Covington, LA and the address on the Driver’s License of Ms.
Ponce was 1543 Lotus Rd Ext. Mandeville, LA. Deputy Falvey
made multiple attempts to locate the vehicle at both addresses,
and each time was met with negative results.

Deputy Falvey placed the Tundra on the Flock ALPR Hotlist,
where it was later located by Deputy Jude St. Clair, Unit 260 of
the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Office. Deputy St. Clair
completed a Field Interview Card on the driver of the Tundra, who
was identified as Eziquiel Taletoc.

Deputy Falvey conducted a query via the LENSS database of Mr.
Taletoc, where he was observed to be a petite (5’4” 135 lbs.)
hispanic male with medium length black hair. Deputy Falvey also
searched for Mr. Taletoc via Facebook where it was confirmed Mr.
Taletoc was currently engaged to Valeri Alexi Ponce.

Deputy Falvey attempted to contact Mr. Taletoc via the phone
number he provided to Deputy St. Clair during their interaction,
however that phone number was not in service at the time contact
was attempted.

Due to the above listed fact and circumstances, Eziquiel Taletoc
should be placed under arrest for violation of Louisiana Revised
Statute 14:100, Hit and Run Driving.
33

Under Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:100, hit-and-run driving is defined
as “the intentional failure of the driver of a vehicle involved in or causing any

33
Doc. 17-3 at 2–4.
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accident, to stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his identity,
and to render reasonable aid.”
34
Falvey’s Affidavit describes that Bodron
noticed the damage to his Corvette upon returning to his car for the second
time—not the first—implying that the damage was caused by a vehicle that
was present in the adjacent space sometime during Bodron’s second trip inside.
Falvey’s Affidavit then states that a black Toyota Tundra “had difficulty
getting into the parking spot and repositioned, before parking the vehicle,
offset in the parking spot closer to the Corvette” and that Bodron returned and
noticed the damage shortly thereafter.
35
Falvey’s Affidavit goes on to describe
how he determined that Plaintiff was driving the black Toyota Tundra in the
video. Although the Affidavit does not conclusively state that Plaintiff caused
the damage to the Corvette, a magistrate has authority to “draw such
reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to him by
applications for a warrant.”
36
The allegations regarding the Tundra’s apparent
difficulty parking in the spot next to the Corvette, taken with the Tundra’s
physical presence at the scene when Falvey believed the damage occurred and
Falvey’s process of determining the driver, are sufficient to cause a reasonable
person to believe that Plaintiff damaged the Corvette and left the scene in
violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:100. Because the allegations in
Falvey’s Affidavit are facially sufficient to meet the probable cause
requirement, Plaintiff’s Malley claim fails and must be dismissed.
b. Franks Liability
Having determined that Falvey’s Affidavit facially demonstrates
probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has

34
LA. REV. STAT. § 14:100(A).
35
Doc. 17-3 at 3.
36
Gates, 462 U.S. at 240.
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stated a claim that entitles him to relief under Franks. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a Franks claim. Defendants assert that
Falvey did not omit any information known to him at the time he drafted his
Affidavit because his interpretation of the video was reasonable. In the same
vein, according to Defendants, Falvey did not make any purported omission
willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth.
“Franks holds that an officer cannot avoid liability where a warrant
affidavit (1) contains false statements or material omissions (2) made with at
least ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ that (3) were ‘necessary to the finding of
probable cause.’”
37
Under Franks, to assess whether allegedly false statements
and omissions were necessary to a finding of probable cause, a court must
“consider the faulty affidavit as if those errors and omissions were removed.”
38

A court must then “examine the ‘corrected affidavit’ and determine whether
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant survives the deleted false
statements and material omissions.”
39

At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs need only point out
specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to
be false . . . accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. By
pleading such facts, plaintiffs meet their burden of alleging a
Franks violation sufficient to withstand the test of
Iqbal/Twombly, but if they press the litigation, they must offer
tangible proof to overcome the presumption of validity with respect
to the affidavit supporting the warrant. Thus, specific examples of
misstatements and omissions—combined with inferential
explanation as to their materiality—can carry a complaint across
the Rule 12(b)(6) line.
40

37
Hughes v. Garcia, 100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56).
38
Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494–95 (5th Cir. 2018).
39
Id. at 495.
40
Hughes, 100 F.4th at 620 (citation modified).
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Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Falvey’s Affidavit was faulty in
that Falvey: (1) omitted that Bodron walked back to his vehicle at
approximately the 42:40-minute mark, stared at his bumper, leaned over and
took a photograph using his phone; and (2) misstated the number and sequence
of vehicles that were parked on the driver side of the Corvette.
41
If these defects
are removed, the remaining pertinent allegations are as follows:
In the footage Deputy Falvey observed the Corvette parked in the
parking lot, and while it was parked five vehicles entered and
exited the parking spot along the driver side of the vehicle. The
vehicles are as follows: (1) a grey truck; (2) a red truck; (3) a white
pickup truck; (4) a black sedan; and (5) a black truck.
42
While the
fourth vehicle, a black sedan, was parked next to the Corvette, the
Corvette owner, Michael Bodron, was observed exiting the store at
approximately 42 minutes and 40 seconds into the video. Mr.
Bodron walked to the vehicle, stared at the driver side corner
bumper of his Corvette, leaned over and took a photograph using
his phone.
43
Bodron then went back into the store.

While in the store for the second time, the black sedan left, and a
black Toyota Tundra Pickup truck entered the spot. The Tundra
had difficulty getting into the parking spot and repositioned,
before parking the vehicle, offset in the parking spot closer to the
Corvette. The driver, a petite Hispanic male with medium length
black hair, entered the store, and Mr. Bodron exited the store

41
“When there is video evidence in the record, courts are not bound to accept the nonmovant’s
version of the facts if it is contradicted by the video.” Crane v. City of Arlington, 50 F.4th
453, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Harris v. Serpas, 745 F. 3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2014)),
abrogated on other grounds by Tuttle v. Gallegos, 180 F.4th 209 (5th Cir. 2026). However,
“a court should not discount the nonmoving party’s story unless the video evidence provides
so much clarity that a reasonable jury could not believe his account.” Id. (quoting Darden
v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, at 730 (5th Cir. 2018)). Because a reasonable jury could
view the video and conclude—as the Court in fact does—that Bodron clearly noticed the
damage to his vehicle the first time he returned to his vehicle at the 42:40-minute mark,
Plaintiff’s allegations are not clearly contradicted by the surveillance video. Accordingly,
this Court will accept Plaintiff’s allegation as true for the purposes of the instant Motion.
42
Doc. 12 at 6.
43
Id. at 5.
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shortly thereafter. When Mr. Bodron approached his vehicle for
the second time, he again observed the damage to the front driver
side corner of his Corvette.

Considering only the remaining allegations, Falvey’s Affidavit does not present
sufficient content to support a finding of probable cause. The corrected
Affidavit indicates that the damage to the Corvette occurred at some point
before Plaintiff arrived, meaning he could not have damaged Bodron’s
Corvette. Therefore, the alleged errors and omissions were necessary to a
finding of probable cause.
Turning to whether the defects in the Affidavit were made with the
requisite intent, Plaintiff also satisfies his burden. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint alleges that “Falvey’s narrative was a hallucination/fabrication,”
and that the “combined omissions and misrepresentations of material facts
demonstrate such a reckless disregard for the truth that no reasonable officer
could have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest [Plaintiff].”
44

Plaintiff further alleges that by ignoring “obviously exculpatory evidence,”
“Falvey made false statements knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth.”
45
Assuming—again, as one must for the instant
Motion—that the video conclusively shows that Bodron noticed the damage
before Plaintiff arrived on the scene, Falvey acted “contrary to the information
provided to him” and “generated the basic facts set out in the probable cause
affidavit.”
46
“Any reasonable officer would have known, based on the evidence
available, that the affidavit contained [material] errors.”
47
Accordingly,
Plaintiff has stated a viable claim for false arrest based on a Franks violation.

44
Id. at 6.
45
Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
46
Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 284.
47
Hughes, 100 F.4th at 623 (citing Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 284).
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c. Independent Intermediary Doctrine
Defendants next argue that because Falvey’s application for Plaintiff’s
arrest was reviewed and approved by a magistrate, the magistrate’s decision
breaks the chain of causation for Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim under the
independent intermediary doctrine. The independent intermediary doctrine
“provides that ‘if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent
intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision
breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party.’”
48

“However, the chain of causation remains intact if ‘it can be shown that the
deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of
the defendant.’”
49
The Fifth Circuit recognizes both Franks and Malley claims
“as functional exceptions to the independent intermediary doctrine.”
50
“Thus,
if a Plaintiff adequately pleads that an officer has obtained an arrest warrant
from a magistrate in violation of Malley or Franks, then nothing more is
required to show that the independent intermediary doctrine does not apply
with respect to that intermediary’s decision.”
51
As set forth above, Plaintiff has
adequately pleaded a Franks violation, meaning the independent intermediary
doctrine does not apply here.
d. Qualified Immunity
Similarly, Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to qualified
immunity also fails. “Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional

48
Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 281 (quoting Cuadra v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813
(5th Cir. 2010)).
49
Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813 (quoting Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988)).
50
Wilson v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 208 (5th Cir. 2022) (collecting cases).
51
Id. (citing Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2020)).
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right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
52
“A
Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the
time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently
clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is
doing violates that right.’”
53
The Supreme Court does “not require a case
directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.”
54
The Court has instructed lower
courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”
55

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right in that Falvey’s Affidavit merely “provides a
different version/interpretation of events in a video from the Plaintiff’s own
self-serving version of events.”
56
Defendants are correct that law enforcement
officials may interpret evidence and detail their reasonable conclusions in a
warrant application without violating Franks,
57
but, because the surveillance
video does not clearly contradict Plaintiff’s version of events, all factual
ambiguities must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor at the motion to dismiss
stage.
58
As held above, Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a claim for false arrest
under Franks. The commission of a Franks violation is a clearly established

52
Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 801 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 664 (2012)).
53
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
54
Id. at 741.
55
Id. at 742.
56
Doc. 24 at 2.
57
See, e.g., Anderson v. City of McComb, 539 F. App’x 385, 387 (affirming dismissal of a false
arrest claim on summary judgment where the attesting officer presented “one version of
disputed facts to the magistrate judge”).
58
See supra note 41.
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hole in the qualified immunity shield.
59
Ergo, Plaintiff’s Franks claim survives
Falvey’s qualified immunity argument.
B. Malicious Prosecution Claim
As to Plaintiff’s state-law malicious prosecution claim against Falvey,
Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to properly plead that Falvey acted
with the requisite intent.
60
Plaintiff counters that his malicious prosecution
claim survives for the same reasons his federal false arrest claim survives—
that intent may be inferred because Falvey recklessly disregarded the evidence
before him and sought a warrant where he lacked probable cause for Plaintiff’s
arrest.
In Louisiana, a claim for malicious prosecution requires a plaintiff to
prove:
(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal or
civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present
defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination
in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause
for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and (6)
damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.
61

To satisfy the malice element, “[t]here must be malice in fact.”
62
However, a
plaintiff need not plead or prove ill will, because “[m]alice may be inferred from
the lack of probable cause or inferred from a finding that the defendant acted

59
See Hughes, 100 F.4th at 620 (citing Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494).
60
Defendants also argue that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims if his false arrest claim is dismissed.
Because Plaintiff has adequately pleaded a federal false arrest claim, this argument is moot.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims
that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”).
61
Lemoine v. Wolfe, 168 So. 3d 362, 367 (La. 2015) (quoting Jones v. Soileau, 448 So. 2d 1268,
1271 (La. 1984)).
62
Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 511 So. 2d 446, 453 (La. 1987).
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in reckless disregard of the other person’s rights.”
63
For the same reasons
Plaintiff has alleged a viable Franks claim based on Falvey’s reckless disregard
for the truth, the Court holds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains
sufficient allegations to support the malice element of his malicious
prosecution claim.
C. Respondeat Superior Claim
Defendants also move to dismiss the claim against Sheriff Smith,
arguing that Plaintiff attempts to seek double damages for the “same set of
facts” underlying his malicious prosecution claim against Falvey. This
argument is without merit. Defendants overlook that Plaintiff seeks to hold
Sheriff Smith liable for Falvey’s conduct based on a respondeat superior
theory.
64
Malicious prosecution is an intentional tort in Louisiana, and
“employers can be vicariously liable for the intentional acts of its employees
when those acts are within the course and scope of the tortfeasor’s
employment.”
65
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Falvey committed the
tort of malicious prosecution while acting as one of Sheriff Smith’s and the
STPSO’s employees. Plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim against Sheriff Smith
may therefore proceed.
D. Immunity Under La. R.S. § 9:2798.1
Defendants next argue that Falvey is entitled to immunity under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:2798.1. Section 9:2798.1 provides immunity to
public entities, their officers, and their employees from liability based on the

63
Id.
64
Doc. 12 at 11 (“Defendant Smith is responsible or any/all wrongful conduct committed by
its employees pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.”).
65
Cerdes v. United States, No. 24-2866 c/w No. 25-142, 2025 WL 2444137, at *14 (E.D. La.
Aug. 25, 2025) (citation modified) (quoting Carnes v. Wilson, 118 So. 3d 1275, 1277 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 2013)).
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performance of their “policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are
within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.”
66
Defendants
cannot invoke this immunity, however, to claims based on Falvey’s alleged
“acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious,
intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.”
67
Because
the Court holds that Plaintiff has stated claims arising from alleged malicious,
intentional, or reckless conduct, Falvey is not entitled to immunity under
§ 9:2798.1.
E. Punitive Damages
Defendants further dispute that Plaintiff has stated a claim entitling
him for punitive damages. This argument is, again, based on their assertion
that, assuming Falvey violated Plaintiff’s rights, Falvey did not have the
requisite intent to do so. A party may recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
“when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or
intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally
protected rights of others.”
68
The Court concludes that, for the reasons set forth
herein, Plaintiff has adequately alleged reckless indifference to a federally
protected right. That is all that is required to pursue punitive damages under
§ 1983 at this early stage.
F. Causation of Damages
Moving to Defendants’ final argument, Defendants assert that Plaintiff
cannot show that their actions are the reason Plaintiff was detained by ICE.
Defendants offer an alternative reason for Plaintiff’s detention, supported by

66
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2798.1(B).
67
Id. at (C)(2).
68
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
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documents the Court has excluded for the purposes of the instant Motion.
69

Because the Court must accept Plaintiff’s version of events as true when
considering this Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that his arrest for the hit-and-run charge was the reason ICE detained
him.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Malley claim is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of August, 2026.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

69
The Court reiterates that Defendants did not present any argument as to why the Court
should consider the Immigration Detainer or the copy of Plaintiff’s criminal history
alongside this Motion.
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