Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Company, S.I.

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RAYNE MEMORIAL UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH,
Plaintiff

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-4129

CHURCH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, S.I.,
Defendant
SECTION: “E” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed by
Plaintiff, Rayne Memorial United Methodist Church (“Plaintiff”),
1
and Defendant, Church
Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. (“Defendant”).
2
Plaintiff requests the Court to grant
summary judgment on the issue of Defendant’s bad faith under L.a. R.S. §§ 22:1892 and
22:1973 and reserve the issue of damages and penalties for trial.
3
Defendant seeks
dismissal of “any and all claims” of Plaintiff asserted under L.a. R.S. §§ 22:1892 and
22:1973.
4
The cross motions are opposed.
5
The parties filed replies.
6

BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of a Hurricane Ida insurance coverage dispute. Defendant
issued an insurance policy to cover Plaintiff’s church property on St. Charles Avenue in
New Orleans, Louisiana.
7
The Policy provided coverage for numerous buildings on the
property, including the Sanctuary, which is the original church building.
8

1
R. Doc. 64.
2
R. Doc. 66.
3
R. Doc. 64, p. 2.
4
R. Doc. 66-1, p. 1.
5
R. Docs. 75, 88 (Defendant’s opposition and amended opposition); R. Doc. 78 (Plaintiff’s opposition).
6
R. Doc. 94 (Plaintiff’s reply); R. Doc. 87 (Defendant’s reply).
7
R. Doc. 64-3 (“the Policy”).
8
Id.
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2
Plaintiff sued Defendant on August 24, 2023 for breach of contract as well as
statutory penalties and attorneys’ fees pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892 and 22:1973.
9
Plaintiff
alleges that, after the storm, it provided Defendant with notice of the loss on September
1, 2021.
10
Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s adjuster, Amy Tomb of the company G4S,
performed an initial inspection of the property on September 11, 2021,
11
but prepared a
“severely underscoped” estimate, “miss[ing] much of the most heavily damaged portions
of the Properties.”
12
Defendant’s inspectors completed “multiple inspections,
13
with final
inspection completed on [October 21, 2021] specifically to inspect [the] church pipe
organ.”
14
Plaintiff alleges that, following the initial inspection, Defendant “agreed to pay
for $178,000 in repairs to Rayne’s organ, paid for interior damage and roof repair for
some of Rayne’s [church] buildings,” and paid for remediation of the property.
15

Defendant represents it received the final inspection report on November 30, 2021.
16
On
December 7, 2021, after applying a $562,450 deductible, Defendant tendered $110,652.21
for Plaintiff’s losses.
17
Plaintiff represents this payment “did not include any amount at all
for the significant roof damage and resulting interior damage to the Sanctuary.”
18

On April 15, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff contacted Defendant to re-inspect the
property.
19
Defendant retained building consultant Robert Spengler of Unified Building
Sciences, Inc. (“UBS”), engineer Tyson Cox of YA Engineering Services (“YAES”), and Jim
Camacho, Church Mutual’s in-house adjuster, to reinspect the property beginning on May

9
R. Doc. 1.
10
R. Doc. 64-2, ¶ 2 (citing R. Doc. 64-4, p. 1).
11
R. Doc. 64-5, p. 1.
12
R. Doc. 1, p. 3.
13
See R. Doc. 66-2, p. 1 (dates of various inspections).
14
R. Doc. 64-5, p. 1.
15
R. Doc. 64-1, p. 7.
16
R. Doc. 66-2, ¶ 8 (citing R. Doc. 66-8); R. Doc. 66-7, p. 30.
17
R. Doc. 64-7. The check is dated December 6, 2021.
18
R. Doc. 64-1, p. 8.
19
R. Doc. 64-8.
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10, 2022, and concluding on June 16, 2022.
20
Plaintiff represents these 2022
reinspections “reflected that there was a storm-caused opening in the roof of the
Sanctuary, which was supported with photographic documentation.”
21
A July 14, 2022
claims note entry by James Camacho states that he
[r]eceived initial report from engineer . . . . the insured and attorney
requested that all the buildings on the policy be inspected . . . . there is little
evidence that there was damage from the storm to those structures . . . . The
original . . . estimate was not sufficient for the extent of the damage that we
saw on our inspection. We will review . . . to see if our reserve will need
increase on loss and any additional ACV needs to be covered and paid.
22

On September 12, 2022, Spengler completed his damages estimates based on his
reinspection of the properties.
23
On September 21, 2022, Defendant received and
reviewed the final reinspection reports.
24
A claims note entry by James Camacho, dated
September 21, 2022, lists out additional damages to church buildings and provides “[t]he
total damage is $472,271.29 not including roof and organ. Will be updating . . . on this
loss and preparing for additional reserve request and an undisputed ACV payment when
. . . complete.”
25
After approving additional payment on October 24, 2022,
26
Defendant
tendered a second payment of $321,669.17 on November 4, 2022.
27
Plaintiff represents
this payment did not include “any funds for Rayne’s storm-caused opening in the roof,”
28

which caused extensive interior damage to the Sanctuary.
29

Plaintiff retained Guaranty Sheet Metal to conduct an inspection of the Sanctuary
roof on November 16 and 17, 2022, which documented “extensive damage to the roof of

20
R. Doc. 64-9; R. Doc. 66-2, ¶¶ 11, 12.
21
R. Doc. 64-2, ¶ 6 (citing R. Doc. 64-9). Defendant disputes this fact. R. Doc. 88-1, ¶ 6.
22
R. Doc. 66-7, p. 4.
23
R. Doc. 64-10.
24
R. Doc. 66-2, ¶ 13; R. Doc. 64-4 (claim notes); R. Doc. 66-7, p. 3 (same).
25
R. Doc. 64-4, pp. 6-7.
26
Id. at p. 6; R. Doc. 66-7, p. 3.
27
R. Doc. 66-2, ¶ 15 (citing R. Doc. 66-9).
28
R. Doc. 64-2, ¶ 8.
29
R. Doc. 64-1, p. 10.
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the Sanctuary building.”
30
Plaintiff provided this report to Defendant on March 7, 2023.
31

A claims note dated April 12, 2023 states that “[t]he insured’s attorney has requested
additional monies in this loss . . . as the contractor billing is stating that additional tiles
are broken due to the storm which we do not agree with. We have asked for a repair
invoice in the past. Awaiting response from attorney on our dispute of the estimate
presented by Guaranty Roof.”
32

Litigation commenced in August 2023.
33
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s most
recent tender in 2022 “failed to account for the full scope of the damage to the Sanctuary
roof.”
34
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s “own expert reports confirm that it has
underpaid Rayne,”
35
but Defendant has made no additional payments. Plaintiff argues
that, not only has Defendant failed to adequately compensate Plaintiff under the Policy,
but “[i]n an effort to justify its failure to timely and adequately compensate Rayne,”
Defendant has “compounded its bad faith by misrepresenting pertinent facts related to
coverage, misrepresenting policy language to fits its arguments, and quoting inapplicable
liability provisions to deny or narrow coverage.”
36
Overall, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant’s failure to adequately investigate damage to the properties and its agents’
misrepresentations of available coverage “is bad faith as a matter of law.”
37

Defendant argues “Plaintiff originally claimed damage to one building, that
morphed into damage to additional buildings over the ensuing 10 months.”
38
Defendant

30
Id. ¶ 10 (citing R. Doc. 64-12).
31
Id. ¶ 10 (citing R. Doc. 64-11).
32
R. Doc. 66-7, p. 2.
33
R. Doc. 1.
34
R. Doc. 64-1, p. 11.
35
Id. (citing R. Doc. 64-14 (April 8, 2025 YAES litigation report authored by Tyson Cox); R. Doc. 64-15
(April 8, 2025 UBS report authored by Robert Spengler)).
36
Id. at pp. 12-13.
37
R. Doc. 64-1, pp. 22-23.
38
R. Doc. 88-1, ¶ 5.
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further argues that Rayne board meeting minutes reflect preexisting plans to repair
various church buildings prior to Hurricane Ida, including roof repairs.
39
Defendant
argues there are “legitimate and substantial questions regarding the causation of roof and
interior damage to all three buildings due to prior conditions and failure to mitigate.”
40

As a result, Defendant argues there are substantial, reasonable, and legitimate questions
as to Plaintiff’s losses and the extent of Defendant’s liability, which is “fatal” to Plaintiff’s
bad faith claims.
41

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”
42
“An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”
43

When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”
44
All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.
45

There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving
party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.
46

If the dispositive issue is one for which the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

39
R. Doc. 66-1, p. 8 (citing R. Doc. 66-10, August 16, 2021 Board Meeting Minutes).
40
Id. at p. 10.
41
Id. at p. 17.
42
FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
43
DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
44
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
45
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
46
Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
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‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’”
47
If the
moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party
successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving
party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the
record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact does indeed exist.
48

On the other hand, if the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of
production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element
of the nonmovant’s claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to
establish an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.
49
When proceeding under the
first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the
movant’s contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
50
When, however, the
movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the
ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim,
the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court’s

47
Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.
v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).
48
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24.
49
Id. at 331-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also St. Amant v. Benoit, 806 F.2d 1294, 1297 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citing Justice Brennan’s statement of the summary judgment standard in Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, and
requiring the Movers to submit affirmative evidence to negate an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim or, alternatively, demonstrate the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element); Fano v. O’Neill, 806 F.2d 1262, 1266 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Justice Brennan’s dissent in Celotex,
and requiring the movant to make an affirmative presentation to negate the nonmovant’s claims on
summary judgment); 10A C
HARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE § 2727.1 (2016) (“Although the Court issued a five-to-four decision, the majority and
dissent both agreed as to how the summary-judgment burden of proof operates; they disagreed as to how
the standard was applied to the facts of the case.” (internal citations omitted)).
50
First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1980); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
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attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by
the moving party.”
51
Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.
52
If the
movant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the
nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving
party’s papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue
for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further
discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”
53
“Summary judgment should be
granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after
the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its
ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for
trial.”
54

Still, “unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the
record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the claim.
‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search
of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”
55

LAW AND ANALYSIS
Both parties seek summary judgment on the issue of Defendant’s bad faith. La. R.S.
22:1973 states that “[a]n insurer owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair

51
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332-33.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 332-33 & n.3.
54
Id.; see also First Nat’l Bank of Ariz., 391 U.S. at 289.
55
Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (first citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;
then Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994); then quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953
F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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dealing.”
56
Pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1892, insurers “shall pay the amount of any claim due
any insured within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the insured
or any party in interest.”
57
If an insurer fails to make such a payment and the failure “is
found to be arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause,” the insurer is subject “to a
penalty, in addition to the amount of the loss, of fifty percent damages on the amount
found to be due . . . as well as reasonable attorney fees and costs.”
58
“A party seeking
statutory penalties under [§ 1892] is required to establish that: (1) the insurer received
satisfactory proof of loss, (2) the insurer failed to pay the claim within thirty days of
receipt of the proof of loss, and (3) the insurer's failure to pay the claim was arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause.
59
Because the statute is penal in nature, it must be
strictly construed.
60
“Under a strict construction, every doubt must be resolved against
the imposition of the penalty.”
61

I. There are genuine issues of material fact as to when Defendant
received satisfactory proof of loss and whether Defendant acted
arbitrarily and capriciously in handling Plaintiff’s claim.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on whether Defendant’s
failure to pay certain sums under the policy was “arbitrary, capricious, or without
probable cause” under § 22:1892.
62
Plaintiff argues that Defendant acted in bad faith in
handling its claim. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that it gave Defendant “prompt notice of
the loss on September 1, 2021,” but Defendant conducted a “deficient” initial inspection

56
La. R.S. 22:1973A., repealed by, Acts 2024, No. 3, § 2, eff. July 1, 2024.
57
La. R.S. § 22:1892(A)(1).
58
Id. § 22:1892(B)(1).
59
Anco Insulations, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 787 F.3d 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2015)
(citation omitted); Dickerson v. Lexington Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 290, 299 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A refusal to pay the
full amount claimed will not be arbitrary and capricious when the dispute has a good faith basis.”).
60
Reed v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 857 So.2d 1012, 1020 (La. 2003); Feingerts v. La. Citizens Prop.
Ins. Corp., 265 So.3d 62, 66 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019).
61
Schexnaildre v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 184 So. 3d 108, 112 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015) (citing
Bowens v. General Motors Corp., 608 So.2d 999, 1005 (La. 1992)).
62
R. Doc. 64; R. Doc. 66.
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and issued an “insufficient, belated” tender.
63
Plaintiff argues Defendant continued to
mishandle Plaintiff’s claim under the Policy in failing to issue a timely second payment
and account for the proper extent of losses.
64
Plaintiff further argues defense expert
Cusimano has “compounded” Defendant’s bad faith by misrepresenting applicable
coverage under the Policy.
65
Defendant asserts it had substantial, legitimate questions
about the extent and amount of loss such that its failure to pay within the statutory time
period and dispute of coverage owed “was not arbitrary, capricious or without probable
cause.”
66

“Louisiana's requirements for proofs of loss are flexible, focusing on notice.”
67
“So
long as the insurer obtains sufficient information to act on the claim, the manner in which
it obtains the information is immaterial.”
68
“Satisfactory proof of loss” is only that which
is “sufficient to fully apprise the insurer of the insured's claims” and extent of the
damage.
69
The burden is on the insured to prove that it provided satisfactory proof of loss.
Whether the insured provided satisfactory proof of loss is a question of fact.
70
“Such a
question is inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage,” because of the
factual disputes highlighted.
71

63
R. Doc. 64-1, p. 7.
64
Id. at pp. 7-12.
65
Id. at pp. 12-13.
66
R. Doc. 66-1, p. 13 (citing United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mutual Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 417, 428 (5th
Cir. 2024)).
67
Cotton v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 831 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing La. Bag
Co., Inc. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 999 So. 2d 1104, 1119-20 (La. 2008)).
68
Anco Insulations, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 787 F.3d 276, 286 (5th Cir. 2015).
69
First Baptist Church of Iowa v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., S.I., 105 F.4th 775, 794 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing La.
Bag Co., 999 So. 2d at 1119); Aghighi v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 119 So.3d 930, 934 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 2013).
70
Boudreaux v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 230, 236 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2005); Anco,
787 F.3d at 286-87.
71
Causey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 18-6467, 2019 WL 5551900, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2019)
(finding that it was inappropriate to resolve the factual question of whether the plaintiff submitted
satisfactory proof of loss at the summary judgment stage).
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To determine whether Defendant acted in bad faith, the Court must also assess
whether Defendant’s conduct was arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. “The
phrase ‘arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause’ is synonymous with ‘vexatious,’
and a ‘vexatious refusal to pay’ means ‘unjustified, without reasonable or probable cause
or excuse.’”
72
Penalties should be imposed only when the facts “negate probable cause for
nonpayment.”
73
“Whether an insured's conduct is arbitrary or capricious depends on the
facts known to the insurer at the time of its action” and “is essentially a factual issue.”
74

Courts should not assess penalties “when the insurer has a reasonable basis to defend the
claim and acts in good-faith reliance on that defense.”
75
“Where there is a substantial,
reasonable and legitimate dispute as to the extent or amount of the loss, the insurer can
avoid the imposition of penalties only by unconditionally tendering the undisputed
portion of the claim.”
76
“The determination of whether [an insurer] acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner or in bad faith in its refusal to fairly and quickly settle its insured's
claim is a question of fact . . . .”
77

In Merwin v. Spears, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment
in favor of the insured, holding that there were “genuine issues of material facts as to
whether [Defendant’s] initial decision to deny the claim, based on its investigation and
consultation with plaintiffs’ expert, was reasonable under the totality of the facts.”
78
The
court determined that summary judgment is “rarely appropriate for a determination

72
La. Bag Co., 999 So. 2d at 1114.
73
Id. (quoting Guillory v. Travelers Ins. Co., 294 So.2d 215, 217 (La. 1974)).
74
Manas Hotel LLC v. AmGUARD Ins. Co., No. 1:22-CV-1823, 2025 WL 757166, at *2 (W.D. La. Mar. 10,
2025) (citing First United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2024)).
75
Reed v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 857 So.2d 1012, 1021 (La. 2003).
76
La. Bag Co., 999 So. 2d at 1114-15 (citing McDill v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 475 So.2d 1085, 1092 (La. 1985)).
77
Urrate v. Argonaut Great Cent. Ins. Co., 881 So.2d 787, 791 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2004), writs denied,
891 So.2d 686, 891 So.2d 690 (La. 2005).
78
Merwin v. Spears, 90 So. 3d 1041, 1042 (La. 2012).
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11
based on subjective facts such as intent, motive, malice, knowledge or good faith.”
79
Such
“fact-intensive inquir[ies are] not ripe for resolution on summary judgment.”
80

The Court finds there are genuine disputes of material fact as to (1) when
Defendant received satisfactory proof of loss from the hurricane, and (2) whether
Defendant’s payment and handling of the claim under the Policy was arbitrary or
capricious. There are outstanding questions about the extent of the loss to the church
properties.
81
As to the proof of loss issue, while Plaintiff represents it gave Defendant
“notice of the loss on September 1, 2021,”
82
Defendant conducted multiple inspections
throughout September and October 2021,
83
and the parties dispute when Defendant
received a final report of the damages estimate before tendering its first payment.
84

Defendant points to evidence in the record that Defendant’s first adjuster, Ms. Tombs,
met with Plaintiff’s representatives over the three 2021 inspections, who “agreed to the
scope of repairs prepared by Ms. Tomb.”
85
The record reflects that, after Defendant’s first
payment, Plaintiff contested the scope of damages and requested additional inspections,
resulting in Defendant’s second tender. Defendant still disputed the scope of Plaintiff’s
reported loss.
86
This factual determination is best left for a jury to decide. Furthermore,
given the record evidence of the Church’s preexisting plans to renovate and repair
buildings on the property prior to Hurricane Ida,
87
there is a dispute of fact as to whether

79
Id.
80
Sacks v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV 16-16578, 2017 WL 4791179, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2017)
(citing Thibodeaux v. Arvie, No. 2017-625, 2017 WL 3775712, at *5 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Aug. 31, 2017)).
81
First United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 417, 428 (5th Cir. 2024). The parties
experts disagree as to the scope of loss. See, e.g., R. Doc. 64-12; R. Doc. 64-17.
82
R. Doc. 64-2, ¶ 2.
83
R. Doc. 64-5, p. 1.
84
R. Doc. 66-2, ¶ 8 (citing R. Doc. 66-8); R. Doc. 66-7, p. 30.
85
R. Doc. 88, p. 2; R. Doc. 66-8, p. 2 (“This estimate represents an agreed scope of repairs with the
insured.”).
86
See R. Doc. 66-7, p. 2.
87
R. Doc. 66-1, p. 8 (citing R. Doc. 66-10, August 16, 2021 Board Meeting Minutes).
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12
Defendant had “reasonable and legitimate question[s] as to the extent and causation of
[the] claim.”
88

The summary judgment motions will be denied.
Accordingly;
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Motions for Summary Judgment are DENIED.
89

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of June, 2025.

_____________________________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

88
First United Pentecostal Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., 119 F.4th 417, 428 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing La.
Bag Co., Inc. v. Audubon Indem. Co., 999 So.2d 1104, 1114 (La. 2008)). There is also a dispute of fact as to
whether Defendant’s expert Cusimano made intentional misrepresentations in efforts to limit the scope of
coverage and whether these actions can be imputed to Defendant’s bad faith.
89
R. Doc. 64; R. Doc. 66.
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