Folks v. Sainato

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________

No. 25-30456
____________

Jared Folks,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Vincenzo Antonio Sainato; Gerald Turlich, in his Official
Capacity as Sheriff of Plaquemines Parish,

Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:23-CV-643
______________________________

Before Stewart, Graves, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
*

In this case, Jared Folks seeks to overturn a jury verdict finding that
Officer Vincenzo Antonio Sainato was not liable for a faulty investigation into
a hit-and-run involving Folks’s company vehicle. Because Folks has failed to
establish that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, we
AFFIRM.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 14, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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I
On February 13, 2022, a truck carrying a trailer behind it collided with
the gate leading out of a Belle Chasse, Louisiana subdivision. The footage
reflected an image of the truck driver, who was a tall, thinner male with a full
head of hair. The footage also showed that the side of the truck bore the name
of Folks’s company, AirTight Solutions, and the company’s phone number.
Using that phone number, Officer Sainato made two calls to Folks: one on
Monday, February 14, and another on Tuesday, February 15. Although the
parties generally agree that the conversations involved Officer Sainato’s
requests for further information and documentation of the incident, they
disagree on exactly what was said. It is undisputed that Folks ultimately did
not provide Officer Sainato the information he requested.
Officer Sainato filed an affidavit seeking an arrest warrant for Folks,
who he listed as a six-foot, two-hundred-and-twenty-pound male with brown
hair. Folks was arrested for two misdemeanors: hit and run driving, and
failure to have evidence of auto insurance in the vehicle. Folks was arrested,
held for three days, and ultimately released on bond. After Folks was released
from jail, he looked for and acquired surveillance footage that showed he was
in his office, not driving the truck, during the February 13 incident.
Meanwhile, Folks was charged by the Plaquemines Parish District Attorney
with both misdemeanors. The case was set for trial, but the charges were
ultimately dismissed.
Folks brought suit against Officer Sainato, Sheriff Gerald Turlich, and
several other defendants, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. After the
district court granted several motions for judgment as a matter of law, only
four claims remained against Officer Sainato:
(1) a Section 1983 claim for violating Folks’s Fourth
Amendment rights under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154
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(1978); (2) a Section 1983 claim for violating Folks’s Fourth
Amendment rights under Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939
(5th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled by Thompson v. Clark, 596
U.S. 36 (2022); (3) a Louisiana-law claim for false arrest/false
imprisonment; and (4) a Louisiana-law malicious prosecution
claim.
In addition, one derivative vicarious liability claim remained against Sheriff
Turlich.
During deliberations, the jury asked one question: “Can we put a
footnote or message in the verdict that if there is no finding of fault by Sainato
can we indicate that we think Sainato should be sanctioned by his superiors
for []reckless or irresponsible actions[?]” The court conferred with the
parties and, with their agreement, answered: “The jury’s obligation is to
follow the instructions provided by the court and complete the verdict form
as presented.” The jury returned to its deliberations and later returned a
verdict finding Officer Sainato not liable on all four claims. As a result, they
did not reach the jury question regarding qualified immunity, or the claim
against Sheriff Turlich (which failed as a matter of law). The court entered
judgment dismissing Folks’s remaining claims with prejudice.
After trial, Folks filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law and alternative motion for a new trial. The district court denied Folks’s
motions, and Folks timely appealed.
II
The district court had jurisdiction over Folks’s federal claims under
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. This court has appellate jurisdiction to review the
district court’s final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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III
Folks raises two overarching arguments on appeal. The first is that the
jury’s verdict as to all four remaining claims is unsupported by the evidence
and must be overturned. The second is that the court erred by giving an
instruction on mitigation of damages. We consider each argument in turn.
A
1
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment
as a matter of law de novo, “applying the same standard as the district
court.” Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Foradori v.
Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008)). “Although [the] review is de
novo, . . . [the] standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is especially
deferential” because it “is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 272–73 (first quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall,
47 F.3d 695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995); and then quoting Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician
Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also Polanco v. City of Aus.,
78 F.3d 968, 974 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The standard for evaluating the sufficiency
of evidence is whether the evidence has such quality that reasonable and fair-
minded persons would reach the same conclusion.”).
In evaluating the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law,
the court “draw[s] all reasonable inferences and resolve[s] all credibility
determinations in the light most favorable” to the verdict. Heck, 775 F.3d at
273. “The jury’s verdict can only be overturned if there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find as the jury did.” Griggs v.
Chickasaw Cnty., 930 F.3d 696, 701 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Miller v. Raytheon
Co., 716 F.3d 138, 144 (5th Cir. 2013)); Heck, 775 F.3d at 273 (“[The court]
‘will reverse the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if the
evidence points so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the nonmoving
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party that no reasonable jury could return a contrary verdict.’” (quoting
Foradori, 523 F.3d at 485)) .
2
In light of the deferential standard of review, the evidence presented
at trial, the parties’ arguments, and the district court’s reasons, we conclude
that Folks fails to establish that no reasonable jury could have reached the
conclusions it did here. On appeal, Folks relies primarily on the surveillance
footage of the truck driver, arguing that because the image of the driver is
clearly not him, Officer Sainato must have made the statements in his
affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth, must have known that no
probable cause existed, and must have made the arrest with malice. But a jury
found otherwise.
When asked for instances in which this court has overturned a jury
verdict in the same or similar circumstances, Folks’s counsel cited two cases.
The first is Babin v. Plaquemines Parish, No. 21-30417, 2022 WL 3097852 (5th
Cir. Aug. 3, 2022) (per curiam). In that case, the plaintiffs sued their
employer for not paying them overtime for time spent on “standby.” Id. at
*1. The parties stipulated that the employer never paid time and a half
overtime to the employees; the remaining question was merely whether the
time on “standby” constituted working time. Id. at *3–4. In an interrogatory,
the jury determined that the standby constituted working time, but
simultaneously found that the employer was not liable for overtime pay. Id.
at *2–3. In an unpublished opinion, this court held that the district court
should have granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employees
because there was no evidence to support the verdict. Id. at *3. The jury had
found that standby time was working time, and the parties agreed that the
plaintiffs had not been paid overtime for that working time. Id.
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Folks’s case is unlike Babin because there is additional evidence to
support the verdict: For example, the jury heard evidence that someone with
the subdivision’s homeowner’s association also concluded that Folks was
driving the truck based on an email Folks and his attorney sent to the
homeowner’s association. The district court recounted that in an email,
Folks stated that the gate “‘closed in between the cab of my [t]ruck and bed,’
and that ‘[w]e did not have any contact information at that time’—implying
that Folks was involved in the collision.” Further, there are several reasons
the jury may have found Folks’s recollection of his conversations with Officer
Sainato to be non-credible, including his “lack of full candor about his
litigation history” and “general litigiousness.”
1

The second case counsel cited is Johnson v. Thibodaux City, 887 F.3d
726 (5th Cir. 2018), an unlawful arrest and excessive force case involving a
traffic stop. In that case, after the officers initiated a valid traffic stop on a car
to arrest the driver, the officers proceeded to arrest a passenger because the
passenger refused to provide valid identification. Id. at 733. This court
overturned the jury verdict because it was “predicated upon an erroneous
legal conclusion”: that the passenger was lawfully stopped, and thus
committed a crime for refusing to provide identification. Id. at 735. In reality,
the stop of the passenger was unlawful because there was no reasonable
suspicion the passenger committed a crime. Id.
But Folks does not explain how Johnson is applicable here. He cites
the case in his opening brief only as support for the appropriate standard of
review. Further, Johnson is simply another case where this court held that a
jury lacked facts to support its decision—not that it chose the wrong side of a
_____________________
1
Specifically, on direct examination, Folks failed to disclose a lawsuit he filed on
behalf of his deceased father. He also testified about “at least two other lawsuits in which
[he] claimed that he would suffer pain and mental anguish for the rest of his life.”
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factual dispute.
2
And to the extent the panel held that the jury’s verdict
rested on an erroneous legal conclusion, Folks has not explained how the
verdict in this case suffers a similar deficiency.
Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility
determinations in the light most favorable to the verdict, we affirm the
district court’s determination that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for
the jury’s verdict. See Heck, 775 F.3d at 273; Griggs, 930 F.3d at 701.
B
1
We next consider Folks’s challenge to the mitigation instruction.
Preserved challenges to a jury instruction are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. RSBCO v. United States, 104 F.4th 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2024), cert.
denied, 145 S. Ct. 1059 (2025). “A party challenging jury instructions ‘must
demonstrate that the charge as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable
_____________________
2
Folks also cites to the jury’s question about sanctioning Officer Sainato, arguing
that it constitutes a “finding” of recklessness. Contrary to Folks’s argument, the question
does not constitute a finding of anything. Further, after being instructed to “follow the
instructions provided by the court and complete the verdict form as presented,” the jury
proceeded to deliver a verdict that Officer Sainato was not liable on all claims. “A jury is
presumed to follow its instructions[, and] to understand a judge’s answer to its question.”
Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211
(1987)).
And even if the jury believed Officer Sainato was reckless in conducting his
investigation generally, general recklessness is insufficient to establish liability on any of
Folks’s claims. A Franks claim specifically requires “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless
disregard for the truth.” See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (emphasis added).
A Castellano claim does not involve any recklessness requirement, nor do Louisiana claims
for malicious prosecution or false arrest/false imprisonment. See Espinal v. City of Houston,
96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024) (discussing Castellano claims); Phillips v. L. Brands Serv.
Co., L.L.C., 82 F.4th 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2023) (discussing Louisiana malicious prosecution
claims); Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing Louisiana false
imprisonment/false arrest claims).
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doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.’” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1315 (5th Cir. 1997)). However,
unpreserved challenges to a jury instruction are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2003). “Under the plain
error standard, the ‘appellant must show clear or obvious error that affects
his substantial rights; if he does, this court has discretion to correct a forfeited
error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings, but [is] not required to do so.’” Id. (quoting United
States v. Gordon, 346 F.3d 135, 137 (5th Cir. 2003)).
After Officer Sainato requested an instruction on mitigation of
damages, Folks’s counsel stated the following: “We object to the mitigation
charge especially given Defendant’s theory of what the mitigation is, it
should have given up the surveillance to Sainato instead of the [district
attorney].” No further argument or discussion was had regarding that
instruction, and the district court delivered the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury
Instruction on mitigation of damages.
3
See 5th Cir. Dist. Judges
Ass’n, Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 15.5
(2020).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(1) requires that an objection to
a jury instruction “stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds
for the objection.” This circuit has “repeatedly held that a general objection
to the district court’s jury instructions is insufficient to satisfy Rule 51.”
Redd, 355 F.3d at 874 (quoting Russell v. Plano Bank & Tr., 130 F.3d 715, 719
(5th Cir. 1997)). Here, Folks’s counsel purportedly objected to the mitigation
instruction, but the objection lacked the specificity required to satisfy Rule
_____________________
3
After delivering the instruction, the district court asked if there were “[a]ny
issues that anybody heard in [the] recitation of the instructions.” Folks’s counsel
responded, “I don’t think so, not from the plaintiff.”
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51. See id. (holding that an objection to a jury instruction lacked the specificity
required by Rule 51 when counsel argued that it was “against the law in the
Fifth Circuit” because it conflicted with two cases, without explaining the
contours of that conflict). Thus, Folks’s challenge to the mitigation charge is
reviewed for plain error. See id.
Plain error exists only if the error is “clear or obvious” and “affects
[Folks’s] substantial rights.” Id. (quoting Gordon, 346 F.3d at 137). Even if
those requirements are met, this court has the discretion to correct the error
only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. Folks cannot make the threshold showing. There
was evidence presented at trial that suggested Folks failed to mitigate his
damages by declining to undergo a recommended medical procedure, thus
warranting a mitigation instruction. Additionally, Folks does not argue that
the instruction given was an incorrect statement of law. See United States v.
Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 354 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It is well-settled that a district
court does not err by giving a charge that tracks this [c]ircuit’s pattern jury
instructions and that is a correct statement of the law.” (citing United States
v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1992)).
4
Accordingly, Folks has not
established that there was a clear or obvious error, that any purported error
_____________________
4
In challenging the mitigation instruction, Folks cites to statements made during
Officer Sainato’s closing argument. Specifically, during closing, Officer Sainato argued that
if the jury found him liable, it should reduce Folks’s damages because he failed to turn over
the surveillance footage showing him in his office. Folks now argues that statement laid the
groundwork for the jury to find Officer Sainato not liable on an untenable theory. To begin,
Folks failed to object to that statement and its allowance is thus reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2000). However, a review of the cited
statement reflects that Officer Sainato offered this argument as to damages, not liability. In
light of that fact, Folks has not made clear how the statement meets the plain error standard
or otherwise entitles him to a new trial.
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seriously affected the fairness of the proceeding, or that this court should
overturn the verdict based on the instruction. Redd, 355 F.3d at 874.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I concur fully in Parts I, II, III-A, and IV of the opinion. As to Part
III-B, because I conclude that Folks adequately preserved his jury instruction
challenge, I disagree that the standard of review is plain error. Instead, we
should review for abuse of discretion. Even under that standard, his challenge
fails, so I concur in the judgment.
“A party who objects to an instruction . . . must do so on the record,
stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)(1).
The majority cites United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 2003)
in holding that Folks did not preserve his argument. In Redd, the defendant
claimed that the district court erred by refusing to give his proposed
instruction, resulting in a misstatement of the law. Id. at 873. In an off-record
discussion, the defendant had argued that the jury instructions needed to
include language “straight from” United States v. Oviedo.
1
Id. at 873–74. But
we found that his on-record objection only amounted to a protest that the
instruction was “‘against the law in the Fifth Circuit’ because it conflicts
with Oviedo in some way.” Id. at 874. Without incorporating the off-record
discussion—which we could not—the objection lacked the specificity to
satisfy the procedural rule’s requirements, and we reviewed for plain error.
Id.; see also Russell v. Plano Bank & Tr., 130 F.3d 715, 719 (5th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the objection, “can we just have an objection that to the extent
that the Plaintiff’s requested instructions were not given, we would object on
that ground[?]” was insufficient under Rule 51); Bolton v. Tesoro Petrol. Corp.,
871 F.2d 1266, 1272 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that objecting “to the extent any
_____________________
1
525 F.2d 881 (5th Cir.1976).
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charge [they] requested was not given by the Court” was insufficient under
Rule 51).
Here, Folks was more specific. His counsel articulated, “We object to
the mitigation charge especially given defendant’s theory of what the
mitigation is, it should have given up the surveillance to Sainato instead of
the [district attorney].” He was concerned that Sainato’s mitigation
argument turned on prevention of harm, instead of being premised on a
proper mitigation theory—that Sainato could have mitigated his injuries by
procuring reasonable medical care, for example.
2
This objection adequately
preserves the argument.
Even so, Folks’ jury instruction challenge fails.
We review preserved errors in jury instructions for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Martinez, 921 F.3d 452, 477 (5th Cir. 2019). We
“ask whether the court’s charge, as a whole, is a correct statement of the law
and whether it clearly instructs jurors as to the principles of the law applicable
to the factual issues confronting them.” Id. (citation omitted).
The mitigation instruction read, “If you [the jury] find the defendant
is liable and the plaintiff has suffered damages, the plaintiff may not recover
for any item of damage which he could have avoided through reasonable
effort.” The instruction is a correct statement of the law, and Folks does not
argue otherwise. Instead, he claims that this instruction allowed Sainato to
make a liability argument. Sainato’s counsel argued at closing, “You’re going
to hear in the law that if he’s going to claim that he was wrongfully arrested,
then you have to consider whether he had the possibility to prevent that arrest
_____________________
2
Folks claimed he suffered a physical injury due to his time in the holding cell. His
orthopedic surgeon recommended surgery to relieve his back pain, which he did not
undergo.
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himself, and I’m going to read you straight from the instruction.” Sainato’s
counsel also read the mitigation of damages instruction, then argued, “This
instruction is telling you, even if you find that Deputy Sainato is liable, that
he’s done something wrong here, if you find that Mr. Folks could have
prevented the arrest in the first place on his own, zero damages to Mr.
Folks.”
To highlight the issue with this closing argument, Folks cites an
out-of-circuit case where a plaintiff was hit repeatedly by police officers and
sued for excessive use of force. Miller v. Lovett, 879 F.2d 1066, 1068 (2d Cir.
1989), partially abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989). The mitigation instruction given there stated that even if the jury
found “that the plaintiff was injured as a natural consequence of conduct by
the defendants in violation of Section 1983, [it] must determine whether the
plaintiff could have done something to avoid or minimize the harm that he
suffered.” Id. at 1069. The Second Circuit held that the trial court “erred in
instructing the jury to consider whether [the plaintiff] ‘could have avoided or
minimized the harm that he suffered.’” Id. at 1070. It explained that a proper
mitigation charge limits the jury’s consideration to the plaintiff’s actions after
injury. Id. And “[i]f a plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages were to include the
duty to avoid the underlying injury, few arrestees could recover damages
under § 1983 since most could have ‘avoided’ engaging in the conduct that
precipitated the arrest.” Id. at 1071. Because the instruction likely left the
jury highly confused, its inclusion was reversible error. Id.
The instruction given here is not the same as in Miller. In Miller, the
court instructed the jury to consider whether the plaintiff could have done
something to minimize his harm. Here, the instruction stated that a person
has the duty to minimize damages. Sainato’s counsel’s closing argument on
this point may have been improper, but the jury instruction was a correct
statement of the law regarding damages. And since the jury found no liability,
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there was no need to make a finding regarding damages. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by allowing the mitigation of damages instruction.

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