ZUBAIR HASAN SIDDIQUI V. FATIMA ALI AHMED — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION OTHER

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1156-MR ZUBAIR HASAN SIDDIQUI APPELLANT v. APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE TRACI H. BRISLIN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-02281 FATIMA ALI AHMED APPELLEE OPINION VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART, AND AFFIRMING IN PART ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES. ACREE, JUDGE: Zubair Siddiqui appeals the family court’s order awarding Fatima Ahmed sole custody of their minor child, restricting Siddiqui to supervised visitation, and requiring Siddiqui to make a $7,000.00 payment to Ahmed pursuant to their marriage contract. We vacate and remand the family court’s custody and visitation rulings and affirm the $7,000.00 payment award.

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-2- The parties’ marriage was arranged pursuant to a marriage contract, and they married in August 2021. Their only child was born in 2022. Ahmed filed for divorce in 2023. There is an active domestic violence order against Siddiqui. Based on the family court’s previous finding that Siddiqui committed domestic violence against Ahmed, it awarded Ahmed sole custody of their child and granted Siddiqui supervised visitation only. The marriage contract called for Siddiqui to pay Ahmed $7,000.00. The family court concluded that Ahmed was entitled to that payment. We develop additional facts and procedural history as necessary. We review a family court’s rulings on questions of law and its application of the law to the facts of a given case de novo. F.E. v. E.B., 641 S.W.3d 700, 704 (Ky. App. 2022). The family court’s ruling on custody is based on the following findings of fact: The Court makes the following findings under KRS 403.270(2) and 403.315: a. [Ahmed] testified that she believed sole custody was in the child’s best interest in order to protect the child. [Siddiqui] wants joint custody and equal timesharing, or at least unsupervised timeshare. b. The Court previously found that [Siddiqui] committed an act of domestic violence against [Ahmed] and

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-3- entered a domestic violence order. It is unreasonable to order [Ahmed] to attempt to co-parent with someone that the Court has determined committed an act of domestic violence against her. c. Therefore, [Ahmed] is granted sole custody of the minor child. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution, May, 30, 2024 (Record (R.) 173)). Siddiqui contends the family court erred when it awarded sole custody to Ahmed and argues that: The trial court’s findings appear to improperly rely on allegations of misconduct rather than a proper best-interest analysis under KRS[1] 403.270. While the trial court found domestic violence occurred, the statute explicitly requires a showing that such misconduct negatively impacts the child’s well-being before it can serve as a basis for restricting custody or time sharing. The record in this case is devoid of any factual findings or testimony demonstrating that the alleged misconduct has had any adverse effect on the minor child. (Appellant’s Br. at [4]). At this point, we believe it helpful to note that the legislature amended the statutes applicable here, effective July 15, 2026. When the family court entered its order, and when the parties drafted their briefs, the prior versions of these statutes—KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315—were in effect. The amendment 1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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-4- reinforces and clarifies, as we hope this Opinion does, that the child’s best interests remain a part of the analysis even when a domestic violence order is among the factors the family court must consider. This Opinion is consistent both with the prior versions of the statutes and their current 2026 versions. On remand, the family court will find it helpful to apply the statutes’ current versions. Our review, however, proceeds by analyzing the order under KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315 prior to their amendment, as applied by the family court. Ahmed agrees that analysis always begins with a presumption “that joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interests of the child.” KRS 403.270(2). However, she argues that a finding of domestic violence negates all need for a “best interests” analysis. We disagree. Although KRS 403.315 plainly disallows the presumption of joint custody when “a domestic violence order is being or has been entered against a party[,]” it does not eliminate the requirement that the family court perform a “best interests” analysis. The statute says so: “The court shall weigh all factors set out in KRS 403.270 in determining the best interests of the child.” KRS 403.315(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, it is not impossible that after balancing all factors, joint custody and equal timesharing, though no longer presumed, remain in a child’s or the children’s best interests.

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-5- The family court made three findings of fact—a., b., and c., respectively—that Ahmed wanted sole custody, that a DVO was in place against Siddiqui, and that Ahmed is granted sole custody. Although the family court may have considered every best-interests factor in the nonexclusive list set out in KRS 403.270(2)(a) through (k), it did not memorialize that consideration for the record. That makes Siddiqui’s argument persuasive that the court based its entire reason for granting sole custody and supervised visitation on the DVO. To paraphrase Anderson v. Johnson, the family court decided only that sole custody would be in the child’s best interests “which is the conclusion of law required by KRS 403.[270]. The order includes no findings of fact to support this conclusion, which violates the command of CR 52.01.” 350 S.W.3d 453, 458– 59 (Ky. 2011). The current 2026 versions of KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315 make the process of analyzing all these factors more straightforward while also incorporating the jurisprudence of Anderson v. Johnson explicitly requiring fact finding. Under these versions, “prior to consideration of any other factors enumerated in subsection (4) of this section[,]”2 the family court must “[c]onsider any allegations of . . . [d]omestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 . . . committed by one (1) party against another party or a child of the parties . . . .” 2 Formerly KRS 403.270(2)(a) through (k).

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-6- KRS 403.270(3)(a)1. (2026). The family court shall then “[m]ake written findings on the record as to the impact, if any, of the allegations” of domestic violence “on the child.” KRS 403.270(3)(b) (2026). Because the family court failed to memorialize its consideration, if any, of the best-interest factors which Ahmed effectively concedes, we vacate and remand with instructions to engage in fact finding as described in Anderson v. Johnson and now in the relevant statute. The family court will determine whether it needs to hear further proof. Whereas the remand might well affect Siddiqui’s remaining arguments regarding custody, visitation, and child support, we also vacate those rulings, to be addressed again by the family court as part of the remand. The family court also ruled that Siddiqui was required to pay Ahmed $7,000.00 as part of their marriage contract. Siddiqui argues that, inherently, the $7,000.00 cannot be considered marital property, and thus that the family court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a contract claim. However, there is no legal basis upon which to argue a family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to interpret and enforce a matrimonial contract. To the contrary, KRS 23A.100(1) addresses the jurisdiction of our family courts, defining them as “a division of Circuit Court with general jurisdiction pursuant to Section 112(6) of the Constitution of Kentucky[.]” (emphasis added). KRS 23A.100(2) likewise states, “In addition to general

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-7- jurisdiction of Circuit Court, a family court division of Circuit Court shall have the following additional jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added). We know of no countervailing authority and Siddiqui cites none. Based on the foregoing, we vacate the Fayette Circuit Court, Family Division’s rulings regarding custody, visitation, and child support, and remand with instruction to determine custody pursuant to KRS 403.270. We affirm the trial court’s ruling with respect to the $7,000.00 payment. ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Brandon M. Music Grayson, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Brandi N. Lewis Lexington, Kentucky

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