Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-148

1989-148Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 18, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 148
The Honorable Debara K. Schauf
State Representative, Eighty-First District
P.O. Box 68
Mulvane, Kansas 67110
Re: Taxation--Property Exempt from Taxation--Property
Exempt from Taxation; Merchants' and Manufacturers'
Inventory
Synopsis: Because the Kansas Constitution does not define the
term "merchants' and manufacturers' inventory" for
purposes of the property tax exemption in article
11, section 1, it is appropriate to rely on common
understanding of the terms at the time the
constitutional provision was adopted, and the
statutory definitions contained in K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 79-201m. The scope of these definitions does
not include real estate, such as houses constructed
on-site for later sale. Therefore, such property
is not eligible for the merchants' and
manufacturers' inventory exemption from property
tax under article 11, section 1. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 79-102; K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-201m, as
amended by L. 1989, ch. 289, § 1; Kan. Const.,
Art. 11, § 1.
*
Dear Representative Schauf:
You request our opinion concerning whether the construction of
housing constitutes "manufacturing" under article 11, section
1 of the Kansas Constitution. Specifically, you ask whether
houses constructed on-site for sale by a builder may qualify
for exemption from property tax as "manufacturers' inventory"
until sold or occupied.
Article 11, section 1 of the Kansas Constitution provides that
"merchants' and manufacturers' inventories . . . shall be
exempt from property taxation." However, article 11, section
1 does not define the term "merchants' and manufacturers'
inventories." K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-201m, which was adopted
two years after the constitutional provision, contains almost
identical language exempting merchants' and manufacturers'
inventories from property tax. The statute contains the
following definitions:
"(a) 'merchant' means. . . every person
. . . who shall own or hold . . . any
tangible personal property . . . for
resale in the ordinary course of business
without modification or change in form or
substance. . . .
"(b) 'manufacturer' means . . . every
person . . . who is engaged in the
business of transforming, refining or
combining materials and labor to convert
tangible personal property from one form
to another. . . .
"(c) 'inventory' means . . . those items
of tangible personal property that: (1)
are primarily held for sale in the
ordinary course of business (finished
goods); (2) are in process of production
for such sale (work in process); or (3)
are to be consumed either directly or
indirectly in the production of finished
goods (raw materials and supplies). . . ."
(Emphasis added).
The statutory definitions limit both merchants' and
manufacturers' inventories to "tangible personal property."
As used in the tax statutes, personal property includes "every
tangible thing which is the subject of ownership, not forming
part or parcel of real property . . ." K.S.A. 79-102. Real
property includes "not only the land itself, but all buildings
. . . appertaining thereto." Id. Houses constructed
on-site by a builder clearly do not satisfy the statutory
definition of personal property. Therefore, they cannot be
considered merchants' or manufacturers' inventory for purposes
of the statutory exemption under K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-201m.
It remains to determine whether such houses can be considered
merchants' or manufacturers' inventory for purposes of the
constitutional exemption. In construing a constitutional
provision, consideration should be given to what appears to
have been the intendment and understanding of the people at
the time of its adoption. State ex rel. Frizzell v.
Highwood Services, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, 825, 826 (1970).
Its language should be interpreted to mean what the words
imply to men of common understanding." Id. at 825.
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-201m was enacted two years after the
current version of article 11, section 1. While it is
arguable that the definitions contained in the statute do not
coincide with the intendment and understanding of the people
at the time the constitutional provision was adopted, we find
nothing in recorded legislative history to support such a
conclusion. The fact that statutory definitions were adopted
soon after the passage of the constitutional amendment
suggests the legislature intended to clarify the scope of the
constitutional exemption, rather than to alter it.
Furthermore, the statutory definitions are consistent with
definitions of "merchant" and "manufacturer" commonly used at
the time of the constitutional amendment. The American
Heritage Dictionary 821, 796 (New College Edition 1976)
defines "merchant" as a person whose occupation is the
wholesale purchase and retail sale of goods; "manufacturer" as
a person or enterprise that manufactures, especially the owner
or operator of a factory; and "manufacture" as the making or
processing of raw material into a finished product, especially
by means of a large-scale industrial operation. These
definitions, like the statutory definitions, would not appear
to include builders or sellers of site-constructed houses such
as you describe. This conclusion is further supported by case
law in other jurisdictions, which has generally held that, for
purposes of tax exemptions, the term "manufacturing" does not
include the construction of buildings. Annot. 17 A.L.R.3d
7, 116 (1968).
We conclude that site-constructed houses are not "merchants'
and manufacturers' inventories" as that term was commonly
understood at the time article 11, section 1 was amended, and
therefore, do not qualify for exemption from property taxes
under the Kansas Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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