Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1989-115

1989-115Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 12, 1989
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89- 115
Mark A. Burghart
General Counsel
Kansas Department of Revenue
Docking State Office Building
915 S.W. Harrison Street
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1588
Re: Taxation--Kansas Retailers' Sales Tax--
Jurisdiction to Enforce Provisions on Federally
Recognized Indian Reservations
Synopsis: Indian retailers operating on federally recognized
reservations selling products which have been
imported for sale are subject to the "collect and
remit" requirements of the State's retailers' sales
tax and cigarette tax acts when the legal incidence
of the tax falls on non-Indian purchasers. Though
enforcement may be difficult in that we do not
believe action to enforce may be brought in state
courts, the absence of civil jurisdiction under
Public Law 280 and 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) does not
preclude the State from requiring collection.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 79-3302; K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
79-3310; 79-3321; 79-3408; K.S.A. 79-3409; K.S.A.
1988 Supp. 79-3604; 18 U.S.C. §1343; 25 U.S.C.
§1322; 28 U.S.C. §1360.
Dear Mr. Burghart:
You have requested our opinion regarding whether the State of
Kansas has the requisite jurisdiction to enable the Department
of Revenue to regulate the collection of sales, cigarette, and
motor fuel taxes on recognized Indian reservations. You state
that your request is strictly limited to on-reservation
activity and does not encompass the situation where an Indian
retailer is operating on other than a federally recognized
reservation.
Since its decision in Moe v. Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976),
the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
states may properly require that such taxes, validly imposed
on non-Indian purchasers, be added to the sale price of the
tribal retailer, thereby aiding the states' enforcement and
collection of the tax.
"The State's requirement that the Indian
tribal seller collect a tax validly
imposed on non-Indians is a minimal burden
designed to avoid the likelihood that in
its absence non-Indians purchasing from
the tribal seller will avoid payment of a
concededly lawful tax. Since this
burden is not, strictly speaking, a tax at
all, it is not governed by the language of
Mescalero [411 U.S. 145, 148, 93 S.Ct.
1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119 (1973)], dealing
with the 'special area of state
taxation.' We see nothing in this burden
which frustrates tribal self-government
[cites omitted], or runs afoul of any
congressional enactment dealing with the
affairs of reservation Indians. . . ."
Moe, 425 U.S. at 483, 48 L.Ed.2d at
112.
The Court went a few steps further in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980), holding that
the state may require Indian retailers to collect sales and
cigarette taxes from non-members purchasing at tribal
smokeshops even if the tribe, by ordinance, also exacts a
tax on such sales. Id. at 154-159. The Court also held
that the state could "validly require the tribal smokeshops
to affix tax stamps purchased from the State to individual
packages of cigarettes prior to the time of sale to nonmembers
of the Tribe," id. at 159, and to keep records of both
taxable and nontaxable transactions, id. at 159, 160.
Finally, the Court held that the state could enforce its
validly imposed tax and its collection requirements by seizing
as contraband unstamped cigarettes en route to the
reservation.
"Although the cigarettes in transit are as
yet exempt from state taxation [because
sales by wholesalers to the tribal
businesses are concededly exempt] they
are not immune from seizure when the
Tribes, as here, have refused to fulfill
collection and remittance obligations
which the State has validly
imposed. . . . By seizing cigarettes en
route to the reservation, the State
polices against wholesale evasion of its
own valid taxes without unnecessarily
intruding on core tribal interests."
Id. at 161, 162.
One point emphasized in Colville was that it was
"painfully apparent that the value marketed by the
smokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated
on the reservations by activities in which the tribes have a
significant interest." Colville, 447 U.S. at 155. The
"value" that was marketed, which was not available from
non-tribal retailers, was the claimed exemption from state
taxes. Compare Indian County, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax
Commission, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987) (recreation
afforded by tribal bingo games created, sold and consumed
entirely on reservation and thus exempt from taxation).
It is also important to note that in both Moe and
Washington v. Colville, the Court focused on the fact that
the legal incidence of the tax involved fell on the non-Indian
or non-tribe member purchaser. 425 U.S. at 481, 482; 447 U.S.
at 142. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State Tax Com'n,
Etc., 574 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1978). "Incidence of a
tax refers to the party or parties bearing ultimate liability
for the tax." Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 413,
note 72 (1982 Ed.). In California State Board of
Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 474 U.S. 9, 106
S.Ct. 289, 88 L.Ed.2d 9, reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1077, 106
S.Ct. 839, 88 L.Ed.2d 810 (1985), the Court explained that the
pertinent statutes need not expressly state "that the tax is
to be passed on to the ultimate purchaser . . . before a State
may require a tribe to collect cigarette taxes from non-Indian
purchasers and remit the amounts of such tax to the state."
474 U.S. at 11. If the statutory scheme is such that
consumers are required to pay the tax whenever the retailer is
untaxable, the legal incidence of the tax falls on the
purchaser and thus is validly imposed on sales from Indians to
non-Indians and the state may require the Indian retailers to
collect the tax.
Clearly the legal incidence of the Kansas retailers' sale tax
falls on the ultimate purchaser/consumer. K.S.A. 1988 Supp.
79-3604. Conversely, the legal incidence of the motor fuels
tax does not fall on the ultimate consumer. K.S.A. 1988
Supp. 79-3408; K.S.A. 79-3409. Pursuant to K.S.A. 79-3409, it
is up to the distributor whether the tax is passed on to the
purchaser and the distributor remains liable; the legal
incidence, or liability, does not fall on the purchaser.
Thus, since states generally cannot tax Indian tribes or their
property absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, the State of Kansas may ,not impose or
collect motor-fuel taxes on or from Indians on federally
recognized Indian reservations. See Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114
(1973); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S.
164, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710
(1976); Moe v. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra.
It is less clear where the legal incidence of Kansas'
cigarette tax falls. Pursuant to K.S.A. 79-3302 and K.S.A.
1988 Supp. 79-3310 the tax is to be collected from the
wholesale or retail cigarette dealer who first sells,
distributes or conveys the cigarettes in the State of Kansas.
However, it is generally unlawful for any person to possess
more than 200 cigarettes without the required tax indicia
being affixed. K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 79-3321(a). Thus, the State
may hold the ultimate purchaser liable for non-payment of the
tax in some circumstances. Further, as a practical matter,
the cigarette tax is traditionally passed on to the consumer.
It is therefore our opinion that the legal incidence of the
cigarette tax in Kansas falls on the ultimate purchaser, and
the State may require Indian retailers to collect and remit
the tax.
It is been suggested that since Kansas has never assumed civil
jurisdiction on Indian reservations pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1360 (commonly referred to as Public Law 280) or 25 U.S.C.
§1322(a) (the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968), the State is
without jurisdiction to enforce a requirement that Indian
retailers collect cigarette and sales taxes. [Kansas was
granted criminal jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3243.
This jurisdiction has been held to be concurrent with federal
criminal jurisdiction. State v. Nioce, 239 Kan. 127
(1986).] We do not believe that assumption of civil
jurisdiction under either of these statutes would enhance
enforcement of the collection requirements, or that failure to
assume jurisdiction under one these statutes would necessarily
preclude the State from imposing the collect and remit
requirements on Indian retailers.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the scope of
jurisdiction afforded by Public Law 280 and, to a lesser
extent, 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) in Bryan v. Itasca County,
supra.
"The primary concern of Congress in
enacting Pub. L. 280 that emerges from its
sparse legislative history was with the
problem of lawlessness on certain Indian
reservations, and the absence of adequate
tribal institutions for law enforcement. .
. . Thus, provision for state criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or
against Indians on the reservations was
the central focus of Pub. L. 280 and is
embodied in §2 of the Act, 18 U.S.C.
§1162." 426 U.S. at 379, 380.
The section of Public Law 280 consenting to state civil
jurisdiction is believed to have been added as somewhat of an
afterthought. See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits
of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 535, 543, 544 (1975). In any event, the Court
concluded that the grant of civil jurisdiction under Public
Law 280 was confined to private causes of action. Bryan v.
Itasca, 426 U.S. at 383-385. The scope of state civil
jurisdiction assumed under 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) was also found
to be limited to private causes of action:
"[T]he legislative history of Title IV
makes it difficult to construe §4
jurisdiction acquired pursuant to Title IV
as extending general state civil
regulatory authority, including taxing
power, to govern Indian reservations."
Id. at 387.
See also, Cohen, supra at 363-364; Israel &
Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic
Development, 49 N.D.L. Rev. 267, 290-297 (1973); Attorney
General Opinion No. 82-221. We do not believe enforcement by
a state of its tax collection requirements would be deemed a
private cause of action, and therefore assumption of
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 or 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) would
do nothing to further those goals.
It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court
has not thoroughly discussed the degree or type of civil
jurisdiction necessary to enforce tax collection and record
keeping requirements. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, supra, the Court
found that the state of Washington had validly assumed civil
jurisdiction over the tribes involved. However, the Court did
not appear to make such a finding a prerequisite to the
state's ability to require collection by Indian retailers of
cigarette and sales taxes, the legal incidence of which falls
on the non-member purchaser. 447 U.S. at 164. See
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
446 F.Supp. 1339, 1345 (1978) (the tribes apparently raised
the question of jurisdiction as a separate issue, not
connected with the state's authority to require collection).
Further, since Public Law 280 and 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) do not
authorize state imposition of regulatory or taxing authority
in and of themselves, it would seem to make little difference
whether a state has jurisdiction under these provisions for
such purposes. Finally, the state involved in Moe v.
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra, did not have Public
Law 280 or 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) civil jurisdiction at the time
the case was decided. Montana had attempted to assume
jurisdiction under Public Law 280 in 1966. Mont. Rev.
Code Ann. §§83-802, 83-806 (1966). However, the United States
Supreme Court held that Montana had not properly assumed such
jurisdiction in Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400
U.S. 423, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed. 507 (1971). Montana had done
nothing further to assume jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C.
§1322(a) between 1971 and 1976, the year in which Moe was
decided. See Cohen, supra, at 363, 363, notes 125,
127. The Court of Appeals of Arizona has specifically held
that "[t]he State may tax non-Indians and non-Indian property
within the reservation even though the State has not expressly
assumed jurisdiction over the reservation pursuant to Public
Law 83-280 (18 U.S.C. §1162) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §1360
(1970)." Arizona Department of Revenue v. Hane
Construction Co., Inc., 564 P.2d 932, 934 (Az. 1977).
See also Cohen, supra, at 413-416.
We conclude, therefore, that assumption of civil jurisdiction
under Public Law 280 or 25 U.S.C. §1322(a) is not necessary to
enable the State of Kansas to require Indian retailers to
collect and remit sales and cigarette taxes validly imposed on
non-Indian purchasers.
Having determined that Indian retailers are subject to the
State's sales and cigarette tax collection requirements, a
question remains as to what measures the State can use to
enforce those requirements. As noted above, the United States
Supreme Court has condoned seizure of unstamped cigarettes
en route to reservations even though the cigarettes were as
yet untaxable. Availability of this method of enforcement
becomes questionable if the cigarettes are deemed tribal
property and the tribe has not waived sovereign immunity.
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Board of
Equalization, 492 F.Supp. 55 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in
relevant part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 757 F.2d
1047 (9th Cir. 1985). We do not believe, however, that
these cigarettes would be deemed tribal property, see
Colville, 447 U.S. at 155, and this should not be a
problem when dealing with Indian-owned businesses not directly
connected with a tribal government. See Nevada Attorney
General Opinion No. 89-2.
In conclusion, Indian retailers operating on federally
recognized reservations selling products which have been
imported for sale are subject to the collect and remit
requirements of the State's retailers' sales tax and cigarette
tax acts when the legal incidence of the tax falls on
non-Indian purchasers. The State may enforce such
requirements through methods not involving State court action.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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