Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-073

1988-073Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL May 25, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 73
The Honorable Betty Jo Charlton
State Representative, Forty-Sixth District
1624 Indiana
Lawrence, Kansas 66044
Re: Eminent Domain -- Procedure Act -- Compensation
Synopsis: 1988 House Bill No. 2704, places restraints on the
"property rights" of individuals in order to
promote and protect the well established public
welfare interest of insuring that human remains are
treated properly. In our opinion it clearly
represents a valid exercise of the state's inherent
police power. Therefore, any private individual
claiming ownership of human skeletal remains would
not be entitled to compensation simply because the
state regulation requires relinquishment of the
remains. However, if a claimant convinced the
court that 1988 House Bill No. 2704 operated as an
eminent domain taking of an identifiable property
interest, rather than a valid exercise of police
power, the court could require compensation for any
legally held property interest taken by the
regulation. Valuation of such a property interest
would require consideration of factors set forth in
K.S.A. 26-513(d) and evidence of (1) the fair
market value and condition of the portion of
property at the time of the taking, and (2) the
loss of that value to the legal owner. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 7-103; 12-707; 12-1401; 13-14c01;
14-1007; 15-1001; 15-1014; 17-1302; 19-1015;
19-2901; 19-3106; 21-3512; 21-4112; 21-4115;
21-4214; 22-3902; 26-513; 41-101; 58-2501; 65-901;
65-1701; 65-4127; 73-301; and 80-916.
Dear Representative Charlton:
As Representative for the Forty-Sixth District, you request
our opinion regarding certain legal issues connected with 1988
House Bill No. 2704, known as the Kansas unmarked human burial
and skeletal remains protection act. You specifically ask:
"(I) whether the proposed bill will
operate as a use of police power or
eminent domain as it affects any existing
privately operated public display of human
skeletal remains, and (II) if the bill
operates as use of legislative eminent
domain condemnation, what types or amounts
of compensation might be available to
private citizens operating a public
display of human skeletal remains."
I. No bright line test exists for determining whether a
legislative action constitutes police power or eminent
domain. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed. 2d 130 (1962). Police power is defined
generally as "an authority conferred by the American
constitutional system in the Tenth Amendment, U.S. Const.,
upon the individual states . . . to place restraints on the
personal freedom and property rights of persons for the
protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public convenience and general
prosperity. . . ." Blacks Law Dictionary 1041 (5th ed.
1979). See also Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113
(1986). Eminent domain is "the power to take private property
for public use. . . ." Blacks Law Dictionary 470 (5th ed.
1979). See also, Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. Secretary
of Kansas Department of Transportation, 234 Kan. 121
(1983). The distinction between eminent domain and police
power may be stated as follows:
"Eminent domain takes property because it
is useful to the public, while the police
power regulates the use of property or
impairs rights in property because the
free exercise of these rights is
detrimental to public interest; and the
police power, although it may take
property, does not, as a general rule,
appropriate it to another use, but
destroys the property, while by eminent
domain property is taken from the owner
and transferred to a public agency to be
enjoyed by the latter as its own. Many
statements of the distinction agree to the
effect that in the exercise of eminent
domain private property is taken for
public use and the owner is invariably
entitled to compensation, while the police
power is usually exerted merely to
regulate the use and enjoyment of property
by the owner, or, if he is deprived of his
property outright, it is not taken for
public use, but rather destroyed in order
to promote the general welfare, and in
neither case is the owner entitled to any
compensation for any injury which he may
sustain, for the law considers that either
the injury is damnum absque injuria or the
owner is sufficiently compensated by
sharing in the general benefits resulting
from the exercise of the police power."
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965).
The state's "police power" is a flexible, broad, variable
process of a government intent upon keeping up to date with
all of the public and social needs; thus, what may have once
been allowed by the law may become unlawful. New York State
Thruway Authority v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 210 N.Y.S.
2d 193, 196, 12 A.D.2d 223 (1961). See also Abie State
Bank v. Bryon, 282 U.S. 765, 51 S.Ct. 252, 75 L.Ed. 690
(1930). A state may exercise police power by totally
prohibiting persons within its jurisdiction from engaging in
occupations or businesses that are detrimental to the public
welfare. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law, §857 (1985).
Kansas laws exercise state police power in many areas. See
landlord tenant laws (K.S.A. 58-2501 et seq.); liquor laws
(K.S.A. 41-101 et seq.); drug laws (e.g. K.S.A. 65-4127(a)
and (b), K.S.A. 21-4214); pornography laws (K.S.A. 22-3902
et seq.); prostitution laws (K.S.A. 21-3512 et seq.);
zoning laws (e.g. K.S.A. 19-2901 et seq. and 12-707 et
seq.); licensing and standards pertaining to certain
professions (e.g. attorneys, K.S.A. 7-103 et eta . and
funeral directors, K.S.A. 65-1701 et seq.); and cemetery
laws (K.S.A. 12-1401 et eta ., 17-1302 et seq., 15-1014
et eta . and 73-301 et seq.). These statutes represent
only a sampling of behaviors that Kansas regulates, restricts,
or prohibits pursuant to the state's police power. Many of
these statutes deny possession of certain property or forbid
certain business activities, just as the bill in question
proposes to do. These statutes do not take private property
for public use, nor must the state pay compensation to every
citizen regulated or effected by these laws.
Case law in which state action was held not to rise to the
level of an eminent domain taking requiring compensation
includes: Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. , 108 S.Ct. , 94 L.Ed.2d
472 (1987), Penn. statute requiring coal mine operators to
leave in certain amounts of coal; Griffeth v. Pence, 9
Kan. App. 253 (1900), assessments made to pay for drainage
districts; Kimberlin v. City of Topeka, 238 Kan. 299
(1985), zoning laws restricting building heights and land use;
Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113 (1986), relocation of a
frontage road resulting in less business; Busch v. City of
Augusta, 9 Kan. App. 2d 119 (1983), demolition of
partially burned out privately owned building because it
represented a public safety hazard; and Kirksey v.
Wichita, 103 Kan. 761 (1918), city ordinance providing that
the city could give an exclusive contract to one garbage
collector even though another collector therefore lost use of
and business connected with the garbage. See also 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain 5 1 (1965). Though property may have
been taken and destroyed or its use strictly regulated in
these cases, the governmental action did not rise to the level
of an eminent domain taking, and thus compensation was
unavailable.
Constitutional provisions against taking private property for
public use without just compensation impose no barrier to the
proper exercise of police power. KCPL Co. v. State Corp.
Comm., 238 Kan. 842, appeal dismissed 107 S.Ct. 41, 93
L.Ed.2d 4 (1986). Thus, when a regulation represents a valid
exercise of police power, private individuals who are affected
by the regulation are not entitled to compensation.
The Supreme Court allows police power regulation that
adversely affects the entire value of legally owned private
property. For example, in Mugler v. Kansas, supra, the
Court approved a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of
liquor that made the distiller's brewery of little value, but
did not completely extinguish the value of the building. In
Miller v. Schone, 276 U.S. 272, 72 L.Ed 568 (1927) the
Court upheld a regulation that required an individual to cut
down his cedar trees but allowed the owner to use the felled
trees. The Court held that these state actions constituted
the use of police power for which no compensation was
forthcoming even though a particular private use of legally
owned property was restricted or denied.
In 1987 a divided Supreme Court upheld a judgment in favor of
a Pennsylvania statute that required coal mine operators to
leave a certain amount of coal in the ground for support.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Co. Assoc. v. DeBenedictus, 480
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. , 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987). The Court
stated that the statute did not effectuate a taking but was
rather a proper exercise of state police power. Therefore,
the Court required no compensation payment for the coal the
owners could never remove and sell. The Court based its
conclusion on the strong public purpose and character of the
statute and characterized the owner's possession as a full
"bundle of property rights." "The destruction of one 'strand'
of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety." Id., 94 L.Ed.2d at 498. See
also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62
L.Ed.2d 210 (1979);. Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 80
S.Ct. 1563, 4 L.Ed.2d 1554 (1960); Penn. Central v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 99 S.Ct. 226, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). A
spirited dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
focused on previous case law in which imposition of societal
burdens on individual landowners was allowed only when the
regulation did not entirely destroy essential legal uses of
private property. Keystone 94 L.Ed.2d at 508; See also
Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 56 L.Ed. 102 (1911). In
the dissent Justice Rehnquist stated that under the statute
in question, the coal operator's interest in particular
identifiable segment of property, the coal deposits, had been
completely destroyed. Thus, the dissent thought that
compensation should be required. Note that neither the
dissent nor the majority questioned the ownership of the coal
as such ownership is a legally recognized and permissible
property interest. The ability to own human skeletal remains
does not enjoy such clearly established recognition.
Kansas case law recognizes that "the subject of burial grounds
in general is a legitimate subject of the state's police
power." State ex rel. Stephan v. Lane, 228 Kan. 379, 388
(1980). See also 14 Am. Jur. 2d Cemeteries, § 6
(1964). The plethora of legislation concerning such matters
evidences attempts by the Kansas legislature to regulate
matters affecting the treatment and disposal of human
remains. Existing Kansas laws that regulate, restrict and
prohibit certain behaviors connected with graves and human
remains include: K.S.A. 19-1015 (disposition of the
deceased); K.S.A. 65-901 (disposition of unclaimed dead
bodies); K.S.A. 12-1401 et seq., 17-1302 et seq.,19-3106et	seq., 80-916 et seq., 13-14c01 et seq.,14-1007et	seq. and 15-1001 et seq (cemetery
regulations), and K.S.A. 21-4112 and 21-4115 (criminal
penalties for desecrating remains or cemeteries). Common law
universally and historically recognizes a duty and right to
care for and dispose of human remains. See 22 Am. Jur. 2d
Dead Bodies, § 6 (1965). Disturbance of a final resting
place and removal of remains therefrom are behaviors subject
to the control and direction of the law. 25A C.J.S. Dead
Bodies, § 4 (1966).
House Bill No. 2704 attempts to extend state protections to
all human skeletal remains including those resting in unmarked
graves. The stated purpose of 1988 House Bill No. 2704 is to:
"(1) Provide adequate protection for
unmarked human burial sites and human
remains located on all private or public
lands within the state of Kansas;
(2) prohibit disturbance of unmarked
human burial sites; and
(3) provide procedures for the proper
care and protection of unmarked human
burial sites and skeletal remains found in
the state of Kansas."
Thus, if 1988 House Bill No. 2704 is enacted, all human
skeletal remains will in some way be protected by the state,
not just those remains fortunate enough to be buried under a
marker or in a recognized cemetery.
Although widely divergent in scope and approach, other states
currently use police power to legislate on how human skeletal
remains should be treated: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 70-26 et
seq. (1981) (exhibit or sale of human skeletal remains
prohibited unless connected with biology or medical studies);
Fla. Stat. § 872.05 (1976) (public display of human remains
allowed only if no objection is made by identifiable
descendants or tribe); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 713 § 38 (1984)
(human remains discovered on private property to be
reinterred); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1167, § 1168.1, 1987
Supp. C. 204 § 13 (1987) (a felony to "knowingly buy, sell
or barter for profit human skeletal remains or associated
burial furniture previously buried within the state of
Oklahoma"); and OR. Rev. Stat. §97.740 et seq. (1981)
(persons prohibited from taking, displaying or possessing
native Indian remains or artifacts, unless supervised by the
Indian tribe.) See also Ga. Code Ann. § 305.A 7 (1976);
N.Y. Indian Law § 12a (McKinney Supp. 1973-74); Alaska
Stat. § 41.35.200(c) (1976); Delaware Code Ann. tit. 7, §
5301 (1975); and Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 6-12 (1975).
If enacted, House Bill No. 2704 would require relinquishment
and subsequent reinterment of human skeletal remains taken
from unmarked graves. The remains may be studied for a brief
time, in order to determine their origin, if possible, to
return the remains to any identifiable decedents. Reinterment
is the ultimate goal. Individuals discovering human skeletal
remains do not lose any real property interest; they still own
and may use their land. Moreover, any business connected with
a burial site may still be conducted. The only possessory
"right" that is possibly affected or taken by this bill is the
possession of the human skeletal remains.
In keeping with the language and considerations expressed by
the dissent in Keystone, the remains may arguably represent
an identifiable segment, and thus relinquishment is arguably
compensable. Ownership of dead bodies, however, is not a
universally recognized property interest. See 14 Am. Jur.
2d Cemeteries § 6 (1964). In fact, most legal systems
recognize that the person having charge of a body cannot be
considered the owner of it; he holds it only as a trust for
the benefit of those who may from family relationship or
friendship have an interest in it. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Dead
Bodies § 4 (1965). It may be argued that the antiquity of
some human remains gives rise to an increased public interest
in them, and thus a claim that ownership rights may accrue.
The definition of dead body is "a corpse . . . the body of a
human being, deprived of life." Blacks Law Dictionary 358
(5th ed. 1979). In one criminal grave desecration case, a
state court absolved the defendant of criminal liability for
opening a grave and stated that "a cadaver is not an
everlasting thing, and after it has undergone an undefined
degree of decomposition, it ceases to be a dead body in the
eyes of the law." State v. Glass, 273 N.E. 2d 893 Ohio,
1971. See also Town of Sudbury v. Department of Public
Utilities, 218 N.E. 2d 415 (Mass. 1966). However, a recent
decision by a Louisiana court of appeals held that because
such things were not owned by a mere "discoverer", an amateur
archeologist, who had uncovered human remains and burial
artifacts, had no claim to either. Charrier v. Bell, No.
85-0867, State of Louisiana Court of Appeals First Circuit
(Oct. 15, 1986). Thus, the questionable ability of
individuals to own human remains, combined with the
well-established public welfare purpose served by protecting
all human remains and burial sites, makes it doubtful that a
court would allow a claimant to recover compensation based
upon a claim that a regulation amounted to an eminent domain
taking of the human remains. Moreover, it is interesting to
note that compensation to those who discover such remains in
the future has not been contemplated. If discovery of human
remains on private property gives the land owner or discoverer
ownership rights and remedies as to the remains, compensation
would be contemplated for all such future "takings," not just
to those who have previously discovered such remains.
Any challenge to the act will most likely be an attempt to
characterize the regulation as an eminent domain taking.
Generally, three requirements must be met before eminent
domain powers can be exercised to take private property: (1)
the property taken must be devoted to a public use; (2) there
must be a public need for such a use; and (3) there must be
just compensation paid to the legal owner of the property thus
taken. Mid America Pipe Line Co. v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co., 298 F. Supp. 1112 (Kan. 1969). See
also 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, § 1 (1966), and 29A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain, § 1 (1965).
Particular governmental actions that have been judicially
recognized as exercises of eminent domain taking requiring
compensation include: urban renewal projects, State v.
Kansas City, 179 Kan. 435 (1956); taking water owned by one
citizen to be used by many citizens, Wallace v. Winfield,
98 Kan. 651 (1916); taking privately owned property to be
used as public duck hunting grounds, Ottawa Hunting Assoc.
v. State; 178 Kan. 460, appeal dismissed 352 U.S. 804 77
S.Ct. 31, 1 L.Ed. 2d 38 (1955); taking privately owned
property for the establishment of public streets and highways,
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 262 U.S. 700
(1922); taking land for public parks, U.S. ex rel. Tenn.
Val. Authority v. Welch, N.C., 327 U.S. 546 (1945);
taking or using private land for flood control and soil
conservation purposes, U.S. v. 21,250 Acres of Land, More or
Less, Situated in Catvaraugus County, 161 F. Supp. 376
(N.Y. 1957); and temporarily using cemetery land in order to
make bore tests on the feasibility of a tunnel under the
cemetery, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v.
One Parcel of Land, 514 F.2d 1350 (1975). Note that these
cases all represent takings of one particular or certain
single piece of private property for public use and
enjoyment. They do not regulate or affect all of a similarly
situated type of property in the state. Additionally, the
governmental action in these cases resulted in the public
using the confiscated property. House Bill No. 2704 seeks to
reinter the human remains, not let the general public or a
public agency use them. This type of protective regulation
a fortiori represents a classic use of police power.
Eminent domain takes private property for public use. Police
power exerts control over the use and enjoyment of private
property. Even assuming arguendo that a private landowner can
establish a claim of legal ownership of human bones discovered
buried on his land, police power allows the state to regulate
or even forbid certain uses of privately owned property in
order to promote the general welfare of the public (e.g.
once enacted, gun laws prohibiting private possession of
certain weapons often require the forbidden guns to be turned
over or destroyed). No one individual will be affected
differently by the proposed law; all human remains buried in
unmarked graves would henceforth be treated in the same manner
without regard to who discovers them or where they are
buried. The state will not appropriate the remains to be
publicly used in a manner that a private individual is
forbidden to engage in. Furthermore, the property owner may
still use his land for every other legal purpose.
Human remains buried in a known cemetery or under a marker are
already protected. See K.S.A. 21-4112 and 21-4115. In
order to promote uniformity of respect given to all human
remains, House Bill No. 2704 merely extends state regulations
to provide similar protections to human remains resting in
unmarked graves. Therefore, it is our opinion House Bill No.
2704 obviously represents a valid exercise of the state's
inherent police power to place restraints on the behavior and
property of persons in order to promote and protect the well
established public welfare interest served by insuring that
all human remains are treated properly. Thus, any private
individual affected by such regulation because they currently
possess human remains, or may find such remains in the future,
would not be entitled to compensation.
II. When a state regulation operates as a use of
legislative eminent domain, the valuation of the property
"taken" or "used" depends upon many factors. See K.S.A.
26-513(d). If a private claimant convinces a court that there
has been an eminent domain taking of a possessory interest,
the state must generally pay the legal property owner the fair
market value of the property taken. United States v. 100
Acres of Land, 468 F. 2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822, 94 S.Ct. 119, 38 L.Ed. 54, (1973);
U.S. v. Osborne County, Kansas, 478 F. 2d 484 (10th Cir.
1973), appeal after remand, 527 F. 2d 1000 (10th Cir.
1976). See also Comment, 27 WLJ 82, "Constitutional
Law: Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause Supports Damage
Award for Temporary Regualtory Taking." (1987). The owner
is entitled to the fair market value of his property at the
time of taking. This value is normally ascertained from what
a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller.
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. U.S., 409 U.S.
470, 474, 43 S.Ct. 791, 35 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973). In fixing market
values, courts and juries may also consider the highest and
best use to which the property may be put. United States v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 538 F. 2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1976). When
there are no known sales of comparable property it is
difficult to arrive at a true valuation.
The value of land taken by eminent domain is always a matter
of opinion and may be proved by opinion evidence. Mai v.
City of Garden City, 177 Kan. 179 (1954). A property owner
may put before a court all evidence necessary to determine the
value of property. Board of park Commissioners v. Fitch,
184 Kan. 508 (1959); Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike
Authority, 183 Kan. 774 (1958). As a general rule, proof
must be limited to showing the present condition of the
property and uses to which it is naturally adapted. 27 Am.
Jur. 2d Eminent Domain, § 435 (1966). In appraising
appropriated land, the fundamental question asks what the
owner has lost, not what the taker has gained. St. Agnes
Cemetery v. N.Y., 163 NYS 2d 655 (1957).
In the case of House Bill No. 2704, the state does not propose
a taking of real property. The only physical taking would be
of the skeletal remains. An individual is not required to
give up anything else. Before compensation becomes available
the party seeking it must establish that they have a legally
held property interest or right that has been impaired or
destroyed. Riddle.v. State Highway Commission, 184 Kan.
603 (1959); see also Small v. Kemp, 240 Kan. 113
(1986). As previously discussed, some question exists as to
the ability of an individual to own human remains. If no
possessory interest in the skeletal remains can be
established, compensation will not be required to be paid for
those remains.
Some individuals may claim that the required relinquishment of
the remains adversely affects the value of their burial site
business and real property.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the
government has considerable latitude in regulating property
rights in ways that may adversely affect the owners. Hodel
v. Irving, 481 U.S. , 107 S.Ct. , 95 L.Ed.2d,
668, 678 (1987). Pursuant to enactment of House Bill No. 2704
an individual may claim a loss of an economic benefit or a
diminished property value because of the loss of the remains.
Lost economic business benefits would be those that would have
otherwise vested in the future. Damage measurement rules
state that in order for future profits to be recoverable there
must be reasonable proof of their amount. Future profit
cannot be awarded when it is speculative, contingent or
uncertain. 25 C.J.S. Damages, § 90 (1966). If the proposed
regulation is passed, private displays of human remains would
be illegal in the future. If compensation for lost revenue
was available every time a government prohibited certain
business activities, it could give rise to suits by every
individual who might have otherwise chosen to go into such
professions as prostitution or pornography. Additionally,
this bill does not prohibit the business in toto; merely
the display of human remains, thus mitigating any loss of
business. This possible adverse affect on business profits
can be analogized to claims by bookstore owners that a loss of
forbidden pornographic materials adversely affects their
business. Loss of revenue due to police power regulation or
action is not compensable. See Small v. Kemp, 240
Kan. 113 (1986).
Diminution in real property value caused by forfeiture of the
human remains could be another impact for which compensation
might be claimed. A claim that the real property value is
adversely affected by requiring relinquishment of the human
skeletal remains would require evidence of the fair market
value of the land with and without the remains. Pursuant to
the regulation in question, the individual property owner may
continue all legal. uses of his property, including any
business connected with the fact that the property once
contained human remains. Furthermore, the property without
the remains could be used for other purposes, such as farming,
which would cause the fair market value to actually increase.
Language contained in many Supreme Court decisions, such as
Musler, Keystone and Pennsylvania Central, also makes
it questionable whether potential loss of business or
potential diminuation of property value is a sufficiently
distinguishable "identifiable segment" of the bundle of
property rights. Thus, even assuming an individual could
convince a court that this regulation constituted an eminent
domain taking, valuation of interests arguably taken would be
very difficult to establish and possibly too speculative or
nondistinct to award.
In summary, the state has considerable latitude in regulating
property rights in ways that adversely affect the owners. As
stated in issue I, we believe that 1988 House Bill No. 2704
clearly operates as a valid exercise of police power, for
which no compensation is necessary or available. However, if
a claimant could convince the court that a regulation amounts
to a taking, just compensation would be required. When an
eminent domain taking has been established by the individual
claiming compensation, the state must generally pay the owner
the fair market value of any legally held property interest
that has been taken. That value may be established by
offering evidence as to factors set forth in K.S.A. 26-513(d)
which can be summarized as proof of (1) the value and
condition of the interest at the time of the taking and (2)
the loss of that value to the owner.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
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