Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-069

1988-069Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL May 17, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 69
The Honorable Bill Graves
Secretary of State
2nd Floor, State Capitol
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1594
Re: Corporations -- Agricultural Corporations --
Limitations; Exceptions -- Acquiring by Process of
Law
Synopsis: If a corporation is a creditor of a party owning
agricultural land, the corporation may acquire the
land by the debtor's voluntary surrender of title
if the land is subject to a lien or claim of the
corporation. If a debt does not involve a lien or
claim on the land, then collection of the debt by
voluntary surrender of title may not be used to
vest title in the corporation. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 17-5904.
Dear Secretary Graves:
As Secretary of State, you have requested our opinion
concerning agricultural corporations. Specifically, you have
inquired whether a corporation may acquire agricultural land
by accepting a deed given in satisfaction of debt or in lieu
of foreclosure of a lien.
Corporate ownership of agricultural land is generally
prohibited by K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 17-5904(a), subject to
several exceptions found within that subsection. Of
particular interest to your inquiry is paragraph four, which
states in relevant part:
"[the restrictions provided do not apply
to] [a]gricultural land acquired by a
corporation by process of law in the
collection of debts . . . or by any
procedure for the enforcement of a lien or
claim thereon, whether created by mortgage
or otherwise, if such corporation divests
itself of any such agricultural land
within 10 years after such process of law,
contract [for deed] or procedure. . . ."
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 17-5904(a)(4).
The issue therefore is whether acceptance of a deed in
satisfaction of a debt or in lieu of foreclosure is an
acquisition by process of law or a procedure for enforcement
of a lien or claim on the land.
The terms "process of law" and "procedure for enforcement" are
not defined by the agricultural corporation act. We have
previously opined that a corporation may acquire agricultural
land which is subject to a contract for deed through
foreclosure on the seller's interest pledged as security for
a separate loan, but not through a program of purchasing a
seller's interests in contracts for deed. Attorney General
Opinion No. 83-182. While in reaching that conclusion it was
not necessary to define with precision the process or
procedure involved, it is clear from the language of K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 17-5904(a)(4) that legal or equitable title to
agricultural land must be acquired by some process or
procedure in order for the exception to apply.
"Process of law" is the grammatical equivalent of "legal
process." The phrase "legal process" was discussed in
Robbins-Leavenworth Floor Covering, Inc. v. Leavenworth
National Bank & Trust Co., 229 Kan. 511 (1981). In that
case, the court stated that the process means "a warrant,
writ, order, mandate, or other formal writing, issued by some
court, body, or official having authority to issue process,
and legal process means process not merely fair on its face,
but in fact valid." 229 Kan. at 515. The court then held
that legal process does not include a voluntary surrender of
property "carried on wholly outside of court . . . without the
aid of its process or decree [citation omitted]." 229 Kan.
at 516. In light of Robbins, we believe that when the
relationship between a corporation and a landowner involves a
debt not rising to the level of a lien or claim on
agricultural land, then a voluntary transfer of the property
in satisfaction of the debt does not satisfy the exception to
corporate ownership of agricultural land provided in K.S.A.
1987 Supp. 17-5904(a)(4).
In comparison, the term "procedure" refers to the mode of
enforcing substantive rights and duties. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464, 14 L.Ed.2d 8, 13 (1965); Board
of Greenwood County Comm'rs v. Nadel, 228 Kan. 469,
475 (1980). Settlements of claims to avoid litigation have
long been favored in the law. E.g. Kennedy v. City of
Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 461 (1980). We believe that a
settlement, in the form of transferring a deed to land,
furthering the enforcement of a lien or claim, may satisfy the
statutory requirement. The distinction between the differing
requirements for official involvement appears on the face of
the statute in question. The legislature obviously placed
different mandates on different situations. When only a debt
is involved which does not rise to a lien or claim on the
land, more formalities are required. However, when the
agricultural land is already subject to a lien or claim, the
statute indicates that any procedure for enforcing the lien or
claim is sufficient.
Our opinion is not inconsistent with Attorney General Opinion
No. 83-182. Purchasing a seller's interest in a contract for
deed is distinguishable from acquiring title to agricultural
land in satisfaction of an existing lien or claim on the
property. In the former situation, legal title is acquired as
an outright purchase of the seller's interest. We opined that
this outright purchase does not involve a bona fide
encumbrance taken for security as allowed by K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 17-5904(a)(1). Rather, the corporation holds legal
title until the purchaser under the contract fulfills the
terms of the contract, at which time such legal title vests in
the purchaser. Thus, subsequent events will determine in whom
title vests. In the latter case, neither legal nor equitable
title vests in the corporation except in satisfaction of a
lien or claim, regardless of whether the vesting of title
occurs as a result of a formal proceeding or a settlement in
avoidance of a formal proceeding. In opinion no. 83-182, we
noted that if a seller under the contract pledged to a
corporation the interest in the contract as security for a
separate loan, then the corporation could foreclose on that
interest. These situations fit the language of K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 17-5904(a)(4). They are grounded in the assumption
that a bona fide encumbrance exists, whether taken as security
as allowed by K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 17-5904(a)(1), or taken
pursuant to other lawful means. Regardless, the interest is
attached to the land. A mere debt does not involve a bona
fide encumbrance without further process of law.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that if a corporation is a
creditor of a party owning agricultural land, the corporation
may acquire the land by the debtor's voluntary surrender of
title if the land is subject to a lien or claim of the
corporation. If a debt does not involve a lien or claim on
the land, then collection of the debt by voluntary surrender
of title may not be used to vest title in the corporation.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Mark W. Stafford
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:MWS:jm

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