Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-041

1988-041Kanag

Testo completo

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 24, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 41
Tom Hanna
Director
Alcoholic Beverage Control Division
Kansas Department of Revenue
700 Jackson Street, Jayhawk Tower
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Intoxicating Liquors and Beverages--Bonded
Warehouses and Related Provisions--Exclusive
Territorial Franchises; Termination or Modification
of Franchise
Synopsis: Change of ownership of a brand at the supplier's
level does not, in and of itself, constitute
"reasonable cause" for a supplier to terminate a
franchise agreement pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
41-410 of the liquor control act. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16-1201; 16-1203; 41-410; L.
1979, ch. 153, §3.
*
Dear Director Hanna:
You request our opinion regarding franchising in the liquor
industry in Kansas. Specifically, you question whether the
acquisition of one supplier by another, or the change of
ownership of a liquor brand at the supplier's level, would
constitute "reasonable cause" for the supplier who acquires
the rights to a brand to terminate and reassign the franchise
agreement that existed at the time of the acquisition. You
advise us that your predecessor issued a memorandum in May of
1987 indicating that since Kansas has a "brand franchise law,"
a supplier who acquires a brand of liquor does so subject to
the original brand owner's previously granted franchise. You
thus question the validity of the opinion expressed in that
memorandum.
The Kansas liquor control act, K.S.A. 41-101 et seq.,
contains a provision dealing with the establishment and
termination of franchise agreements. K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 41-410
provides that "[n]o manufacturer, importer or other supplier
shall grant a franchise for the distribution of a brand to
more than one distributor for all or part of any designated
territory," and that "[n]o franchise agreement for the
distribution of a brand of alcoholic liquor or cereal malt
beverage shall be terminated . . . except for reasonable
cause." "Reasonable cause" is not defined for purposes of
this section, and we are thus left to determine how the courts
will define "reasonable cause."
The first rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature. State v. Ashley, 236 Kan.
551 (1985). The historical background, legislative
proceedings and changes made in a statute during the course of
its enactment may be considered in determining legislative
intent. Hulme v. Woleslagel, 208 Kan. 385 (1972);
Ropfogel v. Enegren, 7 Kan. App. 2d 644 (1982).
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 41-410 was originally enacted as a part of
1979 House Bill No. 2020. It was amended into House Bill No.
2020 by the Committee of the Whole Senate on March 22, 1979
and at that time provided in pertinent part as follows:
"New Sec. 3. (1) No distributor of
alcoholic liquor, except beer, shall sell
any alcoholic liquor in this state unless
such distributor has filed with the
director a written notice stating each
geographic territory, agreed upon by
written agreement between the distributor
and a supplier of the distributor, within
which the distributor distributes to
retailers, one or more brands of such
supplier. There shall also be filed with
such notice a verified copy of each such
written agreement between the distributor
and a supplier. Such agreements shall
constitute franchises for the distribution
of the specified brand or brands within
the territory designated. No
manufacturer, importer or other supplier
shall grant a franchise for the
distribution of a brand to more than one
distributor for all or part of any
designated territory. No manufacturer,
importer or other supplier shall sell any
brand of alcoholic liquor to any licensees
in this state except to a licensed
distributor having a franchise to
distribute such brand as provided herein.
"(2) Except for good cause, no franchise
for the distribution of a brand shall be
terminated or modified nor shall the
designated territory be altered without
the written consent of the distributor and
the manufacturer, importer or other
supplier involved. If a manufacturer,
importer or other supplier wishes to
terminate or modify a franchise or to
alter the designated territory without the
consent of the distributor, such
manufacturer, importer or supplier shall
give written notice to the distributor and
the director by certified mail. . . . If
[after a hearing] the director determines
that the termination, modification or
alteration is being proposed in good faith
and that good cause exists, the director
shall enter an order authorizing the
supplier to proceed with the proposed
termination, modification or alteration
not less than thirty (30) days after the
entry of the order or at such earlier date
as specified in the order. If the
director finds that the termination,
modification or alteration is not being
proposed in good faith or that good cause
does not exist, the director shall enter
an order prohibiting the proposed
termination, modification or alteration.
"(5) As used in this section, 'good faith'
means the duty of each party to any
franchise, and all officers, employees or
agents thereof, to act in a fair and
equitable manner towards each other, and
'good cause' means: (a) Failure of the
distributor to comply substantially with
the provisions of this franchise law; or
(b) use of bad faith or failure to observe
reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade; or (c) failure of
the distributor to reasonably efficiently
represent the supplier in the distribution
of the brands of the supplier. . . ."
1979 Senate Journal 404, 405.
Prior to its final enactment, this provision was amended into
its substantially current form, thus making the termination
provisions more mutual, doing away with the administrative
procedure for determining "good faith" and "good cause," and
eliminating the definitions of those terms. See L. 1979,
ch. 153, §3.
While the above-quoted definition of "good cause" for
termination of a franchise agreement was eventually eliminated
from the statutory language and the term was changed from
"good cause" to "reasonable cause," we believe the above
definition provides an excellent indication of what the
legislature intended "reasonable cause" to encompass. We
believe the definitions were removed in accordance with the
amendments making the termination provisions more mutual, and
to avoid having such a narrow definition as to prohibit a
finding of good cause simply because the activity or reason in
question was not specifically listed as good cause for
termination.
Further evidence of legislative intent may be drawn from the
general purpose of franchise termination regulations. In H &
R Block, Inc. v. Lovelace, 208 Kan. 538 (1972) the Kansas
Supreme Court adopted the following definition of a franchise:
"In its simplest terms a franchise is a
license from the owner of a trademark or
trade name permitting another to sell a
product or service under that name or
mark. More broadly stated, the franchise
has evolved into an elaborate agreement
under which the franchisee undertakes to
conduct a business or sell a product or
service in accordance with methods and
procedures prescribed by the franchisor
and the franchisor undertakes to assist
the franchisee through advertising,
promotion and other advisory service. The
franchise may encompass an exclusive right
to sell the product in a specified
territory (see 15 Business Organizations,
Glickman, Franchising, §2.01)." 208
Kan. at 545.
Thus, both parties to the franchise agreement have significant
investments in the relationship: the franchisee (distributor)
in time and money; the franchisor (supplier) in reputation and
brand. Historically, because of the disparity in the
bargaining power of the parties, franchisors have drafted
contracts permitting them to terminate franchises at will or
for a variety of reasons including failure to comply with
unreasonable conditions, often leaving franchisees with
nothing in return for their investment. See Westfield
Centre Service, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 432 A.2d
48, 53 (N.J. 1981) and authorities cited therein. States have
thus sought to regulate the termination of franchise
agreements to prevent such unfairness and to even-up the
bargaining powers. Generally, the idea is "to protect the
franchisee from undue usurpation of his franchise while yet
allowing franchisor to protect its trade name, trademark and
good will interests in the franchise agreement." Westfield
Centre Service, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 386 A.2d
448, 457 (N.J. 1978), citing Amerada Hess Corp. v.
Quinn, 362 A.2d 1258 (N.J. 1976). While some courts have
held that good faith and bona fide business judgments are
sufficient to constitute good cause to terminate a franchise
agreement, see, e.g., American Mart Corp. v. Jospeh E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 824 F.2d 733, 734 (9th Cir.
1987), based upon the above-cited reasons for regulating
franchise terminations we are more inclined to agree with
authorities who believe good faith business decisions alone
are inadequate to permit terminations which must be for "good
cause." The goals sought through regulation are not met if a
franchisor is able to terminate an agreement on the sole basis
that it is believed to be good for business. See, e.g.,
Gellhorn, "Limitations on Contract Termination Rights -
Franchise Cancellations," 1967 Duke L.J. 465, 504-505; Note,
74 Colum L. Rev. 1487, 1493 (1974); Westfield, 386
A.2d at 459; C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long
Manufacturing Co., 148 N.W.2d 425 (Iowa 1967).
Finally, in construing statutes, courts may take into
consideration other statutory enactments on the same or
similar subject which might shed light on legislative intent.
State v. Roudybush, 235 Kan. 834 (1984). The Kansas
agricultural equipment dealership act, K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
16-1201 et seq ., provides that no farm equipment
manufacturer may "terminate, cancel, fail to renew or
substantially change the competitive circumstances of a
dealership agreement without good cause." K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
16-1203. The purpose of the act, stated at K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
16-1201, is "to prevent arbitrary or abusive conduct and to
preserve and enhance the reasonable expectations for success
in the business of distributing farm equipment." "Good cause"
is defined in this act as:
"[T]he failure by a farm equipment dealer
to substantially comply with essential and
reasonable requirements imposed upon the
dealer by the dealership agreement,
provided such requirements are not
different from those requirements imposed
on other similarly situated dealers either
by their terms or in the manner of their
enforcement." K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16-1203
In addition, the definition lists nine specific "good causes"
for termination, including change of ownership of the dealer
without consent of the manufacturer, dealer's bankruptcy,
change of dealership location without consent, dealer's
default on a security agreement between the parties, failure
of the dealer to operate for seven consecutive days, dealer's
conviction of a felony affecting the relationship, dealer's
engaging in conduct detrimental to its customers and the
public welfare, and the dealer's failure to meet reasonable
market penetration requirements. In that the subject matter,
purpose and language of this act appear similar to that of
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 41-410, it is our opinion that the
definition of "good cause" in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 16-1203 may be
instrumental in determining the definition of "reasonable
cause" as that term is used in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 41-410. Also
persuasive are several cases from other jurisdictions which
define or state a statutory definition of "good cause" for
terminating various types of franchise agreements as some
failure on the part of the franchisee to comply with his
obligations under the agreement or to adequately represent the
franchisor's business interest. Consumers Oil Corp. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 F.2d 816, 818 (3d Cir. 1973)
(citing N.J. Stat. Anno. §56:10-5); DeMoss v. Kelly
Services, Inc., 493 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1974);
Kealey Pharmacy & Home Care Service, Inc. v. Walgreen
Co., 539 F.Supp. 1357, 1364 (W.D. Wis. 1982) [citing Wis.
Stats. §135.03 (1977)); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307
A.2d 578 (N.J. 1973); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196, 218 (1968).
Given the general legislative intent behind establishing
termination restrictions on franchise agreements and that this
intent appears to be the basis for enacting K.S.A. 1987 Supp.
41-410, it is our opinion that the mere change of ownership of
a brand at the supplier's level would not constitute
"reasonable cause" for termination of the franchise agreement
to distribute that brand.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.